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Great-West Lifeco reports first quarter 2022 results

Great-West Lifeco reports first quarter 2022 results
Canada NewsWire
WINNIPEG, MB, May 4, 2022

TSX:GWO
This earnings news release for Great-West Lifeco Inc. should be read in conjunction with the Company’s interim Management’s Discussion & Anal…

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Great-West Lifeco reports first quarter 2022 results

Canada NewsWire

TSX:GWO

This earnings news release for Great-West Lifeco Inc. should be read in conjunction with the Company's interim Management's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) and condensed consolidated interim unaudited Financial Statements for the period ended March 31, 2022, prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) unless otherwise noted. These reports are available on greatwestlifeco.com under Financial Reports. Additional information relating to Lifeco is available on sedar.com. Readers are referred to the cautionary notes regarding Forward-Looking Information and Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios at the end of this release. All figures are expressed in millions Canadian dollars, unless otherwise noted.

 

WINNIPEG, MB, May 4, 2022 /CNW/ - Great-West Lifeco Inc. (Lifeco or the Company) today announced its first quarter 2022 results. Net earnings of $770 million and base earnings1 of $809 million were both up 9% compared to the same period in 2021.

"The start of 2022 has been marked by tragic human dislocation and loss as a result of the senseless invasion of Ukraine. Our hearts go out to those impacted by these events. Despite the challenging macroeconomic backdrop, we are very pleased with our results this quarter that are in line with our medium-term objectives, and reflect the strength, resiliency and diversification in our business," said Paul Mahon, President and CEO of Great-West Lifeco Inc. "We are pleased with the progress we are making in our important value creation priorities. Integration of our acquired businesses remains on track including the launch of Personal Capital capabilities into the Empower platform."


Base earnings(1)  

Net earnings 

Common Shareholders

Q1 2022

Q1 2021

Q1 2022

Q1 2021

Segment earnings(1)





   Canada

$272

$298

$275

$287

   United States (U.S.)

120

104

105

89

   Europe

245

201

219

195

   Capital and Risk Solutions

170

145

169

145

   Lifeco Corporate

2

(9)

2

(9)

Total earnings(1)

$809

$739

$770

$707

EPS(2)

$0.87

$0.80

$0.83

$0.76

Return on equity(2)(3)

14.7%

13.6%

14.1%

15.7%

Base earnings per common share (EPS) for the first quarter of 2022 of $0.87 increased by 9% from $0.80 a year ago, with fee income benefiting from higher average equity markets across all jurisdictions compared to the first quarter of 2021. In addition, mortality experience overall improved from 2021, particularly in Europe and U.S. Life Reinsurance.

Reported net EPS for the first quarter of 2022 was $0.83, up from $0.76 a year  ago, primarily due to the increase in base earnings.

Return on equity of 14.1% and base return on equity of 14.7% in the first quarter of 2022 were solid in light of continued macroeconomic challenges.

___________________________________________

1

Base earnings is a non-GAAP financial measure. Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section of this document for additional details.

2

Base EPS and base return on equity are non-GAAP ratios. Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section of this document for additional details.

3

Base return on equity and return on equity are calculated using the trailing four quarters of applicable earnings and common shareholders' equity.                              

Highlights
Capital strength and financial flexibility maintained
  • The Company's capital position remained strong at March 31, 2022, with a LICAT Ratio4 for Canada Life, Lifeco's major Canadian operating subsidiary, of 119% which is near the high end of the Company's internal target range and above the supervisory target. The LICAT Ratio reduced by 5 points in the quarter mainly due to the material increase in interest rates in the quarter.  
Consolidated assets of $600 billion and assets under administration5 of $2.2 trillion
  • Consolidated assets were approximately $600 billion and assets under administration (AUA) were approximately $2.2 trillion at March 31, 2022, a decrease of 5% and 4%, respectively, from December 31, 2021. In the quarter, higher interest rates, generally downward equity market movements and the strengthening of the Canadian dollar negatively impacted asset values, partially offset by new business growth in other AUA6.
SEGMENTED OPERATING RESULTS

For reporting purposes, Lifeco's consolidated operating results are grouped into five reportable segments – Canada, United States, Europe, Capital and Risk Solutions and Lifeco Corporate – reflecting the management and corporate structure of the Company. For more information, refer to the Company's first quarter of 2022 interim Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A).

CANADA
  • Q1 Canada segment base earnings of $272 million and net earnings of $275 million – Base earnings for the first quarter of 2022 were $272 million, down 9% compared to the first quarter of 2021.  The decrease was primarily due to adverse morbidity experience in Group Customer, as well as unfavourable impacts of new business and policyholder behaviour in Individual Customer. 
  • Positive net cash flows6 in Group and Individual wealth businesses – In the first quarter of 2022, the Group and Individual wealth businesses in Canada recorded net positive flows of fee business AUA of $541 million and $173 million, respectively.
  • Rated Most Valuable Insurance Company Brand in Canada – Brand Finance, the leading brand valuation consultancy, rated Canada Life as the fourth most valued brand in Canada, making Canada Life the first insurance company ever to jump into its top five most valuable brands in Canada.  The annual Canada 100 2022 report highlights the 150% increase in brand value from combining three separately branded businesses under a single brand, the significant increase in the brand's strength, shifting from a A+ ('strong') to a AAA- ('extremely strong'), as well as Canada Life's exceptional brand performance in its home market.
UNITED STATES
  • Q1 U.S. Financial Services base earnings of US$106 million ($134 million) and net earnings of US$94 million ($120 million) – U.S. Financial Services base earnings for the first quarter of 2022 were US$106 million ($134 million), up US$22 million or 26% from the first quarter of 2021. The increase was primarily due to higher contributions from investment experience and higher net fee income driven by higher average equity markets, partially offset by higher operating expenses to support future business growth.
  • Acquisition of the full-service retirement services business of Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential) completed – On April 1, 2022, Empower completed the previously announced acquisition of the full-service retirement services business of Prudential. Empower's reach in the U.S. is now expanded to more than 17.1 million retirement plan participants and AUA to US$1.4 trillion on behalf of approximately 71,000 workplace savings plans.

    On March 30, 2022, to finance a portion of the Prudential retirement services business acquisition, Great-West Lifeco U.S LLC, a subsidiary of the Company, established a 2-year $625 million (US$500 million) non-revolving credit facility. As at March 31, 2022, the facility was fully drawn, along with $403 million (US$323 million) from an existing revolving credit facility.
  • Run-rate cost synergies are on track – Annualized run rate cost synergies of US$80 million pre-tax have been achieved as of March 31, 2022 related to the Company's acquisition of MassMutual's retirement services business. The Company remains on track to achieve annualized run rate cost synergies of US$160 million pre-tax at the end of integration in 2022.
  • Positive net cash flows in Empower and Personal Capital – In the first quarter of 2022, Empower recorded positive net flows of AUA of US$29 billion ($36 billion) and Personal Capital recorded positive net flows of other assets under management7 of US$1.2 billion ($1.5 billion).
  • Q1 Putnam net loss of US$4 million ($5 million) Putnam's net loss for the first quarter of 2022 was US$4 million ($5 million), compared to a net loss of US$3 million ($3 million) in the first quarter of 2021. In-quarter market volatility impacted fee revenue and drove seed capital losses, which along with a small increase in operating expenses, resulted in an increase in loss compared to the first quarter of 2021 of US$1 million ($1 million). For Putnam, there were no differences between net and base earnings (loss).
  • Putnam continues to sustain strong investment performance – As of March 31, 2022, approximately 83% and 87% of Putnam's fund assets performed at levels above the Lipper median on a three-year and five-year basis, respectively. In addition, 58% and 69% of Putnam's fund assets were in the Lipper top quartile on a three-year  and five-year basis, respectively. Putnam has 25 funds currently rated 4 or 5 stars by Morningstar Ratings.
EUROPE
  • Q1 Europe segment base earnings of $245 million and net earnings of $219 million – Base earnings for the first quarter of 2022 were $245 million, up 22% compared to the first quarter of 2021, primarily, due to favourable investment experience in the U.K., higher fee income in Ireland as well as favourable mortality experience in both Ireland and the U.K.  These items were partially offset by less favourable annuitant experience in the U.K. and the strengthening of the Canadian dollar.  Net earnings for the first quarter of 2022 were $219 million, up $24 million or 12% from the first quarter of 2021, primarily due to higher base earnings and improved real estate related market impacts. These items were partially offset by a negative impact from actuarial assumption changes and other management actions, acquisition related costs in Ireland and unfavourable market related impacts in Ireland and Germany.
  • Strong Insurance and Annuity and Wealth sales7 – In the first quarter of 2022, Insurance and Annuity sales increased by 100% and Wealth sales increased 59% over the same period in 2021.
  • Positive net cash flows in Wealth and Investment Only mandates – In the first quarter of 2022, Wealth mandates and Investment Only mandates each recorded positive net flows of AUA of $1.4 billion, for total positive net flows of AUA of $2.8 billion.

__________________________________________

4

The Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test (LICAT) Ratio is based on the consolidated results of The Canada Life Assurance Company (Canada Life), Lifeco's major Canadian operating subsidiary.  The LICAT Ratio is calculated in accordance with the Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions' guideline - Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test.  Refer to the "Capital Management and Adequacy" section of the Company's first quarter of 2022 interim MD&A for additional details.

5

Assets under administration is a non-GAAP financial measure. Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section of this document for additional details.

6

Refer to the "Glossary" section of the Company's first quarter of 2022 interim MD&A for additional details on the composition of other AUA and net cash flows.

7

Refer to the "Glossary" section of the Company's first quarter of 2022 interim MD&A for additional details on the composition of other assets under management and sales.

 CAPITAL AND RISK SOLUTIONS
  • Q1 Capital and Risk Solutions segment base earnings of $170 million and net earnings of $169 million – Base earnings for the first quarter of 2022 were $170 million, up 17% compared to the first quarter of 2021, primarily due to less adverse claims experience in the U.S. life business, favourable impacts from new business and favourable longevity experience. 
  • Continued expansion in the global reinsurance market – In the first quarter of 2022, Capital and Risk Solutions continued to expand its international presence and entered into a mortgage reinsurance agreement with an insurance company in Israel.  In addition, the Company continued growing its presence in the U.S. health market, completing a number of reinsurance agreements during the quarter.
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS

The Board of Directors approved a quarterly dividend of $0.4900 per share on the common shares of Lifeco payable June 30, 2022 to shareholders of record at the close of business June 2, 2022.

In addition, the Directors approved quarterly dividends on Lifeco's preferred shares, as follows:

First Preferred Shares

Record Date

Payment Date

Amount, per share

Series G

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.3250

Series H

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.30313

Series I

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.28125

Series L

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.353125

Series M

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.3625

Series N

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.109313

Series P

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.3375

Series Q

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.321875

Series R

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.3000

Series S

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.328125

Series T

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.321875

Series Y

June 2, 2022

June 30, 2022

$0.28125

For purposes of the Income Tax Act (Canada), and any similar provincial legislation, the dividends referred to above  are eligible dividends.

Selected financial information is attached.

GREAT-WEST LIFECO INC.

Great-West Lifeco is an international financial services holding company with interests in life insurance, health insurance, retirement and investment services, asset management and reinsurance businesses. We operate in Canada, the United States and Europe under the brands Canada Life, Empower, Putnam Investments, and Irish Life. At the end of 2021, our companies had approximately 28,000 employees, 215,000 advisor relationships, and thousands of distribution partners – all serving over 33 million customer relationships across these regions. Great-West Lifeco trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) under the ticker symbol GWO and is a member of the Power Corporation group of companies. To learn more, visit  greatwestlifeco.com.

Basis of presentation

The condensed consolidated interim unaudited financial statements of Lifeco have been prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) unless otherwise noted and are the basis for the figures presented in this release, unless otherwise noted.

Cautionary note regarding Forward-Looking Information

This release may contain forward-looking information. Forward-looking information includes statements that are predictive in nature, depend upon or refer to future events or conditions, or include words such as "will", "may", "expects", "anticipates", "intends", "plans", "believes", "estimates", "objective", "target", "potential" and other similar expressions or negative versions thereof. These statements include, without limitation, statements about the Company's operations, business, financial condition, expected financial performance (including revenues, earnings or growth rates), ongoing business strategies or prospects, climate-related goals, anticipated global economic conditions and possible future actions by the Company, including statements made with respect to the expected cost (including deferred consideration), benefits, timing of integration activities and revenue and expense synergies of acquisitions and divestitures, including but not limited to the acquisitions of the full-service retirement business of Prudential Financial Inc. (Prudential), Personal Capital Corporation (Personal Capital) and the retirement services business of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual), expected capital management activities and use of capital, estimates of risk sensitivities affecting capital adequacy ratios, expected  dividend levels, expected cost reductions and savings, expected expenditures or investments (including but not limited to investment in technology infrastructure and digital capabilities and solutions), the timing and completion of the joint venture between Allied Irish Banks plc and Canada Life Irish Holding Company Limited, the impact of regulatory developments on the Company's business strategy and growth objectives, the expected impact of the current pandemic health event resulting from the coronavirus (COVID-19) and related economic and market impacts on the Company's business operations, financial results and financial condition.

Forward-looking statements are based on expectations, forecasts, estimates, predictions, projections and conclusions about future events that were current at the time of the statements and are inherently subject to, among other things, risks, uncertainties and assumptions about the Company, economic factors and the financial services industry generally, including the insurance, mutual fund and retirement solutions industries. They are not guarantees of future performance, and the reader is cautioned that actual events and results could differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. Many of these assumptions are based on factors and events that are not within the control of the Company and there is no assurance that they will prove to be correct. Whether or not actual results differ from forward-looking information may depend on numerous factors, developments and assumptions, including, without limitation, the severity, magnitude and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of governments' and other businesses' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and the Company's financial results, financial condition and operations), the duration of COVID-19 impacts and the availability and adoption of vaccines, the effectiveness of vaccines, the emergence of COVID-19 variants, geopolitical tensions and related economic impacts, assumptions around sales, fee rates, asset breakdowns, lapses, plan contributions, redemptions and market returns, the ability to integrate the acquisitions of Personal Capital and the retirement services business of MassMutual and Prudential, the ability to leverage Empower's, Personal Capital's, and MassMutual's and Prudential's retirement services businesses and achieve anticipated synergies, customer behaviour (including customer response to new products), the Company's reputation, market prices for products provided, sales levels, premium income, fee income, expense levels, mortality experience, morbidity experience, policy and plan lapse rates, participant net contribution, reinsurance arrangements, liquidity requirements, capital requirements, credit ratings, taxes, inflation, interest and foreign exchange rates, investment values, hedging activities, global equity and capital markets (including continued access to equity and debt markets), industry sector and individual debt issuers' financial conditions (including developments and volatility arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in certain industries that may comprise part of the Company's investment portfolio), business competition, impairments of goodwill and other intangible assets, the Company's ability to execute strategic plans and changes to strategic plans, technological changes, breaches or failure of information systems and security (including cyber attacks), payments required under investment products, changes in local and international laws and regulations, changes in accounting policies and the effect of applying future accounting policy changes, changes in actuarial standards, unexpected judicial or regulatory proceedings, catastrophic events, continuity and availability of personnel and third party service providers, the Company's ability to complete strategic transactions and integrate acquisitions, unplanned material changes to the Company's facilities, customer and employee relations or credit arrangements, levels of administrative and operational efficiencies, changes in trade organizations, and other general economic, political and market factors in North America and internationally. In addition, as we work to advance our climate goals, external factors outside of Lifeco's reasonable control may act as constraints on their achievement, including varying decarbonization efforts across economies, the need for thoughtful climate policies around the world, more and better data, reasonably supported methodologies, technological advancements, the evolution of consumer behavior, the challenges of balancing interim emissions goals with an orderly and just transition, and other significant considerations such as legal and regulatory obligations.

The reader is cautioned that the foregoing list of assumptions and factors is not exhaustive, and there may be other factors listed in other filings with securities regulators, including factors set out in the Company's 2021 Annual MD&A under "Risk Management and Control Practices" and "Summary of Critical Accounting Estimates" and in the Company's annual information form dated February 9, 2022 under "Risk Factors", which, along with other filings, is available for review at www.sedar.com. The reader is also cautioned to consider these and other factors, uncertainties and potential events carefully and not to place undue reliance on forward-looking information.

Other than as specifically required by applicable law, the Company does not intend to update any forward-looking information whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Cautionary note regarding Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios

This release contains some non-GAAP financial measures and non-GAAP ratios as defined in National Instrument 52-112 "Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Disclosure". Terms by which non-GAAP financial measures are identified include, but are not limited to, "base earnings (loss)", "base earnings (loss) (US$)" and "assets under administration". Terms by which non-GAAP ratios are identified include, but are not limited to, "base earnings per common share (EPS)", and "base return on equity (ROE)". Non-GAAP financial measures and ratios are used to provide management and investors with additional measures of performance to help assess results where no comparable GAAP (IFRS) measure exists. However, non-GAAP financial measures and ratios do not have standard meanings prescribed by GAAP (IFRS) and are not directly comparable to similar measures used by other companies. Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section in this release for the appropriate reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to measures prescribed by GAAP as well as additional details on each measure and ratio.

First Quarter Conference Call

Lifeco's first quarter conference call and audio webcast will be held May 5, 2022 at 3:30 p.m. (ET). The call and webcast can be accessed through greatwestlifeco.com/news-events/events or by phone at:

  • Participants in the Toronto area: 416-915-3239
  • Participants from North America: 1-800-319-4610

A replay of the call will be available until June 5, 2022 and can be accessed by calling 1-855-669-9658 or 604-674-8052 (passcode:8893). The archived webcast will be available on greatwestlifeco.com.

FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS (unaudited)
(in Canadian $ millions, except per share amounts)


As at or for the three months ended


March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021

Earnings




Base earnings(1)

$           809

$           825

$           739

Net earnings - common shareholders

770

765

707

     Per common share




          Basic:




               Base earnings(2)

0.869

0.887

0.796

               Net earnings

0.827

0.822

0.762

          Diluted net earnings

0.825

0.820

0.761

          Dividends paid

0.490

0.490

0.438

          Book value(3)

24.57

24.71

23.36

Base return on equity(2)

14.7 %

14.6 %

13.6 %

Return on equity(3)

14.1 %

14.0 %

15.7 %

Total net premiums(4)

$      14,051

$      12,989

$      13,152

Total premiums atnd deposits(1)(4)

44,158

47,654

45,063

Fee and other income

1,813

1,885

1,751

Net policyholder benefits, dividends and experience refunds(4)

12,747

12,241

11,934

Total assets per financial statements

$    600,459

$    630,488

$    592,759

Total assets under management(1)

954,395

1,007,643

943,641

Total assets under administration(1)(5)

2,187,706

2,291,592

2,088,009





Total equity

30,387

30,483

27,385





The Canada Life Assurance Company consolidated LICAT Ratio(6)     

119 %

124 %

123 %



(1)

This metric is a non-GAAP financial measure.  Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section of this document for additional details.

(2)

This metric is a non-GAAP ratio.  Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section of this document for additional details.

(3)

Refer to the "Glossary" section of the Company's March 31, 2022 Management's Discussion and Analysis for additional details on the composition of this measure.

(4)

Comparative figures for the three months ended March 31, 2021 have been restated relating to an immaterial classification error in the U.S. segment as described in note 16 to the Company's June 30, 2021 condensed consolidated interim unaudited financial statements.

(5)

2021 comparative figures have been restated to include Financial Horizons Group and Excel Private Wealth Inc. assets under administration in the Canada segment.

(6)

The Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test (LICAT) Ratio is based on the consolidated results of The Canada Life Assurance Company (Canada Life), Lifeco's major Canadian operating subsidiary.  The LICAT Ratio is calculated in accordance with the Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions' guideline - Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test.  Refer to the "Capital Management and Adequacy" section of the Company's March 31, 2022 Management's Discussion and Analysis for additional details.

 

Base earnings(1) and Net earnings - common shareholders (unaudited)



For the three months ended



March 31
2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31
2021


Base earnings (loss)(1)





    Canada

$               272

$               317

$               298


    United States

120

156

104


    Europe

245

213

201


    Capital and Risk Solutions

170

145

145


    Lifeco Corporate

2

(6)

(9)


 Lifeco base earnings(1)

$               809

$               825

$               739







Items excluded from base earnings





    Actuarial assumption changes and other management actions(2)      

$                  (9)

$                 23

$                   5


    Market-related impacts on liabilities(2)

(11)

20

(24)


    Restructuring and integration costs

(12)

(15)

(12)


    Transaction costs related to acquisitions(3)

(7)

(74)

(1)


    Net gain/charge on business dispositions(4)

(14)


Items excluded from Lifeco base earning

$                (39)

$                (60)

$                (32)







Net earnings (loss) - common shareholders





    Canada

$               275

$               307

$               287


    United States

105

92

89


    Europe

219

239

195


    Capital and Risk Solutions

169

133

145


    Lifeco Corporate

2

(6)

(9)


Lifeco net earnings - common shareholders

$               770

$               765

$               707









(1)

This metric is a non-GAAP financial measure.  Refer to the "Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Ratios" section of this document for additional details.

(2)

Refer to the "Glossary" section of the Company's March 31, 2022 Management's Discussion and Analysis for additional details on the composition of this measure.

(3)

The transaction costs relate to acquisitions in the U.S. segment (the full-service retirement business of Prudential, Personal Capital and the retirement services business of MassMutual) as well as acquisitions in the Europe segment.

(4)

For the three months ended December 31, 2021, net gain/charge on business dispositions includes a $14 million net charge on business disposition in the Europe Corporate business unit.

 

NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES AND RATIOS

Non-GAAP Financial Measures
The Company uses several non-GAAP financial measures to measure overall performance of the Company and to assess each of its business units.  A financial measure is considered a non-GAAP measure for Canadian securities law purposes if it is presented other than in accordance with GAAP used for the Company's consolidated financial statements.  The consolidated financial statements of the Company have been prepared in compliance with IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  Non-GAAP financial measures do not have a standardized meaning under GAAP and may not be comparable to similar financial measures presented by other issuers.  Investors may find these financial measures useful in understanding how management views the underlying business performance of the Company.

Base earnings (loss)
Base earnings (loss) reflect management's view of the underlying business performance of the Company and provide an alternate measure to understand the underlying business performance compared to IFRS net earnings (loss).  Base earnings (loss) exclude the following items:

  • The impact of actuarial assumption changes and other management actions;
  • The net earnings impact related to the direct equity and interest rate market impacts on insurance and investment contract liabilities, net of hedging, and related deferred tax liabilities, which includes:
    • the impact of hedge ineffectiveness related to segregated fund guarantee liabilities that are hedged and the performance of the related hedge assets;
    • the impact on segregated fund guarantee liabilities not hedged;
    • the impact on general fund equity and investment properties supporting insurance contract liabilities;
    • other market impacts on insurance and investment contract liabilities and deferred tax liabilities, including those arising from the difference between actual and expected market movements; and
  • Certain items that, when removed, assist in explaining the Company's underlying business performance including restructuring costs, integration costs related to business acquisitions, material legal settlements, material impairment charges related to goodwill and intangible assets, impact of substantially enacted income tax rate changes and other tax impairments and net gains, losses or costs related to the disposition or acquisition of a business.

 

Lifeco






For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Base earnings

$              809

$              825

$              739







Items excluded from Lifeco base earnings





     Actuarial assumption changes and other management actions (pre-tax)      

$                 (9)

$                28

$                  4


          Income tax (expense) benefit

(5)

1


     Market-related impacts on liabilities (pre-tax)

(14)

22

(25)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

3

(2)

1


     Restructuring and integration costs (pre-tax)

(17)

(21)

(16)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

5

6

4


     Transaction costs related to acquisitions (pre-tax)

(8)

(76)

(2)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

1

2

1


     Net gain/charge on business dispositions (pre-tax)

(14)


          Income tax (expense) benefit


     Total pre-tax items excluded from base earnings

$              (48)

$              (61)

$              (39)


          Impact of items excluded from base earnings on income taxes

9

1

7


Net earnings - common shareholders

$              770

$              765

$              707







 

Canada




For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Base earnings

$             272

$             317

$             298







Items excluded from base earnings





     Actuarial assumption changes and other management actions (pre-tax)    

$                  1

$              (18)

$              (18)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

(1)

5

5


     Market-related impacts on liabilities (pre-tax)

4

4

2


          Income tax (expense) benefit

(1)

(1)


Net earnings - common shareholders

$             275

$             307

$             287







 

United States






For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Base earnings

$             120

$             156

$             104







Items excluded from base earnings





     Actuarial assumption changes and other management actions (pre-tax)

$                —

$                  2

$                —


          Income tax (expense) benefit


     Market-related impacts on liabilities (pre-tax)

(3)

(1)

(2)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

1


     Restructuring and integration costs (pre-tax)

(17)

(21)

(16)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

5

6

4


     Transaction costs related to acquisitions (pre-tax)

(2)

(52)

(2)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

1

2

1


Net earnings - common shareholders

$             105

$               92

$               89







 

Europe






For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Base earnings

$              245

$              213

$              201







Items excluded from base earnings





     Actuarial assumption changes and other management actions (pre-tax)   

$                 (9)

$                59

$                22


          Income tax (expense) benefit

1

(13)

(4)


     Market-related impacts on liabilities (pre-tax)

(15)

19

(25)


          Income tax (expense) benefit

3

(1)

1


     Transaction costs related to acquisitions (pre-tax)

(6)

(24)


          Income tax (expense) benefit


     Net gain/charge on business dispositions (pre-tax)

(14)


          Income tax (expense) benefit


Net earnings - common shareholders

$              219

$              239

$              195







 

Capital and Risk Solutions






For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Base earnings

$             170

$             145

$             145







Items excluded from base earnings





     Actuarial assumption changes and other management actions (pre-tax)      

$                (1)

$              (15)

$                —


          Income tax (expense) benefit

3


Net earnings - common shareholder

$             169

$             133

$             145







 

Lifeco Corporate






For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Base earnings (loss)

$                  2

$                (6)

$                (9)







Net earnings (loss) - common shareholder                    

$                  2

$                (6)

$                (9)


Premiums and deposits
Total premiums and deposits include premiums on risk-based insurance and annuity products net of ceded reinsurance (as defined under IFRS as net premium income), premium equivalents on self-funded group insurance ASO contracts, deposits on individual and group segregated fund products as well as deposits on proprietary mutual funds and institutional accounts.  This measure provides an indicator of top-line growth.

Premiums and deposits






For the three months ended



March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Total net premiums(1)

$         14,051

$         12,989

$         13,152


Policyholder deposits (segregated funds)(2)

8,273

8,337

7,953


Self-funded premium equivalents (ASO contracts) and other        

2,893

4,556

1,703


Proprietary mutual funds and institutional deposits

18,941

21,772

22,255


Total premiums and deposits(1)

$         44,158

$         47,654

$         45,063








(1)

Comparative figures for the three months ended March 31, 2021 have been restated relating to an immaterial classification error in the U.S. segment as described in note 16 to the Company's June 30, 2021 condensed consolidated interim unaudited financial statements.

(2)

Refer to note 9(b) of the Company's condensed consolidated interim unaudited financial statements for the period ended March 31, 2022 for further details.

Assets under management (AUM) and assets under administration (AUA)
Assets under management and assets under administration are non-GAAP measures that provide an indicator of the size and volume of the Company's overall business.  Administrative services are an important aspect of the overall business of the Company and should be considered when comparing volumes, size and trends.

Total assets under administration includes total assets per financial statements, other assets under management and other assets under administration.

Assets under administration






March 31

2022

Dec. 31

2021

March 31

2021


Total assets per financial statements         

$       600,459

$       630,488

$       592,759


  Other AUM

353,936

377,155

350,882


Total AUM

954,395

1,007,643

943,641


  Other AUA(1)

1,233,311

1,283,949

1,144,368


Total AUA(1)

$    2,187,706

$    2,291,592

$    2,088,009









(1)       

2021 comparative figures have been restated to include Financial Horizons Group and Excel Private Wealth Inc. assets under administration in the Canada segment.

Non-GAAP Ratios 
A non-GAAP ratio is a financial measure in the form of a ratio, fraction, percentage or similar representation that is not disclosed in the consolidated financial statements of the Company and has a non-GAAP financial measure as one or more of its components.  These financial measures do not have a standardized definition under GAAP and might not be comparable to similar financial measures presented by other issuers.

The non-GAAP ratios disclosed by the Company each use base earnings (loss) or core earnings (loss) as the non-GAAP component.  Base earnings (loss) reflect management's view of the underlying business performance of the Company and provide an alternate measure to understand the underlying business performance compared to IFRS net earnings.

  • Base earnings per share - Base earnings (loss) for the period is divided by the number of average common shares outstanding for the period.
  • Base return on equity - Base earnings (loss) for the trailing four quarters are divided by the average common shareholders' equity over the trailing four quarters. This measure provides an indicator of business unit profitability.

SOURCE Great-West Lifeco Inc.

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Analysts issue unexpected crude oil price forecast after surge

Here’s what a key investment firm says about the commodity.

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Oil is an asset defined by volatility.

U.S. crude prices stood above $60 a barrel in January 2020, just as the covid pandemic began. Three months later, prices briefly went negative, as the pandemic crushed demand.

By June 2022 the price rebounded all the way to $120, as fiscal and monetary stimulus boosted the economy. The price fell back to $80 in September 2022. Since then, it has bounced between about $65 and $90.

Over the past two months, the price has climbed 15% to $82 as of March 20.

Oil prices often trade in a roller-coaster fashion.

Bullish factors for oil prices

The move stems partly from indications that economic growth this year will be stronger than analysts expected.

Related: The Fed rate decision won't surprise markets. What happens next might

Vanguard has just raised its estimate for 2024 U.S. GDP growth to 2% from 0.5%.

Meanwhile, China’s factory output and retail sales exceeded forecasts in January and February. That could boost oil demand in the country, the world's No. 1 oil importer.

Also, drone strokes from Ukraine have knocked out some of Russia’s oil refinery capacity. Ukraine has hit at least nine major refineries this year, erasing an estimated 11% of Russia’s production capacity, according to Bloomberg.

“Russia is a gas station with an army, and we intend on destroying that gas station,” Francisco Serra-Martins, chief executive of drone manufacturer Terminal Autonomy, told the news service. Gasoline, of course, is one of the products made at refineries.

Speaking of gas, the recent surge of oil prices has sent it higher as well. The average national price for regular gas totaled $3.52 per gallon Wednesday, up 7% from a month ago, according to the American Automobile Association. And we’re nearing the peak driving season.

Another bullish factor for oil: Iraq said Monday that it’s cutting oil exports by 130,000 barrels per day in coming months. Iraq produced much more oil in January and February than its OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) target.

Citigroup’s oil-price forecast

Yet, not everyone is bullish on oil going forward. Citigroup analysts see prices falling through next year, Dow Jones’s Oil Price Information Service (OPIS) reports.

More Economic Analysis:

The analysts note that supply is at risk in Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela. But Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Russia could easily make up any shortfall.

Moreover, output should also rise this year and next in the U.S., Canada, Brazil, and Guyana, the analysts said. Meanwhile, global demand growth will decelerate, amid increased electric vehicle use and economic weakness.

Regarding refineries, the analysts see strong gains in capacity and capacity upgrades this year.

What if Donald Trump is elected president again? That “would likely be bearish for oil and gas," as Trump's policies could boost trade tension, crimping demand, they said.

The analysts made predictions for European oil prices, the world’s benchmark, which sat Wednesday at $86.

They forecast a 9% slide in the second quarter to $78, then a decline to $74 in the third quarter and $70 in the fourth quarter.

Next year should see a descent to $65 in the first quarter, $60 in the second and third, and finally $55 in the fourth, Citi said. That would leave the price 36% below current levels.

U.S. crude prices will trade $4 below European prices from the second quarter this year until the end of 2025, the analysts maintain.

Related: Veteran fund manager picks favorite stocks for 2024

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How The Democrats Plan To Steal The Election

How The Democrats Plan To Steal The Election

Authored by Llewellyn Rockwell via LewRockwell.com,

Biden and Trump have clinched the nominations…

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How The Democrats Plan To Steal The Election

Authored by Llewellyn Rockwell via LewRockwell.com,

Biden and Trump have clinched the nominations of their parties for President. Everybody is gearing up for a battle between them for the election in November. It’s obvious that Biden is “cognitively impaired.” In blunter language, “brain-dead”. Partisans of Trump are gearing up for a decisive victory.

But what if this battle is a sham? What if Biden’s elite gang of neo-con controllers won’t let Biden lose?

How can they stop him from losing? Simple. If it looks like he’s losing, the elite forces will create enough fake ballots to ensure victory. Our corrupt courts won’t stop them. They have done this before, and they will do it again, if they have to.

I said the Democrats have done this before.

The great Dr. Ron Paul explains one way they did this in 2020. The elite covered up a scandal that could have wrecked Biden’s chances:

“Move over Watergate. On or around Oct. 17, 2020, then-senior Biden campaign official Antony Blinken called up former acting CIA director Mike Morell to ask a favor: he needed high-ranking former US intelligence community officials to lie to the American people to save Biden’s lagging campaign from a massive brewing scandal.

The problem was that Joe Biden’s son, Hunter, had abandoned his laptop at a repair shop and the explosive contents of the computer were leaking out. The details of the Biden family’s apparent corruption and the debauchery of the former vice-president’s son were being reported by the New York Post, and with the election less than a month away, the Biden campaign needed to kill the story.

So, according to newly-released transcripts of Morell’s testimony before the House judiciary Committee, Blinken “triggered” Morell to put together a letter for some 50 senior intelligence officials to sign – using their high-level government titles – to claim that the laptop story “had all the hallmarks of a Russian disinformation campaign.”

In short, at the Biden campaign’s direction Morell launched a covert operation against the American people to undermine the integrity of the 2020 election. A letter signed by dozens of the highest-ranking former CIA, DIA, and NSA officials would surely carry enough weight to bury the Biden laptop story. It worked. Social media outlets prevented any reporting on the laptop from being posted and the mainstream media could easily ignore the story as it was merely “Russian propaganda.”

Asked recently by Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Jordan (R-OH) why he agreed to draft the false sign-on letter, Morell testified that he wanted to “help Vice President Biden … because I wanted him to win the election.”

Morell also likely expected to be named by President Biden to head up the CIA when it came time to call in favors.

The Democrats and the mainstream media have relentlessly pushed the lie that the ruckus inside the US Capitol on Jan. 6th 2021 was a move by President Trump to overthrow the election results. Hundreds of “trespassers” were arrested and held in solitary confinement without trial to bolster the false narrative that a conspiracy to steal the election was taking place.

It turns out that there really was a conspiracy to steal the election, but it was opposite of what was reported. Just as the Steele Dossier was a Democratic Party covert action to plant the lie that the Russians were pulling strings for Trump, the “Russian disinformation campaign” letter was a lie to deflect scrutiny of the Biden family’s possible corruption in the final days of the campaign.

Did the Biden campaign’s disinformation campaign help rig the election in his favor? Polls suggest that Biden would not have been elected had the American electorate been informed about what was on Hunter Biden’s laptop. So yes, they cheated in the election.

The Democrats and the mainstream media are still at it, however. Now they are trying to kill the story of how they killed the story of the Biden laptop. This is a scandal that would once upon a time have ended in resignation, impeachment, and/or plenty of jail time. If they successfully bury this story, I hate to say it but there is no more rule of law in what has become the American banana republic.” See here.

But the main way the election can be rigged is by fraudulent “voting.” It’s much easier to do this with digital scanning of votes than with old-fashioned ballot boxes.

Dr. Naomi Wolf explains how electronic voting machines make it easier to steal elections:

“People could steal elections in this ‘analog’ technology of paper and locked ballot boxes, of course, by destroying or hiding votes, or by bribing voters, a la Tammany Hall, or by other forms of wrongdoing, so security and chain of custody, as well as anti-corruption scrutiny, were always needed in guaranteeing accurate election counts. But there was no reason, with analog physical processing of votes, to query the tradition of the secret ballot.

Before the digital scanning of votes, you could not hack a wooden ballot box; and you could not set an algorithm to misread a pile of paper ballots. So, at the end of the day, one way or another, you were counting physical documents.

Those days are gone, obviously, and in many districts there are digital systems reading ballots.” See here.

This isn’t the first time the Left has stolen an election. It happened in the 2020 presidential election too. Ron Unz offers his usual cogent analysis:

“There does seem to be considerable circumstantial evidence of widespread ballot fraud by Democratic Party forces, hardly surprising given the apocalyptic manner in which so many of their leaders had characterized the threat of a Trump reelection. After all, if they sincerely believed that a Trump victory would be catastrophic for America why would they not use every possible means, fair and foul alike, to save our country from that dire fate?

In particular, several of the major swing-states contain large cities—Detroit, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Atlanta—that are both totally controlled by the Democratic Party and also notoriously corrupt, and various eye-witnesses have suggested that the huge anti-Trump margins they provided may have been heavily ‘padded’ to ensure the candidate’s defeat.” See here.

In a program aired right after Biden’s pitiful State of the Union speech, the great Tucker Carlson pointed out that Biden’s “Justice” Department has already confessed that it plans to rig the election. It will do this by banning voter ID laws as “racist.” This permits an unlimited number of fake votes:

“If Joe Biden is so good at politics, why is he losing to Donald Trump, who the rest of us were assured was a retarded racist who no normal person would vote for? But now Joe Biden is getting stomped by Donald Trump, but he’s also at the same time good at politics? Right.

Again, they can’t win, but they’re not giving up. So what does that tell you? Well, they’re going to steal the election. We know they’re going to steal the election because they’re now saying so out loud. Here is the Attorney General of the United States, the chief law enforcement officer of this country in Selma, Alabama, just the other day.

[Now Carlson quotes the Attorney General, Merrick Garland:]

“The right to vote is still under attack, and that is why the Justice Department is fighting back. That is why one of the first things I did when I came into office was to double the size of the voting section of the Civil Rights Division. That is why we are challenging efforts by states and jurisdictions to implement discriminatory, burdensome, and unnecessary restrictions on access to the ballot, including those related to mail-in voting, the use of drop boxes and voter ID requirements. That is why we are working to block the adoption of discriminatory redistricting plans that dilute the vote of Black voters and other voters of color.

[Carlson then comments on Garland:]

“Did you catch that? Of course, you’re a racist. That’s always the takeaway. But consider the details of what the Attorney General of the United States just said. Mail-in balloting, drop boxes, voter ID requirements. The chief law enforcement officer of the United States Government is telling you that it’s immoral, in fact racist, in fact illegal to ask people for their IDs when they vote to verify they are who they say they are. What is that? Well, no one ever talks about this, but the justification for it is that somehow people of color, Black people, don’t have state-issued IDs. Somehow they’re living in a country where you can do virtually nothing without proving your identity with a government-issued ID without government-issued IDs. They can’t fly on planes, they can’t have checking accounts, they can’t have any interaction with the government, state, local, or federal. They can’t stay in hotels. They can’t have credit cards. Because someone without a state-issued ID can’t do any of those things.

But what’s so interesting is these same people, very much including the Attorney General and the administration he serves, is working to eliminate cash, to make this a cashless society. Have you been to a stadium event recently? No cash accepted. You have to have a credit card. In order to get a credit card you need a state-issued ID, and somehow that’s not racist. But it is racist to ask people to prove their identity when they choose the next President of the United States. That doesn’t make any sense at all. That’s a lie. It’s an easily provable lie, and anyone telling that lie is advocating for mass voter fraud, which the Attorney General is. There’s no other way to read it. So you should know that. You live in a country where the Attorney General is abetting, in fact calling for voter fraud, and that’s the only chance they have to get their guy re-elected.” See here.

Because of absentee ballots, the voting can be spread out over a long period of time. This makes voting fraud much easier. Mollie Hemingway has done a lot of research on this topic:

“In the 2020 presidential election, for the first time ever, partisan groups were allowed—on a widespread basis—to cross the bright red line separating government officials who administer elections from political operatives who work to win them. It is important to understand how this happened in order to prevent it in the future.

Months after the election, Time magazine published a triumphant story of how the election was won by “a well-funded cabal of powerful people, ranging across industries and ideologies, working together behind the scenes to influence perceptions, change rules and laws, steer media coverage and control the flow of information.”  Written by Molly Ball, a journalist with close ties to Democratic leaders, it told a cheerful story of a “conspiracy unfolding behind the scenes,” the “result of an informal alliance between left-wing activists and business titans.”

A major part of this “conspiracy” to “save the 2020 election” was to use COVID as a pretext to maximize absentee and early voting. This effort was enormously successful. Nearly half of voters ended up voting by mail, and another quarter voted early. It was, Ball wrote, “practically a revolution in how people vote.” Another major part was to raise an army of progressive activists to administer the election at the ground level.

Here, one billionaire in particular took a leading role: Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg.

Zuckerberg’s help to Democrats is well known when it comes to censoring their political opponents in the name of preventing “misinformation.” Less well known is the fact that he directly funded liberal groups running partisan get-out-the-vote operations. In fact, he helped those groups infiltrate election offices in key swing states by doling out large grants to crucial districts.

The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, an organization led by Zuckerberg’s wife Priscilla, gave more than $400 million to nonprofit groups involved in “securing” the 2020 election. Most of those funds—colloquially called “Zuckerbucks”—were funneled through the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL), a voter outreach organization founded by Tiana Epps-Johnson, Whitney May, and Donny Bridges. All three had previously worked on activism relating to election rules for the New Organizing Institute, once described by The Washington Post as “the Democratic Party’s Hogwarts for digital wizardry.”

Flush with $350 million in Zuckerbucks, the CTCL proceeded to disburse large grants to election officials and local governments across the country. These disbursements were billed publicly as “COVID-19 response grants,” ostensibly to help municipalities acquire protective gear for poll workers or otherwise help protect election officials and volunteers against the virus. In practice, relatively little money was spent for this. Here, as in other cases, COVID simply provided cover.

According to the Foundation for Government Accountability (FGA), Georgia received more than $31 million in Zuckerbucks, one of the highest amounts in the country. The three Georgia counties that received the most money spent only 1.3 percent of it on personal protective equipment. The rest was spent on salaries, laptops, vehicle rentals, attorney fees for public records requests, mail-in balloting, and other measures that allowed elections offices to hire activists to work the election. Not all Georgia counties received CTCL funding. And of those that did, Trump-voting counties received an average of $1.91 per registered voter, compared to $7.13 per registered voter in Biden-voting counties.

The FGA looked at this funding another way, too. Trump won Georgia by more than five points in 2016. He lost it by three-tenths of a point in 2020. On average, as a share of the two-party vote, most counties moved Democratic by less than one percentage point in that time. Counties that didn’t receive Zuckerbucks showed hardly any movement, but counties that did moved an average of 2.3 percentage points Democratic. In counties that did not receive Zuckerbucks, “roughly half saw an increase in Democrat votes that offset the increase in Republican votes, while roughly half saw the opposite trend.” In counties that did receive Zuckerbucks, by contrast, three quarters “saw a significant uptick in Democrat votes that offset any upward change in Republican votes,” including highly populated Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb, and DeKalb counties.

Of all the 2020 battleground states, it is probably in Wisconsin where the most has been brought to light about how Zuckerbucks worked.

CTCL distributed $6.3 million to the Wisconsin cities of Racine, Green Bay, Madison, Milwaukee, and Kenosha—purportedly to ensure that voting could take place “in accordance with prevailing [anti-COVID] public health requirements.”

Wisconsin law says voting is a right, but that “voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse; to prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors who may prefer not to participate in an election.” Wisconsin law also says that elections are to be run by clerks or other government officials. But the five cities that received Zuckerbucks outsourced much of their election operation to private liberal groups, in one case so extensively that a sidelined government official quit in frustration.

This was by design. Cities that received grants were not allowed to use the money to fund outside help unless CTCL specifically approved their plans in writing. CTCL kept tight control of how money was spent, and it had an abundance of “partners” to help with anything the cities needed.

Some government officials were willing to do whatever CTCL recommended. “As far as I’m concerned I am taking all of my cues from CTCL and work with those you recommend,” Celestine Jeffreys, the chief of staff to Democratic Green Bay Mayor Eric Genrich, wrote in an email. CTCL not only had plenty of recommendations, but made available a “network of current and former election administrators and election experts” to scale up “your vote by mail processes” and “ensure forms, envelopes, and other materials are understood and completed correctly by voters.”

Power the Polls, a liberal group recruiting poll workers, promised to help with ballot curing. The liberal Mikva Challenge worked to recruit high school-age poll workers. And the left-wing Brennan Center offered help with “election integrity,” including “post-election audits” and “cybersecurity.”

The Center for Civic Design, an election administration policy organization that frequently partners with groups such as liberal billionaire Pierre Omidyar’s Democracy Fund, designed absentee ballots and voting instructions, often working directly with an election commission to design envelopes and create advertising and targeting campaigns. The Elections Group, also linked to the Democracy Fund, provided technical assistance in handling drop boxes and conducted voter outreach. The communications director for the Center for Secure and Modern Elections, an organization that advocates sweeping changes to the elections process, ran a conference call to help Green Bay develop Spanish-language radio ads and geofencing to target voters in a predefined area.

Digital Response, a nonprofit launched in 2020, offered to “bring voters an updated elections website,” “run a website health check,” “set up communications channels,” “bring poll worker application and management online,” “track and respond to polling location wait times,” “set up voter support and email response tools,” “bring vote-by-mail applications online,” “process incoming [vote-by-mail] applications,” and help with “ballot curing process tooling and voter notification.”

The National Vote at Home Institute was presented as a “technical assistance partner” that could “support outreach around absentee voting,” provide and oversee voting machines, consult on methods to cure absentee ballots, and even assume the duty of curing ballots.

A few weeks after the five Wisconsin cities received their grants, CTCL emailed Claire Woodall-Vogg, the executive director of the Milwaukee Election Commission, to offer “an experienced elections staffer that could potentially embed with your staff in Milwaukee in a matter of days.” The staffer leading Wisconsin’s portion of the National Vote at Home Institute was an out-of-state Democratic activist named Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein. As soon as he met with Woodall-Vogg, he asked for contacts in other cities and at the Wisconsin Elections Commission.

Spitzer-Rubenstein would eventually take over much of Green Bay’s election planning from the official charged with running the election, Green Bay Clerk Kris Teske. This made Teske so unhappy that she took Family and Medical Leave prior to the election and quit shortly thereafter.

Emails from Spitzer-Rubenstein show the extent to which he was managing the election process. To one government official he wrote, “By Monday, I’ll have our edits on the absentee voting instructions. We’re pushing Quickbase to get their system up and running and I’ll keep you updated. I’ll revise the planning tool to accurately reflect the process. I’ll create a flowchart for the vote-by-mail processing that we will be able to share with both inspectors and also observers.”

Once early voting started, Woodall-Vogg would provide Spitzer-Rubenstein with daily updates on the numbers of absentee ballots returned and still outstanding in each ward­­—prized information for a political operative.

Amazingly, Spitzer-Rubenstein even asked for direct access to the Milwaukee Election Commission’s voter database:

“Would you or someone else on your team be able to do a screen-share so we can see the process for an export?” he wrote.

“Do you know if WisVote has an [application programming interface] or anything similar so that it can connect with other software apps? That would be the holy grail.”

Even for Woodall-Vogg, that was too much.

“While I completely understand and appreciate the assistance that is trying to be provided,” she replied, “I am definitely not comfortable having a non-staff member involved in the function of our voter database, much less recording it.”

When these emails were released in 2021, they stunned Wisconsin observers. “What exactly was the National Vote at Home Institute doing with its daily reports? Was it making sure that people were actually voting from home by going door-to-door to collect ballots from voters who had not yet turned theirs in? Was this data sharing a condition of the CTCL grant? And who was really running Milwaukee’s election?” asked Dan O’Donnell, whose election analysis appeared at Wisconsin’s conservative MacIver Institute.

Kris Teske, the sidelined Green Bay city clerk—in whose office Wisconsin law actually places the responsibility to conduct elections—had of course seen what was happening early on. “I just don’t know where the Clerk’s Office fits in anymore,” she wrote in early July. By August, she was worried about legal exposure: “I don’t understand how people who don’t have the knowledge of the process can tell us how to manage the election,” she wrote on August 28.

Green Bay Mayor Eric Genrich simply handed over Teske’s authority to agents from outside groups and gave them leadership roles in collecting absentee ballots, fixing ballots that would otherwise be voided for failure to follow the law, and even supervising the counting of ballots. “The grant mentors would like to meet with you to discuss, further, the ballot curing process. Please let them know when you’re available,” Genrich’s chief of staff told Teske.

Spitzer-Rubenstein explained that the National Vote at Home Institute had done the same for other cities in Wisconsin. “We have a process map that we’ve worked out with Milwaukee for their process. We can also adapt the letter we’re sending out with rejected absentee ballots along with a call script alerting voters. (We can also get people to make the calls, too, so you don’t need to worry about it.)”

Other emails show that Spitzer-Rubenstein had keys to the central counting facility and access to all the machines before election night. His name was on contracts with the hotel hosting the ballot counting.

Sandy Juno, who was clerk of Brown County, where Green Bay is located, later testified about the problems in a legislative hearing. “He was advising them on things. He was touching the ballots. He had access to see how the votes were counted,” Juno said of Spitzer-Rubenstein. Others testified that he was giving orders to poll workers and seemed to be the person running the election night count operation.

“I would really like to think that when we talk about security of elections, we’re talking about more than just the security of the internet,” Juno said. “You know, it has to be security of the physical location, where you’re not giving a third party keys to where you have your election equipment.”

Juno noted that there were irregularities in the counting, too, with no consistency between the various tables. Some had absentee ballots face-up, so anyone could see how they were marked. Poll workers were seen reviewing ballots not just to see that they’d been appropriately checked by the clerk, but “reviewing how they were marked.” And poll workers fixing ballots used the same color pens as the ones ballots had been filled out in, contrary to established procedures designed to make sure observers could differentiate between voters’ marks and poll workers’ marks.

The plan by Democratic strategists to bring activist groups into election offices worked in part because no legislature had ever imagined that a nonprofit could take over so many election offices so easily.

“If it can happen to Green Bay, Wisconsin, sweet little old Green Bay, Wisconsin, these people can coordinate any place,” said Janel Brandtjen, a state representative in Wisconsin.

She was right. What happened in Green Bay happened in Democrat-run cities and counties across the country. Four hundred million Zuckerbucks were distributed with strings attached. Officials were required to work with “partner organizations” to massively expand mail-in voting and staff their election operations with partisan activists. The plan was genius. And because no one ever imagined that the election system could be privatized in this way, there were no laws to prevent it.

"Such laws should now be a priority.” See here.

Let’s do everything we can to publicize the steal. That way, we have a chance to prevent it.

Tyler Durden Wed, 03/20/2024 - 19:00

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Analyst revamps MicroStrategy stock price target after Bitcoin buy

Here’s what could happen to MicroStrategy shares next.

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How does Michael Saylor feel about bitcoin? We'll let him tell you in his own words.

"Bitcoin is a swarm of cyberhornets serving the goddess of wisdom, feeding on the fire of truth, exponentially growing ever smarter, faster, and stronger behind a wall of encrypted energy," the executive chairman and co-founder of MicroStrategy  (MSTR)  once said.

Too subtle? Still not sure how the former CEO of the software intelligence company feels about the world's largest cryptocurrency? 

Maybe this will help.

"Bitcoin is a bank in cyberspace, run by incorruptible software, offering a global, affordable, simple and secure savings account to billions of people that don't have the option or desire to run their own hedge fund," Saylor said.

Okay, so the guy really likes bitcoin. And on March 19, the first day of spring, MicroStrategy took a bigger bite out of bitcoin when the company said it had bought 9,245 bitcoins for $623 million between March 11 and March 18.

MicroStrategy said it a completed a $603.75 million convertible debt offering — its second in a week — to raise money to buy bitcoin.

The company now holds about $13.5 billion of bitcoin, which adds up to more than 1% of the 21 million bitcoin that will ever exist, according to CoinDesk.

An analyst adjusts his price target for MicroStrategy

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Committed to developing bitcoin network

MicroStrategy said in a regulatory filing that it had paid roughly $7.53 billion for its bitcoin stash, an average of $35,160 per coin.

The company's stock fell on Tuesday, while bitcoin posted its biggest single-day loss since November 2022. MicroStrategy was off slightly to $1,416 at last check on Wednesday and bitcoin was up 2.3% to $63.607.

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Phong Le, MicroStrategy’s president and CEO, told analysts during the company’s Feb. 6 fourth-quarter-earnings call that "we remain highly committed to our bitcoin strategy with a long-term focus.."

"We consider MicroStrategy to be the world's first bitcoin development company," he said. "We are a publicly traded operating company committed to the continued development of the bitcoin network through activities in the financial markets, advocacy, and technology innovation."

MicroStrategy earned $4.96 a share in the quarter, beating the FactSet consensus of a loss of 64 cents, and light years beyond the year-ago loss of $21.93 a share.

Revenue totaled $124.5 million, compared with FactSet's call for $133 million and the year-earlier tally of $132.6 million.

During the call, Saylor told analysts that "2024 is the year of birth of bitcoin as an institutional-grade asset class."

MicroStrategy, he said, completed the first 15 years of the bitcoin life cycle, back when it was largely unregulated and misunderstood. 

"The next 15 years, I would expect, will be a regulated, institutional, high-growth period of bitcoin, very, very different in many ways from the last 15 years," Saylor said.

Crypto's dark days

"Bitcoin itself is performing well for a number of reasons, but one reason is because it represents the digital transformation of capital," he added.

Of course, life with bitcoin wasn't always sunshine and roses. 

More Wall Street Analysts:

We take you back now to those less-than-thrilling days yesteryear, when covid-19 was on the rampage and the price of bitcoin fell 30% from March 8 to March 12 2020.

By the end of 2021, bitcoin had fallen nearly 30%. And 2023 saw the cryptocurrency sector wracked with bankruptcy and scandal, with the likes of FTX CEO Sam Bankman-Fried being convicted of fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering. 

SBF, as he has been known, is scheduled to be sentenced in Manhattan federal court on March 28. He faces a long stretch.

But bitcoin rose about 160% in 2023 and hit a record $73,750 on March 14.

Saylor recently said that his high hopes for bitcoin this year stemmed largely from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission approving spot bitcoin ETFs and the upcoming bitcoin halving, where when bitcoin's mining reward is split in half.

MicroStrategy is the first bitcoin development company, Saylor told analysts, but perhaps not for long. 

"We've published our playbook, and we're showing other companies how to do it," he said.

TD Cowen analyst Lance Vitanza cited MicroStrategy's latest bitcoin acquisition when he adjusted his price target for the company's shares on March 20.

The analyst cut the investment firm's price target on MicroStrategy to $1,450 from $1,560 and affirmed an outperform rating on the shares. 

He says the shares remain an attractive vehicle for investors looking to gain bitcoin exposure.

Related: Veteran fund manager picks favorite stocks for 2024

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