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The Millennials Are Coming For The Boomers’ Money: One Bank Sees Generational Conflict Breaking Out This Decade

The Millennials Are Coming For The Boomers’ Money: One Bank Sees Generational Conflict Breaking Out This Decade



The Millennials Are Coming For The Boomers' Money: One Bank Sees Generational Conflict Breaking Out This Decade Tyler Durden Sat, 09/12/2020 - 20:00

Late last week, we published the executive summary from Jim Ried's latest must read long-term asset return study titled "Age of Disorder" in which the author makes the case that Economic cycles come and go, "but sitting above them are the wider structural super-cycles that shape everything from economies to asset prices, politics, and our general way of life" Having identified five such cycles over the last 160 years...

  1. The first era of globalisation (1860-1914)
  2. The Great Wars and the Depression (1914-1945)
  3. Bretton Woods and the return to a gold-based monetary system (1945-1971)
  4. The start of fiat money and the high-inflation era of the 1970s (1971-1980)
  5. The second era of globalisation (1980-2020?)
  6. The Age of Disorder (2020?-????)

... Reid thinks the world is on the cusp of a new era – "one that will be characterised initially by disorder."

While there are extensive socio-economic and political implications as this new "Age of Dirsorder" replaces the current outgoing second era of globalization (touched upon here), one key aspect Reid focused on was the market (after all he is a banker), and specifically how current record high global valuations are threatened by the coming "new age", which according to the Deutsche Bank strategist would have tremendous implications for eight major global themes from deteriorating US-China relations, to exploding global debt levels, to the coming runaway inflation and even worse wealth and income inequality, but perhaps most importantly to the coming generational conflict between the young ("poor" Milennials and Gen-Zers) and the old (i.e. rich). 

Since the generational divide in not only the US but across the developed world has the potential to be even more disruptive than the record wealth gap, we will take a closer look at Reid's observations on why the intergenerational gap has been widening in recent years and looks set to be even more of an issue in the immediate future.

* *  *

The intergenerational divide to end this decade?

Inequality is a multifaceted area, and one sub-area of disorder to emerge out of it could well be the intergenerational divide. This has been widening in recent years and looks set to be even more of an issue in the immediate future.

For now the generational divide is at relatively extreme levels. Those who’ve graduated into the labor market over the last decade have already experienced the twin shocks of the Global Financial Crisis and now the Coronavirus pandemic – the two worst economic shocks since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Young people have therefore lost out economically relative to their predecessors and are behind previous generations on issues from home ownership to student debt levels. Meanwhile, there is an increasing divide on other issues, for example in how young people have been among the most forceful in calling for action on climate change. And this is before we consider how young people will inherit the large national debt burdens that have been accumulated.a

These age divides have manifested themselves increasingly in political preferences, with more and more elections around the world taking place along generational lines.

We think this intergenerational conflict will likely come to a head over the next decade. Ageing populations across the West are exacerbating many of these existing trends. High house prices and lagging income growth for Millennials and Generation Z in a number of countries continue to create anger and resentment. And the young have every right to be aggrieved. Figure 49 shows that in the US, real median net worth by age of head (of household) has diverged markedly since the 1980s.

In the UK, the median household incomes of those born in the 1980s and 1990s aren't doing much better than those born in the 1970s at a similar age. That's a big difference from previous cohorts, where each tended to be noticeably better off ata given age than its predecessor.

Meanwhile, thanks to the GFC and the Covid shock, youth unemployment has already spiked up once over the last decade and looks likely to do so again, especially relative to the rest of the population.

After the GFC and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, youth unemployment peaked above 25% in France and above 50% in Spain and Greece. In the US and UK, it hit just below and just above 20%, respectively. Though these rates fell back in the following years, the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic has thrown away this progress, and young people have once again  found their career prospects harmed by circumstances out of their control. Indeed, in America, the ranks of the jobless youths are greater now than they were at their peak after the financial crisis.

This legacy is likely to be a long-lasting one, even as the economy returns to growth. The evidence shows that for those who graduate in a recession, as many college and university graduates will be doing right now, not only is it harder to get a job initially, but wages suffer for years afterwards as well. Intuitively, this is because young people will be far less picky when it comes to accepting job offers and be more likely to accept a lower-paying role than they might have done in a stronger labour market.

So young people today have had the unfortunate luck to have experienced the two largest economic crises since the Great Depression. It is clear that young people today stand some distance from where previous generations were at the same age.

In general terms, today’s young are finding themselves priced out of the housing market, living with their parents for longer, and having to defer important life stages such as marriage and children. It is little wonder that many feel as though they’ve lost out relative to previous generations at the same point.

More recently, the generational divide has manifested itself in political preferences, with the young generally on the losing side, especially in binary referendums or two-party controlled systems. Although it has long been the case that young people have tended to lean leftward, this divide along age lines has become increasingly prevalent in recent years.

Just look at two of the biggest political decisions on either side of the Atlantic, the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump. Both saw such a divide along age lines, to the point that a large majority of young people faced an outcome they hadn’t voted for. The graphs show that the millennial generation (around 40 today) were the pivot to whether you were more or less likely to vote for Brexit or Trump.

Of course, democracy always has a losing side. Yet it is a newer phenomenon that entire generations would conceive of themselves as the losers, and there is decisive evidence that this has widened over time. For example, look at the 25-34 year-old group in the UK and compare its support for the Conservative Party with the nationwide level. We’ve seen this in the US as well. The proportion of voters who identify as Republican or Republican-leaning has notably widened by generation over the last decade.

There is evidence that the backlash has started even if the Millennials haven’t quite had the weight of numbers. In the last couple of UK elections, the strongest support for the opposition Labour Party has been from younger voters, supporting a manifesto that included measures directly targeted at them, such as the abolition of tuition fees, or preventing rents from rising by more than inflation. Indeed, despite their defeat in the December 2019 general election – where the elder generations’ support of Brexit held sway – they did unexpectedly well back in the 2017 contest, winning 40% of the vote. Similarly in the US, Bernie Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist, was propelled in part by enthusiasm among younger voters towards his left-wing policies, and in both 2016 and 2020 he was the runner-up for the Democratic presidential nomination and was a favourite for a period late in the race in the latter bid.

This isn’t just a US or UK phenomenon. In continental Europe, the most popular candidate in France’s 2017 presidential election among 18-24 year olds was neither President Macron nor Marine Le Pen, but the left-wing Jean-Luc Mélenchon. In Ireland’s election earlier this year, Sinn Fein received the most first-preference votes, partly because of discontent at the lack of affordable housing, thanks to strong support from younger voters. Again, getting over the line has been tough in most places as their demographic doesn’t have a majority – but returning to the French election of 2017, a small % swing in the first round easily could have led to the second-round run-off being between two extreme candidates: Le Pen and Mélenchon.

Looking forward, if this younger generation is unable to achieve its economic aspirations – particularly now, given the effects of the pandemic – why should its views on these economic issues change as the members age, as many assume? Indeed, this young demographic could soon mobilise itself into an electoral majority.

A potential disruptive reversal in power

The general assumption is that the intergenerational divide will worsen as the population ages and that this group will ensure that the self-interest of the status quo continues. However, this misses the key point that the age where the intergenerational divide begins is not static. It is likely that this age will increase over time as the average age of those left behind will continue to increase as a gap has opened up in income and wealth that is very hard to bridge naturally. As such, at some point the younger left-behind generation will exceed those that have benefited from the favourable financial conditions that have been cemented in successive recent elections. When this happens, the possibility of seismic change in policy at elections becomes more likely. We think that over the next decade, the left-behind younger population will become an increasingly powerful electoral force, especially if it continues to be left behind due to the impact of the pandemic.

Figure 56 looks at the Millennial, Generation Z and younger cohorts relative to those born prior to the Millennials in G7 countries on an unweighted aggregated population basis. We have only included those of a voting age in each year past and future. Given the UN data base works in five-year buckets, we’ve assumed those aged in the middle of the 15-20 year-old bucket as being eligible to vote.

The generations prior to the Millennials have held the upper hand, and by a sizeable majority, in recent decades. As recently as 2005 the elder group held a 497,000 vs 69,000 electoral advantage in G7 countries. By 2015 (around the time of Brexit and Trump votes) this was a still strong 442,000 vs. 167,000 advantage. However, as we approach 2030, this gap will narrow towards zero, and after that all those born after 1980 will start to dominate elections.

Assuming there won’t be a large number of Millennials that find economic life much more economically favourable as they age, this could be a turning point for society and start to change election results and thus move policy. In the US, where we can use the census to get even more granularity, 2020 looks set to be the last election where the Millennials and younger have a distinct disadvantage. The Census compilers have slightly more aggressive estimates than the UN and believe that by around 2028 they will reach voting parity in terms of numbers. It will be relatively close in 2024. For context in 2016, the advantage was 156,000 voters to 92,000 voters in favour of the elder group

Interestingly of the G7, Italy and Japan see the crossover between the two groups occurring as late as 2035-2040, which reflects their poorer relative and absolute demographics going forward. This may help explain why Japan continues to be dominated by the elderly interest groups as population growth from the Millennial generation onwards has simply not been enough to threaten the pre-1980s cohort’s dominance. It also suggests that countries like the US and the UK, where the young vs old voter dominance happens much sooner (between 2025 and 2030), won’t necessarily see the same economic trends as what Japan has seen in recent years and is likely to see going forward. The crossover in Germany and France likely occurs in the early 2030s, so even here the themes of younger voters will increasingly be felt as we move through the upcoming decade.

So the 2020s looks set to be the decade where the Millennials and those that follow them make large numerical inroads into the electoral base of the older generation. Although the intergenerational divide is likely to get worse first as they continue to be outnumbered and are left with the Covid-19 shock, it is increasingly feasible that they could usher in a seismic change in a major election within the next decade. As such, we suspect that the electoral dominance of the pre-Millennial coalition is drawing to a close, and when it turns it could have a dramatic impact on the intergenerational divide and the self-reinforcing policies and economic outcomes of the "Globalisation era".

As a caveat, we should say that this analysis assumes equal voter turnout, which history suggests is notably lower for the young. However, this isn’t set in stone and if a movement develops that the young feel strongly about and think they can win, then voter turnout could change. Also, this analysis assumes that Millennials don’t simply inherit the attitudes and wealth of the older generation as they age and become part of the vested interest group of the older generation. Given the generational gap in home ownership, income and debt, it will be difficult for different age groups to naturally bridge the financial divide that has opened up. We should stress that many in the elder generation support alternative politics vs the majority of their own age group – so as we get closer to a 50/50 split, a change in the political direction of travel can occur anytime, with a coalition of voters.

An electoral victory for the post-Millennial generation would likely usher in a reversal of policies that have favoured those born before, say, 1980. These could include a harsher inheritance tax regime, less income protection for pensioners, more property taxes, higher top-end income taxes, higher corporate taxes and more all-round redistributive policies. The “new” generation might also be more tolerant of inflation insofar as it will erode the debt burden it is inheriting and put the pain on bond holders, which tend to have a bias towards the pensioner generation.

Even without an extreme electoral shift, as the left-behind post-Millennial generation becomes more electorally powerful, it is likely to increasingly shape the policies of more mainstream parties. So even without a seismic shift, we still may be in the process of shifting from an era where boomer-type policies were in the ascendancy to one where Millennial preferences start to have a serious impact on politics. In terms of asset prices, most assets are simply transferred from one generation to another at a market-clearing price. Unless the post-Millennial generation has a sudden income boost, the price it will be prepared or able to pay for the assets of the pre-Millennial population – as the latter wants or needs to sell – will likely be under some pressure relative to past growth, especially the stunning growth of the "Globalisation Era".

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Delivering aid during war is tricky − here’s what to know about what Gaza relief operations may face

The politics of delivering aid in war zones are messy, the ethics fraught and the logistics daunting. But getting everything right is essential − and…




Palestinians on the outskirts of Gaza City walk by buildings destroyed by Israeli bombardment on Oct. 20, 2023. AP Photo/Ali Mahmoud

The 2.2 million people who live in Gaza are facing economic isolation and experiencing incessant bombardment. Their supplies of essential resources, including food and water, are quickly dwindling.

In response, U.S. President Joe Biden has pledged US$100 million in humanitarian assistance for the citizens of Gaza.

As a scholar of peace and conflict economics who served as a World Bank consultant during the 2014 war between Hamas and Israel, I believe that Biden’s promise raises fundamental questions regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid in a war zone. Political constraints, ethical quandaries and the need to protect the security of aid workers and local communities always make it a logistical nightmare.

In this specific predicament, U.S. officials have to choose a strategy to deliver the aid without the perception of benefiting Hamas, a group the U.S. and Israel both classify as a terrorist organization.


When aiding people in war zones, you can’t just send money, a development strategy called “cash transfers” that has become increasingly popular due to its efficiency. Sending money can boost the supply of locally produced goods and services and help people on the ground pay for what they need most. But injecting cash into an economy so completely cut off from the world would only stoke inflation.

So the aid must consist of goods that have to be brought into Gaza, and services provided by people working as part of an aid mission. Humanitarian aid can include food and water; health, sanitation and hygiene supplies and services; and tents and other materials for shelter and settlement.

Due to the closure of the border with Israel, aid can arrive in Gaza only via the Rafah crossing on the Egyptian border.

The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, will likely turn to its longtime partner on the ground, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, or UNRWA, to serve as supply depots and distribute goods. That agency, originally founded in 1949 as a temporary measure until a two-state solution could be found, serves in effect as a parallel yet unelected government for Palestinian refugees.

USAID will likely want to tap into UNRWA’s network of 284 schools – many of which are now transformed into humanitarian shelters housing two-thirds of the estimated 1 million people displaced by Israeli airstrikes – and 22 hospitals to expedite distribution.

Map of Gaza and its neighbors
Gaza is a self-governing Palestinian territory. The narrow piece of land is located on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, bordered by Israel and Egypt. PeterHermesFurian/iStock via Getty Images Plus


Prior to the Trump administration, the U.S. was typically the largest single provider of aid to the West Bank and Gaza. USAID administers the lion’s share of it.

Since Biden took office, total yearly U.S. assistance for the Palestinian territories has totaled around $150 million, restored from just $8 million in 2020 under the Trump administration. During the Obama administration, however, the U.S. was providing more aid to the territories than it is now, with $1 billion disbursed in the 2013 fiscal year.

But the White House needs Congress to approve this assistance – a process that requires the House of Representatives to elect a new speaker and then for lawmakers to approve aid to Gaza once that happens.


The United Nations Relief and Works Agency is a U.N. organization. It’s not run by Hamas, unlike, for instance, the Gaza Ministry of Health. However, Hamas has frequently undermined UNRWA’s efforts and diverted international aid for military purposes.

Hamas has repeatedly used UNRWA schools as rocket depots. They have repeatedly tunneled beneath UNRWA schools. They have dismantled European Union-funded water pipes to use as rocket fuselages. And even since the most recent violence broke out, the UNRWA has accused Hamas of stealing fuel and food from its Gaza premises.

Humanitarian aid professionals regularly have to contend with these trade-offs when deciding to what extent they can work with governments and local authorities that commit violent acts. They need to do so in exchange for the access required to help civilians under their control.

Similarly, Biden has had to make concessions to Israel while brokering for the freedom to send humanitarian aid to Gaza. For example, he has assured Israel that if any of the aid is diverted by Hamas, the operation will cease.

This promise may have been politically necessary. But if Biden already believes Hamas to be uncaring about civilian welfare, he may not expect the group to refrain from taking what they can.

Security best practices

What can be done to protect the security of humanitarian aid operations that take place in the midst of dangerous conflicts?

Under International Humanitarian Law, local authorities have the primary responsibility for ensuring the delivery of aid – even when they aren’t carrying out that task. To increase the chances that the local authorities will not attack them, aid groups can give “humanitarian notification” and voluntarily alert the local government as to where they will be operating.

Hamas has repeatedly flouted international norms and laws. So the question of if and how the aid convoy will be protected looms large.

Under the current agreement between the U.S., Israel and Egypt, the convoy will raise the U.N. flag. International inspectors will make sure no weapons are on board the vehicles before crossing over from Arish, Egypt, to Rafah, a city located on the Gaza Strip’s border with Egypt.

The aid convoy will likely cross without militarized security. This puts it at some danger of diversion once inside Gaza. But whether the aid convoy is attacked, seized or left alone, the Biden administration will have demonstrated its willingness to attempt a humanitarian relief operation. In this sense, a relatively small first convoy bearing water, medical supplies and food, among other items, serves as a test balloon for a sustained operation to follow soon after.

If the U.S. were to provide the humanitarian convoy a military escort, by contrast, Hamas could see its presence as a provocation. Washington’s support for Israel is so strong that the U.S. could potentially be judged as a party in the conflict between Israel and Hamas.

In that case, the presence of U.S. armed forces might provoke attacks on Gaza-bound aid convoys by Hamas and Islamic jihad fighters that otherwise would not have occurred. Combined with the mobilization of two U.S. Navy carrier groups in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, I’d be concerned that such a move might also stoke regional anger. It would undermine the Biden administration’s attempts to cool the situation.

On U.N.-approved missions, aid delivery may be secured by third-party peacekeepers – meaning, in this case, personnel who are neither Israeli nor Palestinian – with the U.N. Security Council’s blessing. In this case, tragically, it’s unlikely that such a resolution could conceivably pass such a vote, much less quickly enough to make a difference.

Topher L. McDougal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Diagnosis and management of postoperative wound infections in the head and neck region

“The majority of wound infections often manifest themselves immediately postoperatively, so close followup should take place […]” Credit: 2023 Barbarewicz…



“The majority of wound infections often manifest themselves immediately postoperatively, so close followup should take place […]”

Credit: 2023 Barbarewicz et al.

“The majority of wound infections often manifest themselves immediately postoperatively, so close followup should take place […]”

BUFFALO, NY- October 20, 2023 – A new research perspective was published in Oncoscience (Volume 10) on October 4, 2023, entitled, “Diagnosis and management of postoperative wound infections in the head and neck region.”

In everyday clinical practice at a department for oral and maxillofacial surgery, a large number of surgical procedures in the head and neck region take place under both outpatient and inpatient conditions. The basis of every surgical intervention is the patient’s consent to the respective procedure. Particular attention is drawn to the general and operation-specific risks. 

Particularly in the case of soft tissue procedures in the facial region, bleeding, secondary bleeding, scarring and infection of the surgical area are among the most common complications/risks, depending on the respective procedure. In their new perspective, researchers Filip Barbarewicz, Kai-Olaf Henkel and Florian Dudde from Army Hospital Hamburg in Germany discuss the diagnosis and management of postoperative infections in the head and neck region.

“In order to minimize the wound infections/surgical site infections, aseptic operating conditions with maximum sterility are required.”

Furthermore, depending on the extent of the surgical procedure and the patient‘s previous illnesses, peri- and/or postoperative antibiotics should be considered in order to avoid postoperative surgical site infection. Abscesses, cellulitis, phlegmone and (depending on the location of the procedure) empyema are among the most common postoperative infections in the respective surgical area. The main pathogens of these infections are staphylococci, although mixed (germ) patterns are also possible. 

“Risk factors for the development of a postoperative surgical site infection include, in particular, increased age, smoking, multiple comorbidities and/or systemic diseases (e.g., diabetes mellitus type II) as well as congenital and/ or acquired immune deficiency [10, 11].”


Continue reading the paper: DOI: 

Correspondence to: Florian Dudde


Keywords: surgical site infection, head and neck surgery


About Oncoscience

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Biden’s Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Makes the Poor Pay for the Rich

A year after the Supreme Court struck down President Biden’s student loan forgiveness plan, he presented a new scheme to the Department of Education…



A year after the Supreme Court struck down President Biden’s student loan forgiveness plan, he presented a new scheme to the Department of Education on Tuesday. While it is less aggressive than the prior plan, this proposal would cost hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars, doing more harm than good. 

As the legendary economist Milton Friedman noted, “One of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than their results.” 

Higher education in America is costly, and this “forgiveness” would make it worse. 

Signing up for potentially life-long student loans at a young age is too normalized. At the same time, not enough borrowers can secure jobs that offer adequate financial support to pay off these massive loans upon graduation or leaving college. These issues demand serious attention. But “erasing” student loans, as well-intentioned as it may be, is not the panacea Americans have been led to believe.

Upon closer examination, the President’s forgiveness plan creates winners and losers, ultimately benefiting higher-income earners the most. In reality, this plan amounts to wealth redistribution. To quote another top economist, Thomas Sowell described this clearly: “There are no solutions, only trade-offs.” 

Forgiving student loans is not the end of the road but the beginning of a trade-off for a rising federal fiscal crisis and soaring college tuition. 

When the federal government uses taxpayer funds to give student loans, it charges an interest rate to account for the cost of the loan. To say that all borrowers no longer have to pay would mean taxpayers lose along with those who pay for it and those who have been paying or have paid off their student loans.

According to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, student debt forgiveness could cost at least $360 billion. 

Let’s consider that there will be 168 million tax returns filed this year. A simple calculation suggests that student loan forgiveness could add around $2,000 yearly in taxes per taxpayer, based on the CRFB’s central estimate. 

Clearly, nothing is free, and the burden of student loan forgiveness will be shifted to taxpayers.

One notable feature of this plan is that forgiveness is unavailable to individuals earning over $125,000 annually. In practice, this means that six-figure earners could have their debts partially paid off by lower-income tax filers who might not have even pursued higher education. This skewed allocation of resources is a sharp departure from progressive policy.

Data show that half of Americans are already frustrated with “Bidenomics.” 

Inflation remains high, affordable housing is a distant dream, and wages fail to keep up with soaring inflation. Introducing the potential of an additional $2,000 annual tax burden at least for those already struggling, mainly to subsidize high-income earners, adds insult to injury.

Furthermore, it’s vital to recognize that the burden of unpaid student loans should not fall on low-income earners or Americans who did not attend college. Incentives play a crucial role in influencing markets. 

By removing the incentive for student loan borrowers to repay their debts, we may encourage more individuals to pursue higher education and accumulate debt without the intention of paying it back. After all, why would they when it can be written off through higher taxes for everyone?

The ripple effect of this plan could be far-reaching. 

It may make college more accessible for some, opening the floodgates for students and the need for universities to expand and hire more staff, leading to even higher college tuition. This perverse incentive will set a precedent that will create a cycle of soaring tuition, which would counteract the original goal of making higher education more affordable.

While the intention behind President Biden’s student loan forgiveness may appear noble (in likelihood, it is a rent-seeking move), the results may prove detrimental to our nation’s economic stability and fairness. And if the debt is monetized, more inflation will result.

Forgiving student loans will exacerbate existing problems, with the brunt of the burden falling on lower-income Americans. Instead of improving the situation, it will likely create an intricate web of financial consequences, indirectly affecting the very people it aims to help. But that is the result of most government programs with good intentions.



Vance Ginn, Ph.D., is president of Ginn Economic Consulting, chief economist or senior fellow at multiple state thinks across the country, host of the Let People Prosper Show, and previously the associate director for economic policy of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, 2019-20. Follow him on @VanceGinn.


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