The treatment has been around for over a century but insulin has still become the centre of the ongoing discussion over pricing of pharmaceutical products. Ben Hargreaves looks at why insulin’s price is so controversial and whether this could be set to change.
It has now been 100 years since the first patient with diabetes received an injection of insulin, when Leonard Thomas, a 14-year-old boy, was treated with the hormone. The medical intervention was a success, inspiring the first wave of insulin treatments developed from cattle and pigs. Later, synthetic ‘human’ insulin was developed in 1978 and then commercialised by Eli Lilly in 1982 as Humulin. In recent years, there have been more developments in the area of diabetes management, with the emergence of metformin and more recently semaglutide and dulaglutide.
However, despite these alternative diabetes treatments, insulin is still essential for people living with type 1 diabetes and is also necessary for some individuals living with type 2 diabetes. In the US, approximately 37.3 million Americans have diabetes and a further 96 million have pre-diabetes, according to the US Centers for Disease Control. The disease is estimated to cost the US economy $327 billion per year, due to the medical costs, alongside lost work and wages. It is estimated that people diagnosed with diabetes have more than twice the average medical expenses compared with people without diabetes.
The cost of medical treatment of diabetes is now at the centre of a debate in US politics, as the House of Representatives recently voted to approve legislation to limit cost-sharing for insulin under private health insurance and Medicare. The Affordable Insulin Now Act, as it is known, still has to pass through the Senate, but is just one part of a wider movement to try to reduce the cost of diabetes treatment in the US.
One of the major headlines that has emerged from the debate on insulin pricing is that one in four people have had to ration insulin supplies to cut the cost of their diabetes care, per research conducted by the American Diabetes Association. The same study revealed that 24% of people used savings, loans, or money from their stimulus check to pay for diabetes care. The pandemic has also had a disproportionate impact on those with the lowest income in the diabetes community, with approximately half of low earners reporting that they had lost some or all income.
This is what the Affordable Insulin Now Act is taking aim at, with its attempts to introduce a cap of insulin prices at $35 per month or 25% of an insurance plan’s negotiated price, whichever of the two is lower. The reason a price cap is being targeted is due to the rapid increase in the cost of insulin products over the last few decades. According to research, one vial of Humalog (insulin lispro) cost $21 in 1999, but this increased to $332 in 2019, representing a price increase of 1480%.
For its part, PhRMA, a trade group representing the pharma industry, recently published its own research finding that rebates, discounts and other payments from pharma companies to pharmacy benefit managers, insurers, the government and others, “lowered the cost of the most commonly used insulins by 84% on average in 2021.” The organisation noted that the average net cost of these insulin products is 20% lower than in 2007.
In a statement, PhRMA president and CEO, Stephen Ubl, said, “Too often these savings are not shared with patients. Unfortunately, the current drug pricing bill fails to take a holistic approach to addressing a system that drives affordability challenges for patients. By taking steps to hold middlemen accountable, Congress can help fix a broken system and lower patient costs at the pharmacy counter.”
Potential biosimilar impact
Outside of Congress, there is another element that could reduce the cost of insulin, in the form of biosimilars. Due to a change in the classification of insulin, the door for biosimilars to insulin products was opened up in the US, which allowed for the first biosimilar to be approved midway through last year. This has led to other organisations looking to enter the market with further biosimilars, such as Civica Rx. The non-profit drugmaker plans to launch biosimilars of Sanofi’s Lantus (insulin glargine), Novo Nordisk’s Novolog (insulin aspart) and Eli Lilly’s Humalog (insulin lispro) by 2024. The organisation plans to offer the biosimilars at a ‘significant discount’ to the price charged to uninsured individuals.
GlobalData, a market intelligence company, concluded that Civica’s goal of drastically reducing the price of the insulin products, compared to the branded products, would ultimately lower the cost of all products on the market. One company that received approval for an insulin biosimilar in the US is Viatris, for its Semglee (insulin glargine-yfgn) product. In a recent fourth quarter investor call, Sanjeev Narula, chief financial officer at Viatris, stated that the company was seeing “solid uptake” of its biosimilar. However, the company also announced at the same time that it was selling its biosimilars portfolio to Biocon for $3.3 billion, amid a commercial environment where even brand products were seeing ‘80% to 90% erosion’ due to biosimilar competition on price, noted Rajiv Malik, president at Viatris.
Innovation to end debate?
One common defence of price increases across a broad range of pharmaceutical product has been that the profit generated is reinvested back into the development of new treatments. In the diabetes space, there have been a number of breakthroughs that the industry can highlight, such as the approval of Novo Nordisk’s Ozempic (semaglutide injection) and Eli Lilly’s Trulicity (dulaglutide).
The two treatments are GLP-1 receptor agonists, which have been found in research to be beneficial in body weight loss, protection of islet β cells, promotion of islet β cell proliferation and have minimal side effects. When asked about what other innovations Novo Nordisk is aiming to achieve in diabetes control, a spokesperson for the company told pharmaphorum: “We are developing new types of insulin to further improve management of the condition. We are currently conducting a large-scale phase 3 programme with a once-weekly basal insulin, insulin icodec, that we hope will reduce the disease burden even further.
“Beyond this, we also aim to develop a glucose-sensitive insulin, which would only be activated in the body of the patient when glucose levels rise. The hope is that this will lead to better glucose control and lower risk of dangerously low blood sugar events,” the spokesperson added. The company is also working on combining the effects of GLP-1 with other treatments, such as with an analogue of the hormone amylin, to improve outcomes in type 2 diabetes.
Regarding the overall progress for patients living with either type 1 or 2 diabetes, the spokesperson noted that prior to the development of insulin, diabetes was ‘essentially a death sentence’. By comparison, in the present day, the life expectancy for an individual living with diabetes is close to that of a person without diabetes.
Novo Nordisk is also pursuing a “curative treatment approach”, which could be achieved through a cell therapy for type 1 diabetes that the company is working on, the spokesperson said.
A cure for type 1 diabetes could effectively end debate on the price of insulin and allow the industry to point towards the success that can be achieved through allowing it to work on treatments within the current system. However, with the cell therapy treatment still at the early stage, the discussion of insulin pricing looks set to continue, as the Affordable Insulin Now Act moves towards the US Senate.
The post Why the drug pricing debate is focused on insulin appeared first on .stimulus pandemic disease control congress senate house of representatives treatment therapy stimulus
Russia’s energy war: Putin’s unpredictable actions and looming sanctions could further disrupt oil and gas markets
Russian President Vladimir Putin has not hesitated to use energy as a weapon. An expert on global energy markets analyzes what could come next.
Russia’s effort to conscript 300,000 reservists to counter Ukraine’s military advances in Kharkiv has drawn a lot of attention from military and political analysts. But there’s also a potential energy angle. Energy conflicts between Russia and Europe are escalating and likely could worsen as winter approaches.
One might assume that energy workers, who provide fuel and export revenue that Russia desperately needs, are too valuable to the war effort to be conscripted. So far, banking and information technology workers have received an official nod to stay in their jobs.
The situation for oil and gas workers is murkier, including swirling bits of Russian media disinformation about whether the sector will or won’t be targeted for mobilization. Either way, I expect Russia’s oil and gas operations to be destabilized by the next phase of the war.
The explosions in September 2022 that damaged the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines from Russia to Europe, and that may have been sabotage, are just the latest developments in this complex and unstable arena. As an analyst of global energy policy, I expect that more energy cutoffs could be in the cards – either directly ordered by the Kremlin to escalate economic pressure on European governments or as a result of new sabotage, or even because shortages of specialized equipment and trained Russian manpower lead to accidents or stoppages.
Dwindling natural gas flows
Russia has significantly reduced natural gas shipments to Europe in an effort to pressure European nations who are siding with Ukraine. In May 2022, the state-owned energy company Gazprom closed a key pipeline that runs through Belarus and Poland.
In June, the company reduced shipments to Germany via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which has a capacity of 170 million cubic meters per day, to only 40 million cubic meters per day. A few months later, Gazprom announced that Nord Stream 1 needed repairs and shut it down completely. Now U.S. and European leaders charge that Russia deliberately damaged the pipeline to further disrupt European energy supplies. The timing of the pipeline explosion coincided with the start up of a major new natural gas pipeline from Norway to Poland.
Russia has very limited alternative export infrastructure that can move Siberian natural gas to other customers, like China, so most of the gas it would normally be selling to Europe cannot be shifted to other markets. Natural gas wells in Siberia may need to be taken out of production, or shut in, in energy-speak, which could free up workers for conscription.
Restricting Russian oil profits
Russia’s call-up of reservists also includes workers from companies specifically focused on oil. This has led some seasoned analysts to question whether supply disruptions might spread to oil, either by accident or on purpose.
One potential trigger is the Dec. 5, 2022, deadline for the start of phase six of European Union energy sanctions against Russia. Confusion about the package of restrictions and how they will relate to a cap on what buyers will pay for Russian crude oil has muted market volatility so far. But when the measures go into effect, they could initiate a new spike in oil prices.
Under this sanctions package, Europe will completely stop buying seaborne Russian crude oil. This step isn’t as damaging as it sounds, since many buyers in Europe have already shifted to alternative oil sources.
Before Russia invaded Ukraine, it exported roughly 1.4 million barrels per day of crude oil to Europe by sea, divided between Black Sea and Baltic routes. In recent months, European purchases have fallen below 1 million barrels per day. But Russia has actually been able to increase total flows from Black Sea and Baltic ports by redirecting crude oil exports to China, India and Turkey.
Russia has limited access to tankers, insurance and other services associated with moving oil by ship. Until recently, it acquired such services mainly from Europe. The change means that customers like China, India and Turkey have to transfer some of their purchases of Russian oil at sea from Russian-owned or chartered ships to ships sailing under other nations’ flags, whose services might not be covered by the European bans. This process is common and not always illegal, but often is used to evade sanctions by obscuring where shipments from Russia are ending up.
To compensate for this costly process, Russia is discounting its exports by US$40 per barrel. Observers generally assume that whatever Russian crude oil European buyers relinquish this winter will gradually find alternative outlets.
Where is Russian oil going?
The U.S. and its European allies aim to discourage this increased outflow of Russian crude by further limiting Moscow’s access to maritime services, such as tanker chartering, insurance and pilots licensed and trained to handle oil tankers, for any crude oil exports to third parties outside of the G-7 who pay rates above the U.S.-EU price cap. In my view, it will be relatively easy to game this policy and obscure how much Russia’s customers are paying.
On Sept. 9, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued new guidance for the Dec. 5 sanctions regime. The policy aims to limit the revenue Russia can earn from its oil while keeping it flowing. It requires that unless buyers of Russian oil can certify that oil cargoes were bought for reduced prices, they will be barred from obtaining European maritime services.
However, this new strategy seems to be failing even before it begins. Denmark is still making Danish pilots available to move tankers through its precarious straits, which are a vital conduit for shipments of Russian crude and refined products. Russia has also found oil tankers that aren’t subject to European oversight to move over a third of the volume that it needs transported, and it will likely obtain more.
Traders have been getting around these sorts of oil sanctions for decades. Tricks of the trade include blending banned oil into other kinds of oil, turning off ship transponders to avoid detection of ship-to-ship transfers, falsifying documentation and delivering oil into and then later out of major storage hubs in remote parts of the globe. This explains why markets have been sanguine about the looming European sanctions deadline.
One fuel at a time
But Russian President Vladimir Putin may have other ideas. Putin has already threatened a larger oil cutoff if the G-7 tries to impose its price cap, warning that Europe will be “as frozen as a wolf’s tail,” referencing a Russian fairy tale.
U.S. officials are counting on the idea that Russia won’t want to damage its oil fields by turning off the taps, which in some cases might create long-term field pressurization problems. In my view, this is poor logic for multiple reasons, including Putin’s proclivity to sacrifice Russia’s economic future for geopolitical goals.
Russia managed to easily throttle back oil production when the COVID-19 pandemic destroyed world oil demand temporarily in 2020, and cutoffs of Russian natural gas exports to Europe have already greatly compromised Gazprom’s commercial future. Such actions show that commercial considerations are not a high priority in the Kremlin’s calculus.
How much oil would come off the market if Putin escalates his energy war? It’s an open question. Global oil demand has fallen sharply in recent months amid high prices and recessionary pressures. The potential loss of 1 million barrels per day of Russian crude oil shipments to Europe is unlikely to jack the price of oil back up the way it did initially in February 2022, when demand was still robust.
Speculators are betting that Putin will want to keep oil flowing to everyone else. China’s Russian crude imports surged as high as 2 million barrels per day following the Ukraine invasion, and India and Turkey are buying significant quantities.
Refined products like diesel fuel are due for further EU sanctions in February 2023. Russia supplies close to 40% of Europe’s diesel fuel at present, so that remains a significant economic lever.
The EU appears to know it must kick dependence on Russian energy completely, but its protected, one-product-at-a-time approach keeps Putin potentially in the driver’s seat. In the U.S., local diesel fuel prices are highly influenced by competition for seaborne cargoes from European buyers. So U.S. East Coast importers could also be in for a bumpy winter.
This article has been updated to reflect conflicting reports about the draft status of Russian oil and gas workers.
Amy Myers Jaffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.spread pandemic covid-19 oil india european europe germany poland russia ukraine eu china
Three reasons a weak pound is bad news for the environment
Financial turmoil will make it harder to invest in climate action on a massive scale.
The day before new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng’s mini-budget plan for economic growth, a pound would buy you about $1.13. After financial markets rejected the plan, the pound suddenly sunk to around $1.07. Though it has since rallied thanks to major intervention from the Bank of England, the currency remains volatile and far below its value earlier this year.
A lot has been written about how this will affect people’s incomes, the housing market or overall political and economic conditions. But we want to look at why the weak pound is bad news for the UK’s natural environment and its ability to hit climate targets.
1. The low-carbon economy just became a lot more expensive
The fall in sterling’s value partly signals a loss in confidence in the value of UK assets following the unfunded tax commitments contained in the mini-budget. The government’s aim to achieve net zero by 2050 requires substantial public and private investment in energy technologies such as solar and wind as well as carbon storage, insulation and electric cars.
But the loss in investor confidence threatens to derail these investments, because firms may be unwilling to commit the substantial budgets required in an uncertain economic environment. The cost of these investments may also rise as a result of the falling pound because many of the materials and inputs needed for these technologies, such as batteries, are imported and a falling pound increases their prices.
2. High interest rates may rule out large investment
To support the pound and to control inflation, interest rates are expected to rise further. The UK is already experiencing record levels of inflation, fuelled by pandemic-related spending and Russia’s war on Ukraine. Rising consumer prices developed into a full-blown cost of living crisis, with fuel and food poverty, financial hardship and the collapse of businesses looming large on this winter’s horizon.
While the anticipated increase in interest rates might ease the cost of living crisis, it also increases the cost of government borrowing at a time when we rapidly need to increase low-carbon investment for net zero by 2050. The government’s official climate change advisory committee estimates that an additional £4 billion to £6 billion of annual public spending will be needed by 2030.
Some of this money should be raised through carbon taxes. But in reality, at least for as long as the cost of living crisis is ongoing, if the government is serious about green investment it will have to borrow.
Rising interest rates will push up the cost of borrowing relentlessly and present a tough political choice that seemingly pits the environment against economic recovery. As any future incoming government will inherit these same rates, a falling pound threatens to make it much harder to take large-scale, rapid environmental action.
3. Imports will become pricier
In addition to increased supply prices for firms and rising borrowing costs, it will lead to a significant rise in import prices for consumers. Given the UK’s reliance on imports, this is likely to affect prices for food, clothing and manufactured goods.
At the consumer level, this will immediately impact marginal spending as necessary expenditures (housing, energy, basic food and so on) lower the budget available for products such as eco-friendly cleaning products, organic foods or ethically made clothes. Buying “greener” products typically cost a family of four around £2,000 a year.
Instead, people may have to rely on cheaper goods that also come with larger greenhouse gas footprints and wider impacts on the environment through pollution and increased waste. See this calculator for direct comparisons.
Of course, some spending changes will be positive for the environment, for example if people use their cars less or take fewer holidays abroad. However, high-income individuals who will benefit the most from the mini-budget tax cuts will be less affected by the falling pound and they tend to fly more, buy more things, and have multiple cars and bigger homes to heat.
This raises profound questions about inequality and injustice in UK society. Alongside increased fuel poverty and foodbank use, we will see an uptick in the purchasing power of the wealthiest.
Interest rate rises increase the cost of servicing government debt as well as the cost of new borrowing. One estimate says that the combined cost to government of the new tax cuts and higher cost of borrowing is around £250 billion. This substantial loss in government income reduces the budget available for climate change mitigation and improvements to infrastructure.
The government’s growth plan also seems to be based on an increased use of fossil fuels through technologies such as fracking. Given the scant evidence for absolutely decoupling economic growth from resource use, the opposition’s “green growth” proposal is also unlikely to decarbonise at the rate required to get to net zero by 2050 and avert catastrophic climate change.
Therefore, rather than increasing the energy and materials going into the economy for the sake of GDP growth, we would argue the UK needs an economic reorientation that questions the need of growth for its own sake and orients it instead towards social equality and ecological sustainability.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.economic recovery economic growth pandemic government debt housing market pound mitigation gdp recovery interest rates uk russia ukraine
Covid-19 roundup: Swiss biotech halts in-patient PhII study; Houston-based vaccine and Chinese mRNA shot nab EUAs in Indonesia
Another Covid-19 study is hitting the breaks as a Swiss biotech is pausing its Phase II trial in patients hospitalized with Covid-19.
Another Covid-19 study is hitting the breaks as a Swiss biotech is pausing its Phase II trial in patients hospitalized with Covid-19.
Kinarus Therapeutics announced on Friday that the Data and Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB) has reviewed the company’s Phase II study for its candidate KIN001 and has recommended that the study be stopped.
According to Kinarus, the DSMB stated that there was a low probability to show statistically significant results as the number of Covid-19 patients that are in the hospital is lower than at other points in the pandemic.
“As many of our peers have learned since the beginning of the pandemic, it has become challenging to show the impact of therapeutic intervention at the current pandemic stage, given the disease characteristics in Covid-19 patients with severe disease. Moreover, there are also now relatively smaller numbers of patients that meet enrollment criteria, since fewer patients require hospitalization, in contrast to the situation earlier in the pandemic,” said Thierry Fumeaux, Kinarus CMO, in a statement.
Fumeaux continued to state that the drug will still be investigated in ambulatory Covid-19 patients who are not hospitalized, with the goal of reducing recovery time and the severity of the virus.
The KIN001 candidate is a combination of the small molecule inhibitor pamapimod and pioglitazone, which is currently used to treat type 2 diabetes.
The news has put a dampener on the company’s stock price $KNRS.SW, which is down 22% since opening on Friday.
Houston-developed vaccine and Chinese mRNA shot win EUAs in Indonesia
While Moderna and Pfizer/BioNTech’s mRNA shots to counter Covid-19 have dominated supplies worldwide, a Chinese-based mRNA developer and IndoVac, a recombinant protein-based vaccine, was created and engineered in Houston, Texas by the Texas Children’s Hospital Center for Vaccine Development vaccine is finally ready to head to another nation.
Walvax and Suzhou Abogen’s mRNA vaccine, dubbed AWcorna, has been approved for emergency use for adults 18 and over by the Indonesian Food and Drug Authority.
“This is the first step, and we are hoping to see more families across the country and the rest of the globe protected, which is a shared goal for us all,” said Walvax Chairman Li Yunchun, in a statement.
According to Walvax, the vaccine is 83% effective against the “wild-type” of SARS-CoV-2 infection with the strength against the Omicron variants standing at around 71%. The shots are also not required to be stored in deep freeze conditions and can be put in storage at 2 to 8 degrees Celsius.
Walvax and Abogen have been making progress on their mRNA vaccine for a while. Last year, Abogen received a massive amount of funding as it was moving the candidate forward.
However, while the candidate is moving forward overseas, it’s still finding itself stuck in regulatory approval in China. According to a report from BNN Bloomberg, China has not approved any mRNA vaccines for domestic usage.
Meanwhile, PT Bio Farma, the holding company for state-owned pharma companies in Indonesia, is prepping to make 20 million doses of the IndoVac COVID-19 vaccine this year and 100 million doses by 2024.
IndoVac’s primary series vaccines include nearly 80% of locally sourced content. Indonesia is seeking Halal Certification for the vaccine since no animal cells or products were used in the production of the vaccine. IndoVac successfully completed an audit from the Indonesian Ulema Council Food and Drug Analysis Agency, and the Halal Certification Agency of the Religious Affairs Ministry is expected to grant their approval soon.vaccine pandemic covid-19 recovery china
Do multimillion-dollar dinosaur auctions erode trust in science?
Global IPO market continues to plummet as Q3 draws to a close
Fauci Net Worth Soared 66% During Pandemic
Multipolar World Order – Part 2
Searches For “Real Estate Market Crash” Highest In Internet History
FDA clears Dupixent as first drug for rare skin disorder
Canadians’ Financials Take Hit Due to Inflation and Rising Costs: BDO Canada Affordability Index
Mish’s Daily: Step Back to the Monthly Chart on Transportation
Signs Are Pointing Toward Equities Capitulation
A rapid, highly sensitive method to measure SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater
Government10 hours ago
Do multimillion-dollar dinosaur auctions erode trust in science?
Spread & Containment21 hours ago
This Thanksgiving, Supplies Of Turkey, Eggs, & Butter Will Be Extremely Tight In The US
Government17 hours ago
Fauci Net Worth Soared 66% During Pandemic
Economics11 hours ago
‘Don’t eat me’ upstart taps Takeda vet on path to the clinic; Greg Mayes leaves Antios for Canadian psychedelics player
Spread & Containment22 hours ago
Computers calling time on isolation
Economics18 hours ago
New Provisional CDC Suicide Death Data Is a Call to Action to Double Down on Suicide Prevention Efforts
Crypto22 hours ago
Building Bitcoin Communities From The Ground Up In The Philippines
Spread & Containment4 hours ago
Industry groups call to block WTO IP waiver expansion to Covid-19 therapeutics