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The good, the bad, and the ugly

On the surface, conditions in the US look pretty fantastic these days. Prices for lots of goods and services are soaring. Job openings are at record highs. Financial markets are awash in liquidity, and financial market conditions in general are about…



On the surface, conditions in the US look pretty fantastic these days. Prices for lots of goods and services are soaring. Job openings are at record highs. Financial markets are awash in liquidity, and financial market conditions in general are about as good as they have ever been. Debt service burdens for most people are at all-time lows. The stock market is on the cusp of new all-time highs. Corporate profits are booming. Air travel is surging. The economy has recovered just about all it lost to the Covid-19 crisis. Household net worth is at all-time highs in nominal, real and per capita terms. Private sector jobs have recovered almost 70% of what they lost due to the Covid-19 shutdown. Vaccines and natural immunity have all but vanquished Covid-19. Conditions are improving daily, with no near-term end in sight. On the inflation front, expectations currently remain reasonably anchored at around 2.5%.

We are not free of problems or worries, of course. Is Biden of sound mind and body? Is Kamala capable of running the country? Will Congress pass, by the thinest of partisan margins, another round of trillion-dollar spending boondoggles and a permanent and massive expansion of the welfare state? Will the Fed wait too long to reverse its enormous QE efforts? How many of the 10 million workers currently sitting on their hands will want to return to work when emergency unemployment benefits expire in a few months? How long will it take for the Fed to boost short-term rates to a level that once again offers a positive real rate of return? What will happen, in the meantime, with the nearly $5 trillion in savings that have accumulated in the banking system since March 2020? Does the historically low level of real risk-free yields on TIPS suggest that US economic growth will be anemic at best for as far as the eye can see? Are equity valuations dangerously over-priced?

My sense of the news is that several potentially worrisome initiatives are now unlikely to prevail. Thanks to the opposition of the G7, Biden's proposal to unify and raise corporate tax rates to a higher level is dead; instead, the best he can hope for is an agreement to create a new, lower minimum tax rate (15%) that is uniform among developed economies. Even that looks dodgy, however. Senator Manchin appears to be standing firm against nuking the filibuster. Biden's spending plans, which are looking more extreme by the day, are facing growing pushback among the saner elements of his party. 

As for the ugly, the Libertarian-leaning Tax Foundation recent issued a report that says Biden's tax hikes and spending proposals (billed as all-in stimulus) would in fact hurt the economy (the WSJ has more details). I agree: Biden's tax and spend agenda is the last thing this economy needs right now.

The charts that follow flesh out several of these arguments and developments. In the end, I remain near-term bullish but still quite worried about the potential for 1) higher-than-expected inflation down the road and 2) more outrageous and destabilizing fiscal "stimulus" and tax-hike proposals, all of which could end up derailing what for now is looking like a classic boom-type recovery.

Chart #1

Chart #1 illustrates the bizarre developments in the labor market. Many millions of people have returned to work, but there are still millions more on the sidelines. The number of job openings has exploded because employers are unable to find workers who want to work. The obvious culprit is the emergency unemployment benefits which create an enormous incentive for people to remain unemployed until these benefits expire in early September. While this is mostly a temporary problem, it is unnecessarily holding back the recovery and continuing to balloon the deficit. 

Chart #2

Chart #2 has both good and bad news. Good: more companies are looking to increase their hiring than ever before. Bad: There's a huge shortage of willing workers which is stymying efforts by millions of companies to grow. 

Chart #3

Chart #3 illustrates the dramatic improvement in airline passenger traffic. However, the number of people passing through US airports is still about 30% below the prevailing levels at this time in 2019. 

Chart #4

Small businesses employ the lion's share of US workers, so it is concerning that their confidence has sagged from the heady levels of the Trump years, as Chart #4 shows. Undoubtedly several factors are at work: emergency unemployment benefits which pay people not to work, the prospect of rising tax rates on corporate profits and individual incomes, renewed growth in regulatory burdens, and the knowledge—which will not soon fade—that state and local officials can turn off their business at a moment's notice should a new virus surface. 

Chart #5

As Chart #5 shows, the number of private sector jobs today is about 7 million less than where they would have been if the prior trend had continued. Public jobs are more than one million less than they were pre-pandemic. Yet despite these huge job losses, real GDP today is at least as high as it was prior to the Covid shutdowns. That means that the productivity of those who have been working has shot up dramatically, as the economy was forced to find ways to produce more with fewer people. We've seen a revolutionary advance in productivity thanks to Covid. As millions of currently idled workers find there way back into the workforce, that will give GDP growth a significant boost lasting at least through year end.

Chart #6

Chart #6 is quite sobering. Prior to the Great Recession, the labor force (defined as all those of working age who are employed or looking for work) was growing at a rate of about 1.2% per year. Since then, growth in the labor force has been anemic—more so than ever before. I calculate that there are about 19 million fewer in the labor force today than there would have been at the prior trend growth rate. That's a lot of idled human capacity.

Chart #7

Chart #7, Bloomberg's Financial Conditions Index, today is about as high as it has ever been. This all but rules out a near-term recession or even a growth pause. Liquidity is abundant, credit quality is excellent, and nerves have calmed.

Chart #8

Chart #8 shows corporate credit spreads. Today, spreads are about as low as they have ever been, which is a sign that the market is quite optimistic about the outlook for economic growth and corporate profits. One factor contributing to this is the abundance of liquidity and the Fed's pledge that it will not tighten monetary conditions for a long time. Not only does this limit downside economic risk, but it also adds to inflationary pressures down the road, and inflation is something that generally benefits debtors.

Chart #9

Chart #9 is my indispensable tool for judging the likelihood of recession. With the exception of the Covid-19 shutdown/recession, every other recession on this chart was preceded by 1) a flattening or inversion of the Treasury yield curve (red line), and 2) a high and rising real Federal Funds rate. Today the yield curve is steepening, much as it has always done during growth cycles, and the real funds rate is as low as it has ever been. This adds up to an extremely low probability of recession for the foreseeable future.

Very low real yields, such as we have today, are not an unalloyed boon, unfortunately, since they weaken the demand for money (while also actively encouraging borrowing and spending), and thus this can be harbinger of rising inflation if the Fed does not take steps to a) reduce the supply of money by reversing its QE actions and b) boosting short-term interest rates. High and rising inflation would dramatically increase the likelihood of Fed tightening and eventually lead to another painful recession. That risk is not yet imminent, however, but it is certainly worth keeping an eye on.

Chart #10

Chart #10 shows an index of non-energy spot commodity prices. Prices have soared, beginning right around the time—in late March—when federal government started pumping trillions of dollars into the economy to offset the effect of shutdowns, and the Fed ended up buying almost all of the debt that was issued, thus massively expanding the money supply. How much of the increase in prices is due to monetary inflation, and how much to the economic recovery and increased demand for goods and services which had suddenly become in short supply? 

Chart #11

I've been featuring Chart #11 often over the past year, since I think it illustrates something that almost all commenters have either ignored or forgotten. The chart shows the percentage of annual income (GDP) that is held in cash or cash equivalents (M2); as such it is a good measure of money demand. As all economists should know by now, the balance between money supply and money demand is of crucial importance. When the supply of money exceeds the demand for it, inflation is the result. The Fed's massive increase in the money supply last year was matched by an equally massive increase in money demand—that's why inflation was low last year. More recently, it looks like money demand is beginning to soften. That makes sense, given the fading of the Covid crisis and the return of confidence. Yet the Fed has done nothing to reverse its massive increase in the money supply. That's why inflation has begun to rise at a troubling rate in recent months (see Charts #9 and 10 in my last post). 

The future course of inflation is of the utmost importance, yet most observers, including the Fed, insist that the recent rise in inflation is transitory—inflation has increased solely because demand has outpaced supply of late and supply eventually will catch up. That's probably true in part, but I think the more important explanation is that the Fed has allowed (and even encouraged) the demand for money to decline without taking offsetting action to either reduce money supply or boost money demand. 

Chart #12

Chart #12 compares the M2 money supply to nominal GDP. For many years they tracked each other closely. But now we've seen an unprecedented surge in M2 that has so far not been matched by a similar pickup in nominal GDP, (both nominal and real GDP today are above their pre-Covid highs, but have not yet exceeded their pre-Covid trend growth rate). In the absence of a concerted attempt by the Fed to reduce the money supply, I would expect to see nominal GDP pick up significantly in future years, with most of the pickup coming in the form of rising prices. There is an awful lot of potential inflationary fuel out there, and it only needs only a return of confidence and a laggard Fed to ignite.

Chart #13

Chart #13 compares the 2-yr annualized growth rate of real GDP (red line) with the real yield of 5-year TIPS. (I've assumed that GDP growth in the current quarter will be an annualized 7%.) Not surprisingly, these two variables tend to track each other. Strong GDP growth is consistent with generally high real rates, and weak growth with low real rates. The current level of real yields is about as low as we have ever seen. I can only think that is because market participants expect the long-term rate of GDP growth to be generally anemic. Perhaps it's not a coincidence that Biden's recently proposed budget in fact assumes that despite many trillions of fiscal "stimulus" coupled with rising tax burdens the economy's rate of growth over the next decade will average only 1.7% per year, substantially lower than anemic growth of the Obama years (2009-2017), when growth averaged a little over 2% per year (the weakest recovery on record). 

Chart #14

Chart #14 compares the real Fed funds rate (blue line) to the real yield on 5-yr TIPS (blue line)—the latter being the market's expectation for what the blue line will average over the next 5 years. When the blue line is below the red line, that indicates the market is expecting the Fed to increase its real funds rate target in the future, which is generally the case in normal times. When the blue line is higher than the red line, this is the market saying that the Fed is too tight and is thus likely to have to ease policy in the future. Looks to me like the Fed is plenty easy these days. 

For practical purposes, a very negative real yield on cash and cash equivalents such as we have today (the blue line being a good proxy for cash yields) creates powerful incentives for people to borrow money and spend it. Why? Because borrowing at a negative real rate during a period of rising prices means you don't have to take on much risk in order to make a profit, since the price of most anything you buy will rise while your debt burden—which costs little or nothing to maintain—will shrink. Another way of looking at it: negative real rates strongly discourage people from holding money (i.e., it erodes money demand) and strongly encourage them to spend money. There's an awful lot of money being held these days which is steadily losing purchasing power. If the Fed doesn't reverse its QE efforts, unwanted money will find its way into higher prices.

Chart #15

Chart #15 compares nominal and real yields on 5-yr Treasuries, with the difference between the two (green line) being the market's expectation for the average annual increase in the CPI over the next 5 years. Note the significant pickup in inflation expectations that has occurred since March '20, when the market only expected inflation to average 0.2% per year. That expectation has now jumped to 2.5%. That's not particularly troubling, but it does represent a huge change.

Chart #16

Chart #16 shows the monthly history of the S&P 500 index of equity prices since 1950. As the chart shows, equity prices have increased by an annualized 7% per year over this 70+ year period. Add dividend yields to this, and you get an annualized total rate of return on equities of about 8.5% per year. There's a lot of variability along the way, to be sure, but a buy-and-hold strategy generally pays off handsomely. Note that the 7% trend line shows just about as many above-trend years as below-trend years. If anything, I take this to mean that the equity market today is not necessarily in a "bubble" like it was in the years leading up to 2000. 

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Middle-aged Americans in US are stressed and struggle with physical and mental health – other nations do better

Adults in Germany, South Korea and Mexico reported improvements in health, well-being and memory.

Middle age was often a time to enjoy life. Now, it brings stress and bad health to many Americans, especially those with lower education levels. Mike Harrington/Getty Images

Midlife was once considered a time to enjoy the fruits of one’s years of work and parenting. That is no longer true in the U.S.

Deaths of despair and chronic pain among middle-aged adults have been increasing for the past decade. Today’s middle-aged adults – ages 40 to 65 – report more daily stress and poorer physical health and psychological well-being, compared to middle-aged adults during the 1990s. These trends are most pronounced for people who attained fewer years of education.

Although these trends preclude the COVID-19 pandemic, COVID-19’s imprint promises to further exacerbate the suffering. Historical declines in the health and well-being of U.S. middle-aged adults raises two important questions: To what extent is this confined to the U.S., and will COVID-19 impact future trends?

My colleagues and I recently published a cross-national study, which is currently in press, that provides insights into how U.S. middle-aged adults are currently faring in relation to their counterparts in other nations, and what future generations can expect in the post-COVID-19 world. Our study examined cohort differences in the health, well-being and memory of U.S. middle-aged adults and whether they differed from middle-aged adults in Australia, Germany, South Korea and Mexico.

A middle-aged woman looking sad sitting in front of artwork.
Susan Stevens poses for a photograph in her daughter Toria’s room with artwork Toria left behind at their home in Lewisville, N.C. Toria died from an overdose. Eamon Queeney/For The Washington Post via Getty Images

US is an outlier among rich nations

We compared people who were born in the 1930s through the 1960s in terms of their health and well-being – such as depressive symptoms and life satisfaction – and memory in midlife.

Differences between nations were stark. For the U.S., we found a general pattern of decline. Americans born in the 1950s and 1960s experienced overall declines in well-being and memory in middle age compared to those born in the 1930s and 1940s. A similar pattern was found for Australian middle-aged adults.

In contrast, each successive cohort in Germany, South Korea and Mexico reported improvements in well-being and memory. Improvements were observed in health for each nation across cohorts, but were slowed for Americans born in the 1950s and 1960s, suggesting they improved less rapidly than their counterparts in the countries examined.

Our study finds that middle-aged Americans are experiencing overall declines in key outcomes, whereas other nations are showing general improvements. Our cross-national approach points to policies that could could help alleviate the long-term effects arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Will COVID-19 exacerbate troubling trends?

Initial research on the short-term effects of COVID-19 is telling.

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the fragility of life. Seismic shifts have been experienced in every sphere of existence. In the U.S., job loss and instability rose, household financial fragility and lack of emergency savings have been spotlighted, and children fell behind in school.

At the start of the pandemic the focus was rightly on the safety of older adults. Older adults were most vulnerable to the risks posed by COVID-19, which included mortality, social isolation and loneliness. Indeed, older adults were at higher risk, but an overlooked component has been how the mental health risks and long-haul effects will likely differ across age groups.

Yet, young adults and middle-aged adults are showing the most vulnerabilities in their well-being. Studies are documenting that they are currently reporting more psychological distress and stressors and poorer well-being, compared to older adults. COVID-19 has been exacerbating inequalities across race, gender and socioeconomic status. Women are more likely to leave the workforce, which could further strain their well-being.

A older women hugs her daughter.
Middle-aged people often have parents to take care of as well as children. Ron Levine/Getty Images

Changing views and experiences of midlife

The very nature and expectations surrounding midlife are shifting. U.S. middle-aged adults are confronting more parenting pressures than ever before, in the form of engagement in extracurricular activities and pressures for their children to succeed in school. Record numbers of young adults are moving back home with their middle-aged parents due to student loan debt and a historically challenging labor and housing market.

A direct effect of gains in life expectancy is that middle-aged adults are needing to take on more caregiving-related duties for their aging parents and other relatives, while continuing with full-time work and taking care of school-aged children. This is complicated by the fact that there is no federally mandated program for paid family leave that could cover instances of caregiving, or the birth or adoption of a child. A recent AARP report estimated that in 2020, there were 53 million caregivers whose unpaid labor was valued at US$470 billion.

The restructuring of corporate America has led to less investment in employee development and destabilization of unions. Employees now have less power and input than ever before. Although health care coverage has risen since the Affordable Care Act was enacted, notable gaps exist. High numbers of people are underinsured, which leads to more out-of-pocket expenses that eat up monthly budgets and financially strain households. President Biden’s executive order for providing a special enrollment period of the health care marketplace exchange until Aug. 15, 2021 promises to bring some relief to those in need.

Promoting a prosperous midlife

Our cross-national approach provides ample opportunities to explore ways to reverse the U.S. disadvantage and promote resilience for middle-aged adults.

The nations we studied vastly differ in their family and work policies. Paid parental leave and subsidized child care help relieve the stress and financial strain of parenting in countries such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden. Research documents how well-being is higher in both parents and nonparents in nations with more generous family leave policies.

Countries with ample paid sick and vacation days ensure that employees can take time off to care for an ailing family member. Stronger safety nets protect laid-off employees by ensuring that they have the resources available to stay on their feet.

In the U.S., health insurance is typically tied to one’s employment. Early on in the COVID-19 pandemic over 5 million people in the U.S. lost their health insurance when they lost their jobs.

During the pandemic, the U.S. government passed policy measures to aid people and businesses. The U.S. approved measures to stimulate the economy through stimulus checks, payroll protection for small businesses, expansion of unemployment benefits and health care enrollment, child tax credits, and individuals’ ability to claim forbearance for various forms of debt and housing payments. Some of these measures have been beneficial, with recent findings showing that material hardship declined and well-being improved during periods when the stimulus checks were distributed.

I believe these programs are a good start, but they need to be expanded if there is any hope of reversing these troubling trends and promoting resilience in middle-aged Americans. A recent report from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation concluded that paid family leave has a wide range of benefits, including, but not limited to, addressing health, racial and gender inequities; helping women stay in the workforce; and assisting businesses in recruiting skilled workers. Research from Germany and the United Kingdom shows how expansions in family leave policies have lasting effects on well-being, particularly for women.

Middle-aged adults form the backbone of society. They constitute large segments of the workforce while having to simultaneously bridge younger and older generations through caregiving-related duties. Ensuring their success, productivity, health and well-being through these various programs promises to have cascading effects on their families and society as a whole.

[Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend. Sign up for our weekly newsletter.]

Frank J. Infurna receives funding from the National Institute on Aging and previously from the John Templeton Foundation. The content is solely his responsibility and does not necessarily represent the official views of the funding agencies.

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Euro 2020 – a football tournament where the big players come from China and the US

Much of the money that pays for the competition is spent to build global brands.

Simon Lehmann / Alamy Stock Photo

With Euro 2020 now under way after a year of pandemic delay, football fans will be hoping for great performances from Europe’s finest players. Some of us will watch the tournament unfold on our Hisense televisions, and many will choose to order in some half time refreshments, maybe via the Just Eat delivery service, possibly sent using a Vivo mobile phone.

Sustained by cans of Heineken, as goals are scored, supporters will upload celebration clips on to TikTok. And after the final, what better way to recharge than by arranging a holiday on, perhaps flying on Qatar Airways.

For while fans will have their eyes firmly fixed on the efforts of players worth billions of pounds on the field, another big money game will be taking place off it. The Euros is one of the world’s biggest sport events, and a bonanza for corporate sponsors and partners (just a few of which are mentioned above).

In return for being exposed to the eyes of the world, Euros sponsors pay huge amounts of money. Just how much is difficult to say, as fees are commercially sensitive data. But in one case – that of Alipay (part of the Alibaba empire) – it is believed the Chinese company paid £176 million for an eight year deal.

UEFA has sold these deals in three ways: National Team Football Official Sponsors, Euro 2020 Official Sponsors, and Euro 2020 Official Licensees. And the origins of the companies and brands sponsoring this year’s event are a clear indication of how the beautiful game is valued by the corporate world.

Alongside UEFA partners such as FedEx and Konami, each of the national teams bring their own roster of sponsors, which makes for quite a cluttered selection of brands competing for attention. There’s England’s £50 million, five-year contract with BT, for example, while the Germans will bring Lufthansa to the tournament, Carlsberg will promote its association with Denmark and South Korea’s Hyundai will be represented by the Czech Republic.

The list goes on (and on). To capture the complex network of sponsors at Euro 2020 we created a network graphic of some of the most prominent and significant deals on show over the coming weeks. For reasons of clarity, we wern’t able to include every sponsor, but the range on display is revealing.

Graphic of Euro 2020 teams and sponsors.
Euro 2020 teams and associated sponsors. Paul Widdop and Simon Chadwick, Author provided

What becomes immediately clear is that although the UEFA European Championship is a continental tournament, its commercial reach is truly global. A significant number of sponsors are either not European or else have divisions that operate way beyond the borders of Europe.

At the same time, the sponsorship portfolio shows us that football is at the heart of the entertainment, lifestyle and digital economies. Gone are the days of motor-oil and office photocopier sponsorships. Instead we see a profusion of drinks brands, confectionery products and airlines.

In addition, the sponsorship of teams appears to go hand-in-hand with the promotion of national identity and national industry. “Brand Germany” for instance, is strongly represented by some of the country’s most important corporations, including Adidas and Volkswagen.

The appearance of Gazprom meanwhile, reflects the increasing use by nations of sponsorship as a geopolitical instrument. Indeed, the state owned Russian gas company has recently put its associations with UEFA and others to influential use.

Europe’s own goal

Equally, “Brand China” is now a major industrial and political power, and home to five of UEFA’s biggest tournament sponsors (Alipay, Antchain, Hisense, TikTok and Vivo).

Corporate America continues to endure too, represented by the likes of Coca Cola and IMG. The US has always been the home of contemporary sport sponsorship, and the country’s businesses continue to derive significant commercial value from it.

In fact, the underdogs in this big-money corporate competition appear to be the Europeans themselves. For an event being staged in countries including England, Italy, Spain and Romania, UEFA draws very few of its sponsors from the continent. Instead, it is clear that organisations from China and the US have both the financial muscle and the tactical brains to successfully dominate the tournament.

This reflects broader global trends which indicate the declining presence of European industry. European companies account for a falling percentage of global output. The market capitalisation of European firms is way behind that of American corporations and is fast being caught by Chinese firms. And the world’s technological hot spots are found in places such as Shenzhen and Silicon Valley, not in Europe.

Whether the footballing squad from France, Portugal or Switzerland lifts the trophy in July, there is no doubt that the UEFA tournament will be an on field triumph for Europe.

But the forces of globalisation, digitalisation and politico-economic change, reflected in the Euros’ portfolio of sponsors, will keep on playing long after the final whistle blows. And European industry could pay the penalty with a swift exit from the global industrial competition.

Simon Chadwick works with UEFA on its Certificate in Football Management programme.

Paul Widdop ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

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EU adds another rare blood condition as side effect of AstraZeneca shot

Europe’s drug regulator on June 11 identified another rare blood condition as a potential side effect of AstraZeneca’s Covid-19 vaccine and said it was looking into cases of heart inflammation after inoculation with all coronavirus shots.



EU adds another rare blood condition as side effect of AstraZeneca shot

(Reuters; )

Europe’s drug regulator on Friday identified another rare blood condition as a potential side effect of AstraZeneca’s (AZN.L) COVID-19 vaccine and said it was looking into cases of heart inflammation after inoculation with all coronavirus shots.

The European Medicines Agency’s (EMA) safety committee said that capillary leak syndrome must be added as a new side effect to labelling on AstraZeneca’s vaccine, known as Vaxzevria.

People who had previously sustained the condition, where fluids leak from the smallest blood vessels causing swelling and a drop in blood pressure, should not receive the shot, the EMA added.

The regulator first began looking into these cases in April and the recommendation adds to AstraZeneca’s woes after its vaccine was associated with very rare and potentially lethal cases of blood clotting that come with a low platelet count.

Last month, the EMA had advised against using the second AstraZeneca shot for people with that clotting condition, known as thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome (TTS).

The committee reviewed six validated cases of capillary leak syndrome in people, mostly women, who had received Vaxzevria, including one death. Three had had a history of the condition.

A vial of AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccine is seen at a vaccination centre in Westfield Stratford City shopping centre, amid the outbreak of coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in London, Britain, February 18, 2021. REUTERS/Henry Nicholls/File Photo

AstraZeneca declined to immediately comment.

More than 78 million Vaxzevria doses have been administered in the European Union, Liechtenstein, Iceland & Norway and Britain.

Britain’s regulator, the MHRA said on Thursday it had received 8 reports of capillary leak syndrome in the context of more than 40 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine given, and currently does not see a causal link.

Separately, the EMA said it was continuing its probe into cases of heart inflammation known as myocarditis and pericarditis, primarily following inoculation with the Pfizer/BioNTech (PFE.N), (22UAy.DE) and Moderna mRNA shots, but also after the J&J (JNJ.N) and AstraZeneca vaccines.

U.S. health officials said on Thursday they had registered a higher-than-expected number of heart inflammation cases in young men who received a second dose of the mRNA shots, though a causal relationship could not be established. read more

Israel’s Health Ministry said this month it had found a likely link to the condition in young men who received the Pfizer/BioNTech shot. read more

Both Pfizer and Moderna have acknowldged the observations but said a causal association with their vaccines has not been established.

BioNTech said adverse events, including myocarditis and pericarditis, are being regularly and thoroughly reviewed by the companies and regulatory authorities.

“More than 300 million doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine have been administered globally and the benefit risk profile of our vaccine remains positive.”

The United States and Israel have been months ahead of the EU in vaccinating men below 30, who are particularly prone to heart inflammation, giving them potentially more cases to analyse.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.


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