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February 2023 Monthly

The coming weeks will
likely continue the correction of the trends that began last month. The markets
recognize that tightening cycle is over. However,…

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The coming weeks will likely continue the correction of the trends that began last month. The markets recognize that tightening cycle is over. However, they swung hard, pricing in aggressive easing by most of the G10 central banks, including the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Official comments and some high-frequency economic data have encouraged participants to rein in their expectations, reducing the odds of a rate cuts in Q1 and paring back the extent of the cuts this year. 

The pendulum of market expectations reached an extreme. In the first part of January, pricing of the Fed funds futures strip implied a rate cut at each of the remaining seven FOMC meetings. While this is possible, it is not the most likely scenario, especially given what we know about the national labor market and in the context of still elevated price pressures and above trend growth in Q4 23.

Similarly, at the extreme in late December, the swaps market had discounted 190 bp of ECB cuts this year. It had returned to around 140 bp (five quarter-point cuts and a 60% chance of a sixth) in late January, which still seems aggressive compared with ECB signals. Comments from ECB President Lagarde and the record from the December meeting suggest a timeframe of the first rate cute toward the middle of the year. The market thinks April is a reasonable timeframe and will coincide with a sharp drop in measured inflation. With the eurozone continuing to struggle to sustain economic traction, the disruption of Red Sea transit, which means greater costs and slower deliveries, is the latest exogenous shock. 

The earthquake in Japan at the start of the year and the diminishing price pressures, framed by official comments, have strengthened the emerging consensus for an April policy adjustment. This would allow for the completion of the spring wage negotiations and corresponds to the end of the government's gas and electric subsidies, which could boost measured inflation by 0.4%-0.5%.

China's may have met last year's 5% growth target, according to its own assessment but it is not satisfactory for Beijing. More stimulus is expected in the form of government loans and lending by the PBOC. Given weak prices pressures (deflation), there is still scope for ore targeted measures after reserve requirements were cut in late January by 50 basis points. New formal and informal efforts to stem the hemorrhaging of Chinese stocks on the mainland, and especially in Hong Kong may be tested in the coming weeks. The fact that officials needed to resort to such measures feeds the sense that China is stumbling. Its enormous size means that the scale of whatever it does is globally significant. Coupled powerful economic nationalism and the lack of transparency contributes to economic anxiety in developed and developing countries.

However, the economic rivalry, while intense, is manageable. We often forget that the heated rivalry between the US, Europe, and Japan previously, and the tactics included tariffs and restrictions on the exports of some technology. Europe and Japan, no more than China, have chafed under US leadership, but there the competition was limited to the economy and trade. Not so with China, and Beijing's aggressive tactics, not only toward Taiwan, but others Pacific nations, including the Philippines, and Nepal and Bhutan, while aligning with Russia and Iran, remains particularly troubling.

Yet broadly, one cannot tell by looking at the capital or commodity markets the geopolitical tensions are the highest in at least a generation. Shipping costs between Europe and Asia reflect the disruption, but crude oil prices are more than 10% below Q4 23's peak, and gold was a couple percentage points lower through the first four weeks of January. The G10 currencies usually associated with risk-off, the Japanese yen and Swiss franc have not been beneficiaries of the geopolitical tensions, falling about 4.8% and 2.6%, respectively, against the dollar.

The reversal of the November and December trends in the dollar and interest rates in January was seen in emerging markets too. We know that Chinese equities fell sharply in January, but the MSCI emerging market equity index, excluding China was off about 2.8% in the first four weeks of the year. It had risen by a little more than 17% in the last two months of 2023. The premium of emerging market bonds (JP Morgan Index) over Treasuries tightened by about 50 bp last November-December. It widened a little in January but remains near the lower end of where it has trading over the past two years. Emerging market currencies generally weakened, as well. The JP Morgan and the MSCI emerging market currencies indexes fell by about 1.7% and 1.1%, respectively in the first four weeks of January. 

Bannockburn's World Currency Index, a GDP-weighted basket of the currencies of the 12 largest economies, fell by a little more than 1%. This reflected that most of the components falling against the US dollar in January, retracing some of the gains registered in late 2023. Among the G10 currencies in the BWCI, the Japanese yen was the weakest, falling by a little more than 4.5%, dragged lower, arguably, by the more than 20 bp rise in the US 10-year yield. Sterling was the strongest currency, and it rose by a modest 0.2%. All the emerging market currencies in the BWCI fell, except the Indian rupee, which eked out a minor (0.1%) gain. The South Korean won fell by about 3.6%, the most of the emerging market constituents. The Chinese yuan fell about 1.1%, and among the currencies that declined at the start of the year, only the Russian ruble (-0.5%) and the Mexican peso (-1.05%) in the index fell by less. 

The BWCI downtrend in January may not be complete, but we suspect the lion's share of the adjustment is behind it. We think that markets are still too ambitious in pricing the timing and extent of Fed rate cuts, and until it adjusts more, there is still upside risk for the dollar, especially as the economic impulses from Europe remain weak. If new initiatives from China get traction, better cyclical news could be forthcoming, even without structural reforms.

 

U.S. Dollar: There are often many factors that drive exchange rates in $7.5-trillion average daily turnover market, but most recently the dollar has broadly tracked interest rate expectations. In Q4 23, the market recognized the Fed was pivoting, US interest rates fell sharply and dragged the dollar lower. This year, official comments and economic data persuaded the investors that it had been too aggressive and as interest rates rose, the greenback was recovered. The Summary of Economic Projections issued in December was a clear recognition by officials that the next move will be a rate cut. However, officials do not have the same sense of urgency that had been expressed in the market. The median Fed forecast anticipated that three interest rate cuts would be appropriate this year. Ahead of the January 30-31 FOMC meeting, the market is pricing five cuts and a 40% chance of a sixth cut. We suspect there may be convergence toward four cuts. During this election year, it seems in neither party's partisan interest to force a government shutdown, but the path toward agreeing an appropriations bills for a dozen departments four months after the start of the fiscal year remains difficult. Spending authorization was extended into early March. We expect solid, even if not spectacular job growth in January, but recognize that the harsh winter conditions for much of the country in the middle of the month likely dampened activity. Because we think the interest rate adjustment may not have been completed, we suspect the dollar's correction from the November-December slide can extend further. This could translate into the 104.00-50 area in the Dollar Index (settled January 26 ~103.40). 

 

Euro: The eurozone seems ill-prepared to address the economic and political challenges that may lie ahead. The political leadership appears particularly weak. The German coalition government is terribly unpopular. In France, President Macron has begun the year by sacking his prime minister and appointing Attal, a young popular French politician, in an apparent bid to revive his political fortunes. Le Pen is running ahead of his party in the mid-year EU parliament election. The economic performance remains moribund. The external balance has recovered from the disruptions associated with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the domestic growth remains poor, and the near-term prospects, through the first half, is not much better. One of the bright spots is that the weak economy and rate hikes have not spurred much of a rise in unemployment (so far). The ECB has signaled that it is in no rush to cut rates, with a cut maybe near mid-year. The euro traded between about $1.0815 and $1.10 in the first four weeks of January. We suspect most of the correction from seven-cent Q4 23 rally has been achieved, but it may not be over. The risk may extend by a little more than a cent to the downside. The ECB has signaled a rate cut is likely near midyear, yet the swaps market has almost an 88% chance of a hike in April. 

(As of January 26, indicative closing prices, previous in parentheses)

Spot: $1.0855 ($1.1040) Median Bloomberg One-month forecast: $1.0875 ($1.0990) One-month forward: $1.0865 ($1.1055)   One-month implied vol: 6.2% (6.9%) 

 

Japanese Yen: The combination of the backing up of US rates and greater confidence that the Bank of Japan will not hike rates until at least April dragged the yen lower in January. It fell by about 4.6%. The dramatic slide in US rates November and December 2023 saw the dollar drop from nearly JPY152 in mid-November to almost JPY140 in late December. The greenback recovered to almost JPY149 in the first four weeks of January before settling near JPY148. Despite fiscal efforts, an extraordinary monetary policy, and an undervalued currency, the Japanese economy struggled in H2 23. It contracted almost 3% at an annualized rate in Q3 23, with consumption and business investment falling in Q2 23 and Q3 23. Although the economy is expected to have returned of growth in Q4 (GDP is due February 15), it may take the better part of three quarters to recoup the activity lost in Q3 23. Public support for Prime Minister Kishida and the cabinet is weak. The Liberal Democratic Party had not recovered from the negativity around its ties with the Unification Church before a campaign financing scandal erupted, hobbling some of the largest factions within the party. Still, one of Kishida's achievements has been the stronger defense posture, which includes acquiring offensive capabilities and reduced barriers to the export of armaments. Ironically, core CPI is likely to fall below the central bank's target before it finally exits its negative interest rate policy, seen most likely in April. The dollar's rally in January stretched the momentum indicators suggesting that the "correction" may be nearly complete. We suspect the JPY150 area may hold as a consolidative phase in both US rates and the dollar seems likely after the large adjustment in January. 

Spot: JPY148.15 (JPY141.05) Median Bloomberg One-month forecast: JPY145.65 (JPY142.05) One-month forward: JPY147.45 (JPY140.35) One-month implied vol: 8.25% (10.7%) 

 

British Pound: Since the middle of December, sterling has been chopping in a two-cent range between $1.2600 and $1.2800. Twice in December, the upper end was frayed, and once in January, the lower end was violated, but not on a closing basis. The consolidation is alleviating the overbought technical condition that resulted from the roughly eight-cent rally in Q4 23. We are more inclined to see an eventual downside break, which initially could be worth a cent. The swaps market suggests the Bank of England easing cycle may begin after the Fed and ECB and deliver fewer cuts this year. Specifically, the market does not have the first cut fully discounted until June, and it has 105 bp of easing discounted for this year. At the end of last year, the swaps market discounted slightly more than 170 bp of cuts. The Bank of England meets on February 1, with practically no chance of a change in policy. The economy has been struggling since growing by 0.3% (quarter-over-quarter) in Q1 23. It was stagnant in Q2 and contracted by 0.1% in Q3. GDP for Q4 23 is due February 15. The risk is of another small contraction. The near stagnant conditions may persist through the H1 24. At the same time, the base effect warns that measured inflation will fall sharply in the coming months. In the February-May 2023 period, the UK's CPI rose at an annualized rate of almost 11.5%. As these large monthly increases drop out of the 12-month comparison, with conservative assumption, the year-over-year pace could be halved from the 4% pace seen at the end of last year. The Sunak government is unpopular and support for the Tory party is around 25% according to recent polls. Labour is holding on to almost a 20-percentage point lead. Chancellor Hunt will deliver the Spring budget (March 6), and it is expected to offer tax cuts ahead of the national election expected later this year.

Spot: $1.2705 ($1.2730) Median Bloomberg One-month forecast: $1.2655 ($1.2650) One-month forward:  $1.2735 ($1.2710) One-month implied vol: 6.6% (7.2%) 


Canadian Dollar:  The Bank of Canada left its policy rate steady at 5.0% last month. Citing the persistence of underlying inflation, officials expressed little sense of urgency to ease policy. While Governor Macklem refused to rule out an additional hike, he was clear that should economic activity evolve as officials expect, the question becomes when it should cut. The central bank chopped its forecast for Q4 23 GDP (due on February 29) to flat from 0.8% It projects 0.5% annualized growth in Q1 24. The Bank of Canada sees headline inflation remaining around 3% in H1 24 before slowing to 2.5% by the end of the year. The swaps market has the first cut fully discounted by mid-year and looks for almost 100 bp in cuts this year, back loaded. What seems to drive the exchange rate on most days are the broad direction of the US dollar (think Dollar Index) and the general risk-appetite. The Canadian dollar is often among the most sensitive dollar pairs to the movement of the S&P 500. Contrary to popular wisdom, the Canadian dollar's exchange rate does not appear tightly linked to oil prices. After falling by about 5.2% in November-December 2023, the US dollar recovered rose by about 1.6% in the first four weeks of January. We suspect the move is not complete and look for the greenback to test the CAD1.3600-20 area, but a break of CAD1.3400 would bolster the chances that a high is in place.

Spot: CAD1.3455 (CAD 1.3245) Median Bloomberg One-month forecast: CAD1.3475 (CAD1.3300) One-month forward: CAD1.3445 (CAD1.3235) One-month implied vol: 5.0% (5.7%) 

 

Australian Dollar:  In the last two months of 2023, the Australian dollar appreciated by about 9.5% against the US dollar. Momentum indicators were stretched, and combination of soft inflation and a disastrous labor market report provided the precipitating drivers that forced the Australian dollar to surrender more than half of its gains in the first four weeks of the year. The loss of nearly 107k full-time jobs in December is a record outside of a couple of months early in the pandemic. This outsized loss was not confirmed in other high-frequency time series, which appear to confirm the general slowing of economic activity, not a collapse. The January job report is due February 15. However, even as inflation falls and the economic pulse is faint, the market has pushed out the first cut from May (at the end of 2023) to September now. It has also reduced the amount of cuts this year from 68 bp at the end of December to about 40 bp in late January. The Australian dollar's downside correction may not be complete, and the initial risk could extend to $0.6450-$0.6500.

Spot: $0.6575 ($0.6810) Median Bloomberg One-month forecast: $0.6635 ($0.6775) One-month forward: $0.6585 ($0.6820)    One-month implied vol: 9.0% (9.4%) 

 

Mexican Peso: Mexico's economy is slowing, and inflation is falling. This will set the stage for the first rate cut in the cycle. A case can be made for a cut at the February 8 Banxico meeting, but on balance, a cut at the March 21 meeting, a day after the FOMC meeting, may be more likely. The central bank forecasts growth to slow to nearly 2% this year from about 3% in 2023. The IMF and the median forecast in Bloomberg's survey concur with the central bank. Progress to restore price stability has been extensive. The headline CPI peaked in July 2022 near 8.15%. It reached about 4.25% in October 2023 and finished the year near 4.65%. The core rate peaked in November 2022 around 8.50% and finished last year slightly below 5.30%. The headline rate accelerated to an almost 7% annualized rate in Q4 23 from about 4.4% in Q3. The core rate rose at annualized rate of around 4.35% in Q4 23 after a 4.10% annualized pace in previous three months. The peso has been a darling of the market for some time, and given market positioning (over-weight asset managers, and speculators carry a large net long peso position in the futures market), we think the risk is for some liquidation ahead of the June election. It could be expressed as greater sensitivity to risk-off developments. The high carry still makes it an expensive short. In the middle of January and against in late January, the dollar jumped and tested the 200-day moving average (~MXN17.37-38) and the first retracement of the November-December downtrend. It held. Support may be seen in the MXN17.00-05 area and a break could signal a retest on the January low near MXN16.7850. 

Spot: MXN17.16 (MXN16.97) Median Bloomberg One-Month forecast: MXN17.33 (MXN17.20) One-month forward: MXN17.25 (MXN17.06) One-month implied vol: 10.3% (11.2%)

 

Chinese Yuan: Beijing has managed to deliver a stable exchange rate. The US dollar has largely been confined to a CNY7.10-CNY7.20 for more than two months. Although conventional wisdom often attributes malevolent intentions to the PBOC efforts, it seems that the exchange rate movement is understandable as a reactive function to the dollar's broad movement, especially against the yen and euro. After leaving key interest rates steady, the PBOC delivered a 50 bp cut in required reserves, which frees up an estimated CNY1 trillion (~$140 bln). More stimulus is widely expected, even if the timing is difficult to anticipate. While 10-year yields US and European rose in January, they fell slightly in China. Short-term rates are also low making the offshore yuan an attractive funding leg in structured trades. After a sharp sell-off of Chinese shares on the mainland and in Hong Kong, Beijing's pain threshold was discovered. Although Beijing eschews the performance of the equities as a key metric, officials appear to be stepping up their support using formal and informal channels. Of course, China and the US have different institutional configuration and authority, but Beijing's effort to stem the equity sell-off seems to have a similar goal in mind as the so-called "Fed Put" that used monetary policy to stop a destabilizing equity market decline. In this context, a broadly stable exchange rate may act as a bit of a fire break to a potentially vicious cycle. 

Spot: CNY7.1775 

(CNY7.10) Median Bloomberg One-month forecast: CNY7.1640 (CNY7.1170) One-month forward: CNY7.0950 (CNY7.0810) One-month implied vol 4.7% (4.7%) 

 


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The War Between Knowledge And Stupidity

The War Between Knowledge And Stupidity

Authored by Bert Olivier via The Brownstone Institute,

Bernard Stiegler was, until his premature…

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The War Between Knowledge And Stupidity

Authored by Bert Olivier via The Brownstone Institute,

Bernard Stiegler was, until his premature death, probably the most important philosopher of technology of the present. His work on technology has shown us that, far from being exclusively a danger to human existence, it is a pharmakon – a poison as well as a cure – and that, as long as we approach technology as a means to ‘critical intensification,’ it could assist us in promoting the causes of enlightenment and freedom.

It is no exaggeration to say that making believable information and credible analysis available to citizens at present is probably indispensable for resisting the behemoth of lies and betrayal confronting us. This has never been more necessary than it is today, given that we face what is probably the greatest crisis in the history of humanity, with nothing less than our freedom, let alone our lives, at stake. 

To be able to secure this freedom against the inhuman forces threatening to shackle it today, one could do no better than to take heed of what Stiegler argues in States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century (2015). Considering what he writes here it is hard to believe that it was not written today (p. 15): 

The impression that humanity has fallen under the domination of unreason or madness [déraison] overwhelms our spirit, confronted as we are with systemic collapses, major technological accidents, medical or pharmaceutical scandals, shocking revelations, the unleashing of the drives, and acts of madness of every kind and in every social milieu – not to mention the extreme misery and poverty that now afflict citizens and neighbours both near and far.

While these words are certainly as applicable to our current situation as it was almost 10 years ago, Stiegler was in fact engaged in an interpretive analysis of the role of banks and other institutions – aided and abetted by certain academics – in the establishment of what he terms a ‘literally suicidal financial system’ (p. 1). (Anyone who doubts this can merely view the award-winning documentary film of 2010, Inside Job, by Charles Ferguson, which Stiegler also mentions on p.1.) He explains further as follows (p. 2): 

Western universities are in the grip of a deep malaise, and a number of them have found themselves, through some of their faculty, giving consent to – and sometimes considerably compromised by – the implementation of a financial system that, with the establishment of hyper-consumerist, drive-based and ‘addictogenic’ society, leads to economic and political ruin on a global scale. If this has occurred, it is because their goals, their organizations and their means have been put entirely at the service of the destruction of sovereignty. That is, they have been placed in the service of the destruction of sovereignty as conceived by the philosophers of what we call the Enlightenment…

In short, Stiegler was writing about the way in which the world was being prepared, across the board – including the highest levels of education – for what has become far more conspicuous since the advent of the so-called ‘pandemic’ in 2020, namely an all-out attempt to cause the collapse of civilisation as we knew it, at all levels, with the thinly disguised goal in mind of installing a neo-fascist, technocratic, global regime which would exercise power through AI-controlled regimes of obedience. The latter would centre on ubiquitous facial recognition technology, digital identification, and CBDCs (which would replace money in the usual sense). 

Given the fact that all of this is happening around us, albeit in a disguised fashion, it is astonishing that relatively few people are conscious of the unfolding catastrophe, let alone being critically engaged in disclosing it to others who still inhabit the land where ignorance is bliss. Not that this is easy. Some of my relatives are still resistant to the idea that the ‘democratic carpet’ is about to be pulled from under their feet. Is this merely a matter of ‘stupidity?’ Stiegler writes about stupidity (p.33):

…knowledge cannot be separated from stupidity. But in my view: (1) this is a pharmacological situation; (2) stupidity is the law of the pharmakon; and (3) the pharmakon is the law of knowledge, and hence a pharmacology for our age must think the pharmakon that I am also calling, today, the shadow. 

In my previous post I wrote about the media as pharmaka (plural of pharmakon), showing how, on the one hand, there are (mainstream) media which function as ‘poison,’ while on the other there are (alternative) media that play the role of ‘cure.’ Here, by linking the pharmakon with stupidity, Stiegler alerts one to the (metaphorically speaking) ‘pharmacological’ situation, that knowledge is inseparable from stupidity: where there is knowledge, the possibility of stupidity always asserts itself, and vice versa. Or in terms of what he calls ‘the shadow,’ knowledge always casts a shadow, that of stupidity. 

Anyone who doubts this may only cast their glance at those ‘stupid’ people who still believe that the Covid ‘vaccines’ are ‘safe and effective,’ or that wearing a mask would protect them against infection by ‘the virus.’ Or, more currently, think of those – the vast majority in America – who routinely fall for the Biden administration’s (lack of an) explanation of its reasons for allowing thousands of people to cross the southern – and more recently also the northern – border. Several alternative sources of news and analysis have lifted the veil on this, revealing that the influx is not only a way of destabilising the fabric of society, but possibly a preparation for civil war in the United States. 

There is a different way of explaining this widespread ‘stupidity,’ of course – one that I have used before to explain why most philosophers have failed humanity miserably, by failing to notice the unfolding attempt at a global coup d’etat, or at least, assuming that they did notice it, to speak up against it. These ‘philosophers’ include all the other members of the philosophy department where I work, with the honourable exception of the departmental assistant, who is, to her credit, wide awake to what has been occurring in the world. They also include someone who used to be among my philosophical heroes, to wit, Slavoj Žižek, who fell for the hoax hook, line, and sinker.

In brief, this explanation of philosophers’ stupidity – and by extension that of other people – is twofold. First there is ‘repression’ in the psychoanalytic sense of the term (explained at length in both the papers linked in the previous paragraph), and secondly there is something I did not elaborate on in those papers, namely what is known as ‘cognitive dissonance.’ The latter phenomenon manifests itself in the unease that people exhibit when they are confronted by information and arguments that are not commensurate, or conflict, with what they believe, or which explicitly challenge those beliefs. The usual response is to find standard, or mainstream-approved responses to this disruptive information, brush it under the carpet, and life goes on as usual.

‘Cognitive dissonance’ is actually related to something more fundamental, which is not mentioned in the usual psychological accounts of this unsettling experience. Not many psychologists deign to adduce repression in their explanation of disruptive psychological conditions or problems encountered by their clients these days, and yet it is as relevant as when Freud first employed the concept to account for phenomena such as hysteria or neurosis, recognising, however, that it plays a role in normal psychology too. What is repression? 

In The Language of Psychoanalysis (p. 390), Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis describe ‘repression’ as follows: 

Strictly speaking, an operation whereby the subject attempts to repel, or to confine to the unconscious, representations (thoughts, images, memories) which are bound to an instinct. Repression occurs when to satisfy an instinct – though likely to be pleasurable in itself – would incur the risk of provoking unpleasure because of other requirements. 

 …It may be looked upon as a universal mental process to so far as it lies at the root of the constitution of the unconscious as a domain separate from the rest of the psyche. 

In the case of the majority of philosophers, referred to earlier, who have studiously avoided engaging critically with others on the subject of the (non-)‘pandemic’ and related matters, it is more than likely that repression occurred to satisfy the instinct of self-preservation, regarded by Freud as being equally fundamental as the sexual instinct. Here, the representations (linked to self-preservation) that are confined to the unconscious through repression are those of death and suffering associated with the coronavirus that supposedly causes Covid-19, which are repressed because of being intolerable. The repression of (the satisfaction of) an instinct, mentioned in the second sentence of the first quoted paragraph, above, obviously applies to the sexual instinct, which is subject to certain societal prohibitions. Cognitive dissonance is therefore symptomatic of repression, which is primary. 

Returning to Stiegler’s thesis concerning stupidity, it is noteworthy that the manifestations of such inanity are not merely noticeable among the upper echelons of society; worse – there seems to be, by and large, a correlation between those in the upper classes, with college degrees, and stupidity.

In other words, it is not related to intelligence per se. This is apparent, not only in light of the initially surprising phenomenon pertaining to philosophers’ failure to speak up in the face of the evidence, that humanity is under attack, discussed above in terms of repression. 

Dr Reiner Fuellmich, one of the first individuals to realise that this was the case, and subsequently brought together a large group of international lawyers and scientists to testify in the ‘court of public opinion’ (see 29 min. 30 sec. into the video) on various aspects of the currently perpetrated ‘crime against humanity,’ has drawn attention to the difference between the taxi drivers he talks to about the globalists’ brazen attempt to enslave humanity, and his learned legal colleagues as far as awareness of this ongoing attempt is concerned. In contrast with the former, who are wide awake in this respect, the latter – ostensibly more intellectually qualified and ‘informed’ – individuals are blissfully unaware that their freedom is slipping away by the day, probably because of cognitive dissonance, and behind that, repression of this scarcely digestible truth.

This is stupidity, or the ‘shadow’ of knowledge, which is recognisable in the sustained effort by those afflicted with it, when confronted with the shocking truth of what is occurring worldwide, to ‘rationalise’ their denial by repeating spurious assurances issued by agencies such as the CDC, that the Covid ‘vaccines’ are ‘safe and effective,’ and that this is backed up by ‘the science.’ 

Here a lesson from discourse theory is called for. Whether one refers to natural science or to social science in the context of some particular scientific claim – for example, Einstein’s familiar theory of special relativity (e=mc2) under the umbrella of the former, or David Riesman’s sociological theory of ‘inner-’ as opposed to ‘other-directedness’ in social science – one never talks about ‘the science,’ and for good reason. Science is science. The moment one appeals to ‘the science,’ a discourse theorist would smell the proverbial rat.

Why? Because the definite article, ‘the,’ singles out a specific, probably dubious, version of science compared to science as such, which does not need being elevated to special status. In fact, when this is done through the use of ‘the,’ you can bet your bottom dollar it is no longer science in the humble, hard-working, ‘belonging-to-every-person’ sense. If one’s sceptical antennae do not immediately start buzzing when one of the commissars of the CDC starts pontificating about ‘the science,’ one is probably similarly smitten by the stupidity that’s in the air. 

Earlier I mentioned the sociologist David Riesman and his distinction between ‘inner-directed’ and ‘other-directed’ people. It takes no genius to realise that, to navigate one’s course through life relatively unscathed by peddlers of corruption, it is preferable to take one’s bearings from ‘inner direction’ by a set of values which promotes honesty and eschews mendacity, than from the ‘direction by others.’ Under present circumstances such other-directedness applies to the maze of lies and misinformation emanating from various government agencies as well as from certain peer groups, which today mostly comprise the vociferously self-righteous purveyors of the mainstream version of events. Inner-directness in the above sense, when constantly renewed, could be an effective guardian against stupidity. 

Recall that Stiegler warned against the ‘deep malaise’ at contemporary universities in the context of what he called an ‘addictogenic’ society – that is, a society that engenders addictions of various kinds. Judging by the popularity of the video platform TikTok at schools and colleges, its use had already reached addiction levels by 2019, which raises the question, whether it should be appropriated by teachers as a ‘teaching tool,’ or whether it should, as some people think, be outlawed completely in the classroom.

Recall that, as an instance of video technology, TikTok is an exemplary embodiment of the pharmakon, and that, as Stiegler has emphasised, stupidity is the law of the pharmakon, which is, in turn, the law of knowledge. This is a somewhat confusing way of saying that knowledge and stupidity cannot be separated; where knowledge is encountered, its other, stupidity, lurks in the shadows. 

Reflecting on the last sentence, above, it is not difficult to realise that, parallel to Freud’s insight concerning Eros and Thanatos, it is humanly impossible for knowledge to overcome stupidity once and for all. At certain times the one will appear to be dominant, while on different occasions the reverse will apply. Judging by the fight between knowledge and stupidity today, the latter ostensibly still has the upper hand, but as more people are awakening to the titanic struggle between the two, knowledge is in the ascendant. It is up to us to tip the scales in its favour – as long as we realise that it is a never-ending battle. 

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/15/2024 - 23:00

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“I Can’t Even Save”: Americans Are Getting Absolutely Crushed Under Enormous Debt Load

"I Can’t Even Save": Americans Are Getting Absolutely Crushed Under Enormous Debt Load

While Joe Biden insists that Americans are doing great…

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"I Can't Even Save": Americans Are Getting Absolutely Crushed Under Enormous Debt Load

While Joe Biden insists that Americans are doing great - suggesting in his State of the Union Address last week that "our economy is the envy of the world," Americans are being absolutely crushed by inflation (which the Biden admin blames on 'shrinkflation' and 'corporate greed'), and of course - crippling debt.

The signs are obvious. Last week we noted that banks' charge-offs are accelerating, and are now above pre-pandemic levels.

...and leading this increase are credit card loans - with delinquencies that haven't been this high since Q3 2011.

On top of that, while credit cards and nonfarm, nonresidential commercial real estate loans drove the quarterly increase in the noncurrent rate, residential mortgages drove the quarterly increase in the share of loans 30-89 days past due.

And while Biden and crew can spin all they want, an average of polls from RealClear Politics shows that just 40% of people approve of Biden's handling of the economy.

Crushed

On Friday, Bloomberg dug deeper into the effects of Biden's "envious" economy on Americans - specifically, how massive debt loads (credit cards and auto loans especially) are absolutely crushing people.

Two years after the Federal Reserve began hiking interest rates to tame prices, delinquency rates on credit cards and auto loans are the highest in more than a decade. For the first time on record, interest payments on those and other non-mortgage debts are as big a financial burden for US households as mortgage interest payments.

According to the report, this presents a difficult reality for millions of consumers who drive the US economy - "The era of high borrowing costs — however necessary to slow price increases — has a sting of its own that many families may feel for years to come, especially the ones that haven’t locked in cheap home loans."

The Fed, meanwhile, doesn't appear poised to cut rates until later this year.

According to a February paper from IMF and Harvard, the recent high cost of borrowing - something which isn't reflected in inflation figures, is at the heart of lackluster consumer sentiment despite inflation having moderated and a job market which has recovered (thanks to job gains almost entirely enjoyed by immigrants).

In short, the debt burden has made life under President Biden a constant struggle throughout America.

"I’m making the most money I've ever made, and I’m still living paycheck to paycheck," 40-year-old Denver resident Nikki Cimino told Bloomberg. Cimino is carrying a monthly mortgage of $1,650, and has $4,000 in credit card debt following a 2020 divorce.

Nikki CiminoPhotographer: Rachel Woolf/Bloomberg

"There's this wild disconnect between what people are experiencing and what economists are experiencing."

What's more, according to Wells Fargo, families have taken on debt at a comparatively fast rate - no doubt to sustain the same lifestyle as low rates and pandemic-era stimmies provided. In fact, it only took four years for households to set a record new debt level after paying down borrowings in 2021 when interest rates were near zero. 

Meanwhile, that increased debt load is exacerbated by credit card interest rates that have climbed to a record 22%, according to the Fed.

[P]art of the reason some Americans were able to take on a substantial load of non-mortgage debt is because they’d locked in home loans at ultra-low rates, leaving room on their balance sheets for other types of borrowing. The effective rate of interest on US mortgage debt was just 3.8% at the end of last year.

Yet the loans and interest payments can be a significant strain that shapes families’ spending choices. -Bloomberg

And of course, the highest-interest debt (credit cards) is hurting lower-income households the most, as tends to be the case.

The lowest earners also understandably had the biggest increase in credit card delinquencies.

"Many consumers are levered to the hilt — maxed out on debt and barely keeping their heads above water," Allan Schweitzer, a portfolio manager at credit-focused investment firm Beach Point Capital Management told Bloomberg. "They can dog paddle, if you will, but any uptick in unemployment or worsening of the economy could drive a pretty significant spike in defaults."

"We had more money when Trump was president," said Denise Nierzwicki, 69. She and her 72-year-old husband Paul have around $20,000 in debt spread across multiple cards - all of which have interest rates above 20%.

Denise and Paul Nierzwicki blame Biden for what they see as a gloomy economy and plan to vote for the Republican candidate in November.
Photographer: Jon Cherry/Bloomberg

During the pandemic, Denise lost her job and a business deal for a bar they owned in their hometown of Lexington, Kentucky. While they applied for Social Security to ease the pain, Denise is now working 50 hours a week at a restaurant. Despite this, they're barely scraping enough money together to service their debt.

The couple blames Biden for what they see as a gloomy economy and plans to vote for the Republican candidate in November. Denise routinely voted for Democrats up until about 2010, when she grew dissatisfied with Barack Obama’s economic stances, she said. Now, she supports Donald Trump because he lowered taxes and because of his policies on immigration. -Bloomberg

Meanwhile there's student loans - which are not able to be discharged in bankruptcy.

"I can't even save, I don't have a savings account," said 29-year-old in Columbus, Ohio resident Brittany Walling - who has around $80,000 in federal student loans, $20,000 in private debt from her undergraduate and graduate degrees, and $6,000 in credit card debt she accumulated over a six-month stretch in 2022 while she was unemployed.

"I just know that a lot of people are struggling, and things need to change," she told the outlet.

The only silver lining of note, according to Bloomberg, is that broad wage gains resulting in large paychecks has made it easier for people to throw money at credit card bills.

Yet, according to Wells Fargo economist Shannon Grein, "As rates rose in 2023, we avoided a slowdown due to spending that was very much tied to easy access to credit ... Now, credit has become harder to come by and more expensive."

According to Grein, the change has posed "a significant headwind to consumption."

Then there's the election

"Maybe the Fed is done hiking, but as long as rates stay on hold, you still have a passive tightening effect flowing down to the consumer and being exerted on the economy," she continued. "Those household dynamics are going to be a factor in the election this year."

Meanwhile, swing-state voters in a February Bloomberg/Morning Consult poll said they trust Trump more than Biden on interest rates and personal debt.

Reverberations

These 'headwinds' have M3 Partners' Moshin Meghji concerned.

"Any tightening there immediately hits the top line of companies," he said, noting that for heavily indebted companies that took on debt during years of easy borrowing, "there's no easy fix."

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/15/2024 - 18:00

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Copper Soars, Iron Ore Tumbles As Goldman Says “Copper’s Time Is Now”

Copper Soars, Iron Ore Tumbles As Goldman Says "Copper’s Time Is Now"

After languishing for the past two years in a tight range despite recurring…

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Copper Soars, Iron Ore Tumbles As Goldman Says "Copper's Time Is Now"

After languishing for the past two years in a tight range despite recurring speculation about declining global supply, copper has finally broken out, surging to the highest price in the past year, just shy of $9,000 a ton as supply cuts hit the market; At the same time the price of the world's "other" most important mined commodity has diverged, as iron ore has tumbled amid growing demand headwinds out of China's comatose housing sector where not even ghost cities are being built any more.

Copper surged almost 5% this week, ending a months-long spell of inertia, as investors focused on risks to supply at various global mines and smelters. As Bloomberg adds, traders also warmed to the idea that the worst of a global downturn is in the past, particularly for metals like copper that are increasingly used in electric vehicles and renewables.

Yet the commodity crash of recent years is hardly over, as signs of the headwinds in traditional industrial sectors are still all too obvious in the iron ore market, where futures fell below $100 a ton for the first time in seven months on Friday as investors bet that China’s years-long property crisis will run through 2024, keeping a lid on demand.

Indeed, while the mood surrounding copper has turned almost euphoric, sentiment on iron ore has soured since the conclusion of the latest National People’s Congress in Beijing, where the CCP set a 5% goal for economic growth, but offered few new measures that would boost infrastructure or other construction-intensive sectors.

As a result, the main steelmaking ingredient has shed more than 30% since early January as hopes of a meaningful revival in construction activity faded. Loss-making steel mills are buying less ore, and stockpiles are piling up at Chinese ports. The latest drop will embolden those who believe that the effects of President Xi Jinping’s property crackdown still have significant room to run, and that last year’s rally in iron ore may have been a false dawn.

Meanwhile, as Bloomberg notes, on Friday there were fresh signs that weakness in China’s industrial economy is hitting the copper market too, with stockpiles tracked by the Shanghai Futures Exchange surging to the highest level since the early days of the pandemic. The hope is that headwinds in traditional industrial areas will be offset by an ongoing surge in usage in electric vehicles and renewables.

And while industrial conditions in Europe and the US also look soft, there’s growing optimism about copper usage in India, where rising investment has helped fuel blowout growth rates of more than 8% — making it the fastest-growing major economy.

In any case, with the demand side of the equation still questionable, the main catalyst behind copper’s powerful rally is an unexpected tightening in global mine supplies, driven mainly by last year’s closure of a giant mine in Panama (discussed here), but there are also growing worries about output in Zambia, which is facing an El Niño-induced power crisis.

On Wednesday, copper prices jumped on huge volumes after smelters in China held a crisis meeting on how to cope with a sharp drop in processing fees following disruptions to supplies of mined ore. The group stopped short of coordinated production cuts, but pledged to re-arrange maintenance work, reduce runs and delay the startup of new projects. In the coming weeks investors will be watching Shanghai exchange inventories closely to gauge both the strength of demand and the extent of any capacity curtailments.

“The increase in SHFE stockpiles has been bigger than we’d anticipated, but we expect to see them coming down over the next few weeks,” Colin Hamilton, managing director for commodities research at BMO Capital Markets, said by phone. “If the pace of the inventory builds doesn’t start to slow, investors will start to question whether smelters are actually cutting and whether the impact of weak construction activity is starting to weigh more heavily on the market.”

* * *

Few have been as happy with the recent surge in copper prices as Goldman's commodity team, where copper has long been a preferred trade (even if it may have cost the former team head Jeff Currie his job due to his unbridled enthusiasm for copper in the past two years which saw many hedge fund clients suffer major losses).

As Goldman's Nicholas Snowdon writes in a note titled "Copper's time is now" (available to pro subscribers in the usual place)...

... there has been a "turn in the industrial cycle." Specifically according to the Goldman analyst, after a prolonged downturn, "incremental evidence now points to a bottoming out in the industrial cycle, with the global manufacturing PMI in expansion for the first time since September 2022." As a result, Goldman now expects copper to rise to $10,000/t by year-end and then $12,000/t by end of Q1-25.’

Here are the details:

Previous inflexions in global manufacturing cycles have been associated with subsequent sustained industrial metals upside, with copper and aluminium rising on average 25% and 9% over the next 12 months. Whilst seasonal surpluses have so far limited a tightening alignment at a micro level, we expect deficit inflexions to play out from quarter end, particularly for metals with severe supply binds. Supplemented by the influence of anticipated Fed easing ahead in a non-recessionary growth setting, another historically positive performance factor for metals, this should support further upside ahead with copper the headline act in this regard.

Goldman then turns to what it calls China's "green policy put":

Much of the recent focus on the “Two Sessions” event centred on the lack of significant broad stimulus, and in particular the limited property support. In our view it would be wrong – just as in 2022 and 2023 – to assume that this will result in weak onshore metals demand. Beijing’s emphasis on rapid growth in the metals intensive green economy, as an offset to property declines, continues to act as a policy put for green metals demand. After last year’s strong trends, evidence year-to-date is again supportive with aluminium and copper apparent demand rising 17% and 12% y/y respectively. Moreover, the potential for a ‘cash for clunkers’ initiative could provide meaningful right tail risk to that healthy demand base case. Yet there are also clear metal losers in this divergent policy setting, with ongoing pressure on property related steel demand generating recent sharp iron ore downside.

Meanwhile, Snowdon believes that the driver behind Goldman's long-running bullish view on copper - a global supply shock - continues:

Copper’s supply shock progresses. The metal with most significant upside potential is copper, in our view. The supply shock which began with aggressive concentrate destocking and then sharp mine supply downgrades last year, has now advanced to an increasing bind on metal production, as reflected in this week's China smelter supply rationing signal. With continued positive momentum in China's copper demand, a healthy refined import trend should generate a substantial ex-China refined deficit this year. With LME stocks having halved from Q4 peak, China’s imminent seasonal demand inflection should accelerate a path into extreme tightness by H2. Structural supply underinvestment, best reflected in peak mine supply we expect next year, implies that demand destruction will need to be the persistent solver on scarcity, an effect requiring substantially higher pricing than current, in our view. In this context, we maintain our view that the copper price will surge into next year (GSe 2025 $15,000/t average), expecting copper to rise to $10,000/t by year-end and then $12,000/t by end of Q1-25’

Another reason why Goldman is doubling down on its bullish copper outlook: gold.

The sharp rally in gold price since the beginning of March has ended the period of consolidation that had been present since late December. Whilst the initial catalyst for the break higher came from a (gold) supportive turn in US data and real rates, the move has been significantly amplified by short term systematic buying, which suggests less sticky upside. In this context, we expect gold to consolidate for now, with our economists near term view on rates and the dollar suggesting limited near-term catalysts for further upside momentum. Yet, a substantive retracement lower will also likely be limited by resilience in physical buying channels. Nonetheless, in the midterm we continue to hold a constructive view on gold underpinned by persistent strength in EM demand as well as eventual Fed easing, which should crucially reactivate the largely for now dormant ETF buying channel. In this context, we increase our average gold price forecast for 2024 from $2,090/toz to $2,180/toz, targeting a move to $2,300/toz by year-end.

Much more in the full Goldman note available to pro subs.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/15/2024 - 14:25

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