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How Large Are Inflation Revisions? The Difficulty of Monitoring Prices in Real Time

With prices quickly going up after the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation releases have rarely been as present in the public debate as in recent years. However,…

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With prices quickly going up after the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation releases have rarely been as present in the public debate as in recent years. However, since inflation estimates are frequently revised, how precise are the real-time data releases? In this Liberty Street Economics post, we investigate the size and nature of revisions to inflation. We find that inflation estimates for a given month can change substantially as subsequent data vintages are released. As an example, consider March 2009. With the economy contracting amid the Global Financial Crisis, the twelve-month inflation rate for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy dropped from an initial estimate of 1.8 percent to 0.8 percent in the current series. The difference is dramatic and points to the difficulty of monitoring inflation in real time. Our results suggest that there is significant uncertainty in measuring inflation, and the key features of the recent spike and subsequent moderation of inflation may look quite different in hindsight once further revisions have taken place.

Historical Revisions to the PCE Price Index

There are two main measures of consumer price inflation in the United States: the PCE price index and the consumer price index (CPI). Measuring inflation accurately is challenging because it relies on extensive data collection, seasonal and other adjustments, and imputations. As a result, both the PCE price index and the (seasonally adjusted) CPI are revised over time. We begin by analyzing the PCE price index—the Federal Open Market Committee’s preferred inflation gauge—and document that the magnitude of these revisions is often substantial. This can be seen in the chart below which presents revisions to core PCE inflation, that is, inflation in PCE excluding food and energy components. In this post we focus on core inflation to show that revisions are not confined to the more volatile components.

Core PCE Inflation Revisions Can Be Sizable

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis is the fraction of inflation revisions falling in each bin. For example, 25 percent of inflation rates were revised down between 0 and 0.6 percentage points.

In other words, estimates of annualized monthly inflation in core PCE since 2001 were revised by as much as 6 percentage points and more than 15 percent of the revisions have been greater than one percentage point. Revisions are not only sizable but occur repeatedly since the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) revises PCE as part of the National Income and Product Accounts revision process. For example, the September 2018 number has been revised five times following its initial release: twice in the following months and three times further in July 2019, July 2020, and July 2021.

Our next chart shows that the final vintage of core PCE inflation can diverge markedly from the level of inflation implied by the initial one. We plot the year-over-year core PCE inflation rate at the time of the release against the current version of the series. Between 2004 and 2007, for example, the gap between these two series was about 0.4 percentage point. An even larger gap of about 1 percentage point opened late in 2008 and early in 2009 during the Great Recession. In fact, the initial estimates completely missed the large drop in inflation at that time. Toward the end of the sample period, the two series track one another more closely. This is likely because most revisions are yet to take place for the most recent period.

Core PCE Inflation’s Final Estimate Can Differ Substantially from the Initial One

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.

What Drives Revisions in the Core PCE Price Index?

Are revisions larger and more common for some subcomponents of the index? In the chart below, we show the difference between the initial and latest release of year-over-year inflation in core goods (goods inflation excluding food and energy) and core services (services inflation excluding energy services). We can see that both core goods and core services inflation are revised meaningfully although the magnitude of the revisions are generally larger and more persistent for core services. In fact, on average over our sample, the magnitude of revisions to core services is about double that of core goods.

Revisions in Core Services Inflation Are Generally Larger than for Core Goods Inflation

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.

The impact of revisions to these subcomponents onto revisions to core inflation are governed by the share of expenditures in these two subcategories. Over the last twenty years or so, the share of core services expenditures relative to core expenditures (all expenditures less expenditures on food and energy) is about 75 percent. Consequently, the dominant source of revisions to core inflation emerges from revisions to core services inflation. In the next chart we rescale the revisions of these two subcomponents based on their contribution to core inflation. Once they have been rescaled, we observe that almost all the revisions to core inflation originate from core services inflation.

Revisions in Core Services Are the Lion’s Share of Revisions to Core Inflation

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.

The PCE Price Index and the CPI

The consumer price index, the other key measure of inflation in the United States, is also revised on a yearly basis. These revisions tend to be smaller than for the PCE price index, since revisions in the CPI come entirely from updates in the seasonal adjustment factors. As can be seen in the chart below, revisions to monthly CPI inflation have a mass point at zero and they are almost never greater than 1 percentage point in annualized terms.

Core CPI Revisions Are Smaller than Core PCE Revisions

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis is the fraction of inflation revisions falling in each bin. For example, 25 percent of inflation rates were revised down between 0 and 0.6 percentage points.

Importantly, since revisions to CPI inflation arise solely from changes to the seasonal adjustment factors, year-over-year CPI inflation is (essentially) never revised. A natural question is whether the initial or final release of PCE inflation is closer to CPI inflation. The chart below shows that no clear pattern stands out. There are periods when revisions in PCE inflation make the final series closer to CPI inflation, such as over the periods 2005-07 and 2013-15. There are also periods when revisions in PCE inflation cause it to diverge from CPI inflation, as was the case during the Great Recession.

Core CPI Inflation Is Not a Consistent Signal of the Directions of Revisions to Core PCE Inflation

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.

Conclusion

We have shown that differences between PCE inflation for all vintages and CPI inflation can be substantial. For example, over the period from 2001-18 the differences between year-over-year core PCE inflation based on the initial release versus the final series were large. The gap ranged from -1 to 1.6 percentage point and 90 percent of the time was between -0.5 and 0.5 percentage point. Taken plainly, these gaps would suggest a plausible range for the current year-over-year core PCE inflation rate of as high as about 4.7 percent and as low as around 3.7 percent. Our results show the significant uncertainty surrounding the measurement of inflation in real time, which adds to the challenges faced by policymakers, analysts and the general public in analyzing inflation.

Inflation Revisions Data

Richard Audoly is a research economist in Labor and Product Market Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Martín Almuzara is a research economist in Macroeconomic and Monetary Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Richard K. Crump is a financial research advisor in Macrofinance Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Davide Melcangi is a research economist in Labor and Product Market Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Roshie Xing is a research analyst in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

How to cite this post:
Richard Audoly, Martín Almuzara, Richard Crump, Davide Melcangi, and Roshie Xing, “How Large Are Inflation Revisions? The Difficulty of Monitoring Prices in Real Time,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, September 7, 2023, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2023/09/how-large-are-inflation-revisions-the-difficulty-of-monitoring-prices-in-real-time/.


Disclaimer
The views expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s).

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February Employment Situation

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000…

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By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000 average over the previous 12 months. The payroll data for January and December were revised down by a total of 167,000. The private sector added 223,000 new jobs, the largest gain since May of last year.

Temporary help services employment continues a steep decline after a sharp post-pandemic rise.

Average hours of work increased from 34.2 to 34.3. The increase, along with the 223,000 private employment increase led to a hefty increase in total hours of 5.6% at an annualized rate, also the largest increase since May of last year.

The establishment report, once again, beat “expectations;” the WSJ survey of economists was 198,000. Other than the downward revisions, mentioned above, another bit of negative news was a smallish increase in wage growth, from $34.52 to $34.57.

The household survey shows that the labor force increased 150,000, a drop in employment of 184,000 and an increase in the number of unemployed persons of 334,000. The labor force participation rate held steady at 62.5, the employment to population ratio decreased from 60.2 to 60.1 and the unemployment rate increased from 3.66 to 3.86. Remember that the unemployment rate is the number of unemployed relative to the labor force (the number employed plus the number unemployed). Consequently, the unemployment rate can go up if the number of unemployed rises holding fixed the labor force, or if the labor force shrinks holding the number unemployed unchanged. An increase in the unemployment rate is not necessarily a bad thing: it may reflect a strong labor market drawing “marginally attached” individuals from outside the labor force. Indeed, there was a 96,000 decline in those workers.

Earlier in the week, the BLS announced JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) data for January. There isn’t much to report here as the job openings changed little at 8.9 million, the number of hires and total separations were little changed at 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively.

As has been the case for the last couple of years, the number of job openings remains higher than the number of unemployed persons.

Also earlier in the week the BLS announced that productivity increased 3.2% in the 4th quarter with output rising 3.5% and hours of work rising 0.3%.

The bottom line is that the labor market continues its surprisingly (to some) strong performance, once again proving stronger than many had expected. This strength makes it difficult to justify any interest rate cuts soon, particularly given the recent inflation spike.

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Mortgage rates fall as labor market normalizes

Jobless claims show an expanding economy. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

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Everyone was waiting to see if this week’s jobs report would send mortgage rates higher, which is what happened last month. Instead, the 10-year yield had a muted response after the headline number beat estimates, but we have negative job revisions from previous months. The Federal Reserve’s fear of wage growth spiraling out of control hasn’t materialized for over two years now and the unemployment rate ticked up to 3.9%. For now, we can say the labor market isn’t tight anymore, but it’s also not breaking.

The key labor data line in this expansion is the weekly jobless claims report. Jobless claims show an expanding economy that has not lost jobs yet. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

From the Fed: In the week ended March 2, initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits were flat, at 217,000. The four-week moving average declined slightly by 750, to 212,250


Below is an explanation of how we got here with the labor market, which all started during COVID-19.

1. I wrote the COVID-19 recovery model on April 7, 2020, and retired it on Dec. 9, 2020. By that time, the upfront recovery phase was done, and I needed to model out when we would get the jobs lost back.

2. Early in the labor market recovery, when we saw weaker job reports, I doubled and tripled down on my assertion that job openings would get to 10 million in this recovery. Job openings rose as high as to 12 million and are currently over 9 million. Even with the massive miss on a job report in May 2021, I didn’t waver.

Currently, the jobs openings, quit percentage and hires data are below pre-COVID-19 levels, which means the labor market isn’t as tight as it once was, and this is why the employment cost index has been slowing data to move along the quits percentage.  

2-US_Job_Quits_Rate-1-2

3. I wrote that we should get back all the jobs lost to COVID-19 by September of 2022. At the time this would be a speedy labor market recovery, and it happened on schedule, too

Total employment data

4. This is the key one for right now: If COVID-19 hadn’t happened, we would have between 157 million and 159 million jobs today, which would have been in line with the job growth rate in February 2020. Today, we are at 157,808,000. This is important because job growth should be cooling down now. We are more in line with where the labor market should be when averaging 140K-165K monthly. So for now, the fact that we aren’t trending between 140K-165K means we still have a bit more recovery kick left before we get down to those levels. 




From BLS: Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 275,000 in February, and the unemployment rate increased to 3.9 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Job gains occurred in health care, in government, in food services and drinking places, in social assistance, and in transportation and warehousing.

Here are the jobs that were created and lost in the previous month:

IMG_5092

In this jobs report, the unemployment rate for education levels looks like this:

  • Less than a high school diploma: 6.1%
  • High school graduate and no college: 4.2%
  • Some college or associate degree: 3.1%
  • Bachelor’s degree or higher: 2.2%
IMG_5093_320f22

Today’s report has continued the trend of the labor data beating my expectations, only because I am looking for the jobs data to slow down to a level of 140K-165K, which hasn’t happened yet. I wouldn’t categorize the labor market as being tight anymore because of the quits ratio and the hires data in the job openings report. This also shows itself in the employment cost index as well. These are key data lines for the Fed and the reason we are going to see three rate cuts this year.

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January…

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January jobs report was the "most ridiculous in recent history" but, boy, were we wrong because this morning the Biden department of goalseeked propaganda (aka BLS) published the February jobs report, and holy crap was that something else. Even Goebbels would blush. 

What happened? Let's take a closer look.

On the surface, it was (almost) another blockbuster jobs report, certainly one which nobody expected, or rather just one bank out of 76 expected. Starting at the top, the BLS reported that in February the US unexpectedly added 275K jobs, with just one research analyst (from Dai-Ichi Research) expecting a higher number.

Some context: after last month's record 4-sigma beat, today's print was "only" 3 sigma higher than estimates. Needless to say, two multiple sigma beats in a row used to only happen in the USSR... and now in the US, apparently.

Before we go any further, a quick note on what last month we said was "the most ridiculous jobs report in recent history": it appears the BLS read our comments and decided to stop beclowing itself. It did that by slashing last month's ridiculous print by over a third, and revising what was originally reported as a massive 353K beat to just 229K,  a 124K revision, which was the biggest one-month negative revision in two years!

Of course, that does not mean that this month's jobs print won't be revised lower: it will be, and not just that month but every other month until the November election because that's the only tool left in the Biden admin's box: pretend the economic and jobs are strong, then revise them sharply lower the next month, something we pointed out first last summer and which has not failed to disappoint once.

To be fair, not every aspect of the jobs report was stellar (after all, the BLS had to give it some vague credibility). Take the unemployment rate, after flatlining between 3.4% and 3.8% for two years - and thus denying expectations from Sahm's Rule that a recession may have already started - in February the unemployment rate unexpectedly jumped to 3.9%, the highest since February 2022 (with Black unemployment spiking by 0.3% to 5.6%, an indicator which the Biden admin will quickly slam as widespread economic racism or something).

And then there were average hourly earnings, which after surging 0.6% MoM in January (since revised to 0.5%) and spooking markets that wage growth is so hot, the Fed will have no choice but to delay cuts, in February the number tumbled to just 0.1%, the lowest in two years...

... for one simple reason: last month's average wage surge had nothing to do with actual wages, and everything to do with the BLS estimate of hours worked (which is the denominator in the average wage calculation) which last month tumbled to just 34.1 (we were led to believe) the lowest since the covid pandemic...

... but has since been revised higher while the February print rose even more, to 34.3, hence why the latest average wage data was once again a product not of wages going up, but of how long Americans worked in any weekly period, in this case higher from 34.1 to 34.3, an increase which has a major impact on the average calculation.

While the above data points were examples of some latent weakness in the latest report, perhaps meant to give it a sheen of veracity, it was everything else in the report that was a problem starting with the BLS's latest choice of seasonal adjustments (after last month's wholesale revision), which have gone from merely laughable to full clownshow, as the following comparison between the monthly change in BLS and ADP payrolls shows. The trend is clear: the Biden admin numbers are now clearly rising even as the impartial ADP (which directly logs employment numbers at the company level and is far more accurate), shows an accelerating slowdown.

But it's more than just the Biden admin hanging its "success" on seasonal adjustments: when one digs deeper inside the jobs report, all sorts of ugly things emerge... such as the growing unprecedented divergence between the Establishment (payrolls) survey and much more accurate Household (actual employment) survey. To wit, while in January the BLS claims 275K payrolls were added, the Household survey found that the number of actually employed workers dropped for the third straight month (and 4 in the past 5), this time by 184K (from 161.152K to 160.968K).

This means that while the Payrolls series hits new all time highs every month since December 2020 (when according to the BLS the US had its last month of payrolls losses), the level of Employment has not budged in the past year. Worse, as shown in the chart below, such a gaping divergence has opened between the two series in the past 4 years, that the number of Employed workers would need to soar by 9 million (!) to catch up to what Payrolls claims is the employment situation.

There's more: shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative assessment, reveals just how ugly the composition of "new jobs" has been. Consider this: the BLS reports that in February 2024, the US had 132.9 million full-time jobs and 27.9 million part-time jobs. Well, that's great... until you look back one year and find that in February 2023 the US had 133.2 million full-time jobs, or more than it does one year later! And yes, all the job growth since then has been in part-time jobs, which have increased by 921K since February 2023 (from 27.020 million to 27.941 million).

Here is a summary of the labor composition in the past year: all the new jobs have been part-time jobs!

But wait there's even more, because now that the primary season is over and we enter the heart of election season and political talking points will be thrown around left and right, especially in the context of the immigration crisis created intentionally by the Biden administration which is hoping to import millions of new Democratic voters (maybe the US can hold the presidential election in Honduras or Guatemala, after all it is their citizens that will be illegally casting the key votes in November), what we find is that in February, the number of native-born workers tumbled again, sliding by a massive 560K to just 129.807 million. Add to this the December data, and we get a near-record 2.4 million plunge in native-born workers in just the past 3 months (only the covid crash was worse)!

The offset? A record 1.2 million foreign-born (read immigrants, both legal and illegal but mostly illegal) workers added in February!

Said otherwise, not only has all job creation in the past 6 years has been exclusively for foreign-born workers...

Source: St Louis Fed FRED Native Born and Foreign Born

... but there has been zero job-creation for native born workers since June 2018!

This is a huge issue - especially at a time of an illegal alien flood at the southwest border...

... and is about to become a huge political scandal, because once the inevitable recession finally hits, there will be millions of furious unemployed Americans demanding a more accurate explanation for what happened - i.e., the illegal immigration floodgates that were opened by the Biden admin.

Which is also why Biden's handlers will do everything in their power to insure there is no official recession before November... and why after the election is over, all economic hell will finally break loose. Until then, however, expect the jobs numbers to get even more ridiculous.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/08/2024 - 13:30

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