Connect with us

International

Saving Jobs Won’t Save Us From Jaws

Mario Draghi’s sunset retirement festivities weren’t supposed to have gone off this way. Celebrated for his July 2012 “promise” to save the euro, he instead spent the entirety of his eight years as President of the ECB chasing inflation and recovery,…

Published

on

Mario Draghi’s sunset retirement festivities weren’t supposed to have gone off this way. Celebrated for his July 2012 “promise” to save the euro, he instead spent the entirety of his eight years as President of the ECB chasing inflation and recovery, the very things meant to accomplish the euro’s saving, without success. By the end, his final act in September 2019 was to restart QE all over again, putting him like Europe right back at the start.

It’s why, when it comes to “stimulus” like QE, the goalposts must always be moved. Such “massive” monetary “accommodation” in theory produced so little in economic reality it’s judged mostly by the jobs the program allegedly “saves.” This is true everywhere it’s ever been tried, which is pretty much the entire planet. In other words, Economists think it worked, but because it didn’t, they suspiciously carve out a slice just underneath and claim that surely without QE or its ilk, as bad as things are, they would’ve been even worse.

So when the ECB went back to QE in September last year with the whole global economy facing another “unexpected” downturn, it was a ridiculous proposition. Europe as a whole had been shuffled in the recessionary direction the entire time QE had been in place during 2018. What real difference would restarting it make?

As I wrote at the time, the Jaws analogy seemed appropriate:

What must the angry class of Europeans think? This is “their” big solution, the establishment will reward and promote the person who has been the face of the biggest financial disaster in the IMF’s history. And her first semi-official act is to, channeling fictional Amity Island’s fictional police chief Martin Brody, recoil in horror at the size and danger of the economic shark circling their shared vessel and plead with European authorities for a bigger boat.


Always more. Why? Because it never works, Europe’s pre-COVID slide right into recession another proof for this fact. September 2019’s QE restart did nothing to prevent the ultimate contraction.



Having suffered amplified pressures from shutdowns related to overreacting to COVID, things are, obviously, materially worse now than last year around this same time. And yet, what are European officials offering in the wake of even more devastating economic losses? Not even a bigger boat.

That’s the thing about QE’s; they are supposed to dazzle you with particularly their size. But if you shift your viewpoint sideways just a little, you witness how from any other perspective the boat’s not any bigger at all. It’s all an illusion.

Christine Lagarde’s ECB, the face of the IMF’s biggest financial disaster (Argentina 2018), has put the central bank’s figurative foot to the even more figurative pedal. As of the latest weekly figures, Europe’s central bank has created €2.91 trillion in bank reserves posted to the official “current” account in addition to the €594 billion stuck in the “deposit” account punishing (NIRP) banks doing QE business with it.

Those bank reserve balances derive from the purchase activity (asset swap, not money printing) of the ECB’s two major QE-type programs, the PSPP (the original QE begun in April 2015) and the new-ish PEPP (the pandemic response version begun earlier this year). The first has purchased a net €2.3 trillion in bonds while the latter has bumped just shy of €700 billion.

No matter what size, doing more QE or the like is the same boat too small to successfully wrestle Bruce from eating the vessel’s human contents. The ECB, like Chief Brody, is hoping for a one-in-a-billion deus ex machina to save Europe; only there aren’t any volatile oxygen containers conveniently placed perfect so as to drop right in and stick within the shark’s gaping mouth-hole. Until its stumbling, bumbling policymakers discover this, well, there’ll be plenty of jobs to save in the meantime.




None of this stuff works: flash estimates for European inflation are still some of the worst on record even given those figures cited above. Core inflation, the harmonized rate excluding food, energy, and tobacco prices, has been pinned at the lowest on record for three straight months now.

But this isn’t merely a European disaster; that much even the Europeans are quite normalized to. Instead, after having suffered greatly with a pre-COVID downturn and then a post-shutdown calamity, Economists worldwide tell us that this “jobs saved” business has been somehow “vindicated.” Seriously:

Governments have been vindicated in the support they provided to shield people and firms. With rock-bottom interest rates expected to persist, governments can and need to sustain it to prevent long-term scarring effects of this crisis. The economic consequences will be with us for years to come. Governments must address decisively the effects on the most vulnerable, especially children and the young.

Those were the words of the OECD’s Chief Economist Laurence Boone who, in that organization’s latest update to its forward-looking estimates, tells us that we’re in very bad shape next year and beyond.

And, quite naturally, the way Boone and the OECD frame this sobering warning is with the schizophrenic ravings of madmen:




It’s insufferable to the point of open dissonance; especially when you consider the OECD’s main economic message, delivered in a dose of hard numbers (below), isn’t anything like “hope.” Estimates for economic growth next year were just substantially lowered, but even that isn’t the main problem.

The real shark here is that even in the best scenario conjured up by these models, the global economy does not recover. Let me repeat that again: the global economy is not expected to recover.

Hope sounds (and appears) quite a bit different in this context even though it supposedly shares the same context:

Despite the huge policy band-aid, and even in an upside scenario, the pandemic will have damaged the socio-economic fabric of countries worldwide. Output is projected to remain around 5% below pre-crisis expectations in many countries in 2022, raising the spectre of substantial permanent costs from the pandemic. The most vulnerable will continue to suffer disproportionately. Smaller firms and entrepreneurs are more likely to go out of business. Many low wage earners have lost their jobs and are only covered by unemployment insurance, at best, with poor prospects of finding new jobs soon.





This is the same guy! Those words are taken from the same booklet as the “hope” cover shown above! We’re gonna need a bigger boat, alright. 

Not so, says the QE-clan. They’ll just save some more jobs and call it a day. Like the first and second times we did this (2008 and 2012), ¯_(ツ)_/¯. What do they care if the economy ever really recovers? They always fail upward; Christine hardly the lone outlier.

Chock full of past QE’s and fiscal band-aids, the forward outlook in almost every major economy is (below) below trend growth anyway. In most cases, the OECD’s leading indicators were in October 2020 still among the lowest in each series – including the one for the US.

The world got overexcited in the first few months of reopening, swallowing the gigantic positives that it quite necessarily created as if meaningfully more than those numbers represented. These were extrapolated wildly into fantasies of a quick and easy full-blown “V”-shaped recovery. Worse, the extrapolations were largely predicated on the view of “stimulus” being so much more effective than saving a few jobs.



People really believed stimulus would, you know, stimulate.

But now that we need more “stimulus”, the “stimulus” providers are flat-out admitting to you that it won’t lead to recovery; again, shark’s just too damn huge. There are no bigger boats, the central bank marina only carries the clearly insufficient members of the one class.

The implications are not strictly economic in nature, nor will they be limited to Europe’s cobbled jurisdictions. This is right where the lack of “stimulus” being anything real and tangible leaves for everyone to ponder the same sorts of problems as we’ve seen countless times before, including March 2020. Low bond yields resisting the overwhelming inflation-is-guaranteed narrative are looking instead in this direction:

The toll on the economy could be severe, in turn raising the risk of financial turmoil from fragile sovereigns and corporates, with global spillovers. [emphasis added]

That was Boone’s way of saying the vaccine better work and work so well that we reach the OECD’s “upside scenario.” If it doesn’t, spillovers in corporate bond markets, well, you remember March.

But that’s the thing he doesn’t necessarily consider, nor, apparently, does anyone currently euphoric over the next round of “stimulus” (such as today in the US). The amount of economic damage even at the OECD’s upside is enough to create all sorts of self-reinforcing problems at a monetary level (repo). If not like March 2020, then in many ways similar to what happened in 2011-12 (global dollar shortage in ’11, full extent of economic damage not fully appreciated until later in ’12).

When the best case is truly a worse case, we can’t afford to sit around waiting for the only answers to be more “jobs saved.” We don’t need a bigger boat, or even a different boat. We need to get the global economy the hell out of the water filled with all these Bruces. This, as we’ve seen for thirteen years, is simply beyond the comprehension and therefore capabilities of the current sorry cohort of global officialdom.

The same “authorities” who dare sell you hope as if it could ever be the same thing as a global economy that never recovers.

Exposure of UK's Wind Power's Crippling Costs sees Britain's “Greenblob”  Turn to Doublethink & Doublespeak | STOP THESE THINGS

Read More

Continue Reading

International

Financial Stress Continues to Recede

Overview: Financial stress continues to recede. The Topix bank index is up for the second consecutive session and the Stoxx 600 bank index is recovering…

Published

on

Overview: Financial stress continues to recede. The Topix bank index is up for the second consecutive session and the Stoxx 600 bank index is recovering for the third session. The AT1 ETF is trying to snap a four-day decline. The KBW US bank index rose for the third consecutive session yesterday. More broadly equity markets are rallying. The advance in the Asia Pacific was led by tech companies following Alibaba's re-organization announcement. The Hang Seng rose by over 2% and the index of mainland shares rose by 2.2%. Europe's Stoxx 600 is up nearly 1% and US index futures are up almost the same. Benchmark 10-year yields are mostly 1-3 bp softer in Europe and the US.

The dollar is mixed. The Swiss franc is leading the advancers (~+0.3%) while euro, sterling and the Canadian dollar are posting small gains. The Japanese yen is the weakest of the majors (~-0.6%). The antipodeans and Scandis are also softer. A larger than expected decline in Australia's monthly CPI underscores the likelihood that central bank joins the Bank of Canada in pausing monetary policy when it meets next week. Most emerging market currencies are also firmer today, and the JP Morgan Emerging Market Currency Index is higher for the third consecutive session. Gold is softer within yesterday's $1949-$1975 range. The unexpectedly large drop in US oil inventories (~6 mln barrels according to report of API's estimate, which if confirmed by the EIA later today would be the largest drawdown in four months) is helping May WTI extend its gains above $74 a barrel. Recall that it had fallen below $65 at the start of last week.

Asia Pacific

The US dollar is knocking on the upper end of its band against the Hong Kong dollar, raising the prospect of intervention by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. It appears to be driven by the wide rate differential between Hong Kong and dollar rates (~3.20% vs. ~4.85%). Although the HKMA tracks the Fed's rate increases, the key is not official rates but bank rates, and the large banks have not fully passed the increase. Reports suggest some of the global banks operating locally have raised rates a fraction of what HKMA has delivered. The root of the problem is not a weakness but a strength. Hong Kong has seen an inflow of portfolio and speculative capital seeking opportunities to benefit from the mainland's re-opening.  Of course, from time-to-time some speculators short the Hong Kong dollar on ideas that the peg will break. It is an inexpensive wager. In fact, it is the carry trade. One is paid well to be long the US dollar. Pressure will remain until this consideration changes. Eventually, the one-country two-currencies will eventually end, but it does not mean it will today or tomorrow. As recently as last month, the HKMA demonstrated its commitment to the peg by intervening. Pressure on the peg has been experienced since last May and in this bout, the HKMA has spent around HKD280 defending it (~$35 bln).

The US and Japan struck a deal on critical minerals, but the key issue is whether it will be sufficient to satisfy the American congress that the executive agreement is sufficient to benefit from the tax- credits embodied in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration is negotiating a similar agreement with the EU. The problem is that some lawmakers, including Senator Manchin, have pushed back that it violates the legislature's intent on the restrictions of the tax credit. Manchin previously threatened legislation that would force the issue. The US Trade Representative Office can strike a deal for a specific sector without approval of Congress, but that specific sector deal (critical minerals) cannot then meet the threshold of a free-trade agreement to secure the tax incentives. 

The Japanese yen is the weakest of the major currencies today, dragged lower by the nearly 20 bp rise in US 10-year yields this week and the end of the fiscal year related flows. Some dollar buying may have been related to the expirations of a $615 mln option today at JPY131.75. The greenback tested the JPY130.40 support we identified yesterday and rebounded to briefly trade above JPY132.00 today, a five-day high.  However, the session high may be in place and support now is seen in the JPY131.30-50 band. Softer than expected Australian monthly CPI (6.8% vs. 7.4% in January and 7.2% median forecast in Bloomberg's survey) reinforced ideas that the central bank will pause its rate hike cycle next week. The Australian dollar settled near session highs above $0.6700 in North America yesterday and made a margin new high before being sold. It reached a low slightly ahead of $0.6660 in early European turnover. The immediate selling pressure looks exhausted and a bounce toward $0.6680-90 looks likely. On the downside, note that there are options for A$680 mln that expire today at $0.6650. In line with the developments in the Asia Pacific session today, the US dollar is firmer against the Chinese yuan. However, it held below the high seen on Monday (~CNY6.8935). The dollar's reference rate was set at CNY6.8771, a bit lower than the median projection in Bloomberg's forecast (~CNY6.8788). The sharp decline in the overnight repo to its lowest since early January reflect the liquidity provisions by the central bank into the quarter-end.

Europe

Reports suggest regulators are finding that one roughly 5 mln euro trade on Deutsche Bank's credit-default swaps last Friday, was the likely trigger of the debacle. The bank's market cap fell by1.6 bln euros and billions more off the bank share indices. Then there is the US Treasury market, where the measure of volatility (MOVE) has softened slightly from last week when it rose to the highest level since the Great Financial Crisis. While the wide intraday ranges of the US two-year note have been noted, less appreciated are the large swings in the German two-year yield. Before today, last session with less than a 10 bp range was March 8. In the dozen sessions since, the yield has an average daily range of around 27 bp. The rapid changes and opaque liquidity in some markets leading to dramatic moves challenges the price discovery process. The speed of movement seems to have accelerated, and reports that Silicon Valley Bank lost $40 bln of deposits in a single day.

Italy's Meloni government will tap into a 21 bln euro reserve in the budget to give a three-month extension of help to low-income families cope with higher energy bills but eliminate it for others. It is projected to cost almost 5 billion euros. The energy subsidies have cost about 90 mln euros. Most Italian families are likely to see higher energy bills, though gas will still have a lower VAT. Meloni also intends to adjust corporate taxes to better target them and cost less. Separately, the government is reportedly considering reducing or eliminating the VAT on basic food staples. Meanwhile, the EU is delaying a 19 bln euro distribution to Italy from the pandemic recovery fund. The aid is conditional on meeting certain goals. The EU is extending its assessment phase to review a progress on a couple projects, licensing of port activities, and district heating. These are tied to the disbursement for the end of last year. The EU acknowledged there has been "significant" progress. Italy has received about a third of the 192 bln euros earmarked for it. Despite the volatile swings in the yields, Italy's two-year premium over Germany is within a few basis points of the Q1 average (~46 bp). The same is true of the 10-year differential, which has averaged about 187 bp this year. 

After slipping lower in most of the Asia Pacific session, the euro caught a bid late that carried into the European session and lifted it to session highs near $1.0855. The session low was set slightly below $1.0820 and there are nearly 1.6 bln euros in option expirations today between two strikes ($1.0780 and $1.0800). Recall that on two separate occasions last week, the euro be repulsed from intraday moves above $1.09. A retest today seems unlikely, but the price actions suggest underlying demand. Sterling has also recovered from the slippage seen early in Asia that saw it test initial support near $1.2300. Yesterday, it took out last week's high by a few hundredths of a cent, did so again today rising to slightly above $1.2350. However, here too, the intraday momentum indicators look stretched, cautioning North American participants from looking for strong follow-through buying.

America

What remains striking is the divergence between the market and the Federal Reserve. On rates they are one way. Fed Chair Powell was unequivocal last week. A pause had been considered, but no one was talking about a rate cut this year. The market is pricing in a 4.72% average effective Fed funds rate in July. On the outlook for the economy this year, they are the other way. The median Fed forecast was for the economy to grow by 0.4% this year. The median forecast in Bloomberg's survey anticipated more than twice the growth and projects 1.0% growth this year. As of the end of last week, the Atlanta Fed sees the US expanding by 3.2% this quarter (it will be updated Friday). The median in Bloomberg's survey is half as much. 

The US goods deficit in February was a little more than expected and some of the imports appeared to have gone into wholesale inventories, which unexpectedly rose (0.2% vs. -0.1% median forecast in Bloomberg's survey). Retail inventories jumped 0.8%, well above the 0.2% expected and biggest increase since last August. Given the strength of February retail sales (0.5% for the measure that excludes autos, gasoline, food services and building materials, after a 2.3% rise in January), the increase in retail inventories was likely desired. FHFA houses prices unexpectedly rose in January (first time in three months, leaving them flat over the period). S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller's measure continued to slump. It has not risen since last June. The Conference Board's measure of consumer confidence rose due to the expectations component. This contrasts with the University of Michigan's preliminary estimate that showed the first decline in four months. Moreover, when its final reading is announced at the end of the week, the risk seems to be on the downside, according to the Bloomberg survey. Meanwhile, surveys have shown that the service sector has been faring better than the manufacturing sector. However, the decline in the Richman Fed's business conditions, while its manufacturing survey improved, coupled with the sharp decline in the Dallas Fed's service activity index may be warning of weakness going into Q2.

The US dollar flirted with CAD1.38 at the end of last week is pushing through CAD1.36 today to reach its lowest level since before the banking stress was seen earlier this month. The five-day moving average has crossed below the 20-day moving average for the first time since mid-February. Canada's budget announced late yesterday boosts the deficit via new green initiatives and health spending, while raising taxes, including a new tax on dividend income for banks and insurance companies from Canadian companies. The market appears to be still digesting the implications. Today's range has thus far been too narrow to read much into it. The greenback has traded between roughly CAD1.3590 and CAD1.3615. On the other hand, the Mexican peso has continued to rebound from the risk-off drop that saw the US dollar surge above MXN19.23 (March 20). The dollar is weaker for fifth consecutive session and seventh of the last nine. It finished last week near MXN18.4450 and fell to about MXN18.1230 today, its lowest level since March 9. However, the intraday momentum indicators are stretched, and the greenback looks poised to recover back into the MXN18.20-25 area. Banxico meets tomorrow and is widely expected to hike its overnight target rate by a quarter-of-a-point to 11.25%.

 


Disclaimer

Read More

Continue Reading

International

The ONS has published its final COVID infection survey – here’s why it’s been such a valuable resource

The ONS’ Coronavirus Infection Survey has ceased after three years. Two experts explain why it was a uniquely useful source of data.

Published

on

cktravels.com/Shutterstock

March 24 marked the publication of the final bulletin of the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) Coronavirus Infection Survey after nearly three years of tracking COVID infections in the UK. The first bulletin was published on May 14 2020 and we’ve seen new releases almost every week since.

The survey was based primarily on data from many thousands of people in randomly selected households across the UK who agreed to take regular COVID tests. The ONS used the results to estimate how many people were infected with the virus in any given week.

In the survey’s first six months, we had results from 1.2 million samples taken from 280,000 people. Although the number of people participating each month declined over time, the survey has continued to be a highly valuable tool as we navigate the pandemic.

In particular, because the ONS bulletins were based on surveying a large, random sample of all UK residents, it offered the least biased surveillance system of COVID infections in the UK. We are not aware of any similar study anywhere else in the world. And, while estimating the prevalence of infections was the survey’s main output, it gave us a lot of other useful information about the virus too.

Unbiased surveillance

An important advantage of the ONS survey was its ability to detect COVID infections among many people who had no symptoms, or were not yet displaying symptoms.

Certainly other data sets existed (and some continue to exist) to give a sense of how many people were testing positive. For example, earlier in the pandemic, case numbers were reported at daily national press conferences. Figures continue to be published on the Department of Health and Social Care website.

But these totals have usually only encompassed people who tested because they had reason to suspect they may have been infected (for example because of symptoms or their work). We know many people had such minor symptoms that they had no reason to suspect they had COVID. Further, people who took a home test may or may not have reported the result.

Similarly, case counts from hospital admissions or emergency room attendances only captured a very small percentage of positive cases, even if many of these same people had severe healthcare needs.

Symptom-tracking applications such as the ZOE app or online surveys have been useful but tend to over-represent people who are most technologically competent, engaged and symptom-aware.

Testing wastewater samples to track COVID spread in a community has proved difficult to reliably link to infection numbers.


Read more: The tide of the COVID pandemic is going out – but that doesn't mean big waves still can't catch us


What else the survey told us

Aside from swab samples to test for COVID infections, the ONS survey collected blood samples from some participants to measure antibodies. This was a very useful aspect of the infection survey, providing insights into immunity against the virus in the population and individuals.

Beginning in June 2021, the ONS survey also published reports on the “characteristics of people testing positive”. Arguably these analyses were even more valuable than the simple infection rate estimates.

For example, the ONS data gave practical insights into changing risk factors from November 21 2021 to May 7 2022. In November 2021, living in a house with someone under 16 was a risk factor for testing positive but by the end of that period it seemed to be protective. Travel abroad was not an important risk factor in December 2021 but by April 2022 it was a major risk. Wearing a mask in December 2021 was protective against testing positive but by April 2022 there was no significant association.

We shouldn’t find this changing picture of risk factors particularly surprising when concurrently we had different variants emerging (during that period most notably omicron) and evolving population resistance that came with vaccination programmes and waves of natural infection.

Also, in any pandemic the value of non-pharmaceutical interventions such wearing masks and social distancing declines as the infection becomes endemic. At that point the infection rate is driven more by the rate at which immunity is lost.

A woman wearing a face mask receives a vaccine.
The survey gave us insights into the protection offered by vaccines and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Paul Maguire/Shutterstock

The ONS characteristics analyses also offered evidence about the protective effects of vaccination and prior infection. The bulletin from May 25 2022 showed that vaccination provided protection against infection but probably for not much more than 90 days, whereas a prior infection generally conferred protection for longer.

After May 2022, the focused shifted to reinfections. The analyses confirmed that even in people who had already been infected, vaccination protects against reinfection, but again probably only for about 90 days.

It’s important to note the ONS survey only measured infections and not severe disease. We know from other work that vaccination is much better at protecting against severe disease and death than against infection.


Read more: How will the COVID pandemic end?


A hugely valuable resource

The main shortcoming of the ONS survey was that its reports were always published one to three weeks later than other data sets due to the time needed to collect and test the samples and then model the results.

That said, the value of this infection survey has been enormous. The ONS survey improved understanding and management of the epidemic in the UK on multiple levels. But it’s probably appropriate now to bring it to an end in the fourth year of the pandemic, especially as participation rates have been falling over the past year.

Our one disappointment is that so few of the important findings from the ONS survey have been published in peer-reviewed literature, and so the survey has had less of an impact internationally than it deserves.

Paul Hunter consults for the World Health Organization. He receives funding from National Institute for Health Research, the World Health Organization and the European Regional Development Fund.

Julii Brainard receives funding from the NIHR Health Protection and Research Unit in Emergency Preparedness.

Read More

Continue Reading

Spread & Containment

Candida auris: what you need to know about the deadly fungus spreading through US hospitals

A drug-resistant fungus is a threat to human health.

Published

on

By

A fungal superbug called Candida auris is spreading rapidly through hospitals and nursing homes in the US. The first case was identified in 2016. Since then, it has spread to half the country’s 50 states. And, according to a new report, infections tripled between 2019 and 2021. This is hugely concerning because Candida auris is resistant to many drugs, making this fungal infection one of the hardest to treat.

Candida auris is a yeast-type fungus that is the first to have multiple international health alerts associated with it. It has been found in over 30 countries, including the UK, since it was first identified in Japan in 2009.

It is related to other types of yeast that can cause infections, like Candida albicans which causes thrush. However, Candida auris is very different to these other fungi and in some ways, highly unusual.

First, it can grow, or “colonise”, human skin. Unlike many other Candida species that like to grow in our guts as part of the microbiome, Candida auris does not grow in this environment and seems to prefer the skin. This means that people who are colonised with Candida auris can shed lots of yeast from their skin, and this contaminates bed clothes and surfaces with the fungus. This can lead to outbreaks.

It is unusual for a fungal infection to spread from person to person, but that seems to be how Candida auris infections spread. Outbreaks can happen with this fungus, especially in intensive care units (ICU) and nursing homes where people are at a higher risk for getting fungal infections generally.

The fungus can live on surfaces for several weeks, and getting rid of it can be difficult. Enhanced cleaning and hand washing is needed to try and limit the spread of the fungus and exposure to patients who get ill from it.

Most people who are colonised with Candida auris will not get ill from it, or even know it is there. It causes infections when it gets into surgical wounds or the blood from an intravenous line. Once it gets into the body, it can infect organs and the blood causing a very serious and potentially fatal disease.

The mortality rate for people infected (as opposed to colonised) with the fungus is between 30 and 60%. But a precise mortality rate can be hard to pin down as people who are infected are often critically ill with other conditions.

Diagnosing an infection can be difficult as there can be a wide range of symptoms including fever, chills, headaches and nausea. It is for this reason that we need to keep a close eye on Candida auris as it can easily be confused with other conditions.

In the last few years, new tests to help identify this fungus accurately have been developed.

Candida auris can get into the body via an infected IV line. Tyler Olson/Shutterstock

The first Candida auris infection was reported in the UK in 2013. However, there may have been other cases before this – there is evidence that some early cases were misidentified as unrelated yeasts.

The UK has so far managed to stop any major outbreaks, and most cases have been limited in their spread.

Most patients who have become ill from Candida auris in the UK had recently travelled to parts of the world where the fungus is more common or has been circulating for longer.

Spurred by COVID

Rising numbers of Candida auris infections are thought to be partially linked to the COVID pandemic. People who become very ill from COVID may need mechanical ventilation and long stays in the ICU, which are both risk factors for Candida auris colonisation and infection.

It will take some time to figure out exactly how the pandemic has affected rates and numbers of fungal infections around the world, but these are important questions to answer to help predict how Candida auris cases might fluctuate in the future.

As for most life-threatening fungal infections, treatment is difficult and limited. We have only a handful of antifungal drugs to fight these infections, so when a species is resistant to one or more of these drugs, the options for treatment are extremely limited. Some Candida auris infections are resistant to all three types of antifungal drug.

Healthcare professionals must remain vigilant to this drug-resistant fungus. Without close monitoring and enhanced awareness of this infection, we could see more outbreaks and serious disease associated with Candida auris in the future.

Rebecca A. Drummond receives funding from the Medical Research Council.

Read More

Continue Reading

Trending