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Is Emerging Markets Debt Well Positioned?

Despite softer economic conditions globally, emerging markets (EM) credit fundamentals remain supportive—and while we see some pockets of weakness, especially…

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Despite softer economic conditions globally, emerging markets (EM) credit fundamentals remain supportive—and while we see some pockets of weakness, especially among energy- and food-importing countries, overall we believe EM debt is well positioned to withstand a period of weaker global growth.

You can read more about our economic outlook in our last blog post, Emerging Markets Debt: Clearer Skies Ahead? In terms of strategic opportunities, we favor high-yield issuers over high-grade issuers and remain strategically overweight in higher-yielding frontier markets, where we believe investors are overcompensated for credit risk and volatility.

We continue to see scope for fundamental differentiation among countries. We prefer high-yield commodity-exporting countries, especially in the energy space. We also remain cautious about countries that depend on food and energy imports and countries with negative political dynamics that create institutional risks. We also prefer countries with easier access to financing, especially those that have strong relationships with multilateral and bilateral lenders.

We continue to see opportunities in select distressed debt positions, where we believe bond prices do not reflect realistic assumptions for default risk and recovery values. We also see selective opportunities in EM corporate credit, where we believe a combination of differentiated fundamental drivers, favorable supply technical conditions, and attractive absolute valuations could continue to provide ample investment opportunities.

Given near-term growth concerns and intermittent primary markets, we are focusing on issuers with low refinancing needs and robust balance sheets. In Latin America, our positions are diversified across oil and gas; technology, media, and telecommunications (TMT); utilities; and financials. In Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), our positions are diversified across financials; oil and gas; metals and mining; and real estate. In Asia, our positions are diversified across oil and gas; financials; industrials; metals and mining; utilities; and real estate.

Our highest-conviction overweight and underweight positions are shown in the table below.



High-Beta Bucket

In the high-beta bucket, our largest overweight positions are in Egypt, Argentina, and Angola, and our largest underweight positions are in Turkey, Honduras, and Papua New Guinea.

Egypt (overweight): We believe external financing needs will be met with support from partners in the Middle East and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Critically, we believe the recent currency adjustments will, moving forward, reduce imbalances and support increased financial inflows.

Argentina (overweight): Overall, we remain bearish about Argentine fundamentals, although we believe sovereign bonds are priced below eventual recovery value, providing potential value. We favor bonds on the curve with stronger indenture protections. We remain overweight via higher-quality provincial issuers. We have also purchased credit default swap (CDS) protection (net) to hedge against a default by the Argentine government.

Angola (overweight): We believe in Angola’s prudent policies. The exchange rate flexibility demonstrated in the past quarter cements our view.

Turkey (underweight): Imbalances and unsustainable policies continue to erode the country’s creditworthiness. We believe political uncertainty is likely to remain elevated in coming months given the prospect of elections. Our exposure remains concentrated in long-dated, low-price cash bonds, with our exposure in spread-duration terms closer to neutral.

Honduras (underweight): We do not believe that valuations properly reflect fundamentals. Although Honduras has the capacity to service its debt, fundamentals have been declining. The electricity sector, in particular, has been mismanaged, which has created fiscal challenges. The new government has threatened repudiation of its debt obligations, which gives us some concerns about Honduras’s willingness to pay. Given valuations and the small chance of debt repudiation, we believe there is better value elsewhere.

Papua New Guinea (underweight): A low foreign-exchange (FX) reserves base and a weak fiscal position lead us to avoid the country, although the debt maturity profile is well spaced out (mostly to bilaterally lenders).

Medium-Beta Bucket

In the medium-beta bucket, our largest overweight positions are in Cote d’Ivoire, Mexico, and Romania, and our largest underweight positions are in Oman, Jamaica, and Jordan.

Cote d’Ivoire (overweight): We find attractive valuations in long-dated euro-denominated bonds and believe fundamentals remain relatively supportive.

Mexico (overweight): Our overweight is largely in the state-owned energy company Pemex, which offers one of the largest spreads over its sovereign, and we believe could benefit from the high likelihood of support from the sovereign.

Romania (overweight): We see improving fundamentals and strong relative valuations. We continue to prefer euro-denominated issues over U.S.-dollar-denominated bonds but continue to look for value in U.S.-dollar-denominated bonds in the new-issue market.

Oman (underweight): Oman has been a strong reform story over the past couple of years, but we believe this story is now fairly priced in. The country still has a high dependency on oil, whose prices are vulnerable to slowing global growth.

Jamaica (underweight): Jamaica has continued to implement an impressive fiscal consolidation agenda, even following the pandemic. Despite kicking the debt-to-GDP target can down the road due to pandemic impacts, fiscal discipline has resulted in continued fundamental improvement. However, we believe market expectations are too high and high dollar prices on many Jamaican bonds lead us to believe there is more efficient allocation of capital elsewhere.

Jordan (underweight): Valuations look stretched on a relative basis given the weak outlook for growth, high levels of debt, and need for further improvement in the fiscal dynamics.

Low-Beta Bucket

In the low-beta bucket, our largest overweight positions are in Bermuda, Indonesia, and India, and our largest underweight positions are in Malaysia, Uruguay, and Chile.

Bermuda (overweight): We favor the country’s valuations and fundamentals relative to other low-beta sovereigns. Bermuda has similar valuations to Peru and Chile, but a stronger fundamental trajectory because there is less institutional uncertainty in Bermuda.

Indonesia (overweight): Indonesia has experienced improved terms of trade and structural reforms. Its economic fundamentals have strengthened in recent years through credible policymaking and prudent fiscal policies. The country has attracted foreign direct investment inflows, and our positioning aims to capture opportunities from green projects and value-chain developments in the country.

India (overweight): India has strong fundamentals. It is relatively insulated from external demand compared to other low-beta sovereigns, with resilient domestic demand supporting economic growth. Credit growth remains robust, and we expect inflation to moderate and slow the pace of central bank rate hikes.

Malaysia (underweight): We see unappealing valuations, typically in the longer-duration sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds.

Uruguay (underweight): Fundamentals remain strong, but bonds have compressed materially since the COVID-19 pandemic, and we believe this offers limited potential spread tightening.

Chile (underweight): Valuations are tight and the political trajectory is uncertain. After the failed approval of a new constitution, we believe institutional uncertainty lingers and there are more attractive markets in which to invest.

Marco Ruijer, CFA, is a portfolio manager on William Blair’s emerging markets debt team.

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The post Is Emerging Markets Debt Well Positioned? appeared first on William Blair.

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International

G7 Vs BRICS – Off To The Races

G7 Vs BRICS – Off To The Races

Authored by Scott Ritter via ConsortiumNews.com,

An economist digging below the surface of an IMF report has…

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G7 Vs BRICS - Off To The Races

Authored by Scott Ritter via ConsortiumNews.com,

An economist digging below the surface of an IMF report has found something that should shock the Western bloc out of any false confidence in its unsurpassed global economic clout...

G7 leaders meeting on June 28, 2022, at Schloss Elmau in Krün, Germany. (White House/Adam Schultz)

Last summer, the Group of 7 (G7), a self-anointed forum of nations that view themselves as the most influential economies in the world, gathered at Schloss Elmau, near Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, to hold their annual meeting. Their focus was punishing Russia through additional sanctions, further arming of Ukraine and the containment of China.

At the same time, China hosted, through video conference, a gathering of the BRICS economic forum. Comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, this collection of nations relegated to the status of so-called developing economies focused on strengthening economic bonds, international economic development and how to address what they collectively deemed the counter-productive policies of the G7.

In early 2020, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov had predicted that, based upon purchasing power parity, or PPP, calculations projected by the International Monetary Fund, BRICS would overtake the G7 sometime later that year in terms of percentage of the global total.

(A nation’s gross domestic product at purchasing power parity, or PPP, exchange rates is the sum value of all goods and services produced in the country valued at prices prevailing in the United States and is a more accurate reflection of comparative economic strength than simple GDP calculations.)

Then the pandemic hit and the global economic reset that followed made the IMF projections moot. The world became singularly focused on recovering from the pandemic and, later, managing the fallout from the West’s massive sanctioning of Russia following that nation’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The G7 failed to heed the economic challenge from BRICS, and instead focused on solidifying its defense of the “rules based international order” that had become the mantra of the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden.

Miscalculation

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an ideological divide that has gripped the world, with one side (led by the G7) condemning the invasion and seeking to punish Russia economically, and the other (led by BRICS) taking a more nuanced stance by neither supporting the Russian action nor joining in on the sanctions. This has created a intellectual vacuum when it comes to assessing the true state of play in global economic affairs.

U.S. President Joe Biden in virtual call with G7 leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Feb. 24. (White House/Adam Schultz)

It is now widely accepted that the U.S. and its G7 partners miscalculated both the impact sanctions would have on the Russian economy, as well as the blowback that would hit the West.

Angus King, the Independent senator from Maine, recently observed that he remembers

“when this started a year ago, all the talk was the sanctions are going to cripple Russia. They’re going to be just out of business and riots in the street absolutely hasn’t worked …[w]ere they the wrong sanctions? Were they not applied well? Did we underestimate the Russian capacity to circumvent them? Why have the sanctions regime not played a bigger part in this conflict?”

It should be noted that the IMF calculated that the Russian economy, as a result of these sanctions, would contract by at least 8 percent. The real number was 2 percent and the Russian economy — despite sanctions — is expected to grow in 2023 and beyond.

This kind of miscalculation has permeated Western thinking about the global economy and the respective roles played by the G7 and BRICS. In October 2022, the IMF published its annual World Economic Outlook (WEO), with a focus on traditional GDP calculations. Mainstream economic analysts, accordingly, were comforted that — despite the political challenge put forward by BRICS in the summer of 2022 — the IMF was calculating that the G7 still held strong as the leading global economic bloc.

In January 2023 the IMF published an update to the October 2022 WEO,  reinforcing the strong position of the G7.  According to Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, the IMF’s chief economist, the “balance of risks to the outlook remains tilted to the downside but is less skewed toward adverse outcomes than in the October WEO.”

This positive hint prevented mainstream Western economic analysts from digging deeper into the data contained in the update. I can personally attest to the reluctance of conservative editors trying to draw current relevance from “old data.”

Fortunately, there are other economic analysts, such as Richard Dias of Acorn Macro Consulting, a self-described “boutique macroeconomic research firm employing a top-down approach to the analysis of the global economy and financial markets.”

Rather than accept the IMF’s rosy outlook as gospel, Dias did what analysts are supposed to do — dig through the data and extract relevant conclusions.

After rooting through the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Data Base, Dias conducted a comparative analysis of the percentage of global GDP adjusted for PPP between the G7 and BRICS, and made a surprising discovery: BRICS had surpassed the G7.

This was not a projection, but rather a statement of accomplished fact:

BRICS was responsible for 31.5 percent of the PPP-adjusted global GDP, while the G7 provided 30.7 percent.

Making matters worse for the G7, the trends projected showed that the gap between the two economic blocs would only widen going forward.

The reasons for this accelerated accumulation of global economic clout on the part of BRICS can be linked to three primary factors:

  • residual fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic,

  • blowback from the sanctioning of Russia by the G7 nations in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a growing resentment among the developing economies of the world to G7 economic policies and

  • priorities which are perceived as being rooted more in post-colonial arrogance than a genuine desire to assist in helping nations grow their own economic potential. 

Growth Disparities

It is true that BRICS and G7 economic clout is heavily influenced by the economies of China and the U.S., respectively. But one cannot discount the relative economic trajectories of the other member states of these economic forums. While the economic outlook for most of the BRICS countries points to strong growth in the coming years, the G7 nations, in a large part because of the self-inflicted wound that is the current sanctioning of Russia, are seeing slow growth or, in the case of the U.K., negative growth, with little prospect of reversing this trend.

Moreover, while G7 membership remains static, BRICS is growing, with Argentina and Iran having submitted applications, and other major regional economic powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, expressing an interest in joining. Making this potential expansion even more explosive is the recent Chinese diplomatic achievement in normalizing relations between Iran and Saudia Arabia.

Diminishing prospects for the continued global domination by the U.S. dollar, combined with the economic potential of the trans-Eurasian economic union being promoted by Russia and China, put the G7 and BRICS on opposing trajectories. BRICS should overtake the G7 in terms of actual GDP, and not just PPP, in the coming years.

But don’t hold your breath waiting for mainstream economic analysts to reach this conclusion. Thankfully, there are outliers such as Richard Dias and Acorn Macro Consulting who seek to find new meaning from old data. 

Tyler Durden Sat, 03/25/2023 - 07:00

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Government

Many CDC Blunders Exaggerated Severity Of COVID-19: Study

Many CDC Blunders Exaggerated Severity Of COVID-19: Study

Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),

The U.S. Centers…

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Many CDC Blunders Exaggerated Severity Of COVID-19: Study

Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) made at least 25 statistical or numerical errors during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the overwhelming majority exaggerated the severity of the pandemic, according to a new study.

Researchers who have been tracking CDC errors compiled 25 instances where the agency offered demonstrably false information. For each instance, they analyzed whether the error exaggerated or downplayed the severity of COVID-19.

Of the 25 instances, 20 exaggerated the severity, the researchers reported in the study, which was published ahead of peer review on March 23.

The CDC has expressed significant concern about COVID-19 misinformation. In order for the CDC to be a credible source of information, they must improve the accuracy of the data they provide,” the authors wrote.

The CDC did not respond to a request for comment.

Most Errors Involved Children

Most of the errors were about COVID-19’s impact on children.

In mid-2021, for instance, the CDC claimed that 4 percent of the deaths attributed to COVID-19 were kids. The actual percentage was 0.04 percent. The CDC eventually corrected the misinformation, months after being alerted to the issue.

CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky falsely told a White House press briefing in October 2021 that there had been 745 COVID-19 deaths in children, but the actual number, based on CDC death certificate analysis, was 558.

Walensky and other CDC officials also falsely said in 2022 that COVID-19 was a top five cause of death for children, citing a study that gathered CDC data instead of looking at the data directly. The officials have not corrected the false claims.

Other errors include the CDC claiming in 2022 that pediatric COVID-19 hospitalizations were “increasing again” when they’d actually peaked two weeks earlier; CDC officials in 2023 including deaths among infants younger than 6 months old when reporting COVID-19 deaths among children; and Walensky on Feb. 9, 2023, exaggerating the pediatric death toll before Congress.

“These errors suggest the CDC consistently exaggerates the impact of COVID-19 on children,” the authors of the study said.

Read more here...

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/24/2023 - 20:20

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Government

NIH awards researchers $7.5 million to create data support center for opioid use disorder and pain management research

WINSTON-SALEM, N.C. – March 24, 2023 – Researchers at Wake Forest University School of Medicine have been awarded a five-year, $7.5 million grant…

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WINSTON-SALEM, N.C. – March 24, 2023 – Researchers at Wake Forest University School of Medicine have been awarded a five-year, $7.5 million grant from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Helping End Addiction Long-term (HEAL) initiative.

Credit: Wake Forest University School of Medicine

WINSTON-SALEM, N.C. – March 24, 2023 – Researchers at Wake Forest University School of Medicine have been awarded a five-year, $7.5 million grant from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Helping End Addiction Long-term (HEAL) initiative.

The NIH HEAL initiative, which launched in 2018, was created to find scientific solutions to stem the national opioid and pain public health crises. The funding is part of the HEAL Data 2 Action (HD2A) program, designed to use real-time data to guide actions and change processes toward reducing overdoses and improving opioid use disorder treatment and pain management.

With the support of the grant, researchers will create a data infrastructure support center to assist HD2A innovation projects at other institutions across the country. These innovation projects are designed to address gaps in four areas—prevention, harm reduction, treatment of opioid use disorder and recovery support.

“Our center’s goal is to remove barriers so that solutions can be more streamlined and rapidly distributed,” said Meredith C.B. Adams, M.D., associate professor of anesthesiology, biomedical informatics, physiology and pharmacology, and public health sciences at Wake Forest University School of Medicine.

By monitoring opioid overdoses in real time, researchers will be able to identify trends and gaps in resources in local communities where services are most needed.

“We will collect and analyze data that will inform prevention and treatment services,” Adams said. “We’re shifting chronic pain and opioid care in communities to quickly offer solutions.”

The center will also develop data related resources, education and training related to substance use, pain management and the reduction of opioid overdoses.

According to the CDC, there was a 29% increase in drug overdose deaths in the U.S.  in 2020, and nearly 75% of those deaths involved an opioid.

“Given the scope of the opioid crises, which was only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, it’s imperative that we improve and create new prevention strategies,” Adams said. “The funding will create the infrastructure for rapid intervention.”


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