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What is carbon credit investing? An intro into what drives this novel asset class

The topic of climate change is growing ever more prominent as the planet creaks under humanity’s growing footprint. For financial markets, the effects…

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The topic of climate change is growing ever more prominent as the planet creaks under humanity’s growing footprint. For financial markets, the effects are also on the rise; the impact of ESG investing is expanding, love it or hate it, while the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 is arguably the most impactful piece of US climate legislation ever. 

Yet despite all this, the last couple of years have also brought some worrisome developments for those concerned about climate change. The energy market boomed last year, with the top five oil companies shattering records. The quintet banked close to $200 billion of profits, or $22.4 million per hour, as energy prices went vertical in amid the war in Ukraine. 

Throw in a world economy emerging from a once-in-a-generation (hopefully) pandemic, and fossil fuel demand spiked. This all provides an intriguing backdrop for carbon credit investing, an emerging asset class which is beginning to get more mainstream coverage. 

The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015 implemented internationally agreed targets and regulations around carbon emissions. The social side of this is well covered, but one fascinating development has been the emergence of a market for carbon emissions themselves, which have in a way been turned into a commodity, much like the underlying element itself. 

This is because carbon credits (as well as carbon offsets) can now be bought and sold on the market. Therefore, carbon credits are a market-based solution for the pernicious impact of emissions on our planet. Another way of looking at this: a carbon credit is the market-agreed price for the future impact of one ton of carbon emissions on the planet. 

How does the market price carbon credits?

Carbon credit markets are still finding their level. This is for a variety of reasons, but none more so than the simple fact it is immensely challenging to quantify the damage that a specific amount of carbon will cause to the planet down the line.  

But I wanted to dive in and analyse how prices have moved, despite only having a short period of data to work with for this asset class. And as we will shortly see, it is not so simple as a blind assumption that the price of credits will rise as regulators reduce the cap for emissions going forward. 

We can look at ETFs to get a good gauge of how the market has moved. The KraneShares Global Carbon Strategy ETF (KRBN) tracks a benchmark of the most traded carbon credit futures contracts (from Europe and North America). The below chart shows how it performed during 2021 and 2022, which I plotted against the S&P 500 for perspective.  As described above, this has obviously been a particularly volatile period for energy, as well as markets as a whole. 

Carbon credit investors have evidently fared well, especially in late 2021 (power demand surged, buoyed by a harsh winter in Europe). But as I touched on previously, this is not as efficient a market as many established asset classes. Let’s look at it this way: if the price of fossil fuels falls, consumption should rise and therefore the price of carbon credits should also rise as a result. We should see a very strong inverse relationship, right? 

Well, that is not what has transpired to date. I used the price of coal as a proxy for the cost of emissions in the following chart (not ideal but it is indicative), regressing it against the Carbon ETF mentioned earlier to illustrate the relationship. Forgive the axes crime, but it demonstrates that while there is certainly a correlation, it’s not as tight as you may expect (the volatility of coal is also on a whole other level). 

Or perhaps plotting the correlation directly is more illustrative. Without betraying my love of correlations and maths too much, there are a bunch of different measures one could use here (I have plotted the Pearson 60-Day on a rolling basis here). The below shows that while the correlation resides reasonably close to -1 for a lot of the period analysed, there are also significant deviations. 

Clearly, there are other factors at work here beyond the price of fossil fuels. While one can daydream about a scenario whereby the price of carbon credits rises as the cost to pollute goes up, most likely due to regulator actions, this is not the case. The data clearly shows that there is something else driving the price action of carbon credits. 

Madeline Hume, Senior Research Analyst at Morningstar, put together an excellent research report on the asset class last September, and also encountered this riddle.

The betas – which consider the level as well as the direction of return relationships – of the European-only S&P GSCI Carbon Emissions Allowances Index typically fall below 0.5 against the commodity markets that we surveyed. That’s because over six-month rolling periods during the past five years, the EU’s carbon credits actually moved with energy prices just as frequently as they moved against it

Madeline Hume, Senior Research Analyst at Morningstar

While Hume’s report was clearly more in-depth as it focused on a range of commodities rather than just my quick charting of the correlation against coal, the conclusion is the same. The price of carbon credits is not converging to the cost of pollution as much as it should be, at least from a regulator’s point of view. 

This is mainly due to the heavy hands of compliance and ever-changing policies. Governments hold massive say over the supply, while emissions reduction and adherence to international goals vary hugely from country to country (the EU are the teacher’s pet here, but other regions have been far less diligent). 

Even regulators themselves can impact things by changing which companies fall under the cap. Remember, regulators mandate which businesses are required to fall under these emissions cap, which has a key impact on the market for credits. 

So, it is not so simple as to say “the price of carbon credits must rise because regulators need to increase the cost of emissions in order to achieve climate targets”. This may make conceptual sense, but we live in the real world, and political and regulatory factors greatly affect markets – especially when one ventures this far out into such “novel” asset classes (just ask a cryptocurrency investor how regulation can shake things up!).  

Clearly, carbon credit investing is an emerging asset class with a capital E, and hence laced with risk for investors. This piece is merely an introduction to it, and I’m already looking forward to getting into the meat of it and truly diving into the data to see what is driving demand here, how liquidity is, and what the future could hold in this wacky corner of the financial markets. 

For now, investors need to be wary that like a lot of things in the experimental realm, carbon credit investing is laced with risk. On a side note, I have long wondered what is the criteria for referring to something as an “investment” rather than a “gamble”. A riddle for another day, perhaps? 

The post What is carbon credit investing? An intro into what drives this novel asset class appeared first on Invezz.

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February Employment Situation

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000…

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By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000 average over the previous 12 months. The payroll data for January and December were revised down by a total of 167,000. The private sector added 223,000 new jobs, the largest gain since May of last year.

Temporary help services employment continues a steep decline after a sharp post-pandemic rise.

Average hours of work increased from 34.2 to 34.3. The increase, along with the 223,000 private employment increase led to a hefty increase in total hours of 5.6% at an annualized rate, also the largest increase since May of last year.

The establishment report, once again, beat “expectations;” the WSJ survey of economists was 198,000. Other than the downward revisions, mentioned above, another bit of negative news was a smallish increase in wage growth, from $34.52 to $34.57.

The household survey shows that the labor force increased 150,000, a drop in employment of 184,000 and an increase in the number of unemployed persons of 334,000. The labor force participation rate held steady at 62.5, the employment to population ratio decreased from 60.2 to 60.1 and the unemployment rate increased from 3.66 to 3.86. Remember that the unemployment rate is the number of unemployed relative to the labor force (the number employed plus the number unemployed). Consequently, the unemployment rate can go up if the number of unemployed rises holding fixed the labor force, or if the labor force shrinks holding the number unemployed unchanged. An increase in the unemployment rate is not necessarily a bad thing: it may reflect a strong labor market drawing “marginally attached” individuals from outside the labor force. Indeed, there was a 96,000 decline in those workers.

Earlier in the week, the BLS announced JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) data for January. There isn’t much to report here as the job openings changed little at 8.9 million, the number of hires and total separations were little changed at 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively.

As has been the case for the last couple of years, the number of job openings remains higher than the number of unemployed persons.

Also earlier in the week the BLS announced that productivity increased 3.2% in the 4th quarter with output rising 3.5% and hours of work rising 0.3%.

The bottom line is that the labor market continues its surprisingly (to some) strong performance, once again proving stronger than many had expected. This strength makes it difficult to justify any interest rate cuts soon, particularly given the recent inflation spike.

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Mortgage rates fall as labor market normalizes

Jobless claims show an expanding economy. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

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Everyone was waiting to see if this week’s jobs report would send mortgage rates higher, which is what happened last month. Instead, the 10-year yield had a muted response after the headline number beat estimates, but we have negative job revisions from previous months. The Federal Reserve’s fear of wage growth spiraling out of control hasn’t materialized for over two years now and the unemployment rate ticked up to 3.9%. For now, we can say the labor market isn’t tight anymore, but it’s also not breaking.

The key labor data line in this expansion is the weekly jobless claims report. Jobless claims show an expanding economy that has not lost jobs yet. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

From the Fed: In the week ended March 2, initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits were flat, at 217,000. The four-week moving average declined slightly by 750, to 212,250


Below is an explanation of how we got here with the labor market, which all started during COVID-19.

1. I wrote the COVID-19 recovery model on April 7, 2020, and retired it on Dec. 9, 2020. By that time, the upfront recovery phase was done, and I needed to model out when we would get the jobs lost back.

2. Early in the labor market recovery, when we saw weaker job reports, I doubled and tripled down on my assertion that job openings would get to 10 million in this recovery. Job openings rose as high as to 12 million and are currently over 9 million. Even with the massive miss on a job report in May 2021, I didn’t waver.

Currently, the jobs openings, quit percentage and hires data are below pre-COVID-19 levels, which means the labor market isn’t as tight as it once was, and this is why the employment cost index has been slowing data to move along the quits percentage.  

2-US_Job_Quits_Rate-1-2

3. I wrote that we should get back all the jobs lost to COVID-19 by September of 2022. At the time this would be a speedy labor market recovery, and it happened on schedule, too

Total employment data

4. This is the key one for right now: If COVID-19 hadn’t happened, we would have between 157 million and 159 million jobs today, which would have been in line with the job growth rate in February 2020. Today, we are at 157,808,000. This is important because job growth should be cooling down now. We are more in line with where the labor market should be when averaging 140K-165K monthly. So for now, the fact that we aren’t trending between 140K-165K means we still have a bit more recovery kick left before we get down to those levels. 




From BLS: Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 275,000 in February, and the unemployment rate increased to 3.9 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Job gains occurred in health care, in government, in food services and drinking places, in social assistance, and in transportation and warehousing.

Here are the jobs that were created and lost in the previous month:

IMG_5092

In this jobs report, the unemployment rate for education levels looks like this:

  • Less than a high school diploma: 6.1%
  • High school graduate and no college: 4.2%
  • Some college or associate degree: 3.1%
  • Bachelor’s degree or higher: 2.2%
IMG_5093_320f22

Today’s report has continued the trend of the labor data beating my expectations, only because I am looking for the jobs data to slow down to a level of 140K-165K, which hasn’t happened yet. I wouldn’t categorize the labor market as being tight anymore because of the quits ratio and the hires data in the job openings report. This also shows itself in the employment cost index as well. These are key data lines for the Fed and the reason we are going to see three rate cuts this year.

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January…

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January jobs report was the "most ridiculous in recent history" but, boy, were we wrong because this morning the Biden department of goalseeked propaganda (aka BLS) published the February jobs report, and holy crap was that something else. Even Goebbels would blush. 

What happened? Let's take a closer look.

On the surface, it was (almost) another blockbuster jobs report, certainly one which nobody expected, or rather just one bank out of 76 expected. Starting at the top, the BLS reported that in February the US unexpectedly added 275K jobs, with just one research analyst (from Dai-Ichi Research) expecting a higher number.

Some context: after last month's record 4-sigma beat, today's print was "only" 3 sigma higher than estimates. Needless to say, two multiple sigma beats in a row used to only happen in the USSR... and now in the US, apparently.

Before we go any further, a quick note on what last month we said was "the most ridiculous jobs report in recent history": it appears the BLS read our comments and decided to stop beclowing itself. It did that by slashing last month's ridiculous print by over a third, and revising what was originally reported as a massive 353K beat to just 229K,  a 124K revision, which was the biggest one-month negative revision in two years!

Of course, that does not mean that this month's jobs print won't be revised lower: it will be, and not just that month but every other month until the November election because that's the only tool left in the Biden admin's box: pretend the economic and jobs are strong, then revise them sharply lower the next month, something we pointed out first last summer and which has not failed to disappoint once.

To be fair, not every aspect of the jobs report was stellar (after all, the BLS had to give it some vague credibility). Take the unemployment rate, after flatlining between 3.4% and 3.8% for two years - and thus denying expectations from Sahm's Rule that a recession may have already started - in February the unemployment rate unexpectedly jumped to 3.9%, the highest since February 2022 (with Black unemployment spiking by 0.3% to 5.6%, an indicator which the Biden admin will quickly slam as widespread economic racism or something).

And then there were average hourly earnings, which after surging 0.6% MoM in January (since revised to 0.5%) and spooking markets that wage growth is so hot, the Fed will have no choice but to delay cuts, in February the number tumbled to just 0.1%, the lowest in two years...

... for one simple reason: last month's average wage surge had nothing to do with actual wages, and everything to do with the BLS estimate of hours worked (which is the denominator in the average wage calculation) which last month tumbled to just 34.1 (we were led to believe) the lowest since the covid pandemic...

... but has since been revised higher while the February print rose even more, to 34.3, hence why the latest average wage data was once again a product not of wages going up, but of how long Americans worked in any weekly period, in this case higher from 34.1 to 34.3, an increase which has a major impact on the average calculation.

While the above data points were examples of some latent weakness in the latest report, perhaps meant to give it a sheen of veracity, it was everything else in the report that was a problem starting with the BLS's latest choice of seasonal adjustments (after last month's wholesale revision), which have gone from merely laughable to full clownshow, as the following comparison between the monthly change in BLS and ADP payrolls shows. The trend is clear: the Biden admin numbers are now clearly rising even as the impartial ADP (which directly logs employment numbers at the company level and is far more accurate), shows an accelerating slowdown.

But it's more than just the Biden admin hanging its "success" on seasonal adjustments: when one digs deeper inside the jobs report, all sorts of ugly things emerge... such as the growing unprecedented divergence between the Establishment (payrolls) survey and much more accurate Household (actual employment) survey. To wit, while in January the BLS claims 275K payrolls were added, the Household survey found that the number of actually employed workers dropped for the third straight month (and 4 in the past 5), this time by 184K (from 161.152K to 160.968K).

This means that while the Payrolls series hits new all time highs every month since December 2020 (when according to the BLS the US had its last month of payrolls losses), the level of Employment has not budged in the past year. Worse, as shown in the chart below, such a gaping divergence has opened between the two series in the past 4 years, that the number of Employed workers would need to soar by 9 million (!) to catch up to what Payrolls claims is the employment situation.

There's more: shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative assessment, reveals just how ugly the composition of "new jobs" has been. Consider this: the BLS reports that in February 2024, the US had 132.9 million full-time jobs and 27.9 million part-time jobs. Well, that's great... until you look back one year and find that in February 2023 the US had 133.2 million full-time jobs, or more than it does one year later! And yes, all the job growth since then has been in part-time jobs, which have increased by 921K since February 2023 (from 27.020 million to 27.941 million).

Here is a summary of the labor composition in the past year: all the new jobs have been part-time jobs!

But wait there's even more, because now that the primary season is over and we enter the heart of election season and political talking points will be thrown around left and right, especially in the context of the immigration crisis created intentionally by the Biden administration which is hoping to import millions of new Democratic voters (maybe the US can hold the presidential election in Honduras or Guatemala, after all it is their citizens that will be illegally casting the key votes in November), what we find is that in February, the number of native-born workers tumbled again, sliding by a massive 560K to just 129.807 million. Add to this the December data, and we get a near-record 2.4 million plunge in native-born workers in just the past 3 months (only the covid crash was worse)!

The offset? A record 1.2 million foreign-born (read immigrants, both legal and illegal but mostly illegal) workers added in February!

Said otherwise, not only has all job creation in the past 6 years has been exclusively for foreign-born workers...

Source: St Louis Fed FRED Native Born and Foreign Born

... but there has been zero job-creation for native born workers since June 2018!

This is a huge issue - especially at a time of an illegal alien flood at the southwest border...

... and is about to become a huge political scandal, because once the inevitable recession finally hits, there will be millions of furious unemployed Americans demanding a more accurate explanation for what happened - i.e., the illegal immigration floodgates that were opened by the Biden admin.

Which is also why Biden's handlers will do everything in their power to insure there is no official recession before November... and why after the election is over, all economic hell will finally break loose. Until then, however, expect the jobs numbers to get even more ridiculous.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/08/2024 - 13:30

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