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Putting the (Insta)cart before the (Grocery) horse: A COVID Favorite’s Reality Check!

After years of rumors of an imminent IPO, Instacart has finally filed for a public offering of it’s shares, aspiring to raise about $600 million from…

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After years of rumors of an imminent IPO, Instacart has finally filed for a public offering of it’s shares, aspiring to raise about $600 million from markets, at a pricing of about $9-$10 billion for its equity. Coming in the week after ARM, an AI chip designer, also filed to go public, but with an estimated pricing of $55-$60 billion, it is an indication of how much the ground has shifted under Instacart since the heady days of 2020, when Instacart was viewed by some Americans as the only thing that stood between them and starvation. At that time, there were some who were suggesting that the company could go public at $50 billion or more, and pricing it on that basis, but reality has caught up with both the company and investors, and this IPO represents vastly downgraded expectations for the company’s future.

The Back Story

    To value Instacart, you have to start with an understanding of the business model that animates the company, as well the underlying business that it is intermediating. I start with this section with the Instacart business model, which is not complicated, but I will spend the rest of the section exploring the operating characteristics of the grocery business, and its online segment.

The Instacart Business Model

    The Instacart business model extends online shopping, already common in other areas of retailing, into the grocery store space. That is not to say that there aren't logistical challenges, especially because grocery store carry thousands of items, and grocery shopping lists can run to dozens of these, with varying unit measures (by item, by weight) and substitution questions (when items are out of stock). Instacart operates as the intermediary between customers and grocery stores, where customers pick the grocery store that they would like to shop at and the items that they would like to buy at that store, and Instacart does the rest:


Instacart hires store shoppers who gather the items for the order, checking with the customer on substitutions, if needed, and for those customers who choose the pick-up option, have them ready for pick-up. If home delivery is chosen as the option, a driver (who, in many cases, is also the shopper) delivers the groceries to the customer's home. Customers get the time-savings and convenience from having grocery shopping (and delivery, if chosen) done for them, but they pay in the form on both delivery fees and a service charge of 5-10% of the bill, depending on the store picked and the number of items in the basket. Instacart also offers a subscription model, Instacart Express, where subscribers in return for paying a subscription fee (annual or monthly) get free deliveries from the service.

    For grocery stores, Instacart is a mixed blessing. It does expand the customer base by bringing in those who could not or would not have shopped physically at the store, but stores often have to pay Instacart fulfillment fees, which they sometime pass through as higher prices on products. In addition, grocery stores lose direct relationships with customers as well as data on their shopping habits, which may be useful in making strategic and tactical decision on product mix and pricing.

    I will approach the analysis of the Instacart model's capacity for growth and value creation in four steps. In the first, I will look at the grocery business, both in terms of growth and profitability of grocery stores, since Instacart, as an intermediary in the business, will be affected by grocery business fundamentals. In the second, I will examine the forces that are pushing consumers to online grocery shopping, and the ceiling for that growth is much lower than it is than in other areas of retailing. In the third, I will focus on how the competition to Instacart, within the online grocery retail space, is shaping up, and the consequences for its market share. In the final, I will examine the operating costs faced by Instacart, especially in the content of how the fee pie will be shared by the company with its shoppers and drivers.

1. The Grocery Business

    When you are looking for an easy company to value, where you can safely extrapolate the past and not over indulge your imagination, you should try a grocery store. For decades, at least in the US and Europe, the grocery business has had a combination of low growth and low margins that, on the one hand, keep pricing in check and on the other, make the business an unlikely target for disruption. Let's start by looking at growth in aggregate revenues, across all grocery stores in the United States over the last three decades:

You will notice that revenue growth rate has been anemic for most of the thirty years covered in this analysis, and that even the spurts in growth you have seen in 2020 and 2022 have specific reasons, unlikely to be sustainable, with the COVID shutdown explaining the 2020 jump, and inflation in food prices explaining the 2022 increase.
    On the profitability front, the grocery business operates on slim margins, at every level. The gross margin, measuring how much grocery stores clear after covering the costs of the goods sold, has risen slightly over time, perhaps because of growth in processed and packaged food sales, but is still less than 25%. The operating margin, which is after all operating expenses, and a more complete measure of operating profitability has been about 5% or less for almost the entire period.


If you are an intermediary in a business with slim operating margins, as Instacart is, the low operating profitability of the grocery business will limit how much you can claim as a price for intermediation, in service fees.
    To complete the grocery business story, it is also worth looking at the players in the business, and it should come as little surprise that it is dominated by a few big names. The biggest is Walmart, which derives close to 56% of its $400 billion in total revenues in the US, from groceries, but Target and Amazon (through Whole Foods and Amazon Fresh) are also big players. Krogers and Albertsons have emerged as the grocery store giants, by consolidating smaller grocery companies across the country: 


The fact that the grocery business is dominated by a few big names will also play a role in the Instacart valuation story, by affecting the bargaining power that Instacart has, in negotiating for its share of the grocery pie. In sum, the overall grocery pie is growing slowly, and the slice of the pie that is profit for those in the grocery game is slim, effectively limiting the valuation stories (and values) for every player in that game.

2. The Online Option

    Grocery shopping is different from other shopping, for many reasons. First, customers tend to favor a specific grocery store (or at most, a couple of stores) for most of their grocery needs. One reason for that is familiarity with store layout, since knowing where to find the items that you are looking for can make the difference between a 20-minute trip to the store and a hour-long slog. Another is location, with customers tending to shop at neighborhood stores, for much of their needs, since groceries do not do well with long transportation times. Second, for non-processed food, especially meats and produce, being able to see and sometimes touch items before you buy them is part of the shopping experience, with online pictures of the same products operating as poor substitute. For these reasons, grocery retail remained almost immune from the disruption wrought on the rest of brick-and-mortar retail, at least in the United States. Even so, there has always been always a segment of the population that has been open to online grocery shopping, sometimes because of physical constraints (homebound or unable to drive) and sometimes because of time and convenience (busy work and family schedules). That segment was viewed as a niche market, and until 2020, conventional players in the grocery business did not pay much attention to it, with the exception of Amazon. It was the COVID shutdown in 2020 that changed the dynamics, as online grocery shopping became not just an option, but sometimes the only option, for some. 

As a company that was built exclusively for this purpose, Instacart had a first-move advantage and saw customers, order and revenues all soar during the year. Caught up in the mood of the moment, it is easy to see why so many extrapolated Instacart’s success in 2020 into the future, forecasting that the shift to online grocery shopping would be permanent, and that Instacart would dominate that business.

      As COVID has eased, though, many of those who shopped for groceries online have returned to physical shopping, but it is undeniable that there are some who have decided that the convenience of online shopping exceeds any disadvantages, and have continued with that practice. In fact, while there is uncertainty on this front, the projection is that the percent of grocery shopping that will be done online will increase over time:

There are two points worth making about the trend towards online shopping. The first is that the ceiling on online grocery retail will remain much lower than the ceiling on online shopping in other areas in retail, with even optimists capping the share at 20%.  In short, the growth in online grocery sales will be higher than total grocery sales growth, but not overwhelmingly so. The second is that while some have persisted with online grocery shopping after 2020, it is less in deliveries and more in pick-ups, which will have implications for the market shares of competitors in the space.

3. The Competition

    In the first few months of the COVID shutdown, Instacart was dominant, partly because its platform was designed for online shopping, and partly because in a grocery market, where many stores were out of stock, it offered shopping choices to shoppers. That dominance, though, was short lived, since the grocers woke up quickly, and started offering online shopping services to their customer, with the tilt towards pick-up over delivery. The cost savings to customers was significant, since most grocery stores dispensed with service fees and used employees as shoppers, for their online customers. In the aftermath of COVID, the grocery stores have cemented their dominance of online grocery market, as can be seen in the market shares of the biggest online grocery retailers:


Walmart and Amazon are the two largest players in the online grocery market, and Instacart, while it has lost market share since 2020, is firmly in third place. Kroger's and Albertsons, the two largest grocery story chains, have also improved their standing. Instacart, as the only pure intermediary in this group, allows customers access to multiple grocery store options, and more choices when it comes to delivery, but even one that front, it is starting to face competition from Uber Eats, DoorDash and GrubHub. In short, Instacart will be lucky to hold on to its existing market share, even if it plays its cards right, leaving its growth at or below the growth in the overall online grocery shopping market.
    On a personal note, and it qualifies purely as anecdotal evidence, we (in my household) have not used Instacart since the peak COVID days of 2020, as we have returned to physical grocery shopping for products where it matters, while preserving online shopping for products which are staples, but only for pick up, rather than delivery. Since we shop at Ralph's, a Kroger subsidiary, we use their online shopping app, since it costless, matches in-store discounts and comes with a Ralph employee as a shopper, that is familiar with what we usually buy. I know that there are others who have stayed with Instacart, perhaps because of the grocery store choices it offers or because of its delivery options, but we have little interest in either, and perhaps are closer to the norm than the exception.

4. Operating Economics

    The revenues that Instacart collects from customers, either in service fees or in subscription revenues have multiple costs to cover. By far, the biggest is the cost that the company faces in hiring and paying thousands of shoppers and drivers to operate its system. Like ride-sharing companies, the question of how Instacart categorizes these workers, and the resulting costs, will determine what it will be able to generate as operating profits:

  1. Pay versus Commission: Instacart has traditionally paid its shoppers based upon the batches of work done (with a batch including shopping, packing and loading a customer order) and payments for deliveries made, with tips from customers accruing as additional income. In effect, that makes almost all of these expenses into variable costs, rising and falling with revenues, reducing risk to the company but also limiting benefits from economies of scale, as it gets bigger.
  2. Independent contractor versus Employee: Instacart has argued that the shoppers and drivers who work for it are independent contractors, rather than employees. That distinction matters because an employee categorization will open up Instacart not only to additional costs (social security, health care etc.) but also to legal liabilities, for employee actions. Many states are pushing Instacart (and others users of independent contractors, like Uber and Lyft) to reclassify their workers as employees, and in 2023, Instacart paid $46.5 million, to settle a California lawsuit on this count. 

As a company built around a technology platform, Instacart also has significant spending on R&D, as well as on customer support services.  In many ways, the operating expense issues that Instacart faces parallel the issues that Uber and Lyft have faced in the last few years, and I do believe that, over time, Instacart will have no choice but to deal with their shoppers as employees, with the accompanying costs. 

The Instacart IPO

    To value Instagram ahead of its IPO, I will start with a look at the prospectus filed by the company, which will give me a chance to unload on my pet peeves about how these disclosures have evolved over time, then look at the operating history and unit economics at the company, before settling in on a valuation story (and valuation) of the company.

Prospectus Pet Peeves

    About two years ago, I wrote a post on what I called the disclosure dilemma, where the more companies disclose, the less informative these disclosures become. As part of the post, I talked about trends in IPO prospectuses over time, and the Instacart prospectus gives me a chance to revisit some of those trends that I highlighted. 

  1. Disclosure Diarrhea: Apple and Microsoft, when they filed for their initial public offerings in the 1980s, had prospectuses that were less than 100 pages apiece; Apple weighed in at 73 pages and Microsoft had only 52. In 1997, when Amazon filed for a public offering, its prospectus was 47 pages long. I noted that prospectuses have become more and more bulky over time, with Airbnb's 2020 listing including a prospectus that was 350 pages long. With appendices, Instacart's prospectus stretches on to 416 pages.
  2. “Tech” and AI: In common with many other companies that have gone public in the last decade, Instacart is quick to label itself a technology company, when the truth is that it is a grocery delivery company that uses technology to smooth the ride. In keeping with the times, the prospectus mentions AI multiple times, I counted 32 mentions of AI in the prospectus, and I remain skeptical that AI will (or should) alter grocery shopping in fundamental ways.
  3. Adjusted EBITDA: I have written about the absolute foolishness of adding back stock-based compensation to get to adjusted earnings, noting that stock-based compensation is not a neutral non-cash expense (like depreciation) but one that an expense-in-kind, where you give away quite in your company to employees, either as options or as restricted stock. Needless to say, Instacart plows right ahead and not only adds back stock-based compensation but makes a host of other adjustments (see page 126 of prospectus). Since Instacart makes money without these adjustments, they only draw attention away from that good news.
  4. Share count shenanigans: On page 19 of the prospectus, Instacart headlines that its share count will be 279.33 million shares, if the underwriters exercise their options, but two pages later (on page 21) the company discloses that it does not count restricted stock units, which are shares in existence that still have restrictions on trading or waiting to be vested, options and shares issuable on conversion of preferred shares. Adding these exception together, you get an ignored share count of 43.62 million, which brings the total share count to 322.94 million shares.
To give the company credit on useful disclosures, the company has followed the lead of other user-based companies in providing a cohort table (see page 111) on platform users (tracing how usage changes as users stay on the platform) and on unit economics (the size of an order, with the costs of filling it), but that good disclosure is hidden behind layers of flab.

An Operating History

    For young companies, you learn less by browsing through financial history than with much more mature companies, but it in instructive to look at the pathway that Instacart has taken to arrive at its current position.  For close to seven years after its founding in 2012, Instacart struggled to find its footing with customers, as relatively few were willing to jump on the online grocery shopping bandwagon. Coming into 2020, the  company had about 50 million subscribers and $215 million in revenues, and the $5.1 billion that customers spent on groceries on its platform was a tiny fraction of the $800 billion US grocery market. In a turn of fortune that I am sure that even Instacart did not see coming, the COVID shutdown changed the shopping dynamics. As homebound customers desperately looked for options to shop for and get groceries delivered at home, Instacart stepped into the fray, allowing user numbers, the value of gross transactions (GTV) and revenues to quadruple in 2020. 

It is undeniable that Instacart, like Zoom and Peloton, was a COVID winner, but like those companies, it has struggled to build on those winnings and deliver on the resulting unrealistic expectations. The good news for Instacart is that many of the customers who joined its platform at the height of COVID have stayed on, but the bad news is that growth has leveled off in the years since, and especially so leading into the initial public offering.
    As subscribers and grocery sales on the Instacart platform grew between 2019 and 2023, its business model has also been taking form, turning from losses to a measure of profitability in the twelve months leading into the offering:

Instacart Prospectus
Note again, though, that the bulk of the improvement in operating metrics occurred in 2020, and while the numbers have continued to improve since 2020, the change has been marginal. To understand the drivers of Instacart’s profitability over time, let us break down its components:
  1. Take Rate: When an grocery order is placed on the Instacart platform, the service fees that Instacart collects represent its revenues from transactions, and the take rate measures these revenues as a percentage of the transaction value. Instacart's take rate has improved over time, doubling from 2.86% in 2019 to 5.70% in 2020, before leveling off in 2021 and 2022, and then increasing again to 7.49% in the last twelve months of 2023.

     Just to provide a contrast, Airbnb and Doordash, two other companies in the intermediary business have much higher take rates at 14% and 11.79% respectively. Much of that difference, though, is unbridgeable for a simple reason: the grocery business has significantly lower operating margins (at 5%) than the hospitality  (15% in 2022)  or restaurant businesses (16% in 2022). Put simply, Instacart's take rate will be lower, even with full economies of scale at play, that its counterparts in businesses with more profit buffer.
  2. Operating expenses: The revenues that Instacart collects, from transactions and advertising, are used to cover its operating expenses, which are broken down into three categories: cost of goods sold, operations and support and G&A:

    There are economies of scale that kicked in, in 2020, and the good news is that those economies o scales continued to benefit the company in 2021 and 2022, as all three categories of expense decreased, as a percent of sales. 
  3. Customer Acquisition and Reinvestment:  Growth comes with reinvestment, and in the case of Instacart, as with many other tech companies, that reinvestment is embedded in its operating expenses (instead of capital expenses), since their two biggest capital expenditures are the costs of acquiring new subscribers (shown as part of sales and marketing) and investments in technology/platform (shown as R&D). 

    Looking at the customer acquisition (selling) costs alone, there is evidence that these costs, in dollar terms and as a percent of revenues, after the steep drop off in 2020, are rising over time, indicating that there are more competitors for new online grocery shoppers.  If you add to that the same trend in R&D spending, it does look like the company is working harder and spending more to deliver growth after the COVID boost in 2020.
  4. Unit Economics: With transaction-based businesses, like Instacart, understanding how the unit economies (on individual orders and platform users) are evolving over time can be useful in forecasting the future. Looking across Instacart's entire history, the typical order size has remained remarkably stable, at around $100, with the spurt in 2020 being the exception.
    Instacart Prospectus

    On an inflation-adjusted basis, especially in 2021 and 2022, the average order size has decreased over time. That, by itself, may not be a problem, if Instacart customers are ordering more often, especially as they stay on the platform for longer, and to answer this, I look at Instacart's estimates of revenues, by cohort class:
    Instacart Prospectus
The good news is that customers who joined the platform in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2021 spend more on the platform, the longer they are on it. The bad news is that customers in joined in 2020, Instacart's biggest year of growth in users, are spending less on the platform in 2021 and 2022, indicating that some of the COVID gains are slipping away. That should not be surprising, since many customers who used Instacart in 2020 did so only because they had no alternatives, and once the shutdown ended, returned to old habits.

    As the company has struggled, coming off its COVID high, there has been turnover in its management ranks. Apoorva Mehta, who founded the company and oversaw its COVID growth, stepped down as CEO of the company in 2022, and was replaced with Fido Simo, a Facebook executive, with the impetus for the change rumored to have come from Sequoia, the biggest single stockholder in the company. Before you instinctively jump to the defense of founders, like Mr. Mehta, it is worth noting that he owned only 10% of the outstanding shares in the company in 2022. In short, scaling up and high growth often require large capital infusions, and a side cost almost always will be a reduction in founder control of the company. 

The Valuation Story & Intrinsic Value

    With that long lead-in, I have the basis for my Instacart story, and it reflects both the good and bad news in the company's operating history. 

  1. Growth: To estimate revenue growth at Instacart, I think it makes sense to break down revenues into transaction revenues and advertising revenues, with the former coming from service fees and subscriptions, and the latter from ads. To estimate transaction revenues, I will assume that gross transaction value on the platform will track growth in online grocery retailing, which seems to have settled into a compounded annual growth rate of about 12%, for the next five years. I will assume that Instacart will maintain its market share of the online grocery market, in the face of competition, but only by cutting its fees and accepting a take rate of 6%, by year 5, down from 7.5% in the trailing 12 months. Advertising revenues, though, are assumed to keep track with gross transactions on the platform.
  2. Profitability: Drawing on the company's history of delivering economies of scale on cost of goods sold and operations support, I will assume that the company will be able to improve its operating margins over time to 25%. The tensions between Instacart and its shoppers, as well as push back from grocery stores, will keep a lid on these margins and prevent further improvement.
  3. Reinvestment: As user growth levels off, I expect the company to revert to its capital-light origins, and spend far less on customer acquisitions, as well as on acquisitions. This allows me to assume that the company will be able to deliver $3.13 in revenues, for every dollar invested, roughly matching the global industry average.
With these assumptions in place, the value that I get for the company is shown below:

My Instacart Valuation

With my story and inputs, the value per share that I get for Instacart is about $29, close to the offer price being floated of$30 per share. 
    There is, of course, the very real possibility that I could be wrong on my estimates (in either direction) of key inputs: the growth in GTV, the take rate, the operating margin and the cost of capital, and to account for this uncertainty, I fall back on a simulation:


As you can see, at the offer price of $30/share, the company is priced close to its median value, and the distribution of values suggests that there is less upside in this company than in some of the other growth companies I have valued in recent years.

The Offering

    Instacart was expected to hit the market on September 19, and the reception that it gets may tell us as much about the market, as it does about the company. In my posts on the market, starting mid-year last year and extending into this one, I noted that risk capital had retreated o the sidelines, and one of the statistics that I used was the number of IPOs hitting the market. After hitting an all-time high in 2021, the IPO market has frozen, and the ARM, Instacart and Birkenstock IPOs hitting the market in September may be a sign of a thaw. That sign will become stronger, if the offerings are well received and there is a price pop on the offering. 

Pricing versus Investing

    I have long argued that IPOs are priced, not valued, notwithstanding the lip service that everyone involved in the process, including VCs, founders and bankers, pays to valuation, The difference between valuing and pricing is that while the former requires that you grapple with business questions on growth, profitability and reinvestment, the latter is based on how much investors are paying for peer group companies, a subjective judgment, but one made nevertheless. In keeping with this theme, I compared the proposed pricing for Instacart against the pricing of its peer group. That peer group is not other grocery companies, since the Instacart model is very different, but other intermediary companies like Airbnb and Doordash, which like Instacart, take a slice of transaction revenues in the markets they serve, and try to keep costs under control:

While Instacart looks cheap, relative to Doordash and Airbnb, this pricing is an illustration of the limits of the approach.  Instacart trades at a much lower multiple of revenues, because its take rate (as a percent of gross transaction value) is much lower than the slices that Doordash and Airbnb keep. Airbnb keeps 14% of gross transaction value, Doordash keeps more than 11.79%, but Instacart keeps only 7.5%, if advertising revenues are excluded. Instacart and Doordash both trade at lower multiples of revenues than Airbnb, but that is because Airbnb has higher expected growth and higher operating margins in steady state.    

Previewing the Offering

  Since pricing is about mood and momentum, it is worth looking at the ARM IPO offering on September 14, which saw the company's stock price, which was offered at $51, open for trading at $56.10 and close the dat at $63.59. If that mood spills over into this week, I expect Instacart's IPO to pop on its opening day as well, especially given the fact that the offering price seems to reflect a relatively conservative outlook for the company, and the pricing looks favorable. Even if it does not, I don't see much benefit to buying the stock at the offering price, not only because it looks fairly valued, but also because I don't see enough of an upside, even if things work out in the company's favor. 

    The question of what the market will do became moot, even as I was finishing this post, the stock started trading(September 19), and popped to $42 per share, before giving back some of its gains to settle at about $38 per share. At those prices, you would need more upbeat assumptions about online grocery growth and take rates than I am willing to make, but with this market, who knows? The stock may be trading at a discount on value, a week from now. 

The VC Game

    In the last decade, we have raised venture capital to "great investor" status, driven by stories of investments that have paid off in huge returns. In fact, good venture capitalists are often viewed as shrewd assessors of business potential, capable of separating the wheat from the chaff, when it comes to start-ups. That is true for some of them, but I believe that venture capital is a pricing game, with little heed paid to value, and that  the most successful venture capitalists share more traits with great traders, than with great investors. Not only are the best venture capitalists good at pricing the businesses they invest in, honing in on to the traits that are being priced in (users, subscribers, downloads etc.), but are just as good at making sure that these business scale up these traits. Their success comes from timing skills, entering a business at the right time and just as critically, exiting before the momentum shifts.

    Instacart's multiple venture capital rounds illustrates this process well, and you can see the pricing of the company at each round below:

The earliest providers of capital to the company will walk away with substantial profits, even if the company's market cap ends up at $9 - $9.5 billion, as indicated by the offering price. The seed capital providers (Khosla, Canaan and Y Combinator) will have earned at 55% compounded annual return on their investment, at the IPO offering price, well in excess of the S&P 500 annual return of 13.04% over the same period. Every subsequent round earns a lower annual return, and all investments in Instacart made after 2015 have underperformed the S&P 500 significantly, and the NASDAQ by even more.  The biggest losers in this capital game have been those who provided capital in 2020 and 2021, when COVID pushed up both capital needs and company pricing to new highs. The Series I investment in 2021, when the company was priced at $39 billion,will see markdowns in excess of 60%. While there is no redeeming grace for Fidelity and T. Rowe Price, it is true that Sequoia also invested earlier in the company, and will walk away with substantial returns on its total investment. Thus, the write down that Sequoia takes for its $300 million investment in 2021 will be more than offset by the gains it made on the $21 million that it invested in the company in 2013 and 2014. 

   The notion that there is smart money, i.e., that there is an investor group that is somehow wiser, more informed and less likely to act emotionally than the rest of us, and that it earns higher returns than the rest of us, is deeply held. In my view, it is a mirage, since every group that is anointed as smart money ultimately ends up looking average (in terms of behavior and returns), when all is said and done. It happened to mutual fund managers decades ago, and it has happened to hedge funds and private equity over the last two decades. For those who are holding on to the belief that venture capitalists are the last bastion of smart money, it is time to let go. While there are a few exceptions, venture capitalists for the most part are traders on steroids, riding the momentum train, and being ridden over by it, when it turns. 

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Instacart files

  1. Instacart Prospectus
  2. My Instacart Valuation








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Riley Gaines Explains How Women’s Sports Are Rigged To Promote The Trans Agenda

Riley Gaines Explains How Women’s Sports Are Rigged To Promote The Trans Agenda

Is there a light forming when it comes to the long, dark and…

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March 13, 2024

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Riley Gaines Explains How Women's Sports Are Rigged To Promote The Trans Agenda

Is there a light forming when it comes to the long, dark and bewildering tunnel of social justice cultism?  Global events have been so frenetic that many people might not remember, but only a couple years ago Big Tech companies and numerous governments were openly aligned in favor of mass censorship.  Not just to prevent the public from investigating the facts surrounding the pandemic farce, but to silence anyone questioning the validity of woke concepts like trans ideology. 

From 2020-2022 was the closest the west has come in a long time to a complete erasure of freedom of speech.  Even today there are still countries and Europe and places like Canada or Australia that are charging forward with draconian speech laws.  The phrase "radical speech" is starting to circulate within pro-censorship circles in reference to any platform where people are allowed to talk critically.  What is radical speech?  Basically, it's any discussion that runs contrary to the beliefs of the political left.

Open hatred of moderate or conservative ideals is perfectly acceptable, but don't ever shine a negative light on woke activism, or you might be a terrorist.

Riley Gaines has experienced this double standard first hand.  She was even assaulted and taken hostage at an event in 2023 at San Francisco State University when leftists protester tried to trap her in a room and demanded she "pay them to let her go."  Campus police allegedly witnessed the incident but charges were never filed and surveillance footage from the college was never released.  

It's probably the last thing a champion female swimmer ever expects, but her head-on collision with the trans movement and the institutional conspiracy to push it on the public forced her to become a counter-culture voice of reason rather than just an athlete.

For years the independent media argued that no matter how much we expose the insanity of men posing as women to compete and dominate women's sports, nothing will really change until the real female athletes speak up and fight back.  Riley Gaines and those like her represent that necessary rebellion and a desperately needed return to common sense and reason.

In a recent interview on the Joe Rogan Podcast, Gaines related some interesting information on the inner workings of the NCAA and the subversive schemes surrounding trans athletes.  Not only were women participants essentially strong-armed by colleges and officials into quietly going along with the program, there was also a concerted propaganda effort.  Competition ceremonies were rigged as vehicles for promoting trans athletes over everyone else. 

The bottom line?  The competitions didn't matter.  The real women and their achievements didn't matter.  The only thing that mattered to officials were the photo ops; dudes pretending to be chicks posing with awards for the gushing corporate media.  The agenda took precedence.

Lia Thomas, formerly known as William Thomas, was more than an activist invading female sports, he was also apparently a science project fostered and protected by the athletic establishment.  It's important to understand that the political left does not care about female athletes.  They do not care about women's sports.  They don't care about the integrity of the environments they co-opt.  Their only goal is to identify viable platforms with social impact and take control of them.  Women's sports are seen as a vehicle for public indoctrination, nothing more.

The reasons why they covet women's sports are varied, but a primary motive is the desire to assert the fallacy that men and women are "the same" psychologically as well as physically.  They want the deconstruction of biological sex and identity as nothing more than "social constructs" subject to personal preference.  If they can destroy what it means to be a man or a woman, they can destroy the very foundations of relationships, families and even procreation.  

For now it seems as though the trans agenda is hitting a wall with much of the public aware of it and less afraid to criticize it.  Social media companies might be able to silence some people, but they can't silence everyone.  However, there is still a significant threat as the movement continues to target children through the public education system and women's sports are not out of the woods yet.   

The ultimate solution is for women athletes around the world to organize and widely refuse to participate in any competitions in which biological men are allowed.  The only way to save women's sports is for women to be willing to end them, at least until institutions that put doctrine ahead of logic are made irrelevant.          

Tyler Durden Wed, 03/13/2024 - 17:20

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Government

Congress’ failure so far to deliver on promise of tens of billions in new research spending threatens America’s long-term economic competitiveness

A deal that avoided a shutdown also slashed spending for the National Science Foundation, putting it billions below a congressional target intended to…

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March 13, 2024

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Science is again on the chopping block on Capitol Hill. AP Photo/Sait Serkan Gurbuz

Federal spending on fundamental scientific research is pivotal to America’s long-term economic competitiveness and growth. But less than two years after agreeing the U.S. needed to invest tens of billions of dollars more in basic research than it had been, Congress is already seriously scaling back its plans.

A package of funding bills recently passed by Congress and signed by President Joe Biden on March 9, 2024, cuts the current fiscal year budget for the National Science Foundation, America’s premier basic science research agency, by over 8% relative to last year. That puts the NSF’s current allocation US$6.6 billion below targets Congress set in 2022.

And the president’s budget blueprint for the next fiscal year, released on March 11, doesn’t look much better. Even assuming his request for the NSF is fully funded, it would still, based on my calculations, leave the agency a total of $15 billion behind the plan Congress laid out to help the U.S. keep up with countries such as China that are rapidly increasing their science budgets.

I am a sociologist who studies how research universities contribute to the public good. I’m also the executive director of the Institute for Research on Innovation and Science, a national university consortium whose members share data that helps us understand, explain and work to amplify those benefits.

Our data shows how underfunding basic research, especially in high-priority areas, poses a real threat to the United States’ role as a leader in critical technology areas, forestalls innovation and makes it harder to recruit the skilled workers that high-tech companies need to succeed.

A promised investment

Less than two years ago, in August 2022, university researchers like me had reason to celebrate.

Congress had just passed the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act. The science part of the law promised one of the biggest federal investments in the National Science Foundation in its 74-year history.

The CHIPS act authorized US$81 billion for the agency, promised to double its budget by 2027 and directed it to “address societal, national, and geostrategic challenges for the benefit of all Americans” by investing in research.

But there was one very big snag. The money still has to be appropriated by Congress every year. Lawmakers haven’t been good at doing that recently. As lawmakers struggle to keep the lights on, fundamental research is quickly becoming a casualty of political dysfunction.

Research’s critical impact

That’s bad because fundamental research matters in more ways than you might expect.

For instance, the basic discoveries that made the COVID-19 vaccine possible stretch back to the early 1960s. Such research investments contribute to the health, wealth and well-being of society, support jobs and regional economies and are vital to the U.S. economy and national security.

Lagging research investment will hurt U.S. leadership in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, advanced communications, clean energy and biotechnology. Less support means less new research work gets done, fewer new researchers are trained and important new discoveries are made elsewhere.

But disrupting federal research funding also directly affects people’s jobs, lives and the economy.

Businesses nationwide thrive by selling the goods and services – everything from pipettes and biological specimens to notebooks and plane tickets – that are necessary for research. Those vendors include high-tech startups, manufacturers, contractors and even Main Street businesses like your local hardware store. They employ your neighbors and friends and contribute to the economic health of your hometown and the nation.

Nearly a third of the $10 billion in federal research funds that 26 of the universities in our consortium used in 2022 directly supported U.S. employers, including:

  • A Detroit welding shop that sells gases many labs use in experiments funded by the National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, Department of Defense and Department of Energy.

  • A Dallas-based construction company that is building an advanced vaccine and drug development facility paid for by the Department of Health and Human Services.

  • More than a dozen Utah businesses, including surveyors, engineers and construction and trucking companies, working on a Department of Energy project to develop breakthroughs in geothermal energy.

When Congress shortchanges basic research, it also damages businesses like these and people you might not usually associate with academic science and engineering. Construction and manufacturing companies earn more than $2 billion each year from federally funded research done by our consortium’s members.

A lag or cut in federal research funding would harm U.S. competitiveness in critical advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics. Hispanolistic/E+ via Getty Images

Jobs and innovation

Disrupting or decreasing research funding also slows the flow of STEM – science, technology, engineering and math – talent from universities to American businesses. Highly trained people are essential to corporate innovation and to U.S. leadership in key fields, such as AI, where companies depend on hiring to secure research expertise.

In 2022, federal research grants paid wages for about 122,500 people at universities that shared data with my institute. More than half of them were students or trainees. Our data shows that they go on to many types of jobs but are particularly important for leading tech companies such as Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Intel.

That same data lets me estimate that over 300,000 people who worked at U.S. universities in 2022 were paid by federal research funds. Threats to federal research investments put academic jobs at risk. They also hurt private sector innovation because even the most successful companies need to hire people with expert research skills. Most people learn those skills by working on university research projects, and most of those projects are federally funded.

High stakes

If Congress doesn’t move to fund fundamental science research to meet CHIPS and Science Act targets – and make up for the $11.6 billion it’s already behind schedule – the long-term consequences for American competitiveness could be serious.

Over time, companies would see fewer skilled job candidates, and academic and corporate researchers would produce fewer discoveries. Fewer high-tech startups would mean slower economic growth. America would become less competitive in the age of AI. This would turn one of the fears that led lawmakers to pass the CHIPS and Science Act into a reality.

Ultimately, it’s up to lawmakers to decide whether to fulfill their promise to invest more in the research that supports jobs across the economy and in American innovation, competitiveness and economic growth. So far, that promise is looking pretty fragile.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on Jan. 16, 2024.

Jason Owen-Smith receives research support from the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and Wellcome Leap.

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International

What’s Driving Industrial Development in the Southwest U.S.

The post-COVID-19 pandemic pipeline, supply imbalances, investment and construction challenges: these are just a few of the topics address by a powerhouse…

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March 13, 2024

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The post-COVID-19 pandemic pipeline, supply imbalances, investment and construction challenges: these are just a few of the topics address by a powerhouse panel of executives in industrial real estate this week at NAIOP’s I.CON West in Long Beach, California. Led by Dawn McCombs, principal and Denver lead industrial specialist for Avison Young, the panel tackled some of the biggest issues facing the sector in the Western U.S. 

Starting with the pandemic in 2020 and continuing through 2022, McCombs said, the industrial sector experienced a huge surge in demand, resulting in historic vacancies, rent growth and record deliveries. Operating fundamentals began to normalize in 2023 and construction starts declined, certainly impacting vacancy and absorption moving forward.  

“Development starts dropped by 65% year-over-year across the U.S. last year. In Q4, we were down 25% from pre-COVID norms,” began Megan Creecy-Herman, president, U.S. West Region, Prologis, noting that all of that is setting us up to see an improvement of fundamentals in the market. “U.S. vacancy ended 2023 at about 5%, which is very healthy.” 

Vacancies are expected to grow in Q1 and Q2, peaking mid-year at around 7%. Creecy-Herman expects to see an increase in absorption as customers begin to have confidence in the economy, and everyone gets some certainty on what the Fed does with interest rates. 

“It’s an interesting dynamic to see such a great increase in rents, which have almost doubled in some markets,” said Reon Roski, CEO, Majestic Realty Co. “It’s healthy to see a slowing down… before [rents] go back up.” 

Pre-pandemic, a lot of markets were used to 4-5% vacancy, said Brooke Birtcher Gustafson, fifth-generation president of Birtcher Development. “Everyone was a little tepid about where things are headed with a mediocre outlook for 2024, but much of this is normalizing in the Southwest markets.”  

McCombs asked the panel where their companies found themselves in the construction pipeline when the Fed raised rates in 2022.   

In Salt Lake City, said Angela Eldredge, chief operations officer at Price Real Estate, there is a typical 12-18-month lead time on construction materials. “As rates started to rise in 2022, lots of permits had already been pulled and construction starts were beginning, so those project deliveries were in fall 2023. [The slowdown] was good for our market because it kept rates high, vacancies lower and helped normalize the market to a healthy pace.” 

A supply imbalance can stress any market, and Gustafson joked that the current imbalance reminded her of a favorite quote from the movie Super Troopers: “Desperation is a stinky cologne.” “We’re all still a little crazed where this imbalance has put us, but for the patient investor and owner, there will be a rebalancing and opportunity for the good quality real estate to pass the sniff test,” she said.  

At Bircher, Gustafson said that mid-pandemic, there were predictions that one billion square feet of new product would be required to meet tenant demand, e-commerce growth and safety stock. That transition opened a great opportunity for investors to run at the goal. “In California, the entitlement process is lengthy, around 24-36 months to get from the start of an acquisition to the completion of a building,” she said. Fast forward to 2023-2024, a lot of what is being delivered in 2024 is the result of that chase.  

“Being an optimistic developer, there is good news. The supply imbalance helped normalize what was an unsustainable surge in rents and land values,” she said. “It allowed corporate heads of real estate to proactively evaluate growth opportunities, opened the door for contrarian investors to land bank as values drop, and provided tenants with options as there is more product. Investment goals and strategies have shifted, and that’s created opportunity for buyers.” 

“Developers only know how to run and develop as much as we can,” said Roski. “There are certain times in cycles that we are forced to slow down, which is a good thing. In the last few years, Majestic has delivered 12-14 million square feet, and this year we are developing 6-8 million square feet. It’s all part of the cycle.”  

Creecy-Herman noted that compared to the other asset classes and opportunities out there, including office and multifamily, industrial remains much more attractive for investment. “That was absolutely one of the things that underpinned the amount of investment we saw in a relatively short time period,” she said.  

Market rent growth across Los Angeles, Inland Empire and Orange County moved up more than 100% in a 24-month period. That created opportunities for landlords to flexible as they’re filling up their buildings. “Normalizing can be uncomfortable especially after that kind of historic high, but at the same time it’s setting us up for strong years ahead,” she said. 

Issues that owners and landlords are facing with not as much movement in the market is driving a change in strategy, noted Gustafson. “Comps are all over the place,” she said. “You have to dive deep into every single deal that is done to understand it and how investment strategies are changing.” 

Tenants experienced a variety of challenges in the pandemic years, from supply chain to labor shortages on the negative side, to increased demand for products on the positive, McCombs noted.  

“Prologis has about 6,700 customers around the world, from small to large, and the universal lesson [from the pandemic] is taking a more conservative posture on inventories,” Creecy-Herman said. “Customers are beefing up inventories, and that conservatism in the supply chain is a lesson learned that’s going to stick with us for a long time.” She noted that the company has plenty of clients who want to take more space but are waiting on more certainty from the broader economy.  

“E-commerce grew by 8% last year, and we think that’s going to accelerate to 10% this year. This is still less than 25% of all retail sales, so the acceleration we’re going to see in e-commerce… is going to drive the business forward for a long time,” she said. 

Roski noted that customers continually re-evaluate their warehouse locations, expanding during the pandemic and now consolidating but staying within one delivery day of vast consumer bases.  

“This is a generational change,” said Creecy-Herman. “Millions of young consumers have one-day delivery as a baseline for their shopping experience. Think of what this means for our business long term to help our customers meet these expectations.” 

McCombs asked the panelists what kind of leasing activity they are experiencing as a return to normalcy is expected in 2024. 

“During the pandemic, shifts in the ports and supply chain created a build up along the Mexican border,” said Roski, noting border towns’ importance to increased manufacturing in Mexico. A shift of populations out of California and into Arizona, Nevada, Texas and Florida have resulted in an expansion of warehouses in those markets. 

Eldridge said that Salt Lake City’s “sweet spot” is 100-200 million square feet, noting that the market is best described as a mid-box distribution hub that is close to California and Midwest markets. “Our location opens up the entire U.S. to our market, and it’s continuing to grow,” she said.   

The recent supply chain and West Coast port clogs prompted significant investment in nearshoring and port improvements. “Ports are always changing,” said Roski, listing a looming strike at East Coast ports, challenges with pirates in the Suez Canal, and water issues in the Panama Canal. “Companies used to fix on one port and that’s where they’d bring in their imports, but now see they need to be [bring product] in a couple of places.” 

“Laredo, [Texas,] is one of the largest ports in the U.S., and there’s no water. It’s trucks coming across the border. Companies have learned to be nimble and not focused on one area,” she said. 

“All of the markets in the southwest are becoming more interconnected and interdependent than they were previously,” Creecy-Herman said. “In Southern California, there are 10 markets within 500 miles with over 25 million consumers who spend, on average, 10% more than typical U.S. consumers.” Combined with the port complex, those fundamentals aren’t changing. Creecy-Herman noted that it’s less of a California exodus than it is a complementary strategy where customers are taking space in other markets as they grow. In the last 10 years, she noted there has been significant maturation of markets such as Las Vegas and Phoenix. As they’ve become more diversified, customers want to have a presence there. 

In the last decade, Gustafson said, the consumer base has shifted. Tenants continue to change strategies to adapt, such as hub-and-spoke approaches.  From an investment perspective, she said that strategies change weekly in response to market dynamics that are unprecedented.  

McCombs said that construction challenges and utility constraints have been compounded by increased demand for water and power. 

“Those are big issues from the beginning when we’re deciding on whether to buy the dirt, and another decision during construction,” Roski said. “In some markets, we order transformers more than a year before they are needed. Otherwise, the time comes [to use them] and we can’t get them. It’s a new dynamic of how leases are structured because it’s something that’s out of our control.” She noted that it’s becoming a bigger issue with electrification of cars, trucks and real estate, and the U.S. power grid is not prepared to handle it.  

Salt Lake City’s land constraints play a role in site selection, said Eldridge. “Land values of areas near water are skyrocketing.” 

The panelists agreed that a favorable outlook is ahead for 2024, and today’s rebalancing will drive a healthy industry in the future as demand and rates return to normalized levels, creating opportunities for investors, developers and tenants.  

This post is brought to you by JLL, the social media and conference blog sponsor of NAIOP’s I.CON West 2024. Learn more about JLL at www.us.jll.com or www.jll.ca.

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