HOME BANCORP, INC. ANNOUNCES 2022 FIRST QUARTER RESULTS AND DECLARES QUARTERLY DIVIDEND
HOME BANCORP, INC. ANNOUNCES 2022 FIRST QUARTER RESULTS AND DECLARES QUARTERLY DIVIDEND
PR Newswire
LAFAYETTE, La., April 26, 2022
LAFAYETTE, La., April 26, 2022 /PRNewswire/ — Home Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq: “HBCP”) (the “Company”), the parent compan…
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HOME BANCORP, INC. ANNOUNCES 2022 FIRST QUARTER RESULTS AND DECLARES QUARTERLY DIVIDEND
PR Newswire
LAFAYETTE, La., April 26, 2022
LAFAYETTE, La., April 26, 2022 /PRNewswire/ -- Home Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq: "HBCP") (the "Company"), the parent company for Home Bank, N.A. (the "Bank") (www.home24bank.com), reported financial results for the first quarter of 2022. For the quarter, the Company reported net income of $4.4 million, or $0.53 per diluted common share ("diluted EPS"), down $5.8 million from $10.2 million, or $1.23 diluted EPS, for the fourth quarter of 2021. Income pre-tax, pre-provision and pre-PPP income totaled $8.2 million, up $178,000, or 2%, from the prior quarter.
Acquisition of Friendswood Capital Corporation
On March 26, 2022, the Company completed its acquisition of Friendswood Capital Corporation ("Friendswood"), the former holding company of Texan Bank, N. A. ("Texan Bank") of Houston, Texas. Shareholders of Friendswood received $15.34 per share of common stock. This acquisition added approximately $415.8 million in assets, $318.9 million in loans, $368.0 million in deposits and estimated goodwill of $20.9 million.
"The Board and Management of Home Bank are very excited to have completed the merger of Texan Bank in the first quarter," said John W. Bordelon, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company and the Bank. "The data conversion of Texan Bank's systems remains on track and will take place the last week of June. We look forward to working with our team in Houston to forge new relationships and provide enhanced technology to all of our Texas customers."
First Quarter 2022 Highlights
- Net interest income totaled $23.5 million, down $1.1 million, or 5% from the prior quarter. Excluding PPP income, net interest income totaled $22.7 million, up $258,000, or 1% from the prior quarter.
- The Company recorded a $3.2 million provision to the allowance for loan losses primarily due to the acquisition of Texan Bank, compared to a $2.6 million reversal to the allowance for loan losses in the prior quarter.
- Loan income from the recognition of deferred PPP lender fees totaled $721,000, down $1.3 million from the prior quarter.
- Loans totaled $2.2 billion at March 31, 2022, up $317.9 million, or 17%, from December 31, 2021 primarily due to the acquisition of Texan Bank. Excluding PPP loans, total organic loans were up $20.7 million, or 5% annualized, from December 31, 2021.
- PPP loans totaled $22.8 million at March 31, 2022, down $20.9 million, or 48%, from December 31, 2021.
- The allowance for loan losses totaled $26.7 million, or 1.24% of total loans, at March 31, 2022. Excluding PPP loans, the ratio of allowance for loan losses to total loans was 1.25%, at such date.
- Preliminary Tier 1 leverage capital and total risk-based capital ratios were 8.62% and 11.83%, respectively, at March 31, 2022, compared to 9.77% and 15.85%, respectively, at December 31, 2021.
Loans
Loans totaled $2.2 billion at March 31, 2022, up $317.9 million, or 17%, from December 31, 2021. The loan growth resulted from the addition of Texan Bank's loan portfolio, which amounted to $318.9 million on March 26, 2022 (the date of acquisition). PPP loans, included in commercial and industrial loans, decreased $20.9 million, or 48%, from December 31, 2021. The following table summarizes the changes in the Company's loan portfolio, net of unearned income, from December 31, 2021 to March 31, 2022.
(dollars in thousands) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | Increase (Decrease) | |||||
Real estate loans: | ||||||||
One- to four-family first mortgage | $ 363,377 | $ 350,843 | $ 12,534 | 4 % | ||||
Home equity loans and lines | 58,375 | 60,312 | (1,937) | (3) | ||||
Commercial real estate | 1,046,568 | 801,624 | 244,944 | 31 | ||||
Construction and land | 297,079 | 259,652 | 37,427 | 14 | ||||
Multi-family residential | 98,527 | 90,518 | 8,009 | 9 | ||||
Total real estate loans | 1,863,926 | 1,562,949 | 300,977 | 19 | ||||
Other loans: | ||||||||
Commercial and industrial | 260,843 | 244,123 | 16,720 | 7 | ||||
Consumer | 33,200 | 33,021 | 179 | 1 | ||||
Total other loans | 294,043 | 277,144 | 16,899 | 6 | ||||
Total loans | $ 2,157,969 | $ 1,840,093 | $ 317,876 | 17 % | ||||
Credit Quality and Allowance for Credit Losses
Nonperforming assets ("NPAs") totaled $22.4 million, or 0.67% of total assets, at March 31, 2022, up $7.9 million, or 55%, from $14.5 million, or 0.49% of total assets, at December 31, 2021. The increase in NPAs during the first quarter of 2022 was primarily due to Texan Bank's NPAs, which amounted to $10.2 million on March 26, 2022 (the date of acquisition). During the first quarter of 2022, the Company recorded net loan recoveries of $149,000, compared to net charge-offs of $412,000 during the fourth quarter of 2021.
The Company provisioned $3.2 million for the allowance for loan losses in the first quarter of 2022 primarily due to the acquisition of Texan Bank's loan portfolio. For the three months ended December 31, 2021, we reversed a total of $2.6 million of the allowance for loan losses. At March 31, 2022, the allowance for loan losses totaled $26.7 million, or 1.24% of total loans, compared to $21.1 million, or 1.15% of total loans, at December 31, 2021. Excluding PPP loans, the ratios of the allowance for loan losses to total loans were 1.25% and 1.17% at March 31, 2022 and December 31, 2021, respectively. Changes in expected losses consider various factors including the changing economic activity, potential mitigating effects of governmental stimulus, the duration of the health crisis, customer specific information impacting changes in risk ratings, projected delinquencies and the impact of industry-wide loan modification efforts, among other factors.
Deposits
Total deposits were $2.9 billion at March 31, 2022, up $405.3 million, or 16%, from December 31, 2021. The increase was primarily from the addition of Texan Bank's deposits, which amounted to $368.0 million on March 26, 2022 (the date of acquisition). The following table summarizes the changes in the Company's deposits from December 31, 2021 to March 31, 2022.
(dollars in thousands) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | Increase (Decrease) | |||||
Demand deposits | $ 913,137 | $ 766,385 | $ 146,752 | 19 % | ||||
Savings | 315,356 | 285,728 | 29,628 | 10 | ||||
Money market | 484,847 | 371,478 | 113,369 | 31 | ||||
NOW | 806,501 | 792,919 | 13,582 | 2 | ||||
Certificates of deposit | 421,338 | 319,339 | 101,999 | 32 | ||||
Total deposits | $ 2,941,179 | $ 2,535,849 | $ 405,330 | 16 % | ||||
The average rate on interest-bearing deposits decreased two basis points from 0.22% for the fourth quarter of 2021 to 0.20% for the first quarter of 2022. At March 31, 2022, certificates of deposit maturing within the next 12 months totaled $321.7 million.
Net Interest Income
The net interest margin ("NIM") decreased 14 basis points from 3.53% for the fourth quarter of 2021 to 3.39% for the first quarter of 2022 primarily due to a decrease in the average yield on loans. Loan income from the recognition of deferred PPP lender fees totaled $721,000 during the first quarter of 2022, down $1.3 million, or 64%, compared to the fourth quarter of 2021.
The average loan yield was 4.88% for the first quarter of 2022, down 24 basis points from the fourth quarter of 2021. During the first quarter of 2022, recognition of deferred lender fees from PPP loans increased the average loan yield by 9 basis points and increased the NIM by 8 basis points. During the fourth quarter of 2021, PPP loans positively impacted the average loan yield by 29 basis points and the NIM by 24 basis points.
Average PPP loans were $31.3 million for the first quarter of 2022, down $35.9 million, or 53%, from the fourth quarter of 2021. Unrecognized PPP lender fees totaled $580,000 at March 31, 2022.
Average other interest-earning assets were $561.3 million for the first quarter of 2022, down $16.7 million, or 3%, from the fourth quarter of 2021 primarily due to an increase in cash and cash equivalents.
Loan accretion income from acquired loans totaled $457,000 for the first quarter of 2022 and $485,000 for the fourth quarter of 2021.
The following table summarizes the Company's average volume and rate of its interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities for the periods indicated. Taxable equivalent ("TE") yields on investment securities have been calculated using a marginal tax rate of 21%.
Quarter Ended | ||||||||||||
3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | |||||||||||
(dollars in thousands) | Average | Interest | Average | Average | Interest | Average | ||||||
Interest-earning assets: | ||||||||||||
Loans receivable | $ 1,862,616 | $ 22,667 | 4.88 % | $ 1,856,814 | $ 24,215 | 5.12 % | ||||||
Investment securities (TE) | 359,736 | 1,618 | 1.82 | 314,686 | 1,309 | 1.69 | ||||||
Other interest-earning assets | 561,262 | 277 | 0.20 | 577,945 | 264 | 0.18 | ||||||
Total interest-earning assets | $ 2,783,614 | $ 24,562 | 3.54 % | $ 2,749,445 | $ 25,788 | 3.69 % | ||||||
Interest-bearing liabilities: | ||||||||||||
Deposits: | ||||||||||||
Savings, checking, and money market | $ 1,461,966 | $ 530 | 0.15 % | $ 1,401,774 | $ 554 | 0.16 % | ||||||
Certificates of deposit | 317,866 | 363 | 0.46 | 327,567 | 420 | 0.51 | ||||||
Total interest-bearing deposits | 1,779,832 | 893 | 0.20 | 1,729,341 | 974 | 0.22 | ||||||
Other borrowings | 5,539 | 53 | 3.89 | 5,539 | 53 | 3.80 | ||||||
FHLB advances | 25,795 | 109 | 1.70 | 26,172 | 111 | 1.70 | ||||||
Total interest-bearing liabilities | $ 1,811,166 | $ 1,055 | 0.24 % | $ 1,761,052 | $ 1,138 | 0.26 % | ||||||
Net interest spread (TE) | 3.30 % | 3.43 % | ||||||||||
Net interest margin (TE) | 3.39 % | 3.53 % | ||||||||||
Noninterest Income
Noninterest income for the first quarter of 2022 totaled $3.4 million, down $144,000, or 4%, from the fourth quarter of 2021.
Service fees and charges were down primarily due to lower deposit account service charges and overdraft fees. Bank card fees and gain on the sale of loans were down due to seasonal factors.
Noninterest Expense
Noninterest expense for the first quarter of 2022 totaled $18.2 million, up $223,000, or 1%, from the fourth quarter of 2021.
Compensation and benefits was up $168,000 from the fourth quarter of 2021 primarily due to annual bonuses paid during the first quarter of 2022 and an increase in health insurance expense.
The Company recorded a $302,000 provision for credit losses on unfunded loan commitments during the first quarter of 2022, compared to $15,000 during the fourth quarter of 2021.
Marketing and advertising expense was down $626,000 from the fourth quarter of 2021 primarily due to lower charitable donations and general advertising activities during the first quarter of 2022.
Noninterest expense for the first quarter of 2022 and the fourth quarter of 2021 include $328,000 and $299,000, respectively, of merger expenses related to the acquisition of Friendswood.
Dividend and Share Repurchases
The Company announced that its Board of Directors declared a quarterly cash dividend on shares of its common stock of $0.23 per share payable on May 20, 2022, to shareholders of record as of May 9, 2022.
The Company repurchased 84,515 shares of its common stock during the first quarter of 2022 at an average price per share of $40.13. An additional 399,553 shares remain eligible for purchase under the 2020 Repurchase Plan. The book value per share and tangible book value per share of the Company's common stock was $39.93 and $29.57, respectively, at March 31, 2022.
Non-GAAP Reconciliation
This news release contains financial information determined by methods other than in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). The Company's management uses this non-GAAP financial information in its analysis of the Company's performance. In this news release, information is included which excludes intangible assets and PPP loans. Management believes the presentation of this non-GAAP financial information provides useful information that is helpful to a full understanding of the Company's financial position and operating results. This non-GAAP financial information should not be viewed as a substitute for financial information determined in accordance with GAAP, nor is it necessarily comparable to non-GAAP financial information presented by other companies. A reconciliation on non-GAAP information included herein to GAAP is presented below.
Quarter Ended | ||||||
(dollars in thousands, except per share data) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | 3/31/2021 | |||
Reported net income | $ 4,401 | $ 10,238 | $ 11,928 | |||
Add: Core deposit intangible amortization, net tax | 252 | 221 | 237 | |||
Non-GAAP tangible income | $ 4,653 | $ 10,459 | $ 12,165 | |||
Reported loan income | $ 22,667 | $ 24,215 | $ 25,817 | |||
Less: PPP loan income | 800 | 2,201 | 3,893 | |||
Loan income excluding PPP loan income | $ 21,867 | $ 22,014 | $ 21,924 | |||
Provision (reversal) for loan losses | $ 3,215 | $ (2,648) | $ (1,703) | |||
Less: CECL impact for acquisition | 3,802 | — | — | |||
Provision (reversal) for organic loans | $ (587) | $ (2,648) | $ (1,703) | |||
Loan yield | 4.88 % | 5.12 % | 5.21 % | |||
(Positive) negative impact of PPP loans | (0.09) | (0.29) | (0.18) | |||
Loan yield excluding PPP loans | 4.79 % | 4.83 % | 5.03 % | |||
Net interest margin | 3.39 % | 3.53 % | 4.14 % | |||
(Positive) negative impact of PPP loans | (0.08) | (0.24) | (0.26) | |||
Net interest margin excluding PPP loans | 3.31 % | 3.29 % | 3.88 % | |||
Total assets | $ 3,332,228 | $ 2,938,244 | $ 2,707,517 | |||
Less: Intangible assets | 87,569 | 61,949 | 62,813 | |||
Non-GAAP tangible assets | $ 3,244,659 | $ 2,876,295 | $ 2,644,704 | |||
Total shareholders' equity | $ 337,504 | $ 351,903 | $ 328,610 | |||
Less: Intangible assets | 87,569 | 61,949 | 62,813 | |||
Non-GAAP tangible shareholders' equity | $ 249,935 | $ 289,954 | $ 265,797 | |||
Total loans | $ 2,157,969 | $ 1,840,093 | $ 1,979,868 | |||
Less: PPP loans | 19,596 | 43,637 | 235,681 | |||
Less: PPP loans from Texan | 3,163 | — | — | |||
Total loans excluding PPP loans | $ 2,135,210 | $ 1,796,456 | $ 1,744,187 | |||
Less: Texan Bank loan portfolio, excluding PPP loans | 318,044 | — | — | |||
Organic loan portfolio | $ 1,817,166 | $ 1,796,456 | $ 1,744,187 | |||
Quarter Ended | ||||||
3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | 3/31/2021 | ||||
Reported net income | $ 4,401 | $ 10,238 | $ 11,928 | |||
Add: Provision (reversal) for loan losses | 3,215 | (2,648) | (1,703) | |||
Add: Provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments | 302 | 15 | — | |||
Add: Income tax expense | 1,041 | 2,577 | 2,964 | |||
Pre-tax, pre-provision income | $ 8,959 | $ 10,182 | $ 13,189 | |||
Less: PPP income | 800 | 2,201 | 3,893 | |||
Pre-tax, pre-provision, pre- PPP income | $ 8,159 | $ 7,981 | $ 9,296 | |||
Allowance for loan losses to total loans | 1.24 % | 1.15 % | 1.51 % | |||
Less: PPP loans | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.20 | |||
Non-GAAP allowance for loan losses to total loans | 1.25 % | 1.17 % | 1.72 % | |||
Return on average equity | 5.08 % | 11.65 % | 14.80 % | |||
Add: Average intangible assets | 1.39 | 2.83 | 3.90 | |||
Non-GAAP return on average tangible common equity | 6.47 % | 14.48 % | 18.70 % | |||
Common equity ratio | 10.13 % | 11.98 % | 12.14 % | |||
Less: Intangible assets | 2.43 | 1.90 | 2.09 | |||
Non-GAAP tangible common equity ratio | 7.70 % | 10.08 % | 10.05 % | |||
Book value per share | $ 39.93 | $ 41.27 | $ 37.73 | |||
Less: Intangible assets | 10.36 | 7.27 | 7.21 | |||
Non-GAAP tangible book value per share | $ 29.57 | $ 34.00 | $ 30.52 | |||
This news release contains certain forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or current facts. They often include the words "believe," "expect," "anticipate," "intend," "plan," "estimate" or words of similar meaning, or future or conditional verbs such as "will," "would," "should," "could" or "may."
Forward-looking statements, by their nature, are subject to risks and uncertainties. A number of factors - many of which are beyond our control - could cause actual conditions, events or results to differ significantly from those described in the forward-looking statements. Home Bancorp's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2021 describes some of these factors, including risk elements in the loan portfolio, the level of the allowance for credit losses, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, risks of our growth strategy, geographic concentration of our business, dependence on our management team, risks of market rates of interest and of regulation on our business and risks of competition. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. We do not undertake to update forward-looking statements to reflect circumstances or events that occur after the date the forward-looking statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.
HOME BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY | ||||||||
CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION | ||||||||
(Unaudited) | ||||||||
(dollars in thousands) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | % Change | 3/31/2021 | ||||
Assets | ||||||||
Cash and cash equivalents | $ 548,019 | $ 601,443 | (9) % | $ 282,700 | ||||
Interest-bearing deposits in banks | 349 | 349 | — | 349 | ||||
Investment securities available for sale, at fair value | 415,260 | 327,632 | 27 | 274,965 | ||||
Investment securities held to maturity | 2,094 | 2,102 | — | 2,126 | ||||
Mortgage loans held for sale | 4,187 | 1,104 | 279 | 5,304 | ||||
Loans, net of unearned income | 2,157,969 | 1,840,093 | 17 | 1,979,868 | ||||
Allowance for loan losses | (26,731) | (21,089) | 27 | (29,993) | ||||
Total loans, net of allowance for loan losses | 2,131,238 | 1,819,004 | 17 | 1,949,875 | ||||
Office properties and equipment, net | 43,929 | 43,542 | 1 | 45,138 | ||||
Cash surrender value of bank-owned life insurance | 40,575 | 40,361 | 1 | 40,559 | ||||
Goodwill and core deposit intangibles | 87,569 | 61,949 | 41 | 62,813 | ||||
Accrued interest receivable and other assets | 59,008 | 40,758 | 45 | 43,688 | ||||
Total Assets | $ 3,332,228 | $ 2,938,244 | 13 | $ 2,707,517 | ||||
Liabilities | ||||||||
Deposits | $ 2,941,179 | $ 2,535,849 | 16 % | $ 2,328,365 | ||||
Other Borrowings | 5,539 | 5,539 | — | 5,539 | ||||
Federal Home Loan Bank advances | 25,671 | 26,046 | (1) | 28,106 | ||||
Accrued interest payable and other liabilities | 22,335 | 18,907 | 18 | 16,897 | ||||
Total Liabilities | 2,994,724 | 2,586,341 | 16 | 2,378,907 | ||||
Shareholders' Equity | ||||||||
Common stock | 85 | 85 | — % | 87 | ||||
Additional paid-in capital | 164,830 | 164,982 | — | 165,155 | ||||
Common stock acquired by benefit plans | (2,332) | (2,423) | 4 | (2,695) | ||||
Retained earnings | 188,386 | 188,515 | — | 163,507 | ||||
Accumulated other comprehensive (loss) income | (13,465) | 744 | (1910) | 2,556 | ||||
Total Shareholders' Equity | 337,504 | 351,903 | (4) | 328,610 | ||||
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity | $ 3,332,228 | $ 2,938,244 | 13 | $ 2,707,517 | ||||
HOME BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY | ||||||||||
CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF INCOME | ||||||||||
(Unaudited) | ||||||||||
Quarter Ended | ||||||||||
(dollars in thousands, except per share data) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | % | 3/31/2021 | % | |||||
Interest Income | ||||||||||
Loans, including fees | $ 22,667 | $ 24,215 | (6) % | $ 25,817 | (12) % | |||||
Investment securities | 1,618 | 1,309 | 24 | 1,012 | 60 | |||||
Other investments and deposits | 277 | 264 | 5 | 99 | 180 | |||||
Total interest income | 24,562 | 25,788 | (5) | 26,928 | (9) | |||||
Interest Expense | ||||||||||
Deposits | 893 | 974 | (8) % | 1,656 | (46) % | |||||
Other borrowings | 53 | 53 | — | 53 | — | |||||
Federal Home Loan Bank advances | 109 | 111 | (2) | 124 | (12) | |||||
Total interest expense | 1,055 | 1,138 | (7) | 1,833 | (42) | |||||
Net interest income | 23,507 | 24,650 | (5) | 25,095 | (6) | |||||
Provision (reversal) for loan losses | 3,215 | (2,648) | 221 | (1,703) | 289 | |||||
Net interest income after provision (reversal) for loan losses | 20,292 | 27,298 | (26) | 26,798 | (24) | |||||
Noninterest Income | ||||||||||
Service fees and charges | 1,169 | 1,224 | (4) % | 1,072 | 9 % | |||||
Bank card fees | 1,454 | 1,519 | (4) | 1,306 | 11 | |||||
Gain on sale of loans, net | 299 | 376 | (20) | 1,168 | (74) | |||||
Income from bank-owned life insurance | 214 | 219 | (2) | 225 | (5) | |||||
Gain (loss) on sale of assets, net | 5 | (44) | 111 | — | — | |||||
Other income | 249 | 240 | 4 | 289 | (14) | |||||
Total noninterest income | 3,390 | 3,534 | (4) | 4,060 | (17) | |||||
Noninterest Expense | ||||||||||
Compensation and benefits | 10,159 | 9,991 | 2 % | 9,664 | 5 % | |||||
Occupancy | 1,803 | 1,824 | (1) | 1,696 | 6 | |||||
Marketing and advertising | 407 | 1,033 | (61) | 171 | 138 | |||||
Data processing and communication | 2,195 | 2,237 | (2) | 1,986 | 11 | |||||
Professional fees | 542 | 493 | 10 | 234 | 132 | |||||
Forms, printing and supplies | 146 | 164 | (11) | 159 | (8) | |||||
Franchise and shares tax | 391 | 396 | (1) | 360 | 9 | |||||
Regulatory fees | 446 | 331 | 35 | 379 | 18 | |||||
Foreclosed assets, net | 402 | 155 | 159 | 123 | 227 | |||||
Amortization of acquisition intangible | 252 | 279 | (10) | 300 | (16) | |||||
Provision for credit losses on unfunded commitments | 302 | 15 | 1913 | — | — | |||||
Other expenses | 1,195 | 1,099 | 9 | 894 | 34 | |||||
Total noninterest expense | 18,240 | 18,017 | 1 | 15,966 | 14 | |||||
Income before income tax expense | 5,442 | 12,815 | (58) | 14,892 | (63) | |||||
Income tax expense | 1,041 | 2,577 | (60) | 2,964 | (65) | |||||
Net income | $ 4,401 | $ 10,238 | (57) | $ 11,928 | (63) | |||||
Earnings per share - basic | $ 0.53 | $ 1.24 | (57) % | $ 1.41 | (62) % | |||||
Earnings per share - diluted | $ 0.53 | $ 1.23 | (57) % | $ 1.41 | (62) % | |||||
Cash dividends declared per common share | $ 0.23 | $ 0.23 | — % | $ 0.22 | 5 % | |||||
HOME BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY | ||||||||||
SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION | ||||||||||
(Unaudited) | ||||||||||
Quarter Ended | ||||||||||
(dollars in thousands, except per share data) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | % | 3/31/2021 | % | |||||
EARNINGS DATA | ||||||||||
Total interest income | $ 24,562 | $ 25,788 | (5) % | $ 26,928 | (9) % | |||||
Total interest expense | 1,055 | 1,138 | (7) | 1,833 | (42) | |||||
Net interest income | 23,507 | 24,650 | (5) | 25,095 | (6) | |||||
(Reversal) provision for loan losses | 3,215 | (2,648) | 221 | (1,703) | 289 | |||||
Total noninterest income | 3,390 | 3,534 | (4) | 4,060 | (17) | |||||
Total noninterest expense | 18,240 | 18,017 | 1 | 15,966 | 14 | |||||
Income tax expense | 1,041 | 2,577 | (60) | 2,964 | (65) | |||||
Net income | $ 4,401 | $ 10,238 | (57) | $ 11,928 | (63) | |||||
AVERAGE BALANCE SHEET DATA | ||||||||||
Total assets | $ 2,977,559 | $ 2,941,274 | 1 % | $ 2,620,664 | 14 % | |||||
Total interest-earning assets | 2,783,614 | 2,749,445 | 1 | 2,432,327 | 14 | |||||
Total loans | 1,862,616 | 1,856,814 | — | 1,987,264 | (6) | |||||
PPP loans | 31,326 | 67,198 | (53) | 238,813 | (87) | |||||
Total interest-bearing deposits | 1,779,832 | 1,729,341 | 3 | 1,593,434 | 12 | |||||
Total interest-bearing liabilities | 1,811,166 | 1,761,052 | 3 | 1,627,564 | 11 | |||||
Total deposits | 2,576,378 | 2,537,670 | 2 | 2,241,918 | 15 | |||||
Total shareholders' equity | 351,337 | 348,635 | 1 | 326,829 | 7 | |||||
PER SHARE DATA | ||||||||||
Earnings per share - basic | $ 0.53 | $ 1.24 | (57) % | $ 1.41 | (62) % | |||||
Earnings per share - diluted | 0.53 | 1.23 | (57) | 1.41 | (62) | |||||
Book value at period end | 39.93 | 41.27 | (3) | 37.73 | 6 | |||||
Tangible book value at period end | 29.57 | 34.00 | (13) | 30.52 | (3) | |||||
Shares outstanding at period end | 8,453,014 | 8,526,907 | (1) | 8,709,631 | (3) | |||||
Weighted average shares outstanding | ||||||||||
Basic | 8,270,209 | 8,278,472 | — % | 8,436,624 | (2) % | |||||
Diluted | 8,336,561 | 8,331,749 | — | 8,476,445 | (2) | |||||
SELECTED RATIOS (1) | ||||||||||
Return on average assets | 0.60 % | 1.38 % | (57) % | 1.85 % | (68) % | |||||
Return on average equity | 5.08 | 11.65 | (56) | 14.80 | (66) | |||||
Common equity ratio | 10.13 | 11.98 | (15) | 12.14 | (17) | |||||
Efficiency ratio (2) | 67.81 | 63.93 | 6 | 54.76 | 24 | |||||
Average equity to average assets | 11.80 | 11.85 | — | 12.47 | (5) | |||||
Tier 1 leverage capital ratio (3) | 8.62 | 9.77 | (12) | 9.89 | (13) | |||||
Total risk-based capital ratio (3) | 11.83 | 15.85 | (25) | 15.37 | (23) | |||||
Net interest margin (4) | 3.39 | 3.53 | (4) | 4.14 | (18) | |||||
SELECTED NON-GAAP RATIOS (1) | ||||||||||
Tangible common equity ratio (5) | 7.70 % | 10.08 % | (24) % | 10.05 % | (23) % | |||||
Return on average tangible common equity (6) | 6.47 | 14.48 | (55) | 18.70 | (65) | |||||
(1) | With the exception of end-of-period ratios, all ratios are based on average daily balances during the respective periods. |
(2) | The efficiency ratio represents noninterest expense as a percentage of total revenues. Total revenues is the sum of net interest income and noninterest income. |
(3) | Capital ratios are preliminary end-of-period ratios for the Bank only and are subject to change. |
(4) | Net interest margin represents net interest income as a percentage of average interest-earning assets. Taxable equivalent yields are calculated using a marginal tax rate of 21%. |
(5) | Tangible common equity ratio is common shareholders' equity less intangible assets divided by total assets less intangible assets. See "Non-GAAP Reconciliation" for additional information. |
(6) | Return on average tangible common equity is net income plus amortization of core deposit intangible, net of taxes, divided by average common shareholders' equity less average intangible assets. See "Non-GAAP Reconciliation" for additional information. |
HOME BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY | ||||||||||||||||||
SUMMARY CREDIT QUALITY INFORMATION | ||||||||||||||||||
(Unaudited) | ||||||||||||||||||
3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | 3/31/2021 | ||||||||||||||||
(dollars in thousands) | Originated | Acquired | Total | Originated | Acquired | Total | Originated | Acquired | Total | |||||||||
CREDIT QUALITY (1) | ||||||||||||||||||
Nonaccrual loans(2) | $ 5,515 | $ 15,598 | $ 21,113 | $ 7,233 | $ 6,036 | $ 13,269 | $ 8,735 | $ 6,958 | $ 15,693 | |||||||||
Accruing loans 90 days or more past due | — | — | — | 6 | — | 6 | — | — | — | |||||||||
Total nonperforming loans | 5,515 | 15,598 | 21,113 | 7,239 | 6,036 | 13,275 | 8,735 | 6,958 | 15,693 | |||||||||
Foreclosed assets and ORE | 536 | 729 | 1,265 | 1,109 | 80 | 1,189 | 1,082 | 499 | 1,581 | |||||||||
Total nonperforming assets | 6,051 | 16,327 | 22,378 | 8,348 | 6,116 | 14,464 | 9,817 | 7,457 | 17,274 | |||||||||
Performing troubled debt restructurings | 3,797 | 1,100 | 4,897 | 3,867 | 1,096 | 4,963 | 2,042 | 971 | 3,013 | |||||||||
Total nonperforming assets and troubled debt restructurings | $ 9,848 | $ 17,427 | $ 27,275 | $ 12,215 | $ 7,212 | $ 19,427 | $ 11,859 | $ 8,428 | $ 20,287 | |||||||||
Nonperforming assets to total assets | 0.67 % | 0.49 % | 0.64 % | |||||||||||||||
Nonperforming loans to total assets | 0.63 | 0.45 | 0.58 | |||||||||||||||
Nonperforming loans to total loans | 0.98 | 0.72 | 0.79 | |||||||||||||||
(1) | It is our policy to cease accruing interest on loans 90 days or more past due, with certain limited exceptions. Nonperforming assets consist of nonperforming loans, foreclosed assets and surplus real estate (ORE). Foreclosed assets consist of assets acquired through foreclosure or acceptance of title in-lieu of foreclosure. ORE consists of closed or unused bank buildings. |
(2) | Nonaccrual loans include originated restructured loans placed on nonaccrual totaling $3.6 million, $3.7 million and $5.0 million at March 31, 2022, December 31, 2021 and March 31, 2021, respectively. Acquired restructured loans placed on nonaccrual totaled $3.0 million, $3.5 million and $3.7 million at March 31, 2022, December 31, 2021 and March 31, 2021, respectively. |
HOME BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY | ||||||||||||||||||
SUMMARY CREDIT QUALITY INFORMATION - CONTINUED | ||||||||||||||||||
(Unaudited) | ||||||||||||||||||
3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | 3/31/2021 | ||||||||||||||||
Collectively | Individually | Total | Collectively | Individually | Total | Collectively | Individually | Total | ||||||||||
ALLOWANCE FOR CREDIT LOSSES | ||||||||||||||||||
One- to four-family first mortgage | $ 2,056 | $ — | $ 2,056 | $ 1,944 | $ — | $ 1,944 | $ 2,779 | $ 100 | $ 2,879 | |||||||||
Home equity loans and lines | 539 | — | 539 | 508 | — | 508 | 649 | — | 649 | |||||||||
Commercial real estate | 12,878 | 2,324 | 15,202 | 10,207 | 247 | 10,454 | 16,191 | 333 | 16,524 | |||||||||
Construction and land | 4,112 | — | 4,112 | 3,572 | — | 3,572 | 4,448 | — | 4,448 | |||||||||
Multi-family residential | 554 | — | 554 | 457 | — | 457 | 967 | — | 967 | |||||||||
Commercial and industrial | 3,200 | 440 | 3,640 | 3,095 | 425 | 3,520 | 3,521 | 234 | 3,755 | |||||||||
Consumer | 628 | — | 628 | 634 | — | 634 | 771 | — | 771 | |||||||||
Total allowance for credit losses | $ 23,967 | $ 2,764 | $ 26,731 | $ 20,417 | $ 672 | $ 21,089 | $ 29,326 | $ 667 | $ 29,993 | |||||||||
Unfunded lending commitments(3) | 2,117 | — | 2,117 | 1,815 | — | 1,815 | 1,425 | — | 1,425 | |||||||||
Total allowance for credit losses | $ 26,084 | $ 2,764 | $ 28,848 | $ 22,232 | $ 672 | $ 22,904 | $ 30,751 | $ 667 | $ 31,418 | |||||||||
Allowance for loan losses to nonperforming assets | 119.45 | 145.80 | 173.63 | |||||||||||||||
Allowance for loan losses to nonperforming loans | 126.61 | 158.86 | 191.12 | |||||||||||||||
Allowance for loan losses to total loans | 1.24 | 1.15 | 1.51 | |||||||||||||||
Allowance for credit losses to total loans | 1.34 | 1.24 | 1.59 | |||||||||||||||
Year-to-date loan charge-offs | $ 316 | $ 2,305 | $ 1,330 | |||||||||||||||
Year-to-date loan recoveries | 465 | 592 | 63 | |||||||||||||||
Year-to-date net loan recoveries (charge-offs) | $ (149) | $ 1,713 | $ 1,267 | |||||||||||||||
Annualized YTD net loan recoveries (charge-offs) to average loans | (0.03) % | 0.09 % | 0.26 % | |||||||||||||||
(3) | The allowance for unfunded lending commitments is recorded within accrued interest payable and other liabilities on the Consolidated Statements of Financial Condition. |
View original content to download multimedia:https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/home-bancorp-inc-announces-2022-first-quarter-results-and-declares-quarterly-dividend-301532981.html
SOURCE Home Bancorp, Inc.
Government
Are Voters Recoiling Against Disorder?
Are Voters Recoiling Against Disorder?
Authored by Michael Barone via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
The headlines coming out of the Super…
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Authored by Michael Barone via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
The headlines coming out of the Super Tuesday primaries have got it right. Barring cataclysmic changes, Donald Trump and Joe Biden will be the Republican and Democratic nominees for president in 2024.
With Nikki Haley’s withdrawal, there will be no more significantly contested primaries or caucuses—the earliest both parties’ races have been over since something like the current primary-dominated system was put in place in 1972.
The primary results have spotlighted some of both nominees’ weaknesses.
Donald Trump lost high-income, high-educated constituencies, including the entire metro area—aka the Swamp. Many but by no means all Haley votes there were cast by Biden Democrats. Mr. Trump can’t afford to lose too many of the others in target states like Pennsylvania and Michigan.
Majorities and large minorities of voters in overwhelmingly Latino counties in Texas’s Rio Grande Valley and some in Houston voted against Joe Biden, and even more against Senate nominee Rep. Colin Allred (D-Texas).
Returns from Hispanic precincts in New Hampshire and Massachusetts show the same thing. Mr. Biden can’t afford to lose too many Latino votes in target states like Arizona and Georgia.
When Mr. Trump rode down that escalator in 2015, commentators assumed he’d repel Latinos. Instead, Latino voters nationally, and especially the closest eyewitnesses of Biden’s open-border policy, have been trending heavily Republican.
High-income liberal Democrats may sport lawn signs proclaiming, “In this house, we believe ... no human is illegal.” The logical consequence of that belief is an open border. But modest-income folks in border counties know that flows of illegal immigrants result in disorder, disease, and crime.
There is plenty of impatience with increased disorder in election returns below the presidential level. Consider Los Angeles County, America’s largest county, with nearly 10 million people, more people than 40 of the 50 states. It voted 71 percent for Mr. Biden in 2020.
Current returns show county District Attorney George Gascon winning only 21 percent of the vote in the nonpartisan primary. He’ll apparently face Republican Nathan Hochman, a critic of his liberal policies, in November.
Gascon, elected after the May 2020 death of counterfeit-passing suspect George Floyd in Minneapolis, is one of many county prosecutors supported by billionaire George Soros. His policies include not charging juveniles as adults, not seeking higher penalties for gang membership or use of firearms, and bringing fewer misdemeanor cases.
The predictable result has been increased car thefts, burglaries, and personal robberies. Some 120 assistant district attorneys have left the office, and there’s a backlog of 10,000 unprosecuted cases.
More than a dozen other Soros-backed and similarly liberal prosecutors have faced strong opposition or have left office.
St. Louis prosecutor Kim Gardner resigned last May amid lawsuits seeking her removal, Milwaukee’s John Chisholm retired in January, and Baltimore’s Marilyn Mosby was defeated in July 2022 and convicted of perjury in September 2023. Last November, Loudoun County, Virginia, voters (62 percent Biden) ousted liberal Buta Biberaj, who declined to prosecute a transgender student for assault, and in June 2022 voters in San Francisco (85 percent Biden) recalled famed radical Chesa Boudin.
Similarly, this Tuesday, voters in San Francisco passed ballot measures strengthening police powers and requiring treatment of drug-addicted welfare recipients.
In retrospect, it appears the Floyd video, appearing after three months of COVID-19 confinement, sparked a frenzied, even crazed reaction, especially among the highly educated and articulate. One fatal incident was seen as proof that America’s “systemic racism” was worse than ever and that police forces should be defunded and perhaps abolished.
2020 was “the year America went crazy,” I wrote in January 2021, a year in which police funding was actually cut by Democrats in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Denver. A year in which young New York Times (NYT) staffers claimed they were endangered by the publication of Sen. Tom Cotton’s (R-Ark.) opinion article advocating calling in military forces if necessary to stop rioting, as had been done in Detroit in 1967 and Los Angeles in 1992. A craven NYT publisher even fired the editorial page editor for running the article.
Evidence of visible and tangible discontent with increasing violence and its consequences—barren and locked shelves in Manhattan chain drugstores, skyrocketing carjackings in Washington, D.C.—is as unmistakable in polls and election results as it is in daily life in large metropolitan areas. Maybe 2024 will turn out to be the year even liberal America stopped acting crazy.
Chaos and disorder work against incumbents, as they did in 1968 when Democrats saw their party’s popular vote fall from 61 percent to 43 percent.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.
Government
Veterans Affairs Kept COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate In Place Without Evidence
Veterans Affairs Kept COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate In Place Without Evidence
Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
The…
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Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reviewed no data when deciding in 2023 to keep its COVID-19 vaccine mandate in place.
VA Secretary Denis McDonough said on May 1, 2023, that the end of many other federal mandates “will not impact current policies at the Department of Veterans Affairs.”
He said the mandate was remaining for VA health care personnel “to ensure the safety of veterans and our colleagues.”
Mr. McDonough did not cite any studies or other data. A VA spokesperson declined to provide any data that was reviewed when deciding not to rescind the mandate. The Epoch Times submitted a Freedom of Information Act for “all documents outlining which data was relied upon when establishing the mandate when deciding to keep the mandate in place.”
The agency searched for such data and did not find any.
“The VA does not even attempt to justify its policies with science, because it can’t,” Leslie Manookian, president and founder of the Health Freedom Defense Fund, told The Epoch Times.
“The VA just trusts that the process and cost of challenging its unfounded policies is so onerous, most people are dissuaded from even trying,” she added.
The VA’s mandate remains in place to this day.
The VA’s website claims that vaccines “help protect you from getting severe illness” and “offer good protection against most COVID-19 variants,” pointing in part to observational data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that estimate the vaccines provide poor protection against symptomatic infection and transient shielding against hospitalization.
There have also been increasing concerns among outside scientists about confirmed side effects like heart inflammation—the VA hid a safety signal it detected for the inflammation—and possible side effects such as tinnitus, which shift the benefit-risk calculus.
President Joe Biden imposed a slate of COVID-19 vaccine mandates in 2021. The VA was the first federal agency to implement a mandate.
President Biden rescinded the mandates in May 2023, citing a drop in COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations. His administration maintains the choice to require vaccines was the right one and saved lives.
“Our administration’s vaccination requirements helped ensure the safety of workers in critical workforces including those in the healthcare and education sectors, protecting themselves and the populations they serve, and strengthening their ability to provide services without disruptions to operations,” the White House said.
Some experts said requiring vaccination meant many younger people were forced to get a vaccine despite the risks potentially outweighing the benefits, leaving fewer doses for older adults.
“By mandating the vaccines to younger people and those with natural immunity from having had COVID, older people in the U.S. and other countries did not have access to them, and many people might have died because of that,” Martin Kulldorff, a professor of medicine on leave from Harvard Medical School, told The Epoch Times previously.
The VA was one of just a handful of agencies to keep its mandate in place following the removal of many federal mandates.
“At this time, the vaccine requirement will remain in effect for VA health care personnel, including VA psychologists, pharmacists, social workers, nursing assistants, physical therapists, respiratory therapists, peer specialists, medical support assistants, engineers, housekeepers, and other clinical, administrative, and infrastructure support employees,” Mr. McDonough wrote to VA employees at the time.
“This also includes VA volunteers and contractors. Effectively, this means that any Veterans Health Administration (VHA) employee, volunteer, or contractor who works in VHA facilities, visits VHA facilities, or provides direct care to those we serve will still be subject to the vaccine requirement at this time,” he said. “We continue to monitor and discuss this requirement, and we will provide more information about the vaccination requirements for VA health care employees soon. As always, we will process requests for vaccination exceptions in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.”
The version of the shots cleared in the fall of 2022, and available through the fall of 2023, did not have any clinical trial data supporting them.
A new version was approved in the fall of 2023 because there were indications that the shots not only offered temporary protection but also that the level of protection was lower than what was observed during earlier stages of the pandemic.
Ms. Manookian, whose group has challenged several of the federal mandates, said that the mandate “illustrates the dangers of the administrative state and how these federal agencies have become a law unto themselves.”
Spread & Containment
The Coming Of The Police State In America
The Coming Of The Police State In America
Authored by Jeffrey Tucker via The Epoch Times,
The National Guard and the State Police are now…
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Authored by Jeffrey Tucker via The Epoch Times,
The National Guard and the State Police are now patrolling the New York City subway system in an attempt to do something about the explosion of crime. As part of this, there are bag checks and new surveillance of all passengers. No legislation, no debate, just an edict from the mayor.
Many citizens who rely on this system for transportation might welcome this. It’s a city of strict gun control, and no one knows for sure if they have the right to defend themselves. Merchants have been harassed and even arrested for trying to stop looting and pillaging in their own shops.
The message has been sent: Only the police can do this job. Whether they do it or not is another matter.
Things on the subway system have gotten crazy. If you know it well, you can manage to travel safely, but visitors to the city who take the wrong train at the wrong time are taking grave risks.
In actual fact, it’s guaranteed that this will only end in confiscating knives and other things that people carry in order to protect themselves while leaving the actual criminals even more free to prey on citizens.
The law-abiding will suffer and the criminals will grow more numerous. It will not end well.
When you step back from the details, what we have is the dawning of a genuine police state in the United States. It only starts in New York City. Where is the Guard going to be deployed next? Anywhere is possible.
If the crime is bad enough, citizens will welcome it. It must have been this way in most times and places that when the police state arrives, the people cheer.
We will all have our own stories of how this came to be. Some might begin with the passage of the Patriot Act and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2001. Some will focus on gun control and the taking away of citizens’ rights to defend themselves.
My own version of events is closer in time. It began four years ago this month with lockdowns. That’s what shattered the capacity of civil society to function in the United States. Everything that has happened since follows like one domino tumbling after another.
It goes like this:
1) lockdown,
2) loss of moral compass and spreading of loneliness and nihilism,
3) rioting resulting from citizen frustration, 4) police absent because of ideological hectoring,
5) a rise in uncontrolled immigration/refugees,
6) an epidemic of ill health from substance abuse and otherwise,
7) businesses flee the city
8) cities fall into decay, and that results in
9) more surveillance and police state.
The 10th stage is the sacking of liberty and civilization itself.
It doesn’t fall out this way at every point in history, but this seems like a solid outline of what happened in this case. Four years is a very short period of time to see all of this unfold. But it is a fact that New York City was more-or-less civilized only four years ago. No one could have predicted that it would come to this so quickly.
But once the lockdowns happened, all bets were off. Here we had a policy that most directly trampled on all freedoms that we had taken for granted. Schools, businesses, and churches were slammed shut, with various levels of enforcement. The entire workforce was divided between essential and nonessential, and there was widespread confusion about who precisely was in charge of designating and enforcing this.
It felt like martial law at the time, as if all normal civilian law had been displaced by something else. That something had to do with public health, but there was clearly more going on, because suddenly our social media posts were censored and we were being asked to do things that made no sense, such as mask up for a virus that evaded mask protection and walk in only one direction in grocery aisles.
Vast amounts of the white-collar workforce stayed home—and their kids, too—until it became too much to bear. The city became a ghost town. Most U.S. cities were the same.
As the months of disaster rolled on, the captives were let out of their houses for the summer in order to protest racism but no other reason. As a way of excusing this, the same public health authorities said that racism was a virus as bad as COVID-19, so therefore it was permitted.
The protests had turned to riots in many cities, and the police were being defunded and discouraged to do anything about the problem. Citizens watched in horror as downtowns burned and drug-crazed freaks took over whole sections of cities. It was like every standard of decency had been zapped out of an entire swath of the population.
Meanwhile, large checks were arriving in people’s bank accounts, defying every normal economic expectation. How could people not be working and get their bank accounts more flush with cash than ever? There was a new law that didn’t even require that people pay rent. How weird was that? Even student loans didn’t need to be paid.
By the fall, recess from lockdown was over and everyone was told to go home again. But this time they had a job to do: They were supposed to vote. Not at the polling places, because going there would only spread germs, or so the media said. When the voting results finally came in, it was the absentee ballots that swung the election in favor of the opposition party that actually wanted more lockdowns and eventually pushed vaccine mandates on the whole population.
The new party in control took note of the large population movements out of cities and states that they controlled. This would have a large effect on voting patterns in the future. But they had a plan. They would open the borders to millions of people in the guise of caring for refugees. These new warm bodies would become voters in time and certainly count on the census when it came time to reapportion political power.
Meanwhile, the native population had begun to swim in ill health from substance abuse, widespread depression, and demoralization, plus vaccine injury. This increased dependency on the very institutions that had caused the problem in the first place: the medical/scientific establishment.
The rise of crime drove the small businesses out of the city. They had barely survived the lockdowns, but they certainly could not survive the crime epidemic. This undermined the tax base of the city and allowed the criminals to take further control.
The same cities became sanctuaries for the waves of migrants sacking the country, and partisan mayors actually used tax dollars to house these invaders in high-end hotels in the name of having compassion for the stranger. Citizens were pushed out to make way for rampaging migrant hordes, as incredible as this seems.
But with that, of course, crime rose ever further, inciting citizen anger and providing a pretext to bring in the police state in the form of the National Guard, now tasked with cracking down on crime in the transportation system.
What’s the next step? It’s probably already here: mass surveillance and censorship, plus ever-expanding police power. This will be accompanied by further population movements, as those with the means to do so flee the city and even the country and leave it for everyone else to suffer.
As I tell the story, all of this seems inevitable. It is not. It could have been stopped at any point. A wise and prudent political leadership could have admitted the error from the beginning and called on the country to rediscover freedom, decency, and the difference between right and wrong. But ego and pride stopped that from happening, and we are left with the consequences.
The government grows ever bigger and civil society ever less capable of managing itself in large urban centers. Disaster is unfolding in real time, mitigated only by a rising stock market and a financial system that has yet to fall apart completely.
Are we at the middle stages of total collapse, or at the point where the population and people in leadership positions wise up and decide to put an end to the downward slide? It’s hard to know. But this much we do know: There is a growing pocket of resistance out there that is fed up and refuses to sit by and watch this great country be sacked and taken over by everything it was set up to prevent.
Veterans Affairs Kept COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate In Place Without Evidence
The Coming Of The Police State In America
When Military Rule Supplants Democracy
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Economic Earthquake Ahead? The Cracks Are Spreading Fast
February Employment Situation
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