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Q&A with Sharon Peacock, head of UK effort to sequence SARS-CoV-2

How the UK came to be the world leader in sequencing SARS-CoV-2, in the words of the person who made it all happen.

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Sharon Peacock, Author provided

The UK is a world leader in sequencing SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. Of all the coronavirus genomes that have been sequenced in the world, nearly half have been sequenced by COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium (Cog-UK). The consortium began life on March 4 when Sharon Peacock, a professor of public health and microbiology at the University of Cambridge, emailed a handful of scientists and asked for their help. The Conversation spoke to Professor Peacock about that day and what happened after.

Q: When did you first get the idea to set up Cog-UK? And how was it formed?

In late February 2020, it dawned on me that we were going to need genome sequencing capabilities across the UK for the novel coronavirus. It was predictable that the virus was going to develop mutations that could become problematic.

On March 4, I emailed five colleagues, asking if they’d be interested in helping me set up a UK sequencing consortium. A week later we met at the Wellcome building on Euston Road in London with the aim of thrashing out a plan. We looked to draw in people who might be able to help us put together a blueprint and a network for sequencing in the UK.

There were about 20 people in the meeting. They were clinical virologists, experts in human genomes and pathogen genomes, epidemiologists and immunologists. During that day, we worked through what we thought an end-to-end sequencing pipeline would be, and we debated whether the sequencing would be centralised or distributed or both, and who would do what. By the end of the day, we had the blueprint.

The notes from the meeting were written up into a formal proposal for Sir Patrick Vallance, the UK government’s chief scientific adviser.

It’s unusual because if you have four public health agencies and lots of researchers from different institutions and the NHS, it would take a year or more to do something like that normally. But we just sat down and did it, and that’s how Cog-UK was born.

Q: How did you get funding?

The application was on Sir Patrick Vallance’s desk by March 15. He and Professor Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer for England, had what they called a “COVID-19 fighting fund”. They reviewed our proposal and strongly supported it.

I also contacted Sir Mike Stratton, director of the Wellcome Sanger Institute in Cambridge. I asked Mike if they could support us as they have the technology to do large-scale sequencing. He said yes, and since then, Sanger has contributed a great deal.

So at the outset, we got about £14.5 million from the government, plus in-kind funding from Sanger, which together came to a total of around £20 million.

We started on April 1, but we’d already done quite a lot of sequencing by then. About 260 coronavirus sequences were already in the bag.

Q: So the sequencing began even before Cog-UK was launched?

Because a lot of people had sequencing instruments and expertise, they had already started work. There are sequencing instruments in labs across the country. We hadn’t catalogued where or what at that stage. And, in fact, we weren’t particularly prescriptive about what types of sequencing instruments we asked the labs to use. People used what they thought worked well for them.

Q: How did other scientists react?

They were hugely supportive. Some people were worried that the virus would not accumulate enough mutations to make it worth our while. It would mean that we would end up sequencing the same virus over and over again because it only mutates once or twice a month. It could all have been a waste of time.

What we hadn’t bargained for was the 100 million cases – but perhaps even as high as a billion, if you include undiagnosed cases. And each time the virus infects a person it has an opportunity to make a mistake in its genome.

We considered the risk of lack of genetic variation, but went ahead. What we did was rather bold at the time.

Q: How does it work in practice, from the time someone is swabbed to the time the sequence is uploaded onto the shared Gisaid database that holds all of the world’s sequences of SARS-CoV-2?

Laboratory testing for COVID-19 using the so-called PCR test in the UK is roughly divided into two testing pathways. If you are hospitalised with COVID-19, your sample will get tested in a local laboratory. We call that pillar one.

Cog-UK collects samples from about 90 different laboratories at the moment, which is quite a logistical challenge. These are sent to regional sequencing hubs that focus mostly on sequencing from their region. These are really important samples because they are from the sickest people with COVID-19.

Pillar two testing is done in the Lighthouse labs, which were set up to analyse community testing samples. These are sequenced at the Wellcome Sanger Institute.

We also provide sequencing to major government projects, like the Office for National Statistics study. We also support the React study, [a major programme of home testing for COVID-19 to track the progress of the infection across England] and vaccine trials.

We can’t sequence all of the positive samples at the moment. When we first started, we were aiming for a minimum of 10%. At the moment it’s under 10%, but we hope to get to around 20%, and we’ll build from there.

Q: And as a total of the viruses sequenced in the world, what proportion is Cog-UK sequencing, and how does it compare with other countries?

We have sequenced about 45% to 48% of all SARS-CoV-2 genomes in the Gisaid database.

Q: Given the importance of tracking mutations, are other countries starting to increase their sequencing efforts?

Yes. The country where I think we will see a big shift is the US because of all the changes they’re making in their response to the pandemic. I would anticipate quite a few other countries beginning to come up, too. I know that Germany is looking to increase its sequencing capacity. But there are some really big gaps in the map.

Q: Worrying coronavirus variants have been widely reported on in the last few months. The so-called “UK variant”, B117, was raised as a concern in November, but the sample was from September. Is that right?

Yes, September 20. There were very few cases of B117 initially, and it’s one of hundreds of different variants. So there was no reason to be concerned about it initially. We are learning all the time about which mutations might be important, particularly when they crop up all around the world. So the first time the UK variant was in the database, you probably wouldn’t give it a second thought. It’s only once you start to learn about what the mutations really mean, or when an event occurs, that you start to zoom in on specific variants. And with B117, Public Health England noticed that there was a surge in cases in Kent, which was odd because there was a lockdown and there weren’t any surges elsewhere. That was a striking observation.

So that could be due to human behaviour, such as a super-spreader event. It was at that point, towards the beginning of December, that it became clear that there was not only a surge in cases, but those cases were caused by B117. It had a really striking genome in that it had 23 mutations, which were far more than we were used to seeing. That’s when researchers began to find evidence that it was more transmissible. And it took a bit longer to do the essential science so that we could be certain that this variant was indeed associated with increased transmission.

Q: Why are we suddenly seeing all of these mutations that give the coronavirus an advantage now?

It’s not the first time that we have observed mutations that have given the virus an advantage. At the end of March 2020, we noticed something for the first time in the UK: a mutation in the spike protein called D614G. This wasn’t in the original virus that was first detected in China. But the virus with this mutation rapidly expanded and replaced the other viral lineages circulating at the time.

We talked about this at Sage, the government’s scientific advisory group for emergencies, quite early on. And we calculated that it caused an increase in the R0, which represents the average number of people infected by one infectious individual. So we knew then that this type of event could happen – it was a practice run for more serious variants to come.

The D614G mutation gave the virus a modest increase in transmissibility. But it swept across the world. It’s now present in almost all SARS-CoV-2 viruses.

The next variant to worry people emerged in Denmark and was related to SARS-CoV-2 being transmitted between mink and people – referred to as the “cluster 5 variant”. People were concerned that evolution had been accelerated by passage through mink and had been transmitted back to humans. But only 12 people in Denmark were ever found to have that variant. So that fizzled.

A third worrying variant emerged in Spain in the summer. It seemed to be spreading very quickly around Europe. One possible reason for this was a particular mutation in the spike protein. But over time it became clear that it was being transmitted because people were moving around on their summer holidays. There was no evidence that it was more transmissible.

We also reported to Sage another mutation in the spike protein last October, called N439K. And that change in the spike protein appears to affect the body’s immune response, at least based on laboratory experiments.

So the idea that variants have only just arisen is not the case. We’ve been talking about variants since the early days of the pandemic, which might surprise some people.

Q: Is the original virus from Wuhan still around?

Lineages can expand and then go extinct, so we don’t expect the same lineage to necessarily be around forever. This was shown by work in Wales and in Scotland, where they looked at the lineages in the first wave and then in the second wave.

In the first wave, these were largely imported from Europe. In the summer as cases fell, most of those original lineages disappeared. Then, in the second wave, numerous new lineages were introduced from overseas, which kicked off the second wave. So it’s quite a dynamic process. As particular lineages have a fitness advantage, then that is probably what is circulating at any particular time.

Q: Is there a base type that you compare changes against? And is it the original virus or the current dominant variant?

We compare changes against the original virus sequenced in Wuhan in January 2020 – it’s the reference genome. But it’s quite confusing because different groups use different names and different naming conventions. I hope that the World Health Organization will help us to reach a common international nomenclature.

It worries me that people name variants after where they were first identified. Evolution is not a function of geography, it’s a function of nature. I very much hope that we move away from calling coronaviruses, the UK variant or the South African variant or the Brazilian variant. I tend to try and say the variant first detected in South Africa, or whatever. Because it could be quite stigmatising in the longer term.

Q: Is a certain amount of evolutionary selective pressure created when we start to vaccinate lots of people? Or is the greater number of people in which the virus has the opportunity to mutate the greater problem of the two?

At the moment, I think it’s the number of cases that is important because the variant detected in the UK emerged when vaccines weren’t yet being rolled out, but when cases were high. And the same is true in South Africa and Brazil.

Some people have contacted me to say: “Do you think it was the vaccine trials that led variants to emerge?” But if you compare the relatively small number of people who’ve been in vaccine trials versus the very large number of people who are infected – 100 million people infected. I think the biggest driver of mutation emerging is the number of opportunities the virus has had to mutate.

And people say, “Well, isn’t the vaccine going to drive the emergence of new variants?” It may be one of the pressures, but if you’re in a population where, say, 50% have been infected and have so-called “natural immunity”, then it doesn’t matter how you get the immunity to the virus, the virus will try to find a chink in that armour. But in that instance, it’s a naturally acquired infection rather than immunisation. So this problem has been around long before vaccination.

Q: And of the variants of concern that we know of, which one is the most worrying?

Right now, it’s the variant first detected in South Africa. It has already been reported in 31 countries and identified in 750 sequences so far. Although this is probably a gross underestimate because quite a few countries that surround South Africa do not have sequencing capacity at the moment. This variant appears to be more transmissible in South Africa and reduces the effectiveness of our immune response, be that from natural infection or vaccination.

P1 is also on the watch list. This variant first identified in Brazil has mutations associated with being more transmissible and with a reduced immune response. If you look at the global spread of P1 though, unlike some of the other variants, I don’t really see it taking hold at the moment. It’s been linked to just nine countries so far.

I’m also looking at what else might be emerging in the coming weeks and months. What I’m particularly concerned about is that now that B117 causes almost all COVID-19 cases in the UK – what new mutations will arise in this? This new variant is likely to start to develop constellations of different mutations in its descendants. And what I’m watching for is something like E484K, the “escape mutation”, being increasingly found in B117. So far, this has arisen independently several times and includes a cluster of cases in Bristol and south-west England, but the number of cases is low.

Q: How important is what Cog-UK does to the vaccine effort?

Sequencing is absolutely integral to vaccine development. We are going to need to have sequence data.

We’re going to need to keep sequencing for the foreseeable future so that we can adapt our vaccines to keep them effective. It’s going to be a long-term job to run the two in parallel. Vaccine manufacturers are already working to tweak their vaccines for the South Africa variant, for example, to make sure it’s going to be effective against that variant.

There are going to be new variants arising in the future and we’re going to have to adapt our response to these as we go along. Sequencing and vaccine development are key partners. I suspect that this is going to be ongoing throughout my life and beyond. Of concern is that we don’t have global coverage, so we are not sighted globally in terms of new variants.

Q: So it’s going to be like the flu vaccine every year, depending on how long immunity lasts?

Yes, quite similar, but it might be a bit less predictable than a single vaccine booster each year. SARS-CoV-2 could ratchet up its characteristics over time, and the diversity of mutation combinations in different variants could change over time. So it could be more complex than flu.

We’ve also known that immunity wanes over time. So we’re going to have to be thinking about long-term strategies with this virus.

Sharon Peacock receives funding from UKRI and DHSC

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Illegal Immigrants Leave US Hospitals With Billions In Unpaid Bills

Illegal Immigrants Leave US Hospitals With Billions In Unpaid Bills

By Autumn Spredemann of The Epoch Times

Tens of thousands of illegal…

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Illegal Immigrants Leave US Hospitals With Billions In Unpaid Bills

By Autumn Spredemann of The Epoch Times

Tens of thousands of illegal immigrants are flooding into U.S. hospitals for treatment and leaving billions in uncompensated health care costs in their wake.

The House Committee on Homeland Security recently released a report illustrating that from the estimated $451 billion in annual costs stemming from the U.S. border crisis, a significant portion is going to health care for illegal immigrants.

With the majority of the illegal immigrant population lacking any kind of medical insurance, hospitals and government welfare programs such as Medicaid are feeling the weight of these unanticipated costs.

Apprehensions of illegal immigrants at the U.S. border have jumped 48 percent since the record in fiscal year 2021 and nearly tripled since fiscal year 2019, according to Customs and Border Protection data.

Last year broke a new record high for illegal border crossings, surpassing more than 3.2 million apprehensions.

And with that sea of humanity comes the need for health care and, in most cases, the inability to pay for it.

In January, CEO of Denver Health Donna Lynne told reporters that 8,000 illegal immigrants made roughly 20,000 visits to the city’s health system in 2023.

The total bill for uncompensated care costs last year to the system totaled $140 million, said Dane Roper, public information officer for Denver Health. More than $10 million of it was attributed to “care for new immigrants,” he told The Epoch Times.

Though the amount of debt assigned to illegal immigrants is a fraction of the total, uncompensated care costs in the Denver Health system have risen dramatically over the past few years.

The total uncompensated costs in 2020 came to $60 million, Mr. Roper said. In 2022, the number doubled, hitting $120 million.

He also said their city hospitals are treating issues such as “respiratory illnesses, GI [gastro-intenstinal] illnesses, dental disease, and some common chronic illnesses such as asthma and diabetes.”

“The perspective we’ve been trying to emphasize all along is that providing healthcare services for an influx of new immigrants who are unable to pay for their care is adding additional strain to an already significant uncompensated care burden,” Mr. Roper said.

He added this is why a local, state, and federal response to the needs of the new illegal immigrant population is “so important.”

Colorado is far from the only state struggling with a trail of unpaid hospital bills.

EMS medics with the Houston Fire Department transport a Mexican woman the hospital in Houston on Aug. 12, 2020. (John Moore/Getty Images)

Dr. Robert Trenschel, CEO of the Yuma Regional Medical Center situated on the Arizona–Mexico border, said on average, illegal immigrants cost up to three times more in human resources to resolve their cases and provide a safe discharge.

“Some [illegal] migrants come with minor ailments, but many of them come in with significant disease,” Dr. Trenschel said during a congressional hearing last year.

“We’ve had migrant patients on dialysis, cardiac catheterization, and in need of heart surgery. Many are very sick.”

He said many illegal immigrants who enter the country and need medical assistance end up staying in the ICU ward for 60 days or more.

A large portion of the patients are pregnant women who’ve had little to no prenatal treatment. This has resulted in an increase in babies being born that require neonatal care for 30 days or longer.

Dr. Trenschel told The Epoch Times last year that illegal immigrants were overrunning healthcare services in his town, leaving the hospital with $26 million in unpaid medical bills in just 12 months.

ER Duty to Care

The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act of 1986 requires that public hospitals participating in Medicare “must medically screen all persons seeking emergency care … regardless of payment method or insurance status.”

The numbers are difficult to gauge as the policy position of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is that it “will not require hospital staff to ask patients directly about their citizenship or immigration status.”

In southern California, again close to the border with Mexico, some hospitals are struggling with an influx of illegal immigrants.

American patients are enduring longer wait times for doctor appointments due to a nursing shortage in the state, two health care professionals told The Epoch Times in January.

A health care worker at a hospital in Southern California, who asked not to be named for fear of losing her job, told The Epoch Times that “the entire health care system is just being bombarded” by a steady stream of illegal immigrants.

“Our healthcare system is so overwhelmed, and then add on top of that tuberculosis, COVID-19, and other diseases from all over the world,” she said.

A Salvadorian man is aided by medical workers after cutting his leg while trying to jump on a truck in Matias Romero, Mexico, on Nov. 2, 2018. (Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

A newly-enacted law in California provides free healthcare for all illegal immigrants residing in the state. The law could cost taxpayers between $3 billion and $6 billion per year, according to recent estimates by state and federal lawmakers.

In New York, where the illegal immigration crisis has manifested most notably beyond the southern border, city and state officials have long been accommodating of illegal immigrants’ healthcare costs.

Since June 2014, when then-mayor Bill de Blasio set up The Task Force on Immigrant Health Care Access, New York City has worked to expand avenues for illegal immigrants to get free health care.

“New York City has a moral duty to ensure that all its residents have meaningful access to needed health care, regardless of their immigration status or ability to pay,” Mr. de Blasio stated in a 2015 report.

The report notes that in 2013, nearly 64 percent of illegal immigrants were uninsured. Since then, tens of thousands of illegal immigrants have settled in the city.

“The uninsured rate for undocumented immigrants is more than three times that of other noncitizens in New York City (20 percent) and more than six times greater than the uninsured rate for the rest of the city (10 percent),” the report states.

The report states that because healthcare providers don’t ask patients about documentation status, the task force lacks “data specific to undocumented patients.”

Some health care providers say a big part of the issue is that without a clear path to insurance or payment for non-emergency services, illegal immigrants are going to the hospital due to a lack of options.

“It’s insane, and it has been for years at this point,” Dana, a Texas emergency room nurse who asked to have her full name omitted, told The Epoch Times.

Working for a major hospital system in the greater Houston area, Dana has seen “a zillion” migrants pass through under her watch with “no end in sight.” She said many who are illegal immigrants arrive with treatable illnesses that require simple antibiotics. “Not a lot of GPs [general practitioners] will see you if you can’t pay and don’t have insurance.”

She said the “undocumented crowd” tends to arrive with a lot of the same conditions. Many find their way to Houston not long after crossing the southern border. Some of the common health issues Dana encounters include dehydration, unhealed fractures, respiratory illnesses, stomach ailments, and pregnancy-related concerns.

“This isn’t a new problem, it’s just worse now,” Dana said.

Emergency room nurses and EMTs tend to patients in hallways at the Houston Methodist The Woodlands Hospital in Houston on Aug. 18, 2021. (Brandon Bell/Getty Images)

Medicaid Factor

One of the main government healthcare resources illegal immigrants use is Medicaid.

All those who don’t qualify for regular Medicaid are eligible for Emergency Medicaid, regardless of immigration status. By doing this, the program helps pay for the cost of uncompensated care bills at qualifying hospitals.

However, some loopholes allow access to the regular Medicaid benefits. “Qualified noncitizens” who haven’t been granted legal status within five years still qualify if they’re listed as a refugee, an asylum seeker, or a Cuban or Haitian national.

Yet the lion’s share of Medicaid usage by illegal immigrants still comes through state-level benefits and emergency medical treatment.

A Congressional report highlighted data from the CMS, which showed total Medicaid costs for “emergency services for undocumented aliens” in fiscal year 2021 surpassed $7 billion, and totaled more than $5 billion in fiscal 2022.

Both years represent a significant spike from the $3 billion in fiscal 2020.

An employee working with Medicaid who asked to be referred to only as Jennifer out of concern for her job, told The Epoch Times that at a state level, it’s easy for an illegal immigrant to access the program benefits.

Jennifer said that when exceptions are sent from states to CMS for approval, “denial is actually super rare. It’s usually always approved.”

She also said it comes as no surprise that many of the states with the highest amount of Medicaid spending are sanctuary states, which tend to have policies and laws that shield illegal immigrants from federal immigration authorities.

Moreover, Jennifer said there are ways for states to get around CMS guidelines. “It’s not easy, but it can and has been done.”

The first generation of illegal immigrants who arrive to the United States tend to be healthy enough to pass any pre-screenings, but Jennifer has observed that the subsequent generations tend to be sicker and require more access to care. If a family is illegally present, they tend to use Emergency Medicaid or nothing at all.

The Epoch Times asked Medicaid Services to provide the most recent data for the total uncompensated care that hospitals have reported. The agency didn’t respond.

Continue reading over at The Epoch Times

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/15/2024 - 09:45

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Fuel poverty in England is probably 2.5 times higher than government statistics show

The top 40% most energy efficient homes aren’t counted as being in fuel poverty, no matter what their bills or income are.

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Julian Hochgesang|Unsplash

The cap set on how much UK energy suppliers can charge for domestic gas and electricity is set to fall by 15% from April 1 2024. Despite this, prices remain shockingly high. The average household energy bill in 2023 was £2,592 a year, dwarfing the pre-pandemic average of £1,308 in 2019.

The term “fuel poverty” refers to a household’s ability to afford the energy required to maintain adequate warmth and the use of other essential appliances. Quite how it is measured varies from country to country. In England, the government uses what is known as the low income low energy efficiency (Lilee) indicator.

Since energy costs started rising sharply in 2021, UK households’ spending powers have plummeted. It would be reasonable to assume that these increasingly hostile economic conditions have caused fuel poverty rates to rise.

However, according to the Lilee fuel poverty metric, in England there have only been modest changes in fuel poverty incidence year on year. In fact, government statistics show a slight decrease in the nationwide rate, from 13.2% in 2020 to 13.0% in 2023.

Our recent study suggests that these figures are incorrect. We estimate the rate of fuel poverty in England to be around 2.5 times higher than what the government’s statistics show, because the criteria underpinning the Lilee estimation process leaves out a large number of financially vulnerable households which, in reality, are unable to afford and maintain adequate warmth.

Blocks of flats in London.
Household fuel poverty in England is calculated on the basis of the energy efficiency of the home. Igor Sporynin|Unsplash

Energy security

In 2022, we undertook an in-depth analysis of Lilee fuel poverty in Greater London. First, we combined fuel poverty, housing and employment data to provide an estimate of vulnerable homes which are omitted from Lilee statistics.

We also surveyed 2,886 residents of Greater London about their experiences of fuel poverty during the winter of 2022. We wanted to gauge energy security, which refers to a type of self-reported fuel poverty. Both parts of the study aimed to demonstrate the potential flaws of the Lilee definition.

Introduced in 2019, the Lilee metric considers a household to be “fuel poor” if it meets two criteria. First, after accounting for energy expenses, its income must fall below the poverty line (which is 60% of median income).

Second, the property must have an energy performance certificate (EPC) rating of D–G (the lowest four ratings). The government’s apparent logic for the Lilee metric is to quicken the net-zero transition of the housing sector.

In Sustainable Warmth, the policy paper that defined the Lilee approach, the government says that EPC A–C-rated homes “will not significantly benefit from energy-efficiency measures”. Hence, the focus on fuel poverty in D–G-rated properties.

Generally speaking, EPC A–C-rated homes (those with the highest three ratings) are considered energy efficient, while D–G-rated homes are deemed inefficient. The problem with how Lilee fuel poverty is measured is that the process assumes that EPC A–C-rated homes are too “energy efficient” to be considered fuel poor: the main focus of the fuel poverty assessment is a characteristic of the property, not the occupant’s financial situation.

In other words, by this metric, anyone living in an energy-efficient home cannot be considered to be in fuel poverty, no matter their financial situation. There is an obvious flaw here.

Around 40% of homes in England have an EPC rating of A–C. According to the Lilee definition, none of these homes can or ever will be classed as fuel poor. Even though energy prices are going through the roof, a single-parent household with dependent children whose only income is universal credit (or some other form of benefits) will still not be considered to be living in fuel poverty if their home is rated A-C.

The lack of protection afforded to these households against an extremely volatile energy market is highly concerning.

In our study, we estimate that 4.4% of London’s homes are rated A-C and also financially vulnerable. That is around 171,091 households, which are currently omitted by the Lilee metric but remain highly likely to be unable to afford adequate energy.

In most other European nations, what is known as the 10% indicator is used to gauge fuel poverty. This metric, which was also used in England from the 1990s until the mid 2010s, considers a home to be fuel poor if more than 10% of income is spent on energy. Here, the main focus of the fuel poverty assessment is the occupant’s financial situation, not the property.

Were such alternative fuel poverty metrics to be employed, a significant portion of those 171,091 households in London would almost certainly qualify as fuel poor.

This is confirmed by the findings of our survey. Our data shows that 28.2% of the 2,886 people who responded were “energy insecure”. This includes being unable to afford energy, making involuntary spending trade-offs between food and energy, and falling behind on energy payments.

Worryingly, we found that the rate of energy insecurity in the survey sample is around 2.5 times higher than the official rate of fuel poverty in London (11.5%), as assessed according to the Lilee metric.

It is likely that this figure can be extrapolated for the rest of England. If anything, energy insecurity may be even higher in other regions, given that Londoners tend to have higher-than-average household income.

The UK government is wrongly omitting hundreds of thousands of English households from fuel poverty statistics. Without a more accurate measure, vulnerable households will continue to be overlooked and not get the assistance they desperately need to stay warm.

Torran Semple receives funding from Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) grant EP/S023305/1.

John Harvey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Looking Back At COVID’s Authoritarian Regimes

After having moved from Canada to the United States, partly to be wealthier and partly to be freer (those two are connected, by the way), I was shocked,…

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After having moved from Canada to the United States, partly to be wealthier and partly to be freer (those two are connected, by the way), I was shocked, in March 2020, when President Trump and most US governors imposed heavy restrictions on people’s freedom. The purpose, said Trump and his COVID-19 advisers, was to “flatten the curve”: shut down people’s mobility for two weeks so that hospitals could catch up with the expected demand from COVID patients. In her book Silent Invasion, Dr. Deborah Birx, the coordinator of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, admitted that she was scrambling during those two weeks to come up with a reason to extend the lockdowns for much longer. As she put it, “I didn’t have the numbers in front of me yet to make the case for extending it longer, but I had two weeks to get them.” In short, she chose the goal and then tried to find the data to justify the goal. This, by the way, was from someone who, along with her task force colleague Dr. Anthony Fauci, kept talking about the importance of the scientific method. By the end of April 2020, the term “flatten the curve” had all but disappeared from public discussion.

Now that we are four years past that awful time, it makes sense to look back and see whether those heavy restrictions on the lives of people of all ages made sense. I’ll save you the suspense. They didn’t. The damage to the economy was huge. Remember that “the economy” is not a term used to describe a big machine; it’s a shorthand for the trillions of interactions among hundreds of millions of people. The lockdowns and the subsequent federal spending ballooned the budget deficit and consequent federal debt. The effect on children’s learning, not just in school but outside of school, was huge. These effects will be with us for a long time. It’s not as if there wasn’t another way to go. The people who came up with the idea of lockdowns did so on the basis of abstract models that had not been tested. They ignored a model of human behavior, which I’ll call Hayekian, that is tested every day.

These are the opening two paragraphs of my latest Defining Ideas article, “Looking Back at COVID’s Authoritarian Regimes,” Defining Ideas, March 14, 2024.

Another excerpt:

That wasn’t the only uncertainty. My daughter Karen lived in San Francisco and made her living teaching Pilates. San Francisco mayor London Breed shut down all the gyms, and so there went my daughter’s business. (The good news was that she quickly got online and shifted many of her clients to virtual Pilates. But that’s another story.) We tried to see her every six weeks or so, whether that meant our driving up to San Fran or her driving down to Monterey. But were we allowed to drive to see her? In that first month and a half, we simply didn’t know.

Read the whole thing, which is longer than usual.

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