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The Economics of Quiet Quitting: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

In the last several months, growing attention has been paid both in print and social media to what has become known as “The Great Resignation,” a term…

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In the last several months, growing attention has been paid both in print and social media to what has become known as “The Great Resignation,” a term referring to the increase in job openings and corresponding increase in employment turnover rate since 2021. To place this phenomenon in context, according to a November 2022 news release by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the number of job openings has steadily increased from January 2012 to the December 2020, during which time the number of job openings rose from 3.9 million to 6.9 million.1 From January 2021 to September 2022, however, that figure has jumped from 7.2 million to approximately 10.7 million job openings.

In the wake of the reopening and recovery of the United States economy following COVID-19, such an increase in the number of job openings is to be expected. However, during this same period, the reported rate of job quits reported monthly by BLS has also increased. From January 2012 to December 2020, the rate of employees who have quit increased from 1.5 percent to 2.4 percent, while from January 2021 to September 2022, the “job quits rate” increased to 2.7 percent (peaking at 3 percent in December 2021).

Placing this Great Resignation in longer-term perspective will draw attention to and particularly focus on a corresponding labor market trend, recently dubbed “quiet quitting.” My purpose here will neither be to dismiss nor lend credence to whether quiet quitting is something new, per se. Rather, by taking stock of past trends, my goal will be to suggest, not predict, what we can expect in the future by explicating an economic rationale to “quiet quitting.” My argument is that what is known today as “quiet quitting” is simply a new manifestation of labor market turnover, and therefore a difference of degree, rather than of kind, in labor market trends.

According to a Wall Street Journal article, quiet quitting “isn’t about getting off the company payroll.” Rather, “the idea is to stay on it—but focus your time on the things you do outside of the office.”2 Quiet quitting, unlike quitting in the traditional sense of the term3, suggests that employees continue to work, but become less invested in their current employment, doing enough not to get fired, but not enough to accrue the human capital investments necessary for advancement, such as learning additional job skills specific to one’s current employment. While the term “quiet quitting” is new, and therefore continues to evolve, what it implies is that more time on the job is spent, as Ellis and Yang state, “on the things you do outside of the office.”

Much of the attention that has been drawn to quiet quitting has been based on a poll conducted by Gallup since 2000, measuring “the percentage of U.S. employees who are engaged at work.”4 “Employee Engagement,” according to Gallup, is defined as “the involvement and enthusiasm of employees in both their work and workplace.” According to an article entitled “Is Quiet Quitting Real?” by Jim Harter, Chief Scientist for Gallup’s workplace management practice, these data imply half of the U.S. work force currently employed is quietly quitting. Only 32 percent of employees reported to be “engaged”, while 50 percent were “not engaged” and 18 percent are “actively disengaged” (or “loudly quitting”) at work.

However, according to Derek Thompson at The Atlantic, quiet quitting is a “fake trend” and therefore unreflective of anything new in the labor market. Rather, “quit quitting” is but a reversion to the mean in labor market trends from the standpoint of Gallup’s data. Although indeed Thompson concedes the fact that worker engagement has decreased 36 percent in January 2020 to 32 percent in September 2022, both figures are still above the reported figure of 26 percent of workers being “engaged” at work reported in 2000.5 This is much is admitted in another article by Jim Harter, who states that, with the exception of 2020, “[e]mployee engagement has been a steady metric without sharp ups and downs since Gallup began tracking it in 2000.”

“Describing a particular phenomenon by appealing to psychological reasons is not the same as providing an economic explanation.”

My point in providing this summary has not been to give an exhaustive account of what appear (or do not appear?) to be opposing arguments regarding whether quiet quitting is “real” or “fake” by appealing to working polls that “measure” a worker’s psychological attachment to their work. I do not wish to discount claims that “quiet quitting” can be attributed to psychological reasons, nor do I suggest that COVID-19 has not affected worker attitudes toward their employment. But claiming that workers are “quietly quitting” by describing them as “detached”, “burned out”, or “lazy” gives too myopic a rationale centered on COVID-19 that misdirects attention to explaining “quiet quitting” as a phenomenon that has been recently accelerated, but not caused by COVID-19. Describing a particular phenomenon by appealing to psychological reasons is not the same as providing an economic explanation. As F.A. Hayek best states this point:

  • It is a mistake, to which careless expressions by social scientists often give countenance, to believe that their aim is to explain conscious action. This, if it can be done at all, is a different task, the task of psychology. For the social sciences the types of conscious action are data and all they have to do with regard to these data is to arrange them in such orderly fashion that they can be effectively used for their task (emphasis original, [1952] 1979: 68).

To be fair, I am not suggesting that economic explanations have not been provided. In fact, Greg Rosalsky and Alina Selyukh have argued that “quiet quitting” should be understood as a principal-agent problem. As they argue: “In this model, the principal (the boss) enlists an agent (the worker) to do a specific job for them. The problem: the principal doesn’t have complete information on exactly what their agent is doing. Is their agent being productive on the job? Or are they slacking? In order to make sure the agent is doing their bidding, the principal must figure out ways to incentivize and monitor them. The model has implications for the dramatic changes in office life—or lack thereof—we’ve seen in recent years. With the mass adoption of remote work, many managers seem to be struggling with how to effectively monitor and motivate their employees.”6 It is on this basis, they argue, that what is known as “The Great Resignation” should be relabeled “The Great Renegotiation.”

While I do not disagree with the economic basis of Rosalsky and Selyukh’s conclusions, the implications of their argument are incomplete. They suggest that “The Great Resignation” shows “a large chunk of our labor force was always phoning it in, but now they have a loud social-media presence and better branding.” Indeed remote work presents a principle-agent problem between employers and employees. Yet this claim misdirects attention to the fact that, whether “quiet quitting” is “real” or “fake”, to imply that “quiet quitting” is simply consumption of on-the-job leisure overlooks that what can also be understood as an “idle labor resource” that is employed seeking information about alternative job opportunities.

My reframing suggested here is not new but based on the work of economists William H. Hutt ([1939] 1977) and Armen A. Alchian (1969) and is consistent with the observations made earlier by Jim Harter and Derek Thompson. As Harter states: “Most employees who are not engaged or actively disengaged are already looking for another job” (emphasis added); and according to Thompson: “most people weren’t quitting to retire; they were quitting to take a new job” (emphasis original).

Returning to my introduction, and consistent with BLS data, increased turnover along with a corresponding increase in job openings was not caused by COVID-19, per se, but accelerated by government responses to the pandemic. What COVID-19 lockdowns accelerated was the use of already-available computer technology and other platforms, such as Zoom, that could not only transfer work to remote locations. More importantly, these same uses decreased the relative costs of employees seeking information about alternative job opportunities from other employers virtually. Whereas in the past, as suggested by Hutt and Alchian, workers would actively quit their job in order to become actively “employed” in discovering information about alternative employment opportunities,” the relative decline in the cost of discovering information about alternative job opportunities has allowed workers, more than ever, to seek new employment elsewhere while remaining currently employed, although in a passive or “quiet” manner.

For more on these topics, see

Rather than taking a temporary wage cut by becoming unemployed to seek information specific to other jobs, the wage cut incurred through “quietly quitting” comes in the form of foregone human capital investments specific to their current employment that would have allowed workers to command higher wages from their current employer. Hence, if we are to seek an economic rationale for “quietly quitting” which fits with longer-term labor market phenomena and gives us some reliable expectations about continued labor-market trends, it must be understood not as a change in preferences in employees, but due to primarily to a decline in information costs for employees seeking alternative employers while remaining currently employed.


References

Alchian, Armen A. 1969. “Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment.” Western Economic Journal, vol.7, no. 2: 109-128

Hayek, F.A. [1952] 1979. The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.

Hutt, William H. [1939] 1977. The Theory of Idle Resources, 2nd Edition. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.

Mulligan, Casey B. 2012. The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.


Footnotes

[1] Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey, accessed 11/29/2022.

[2] Lindsay Ellis and Angela Yang, “If Your Co-Workers Are ‘Quiet Quitting,’ Here’s What That Means.” The Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2022.

[3] Also of importance, though not the focus here, are labor market policies that have led to labor market distortions that had accelerated a fall in the labor force participation rate, which has steadily declined in the United States since 2000. See Mulligan (2012) and EconTalk podcast episode Edward Glaeser on Joblessness and the War on Work, March 26, 2018.

[4] Gallup, Employee Engagement. Accessed 11/29/2022.

[5] Derek Thompson, “Quiet Quitting Is a Fake Trend.” The Atlantic, September 16, 2022.

[6] Greg Rosalsky and Alina Selyuch, “The economics behind ‘quiet quitting’—and what it should be called instead.” Planet Money, September 13, 2022.


* I wish to thank Peter Boettke, Thea Burress, Christopher Coyne, and Amy Willis for their comments and feedback. Special thanks are due to Andreea Candela for improving an earlier draft of this essay. Any remaining errors are entirely my own.

Rosolino Candela is a Senior Fellow in the F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, and Program Director of Academic and Student Programs at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.


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Aging at AACR Annual Meeting 2024

BUFFALO, NY- March 11, 2024 – Impact Journals publishes scholarly journals in the biomedical sciences with a focus on all areas of cancer and aging…

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BUFFALO, NY- March 11, 2024 – Impact Journals publishes scholarly journals in the biomedical sciences with a focus on all areas of cancer and aging research. Aging is one of the most prominent journals published by Impact Journals

Credit: Impact Journals

BUFFALO, NY- March 11, 2024 – Impact Journals publishes scholarly journals in the biomedical sciences with a focus on all areas of cancer and aging research. Aging is one of the most prominent journals published by Impact Journals

Impact Journals will be participating as an exhibitor at the American Association for Cancer Research (AACR) Annual Meeting 2024 from April 5-10 at the San Diego Convention Center in San Diego, California. This year, the AACR meeting theme is “Inspiring Science • Fueling Progress • Revolutionizing Care.”

Visit booth #4159 at the AACR Annual Meeting 2024 to connect with members of the Aging team.

About Aging-US:

Aging publishes research papers in all fields of aging research including but not limited, aging from yeast to mammals, cellular senescence, age-related diseases such as cancer and Alzheimer’s diseases and their prevention and treatment, anti-aging strategies and drug development and especially the role of signal transduction pathways such as mTOR in aging and potential approaches to modulate these signaling pathways to extend lifespan. The journal aims to promote treatment of age-related diseases by slowing down aging, validation of anti-aging drugs by treating age-related diseases, prevention of cancer by inhibiting aging. Cancer and COVID-19 are age-related diseases.

Aging is indexed and archived by PubMed/Medline (abbreviated as “Aging (Albany NY)”), PubMed CentralWeb of Science: Science Citation Index Expanded (abbreviated as “Aging‐US” and listed in the Cell Biology and Geriatrics & Gerontology categories), Scopus (abbreviated as “Aging” and listed in the Cell Biology and Aging categories), Biological Abstracts, BIOSIS Previews, EMBASE, META (Chan Zuckerberg Initiative) (2018-2022), and Dimensions (Digital Science).

Please visit our website at www.Aging-US.com​​ and connect with us:

  • Aging X
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  • Aging LinkedIn
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Click here to subscribe to Aging publication updates.

For media inquiries, please contact media@impactjournals.com.


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NY Fed Finds Medium, Long-Term Inflation Expectations Jump Amid Surge In Stock Market Optimism

NY Fed Finds Medium, Long-Term Inflation Expectations Jump Amid Surge In Stock Market Optimism

One month after the inflation outlook tracked…

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NY Fed Finds Medium, Long-Term Inflation Expectations Jump Amid Surge In Stock Market Optimism

One month after the inflation outlook tracked by the NY Fed Consumer Survey extended their late 2023 slide, with 3Y inflation expectations in January sliding to a record low 2.4% (from 2.6% in December), even as 1 and 5Y inflation forecasts remained flat, moments ago the NY Fed reported that in February there was a sharp rebound in longer-term inflation expectations, rising to 2.7% from 2.4% at the three-year ahead horizon, and jumping to 2.9% from 2.5% at the five-year ahead horizon, while the 1Y inflation outlook was flat for the 3rd month in a row, stuck at 3.0%. 

The increases in both the three-year ahead and five-year ahead measures were most pronounced for respondents with at most high school degrees (in other words, the "really smart folks" are expecting deflation soon). The survey’s measure of disagreement across respondents (the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile of inflation expectations) decreased at all horizons, while the median inflation uncertainty—or the uncertainty expressed regarding future inflation outcomes—declined at the one- and three-year ahead horizons and remained unchanged at the five-year ahead horizon.

Going down the survey, we find that the median year-ahead expected price changes increased by 0.1 percentage point to 4.3% for gas; decreased by 1.8 percentage points to 6.8% for the cost of medical care (its lowest reading since September 2020); decreased by 0.1 percentage point to 5.8% for the cost of a college education; and surprisingly decreased by 0.3 percentage point for rent to 6.1% (its lowest reading since December 2020), and remained flat for food at 4.9%.

We find the rent expectations surprising because it is happening just asking rents are rising across the country.

At the same time as consumers erroneously saw sharply lower rents, median home price growth expectations remained unchanged for the fifth consecutive month at 3.0%.

Turning to the labor market, the survey found that the average perceived likelihood of voluntary and involuntary job separations increased, while the perceived likelihood of finding a job (in the event of a job loss) declined. "The mean probability of leaving one’s job voluntarily in the next 12 months also increased, by 1.8 percentage points to 19.5%."

Mean unemployment expectations - or the mean probability that the U.S. unemployment rate will be higher one year from now - decreased by 1.1 percentage points to 36.1%, the lowest reading since February 2022. Additionally, the median one-year-ahead expected earnings growth was unchanged at 2.8%, remaining slightly below its 12-month trailing average of 2.9%.

Turning to household finance, we find the following:

  • The median expected growth in household income remained unchanged at 3.1%. The series has been moving within a narrow range of 2.9% to 3.3% since January 2023, and remains above the February 2020 pre-pandemic level of 2.7%.
  • Median household spending growth expectations increased by 0.2 percentage point to 5.2%. The increase was driven by respondents with a high school degree or less.
  • Median year-ahead expected growth in government debt increased to 9.3% from 8.9%.
  • The mean perceived probability that the average interest rate on saving accounts will be higher in 12 months increased by 0.6 percentage point to 26.1%, remaining below its 12-month trailing average of 30%.
  • Perceptions about households’ current financial situations deteriorated somewhat with fewer respondents reporting being better off than a year ago. Year-ahead expectations also deteriorated marginally with a smaller share of respondents expecting to be better off and a slightly larger share of respondents expecting to be worse off a year from now.
  • The mean perceived probability that U.S. stock prices will be higher 12 months from now increased by 1.4 percentage point to 38.9%.
  • At the same time, perceptions and expectations about credit access turned less optimistic: "Perceptions of credit access compared to a year ago deteriorated with a larger share of respondents reporting tighter conditions and a smaller share reporting looser conditions compared to a year ago."

Also, a smaller percentage of consumers, 11.45% vs 12.14% in prior month, expect to not be able to make minimum debt payment over the next three months

Last, and perhaps most humorous, is the now traditional cognitive dissonance one observes with these polls, because at a time when long-term inflation expectations jumped, which clearly suggests that financial conditions will need to be tightened, the number of respondents expecting higher stock prices one year from today jumped to the highest since November 2021... which incidentally is just when the market topped out during the last cycle before suffering a painful bear market.

Tyler Durden Mon, 03/11/2024 - 12:40

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Homes listed for sale in early June sell for $7,700 more

New Zillow research suggests the spring home shopping season may see a second wave this summer if mortgage rates fall
The post Homes listed for sale in…

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  • A Zillow analysis of 2023 home sales finds homes listed in the first two weeks of June sold for 2.3% more. 
  • The best time to list a home for sale is a month later than it was in 2019, likely driven by mortgage rates.
  • The best time to list can be as early as the second half of February in San Francisco, and as late as the first half of July in New York and Philadelphia. 

Spring home sellers looking to maximize their sale price may want to wait it out and list their home for sale in the first half of June. A new Zillow® analysis of 2023 sales found that homes listed in the first two weeks of June sold for 2.3% more, a $7,700 boost on a typical U.S. home.  

The best time to list consistently had been early May in the years leading up to the pandemic. The shift to June suggests mortgage rates are strongly influencing demand on top of the usual seasonality that brings buyers to the market in the spring. This home-shopping season is poised to follow a similar pattern as that in 2023, with the potential for a second wave if the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates midyear or later. 

The 2.3% sale price premium registered last June followed the first spring in more than 15 years with mortgage rates over 6% on a 30-year fixed-rate loan. The high rates put home buyers on the back foot, and as rates continued upward through May, they were still reassessing and less likely to bid boldly. In June, however, rates pulled back a little from 6.79% to 6.67%, which likely presented an opportunity for determined buyers heading into summer. More buyers understood their market position and could afford to transact, boosting competition and sale prices.

The old logic was that sellers could earn a premium by listing in late spring, when search activity hit its peak. Now, with persistently low inventory, mortgage rate fluctuations make their own seasonality. First-time home buyers who are on the edge of qualifying for a home loan may dip in and out of the market, depending on what’s happening with rates. It is almost certain the Federal Reserve will push back any interest-rate cuts to mid-2024 at the earliest. If mortgage rates follow, that could bring another surge of buyers later this year.

Mortgage rates have been impacting affordability and sale prices since they began rising rapidly two years ago. In 2022, sellers nationwide saw the highest sale premium when they listed their home in late March, right before rates barreled past 5% and continued climbing. 

Zillow’s research finds the best time to list can vary widely by metropolitan area. In 2023, it was as early as the second half of February in San Francisco, and as late as the first half of July in New York. Thirty of the top 35 largest metro areas saw for-sale listings command the highest sale prices between May and early July last year. 

Zillow also found a wide range in the sale price premiums associated with homes listed during those peak periods. At the hottest time of the year in San Jose, homes sold for 5.5% more, a $88,000 boost on a typical home. Meanwhile, homes in San Antonio sold for 1.9% more during that same time period.  

 

Metropolitan Area Best Time to List Price Premium Dollar Boost
United States First half of June 2.3% $7,700
New York, NY First half of July 2.4% $15,500
Los Angeles, CA First half of May 4.1% $39,300
Chicago, IL First half of June 2.8% $8,800
Dallas, TX First half of June 2.5% $9,200
Houston, TX Second half of April 2.0% $6,200
Washington, DC Second half of June 2.2% $12,700
Philadelphia, PA First half of July 2.4% $8,200
Miami, FL First half of June 2.3% $12,900
Atlanta, GA Second half of June 2.3% $8,700
Boston, MA Second half of May 3.5% $23,600
Phoenix, AZ First half of June 3.2% $14,700
San Francisco, CA Second half of February 4.2% $50,300
Riverside, CA First half of May 2.7% $15,600
Detroit, MI First half of July 3.3% $7,900
Seattle, WA First half of June 4.3% $31,500
Minneapolis, MN Second half of May 3.7% $13,400
San Diego, CA Second half of April 3.1% $29,600
Tampa, FL Second half of June 2.1% $8,000
Denver, CO Second half of May 2.9% $16,900
Baltimore, MD First half of July 2.2% $8,200
St. Louis, MO First half of June 2.9% $7,000
Orlando, FL First half of June 2.2% $8,700
Charlotte, NC Second half of May 3.0% $11,000
San Antonio, TX First half of June 1.9% $5,400
Portland, OR Second half of April 2.6% $14,300
Sacramento, CA First half of June 3.2% $17,900
Pittsburgh, PA Second half of June 2.3% $4,700
Cincinnati, OH Second half of April 2.7% $7,500
Austin, TX Second half of May 2.8% $12,600
Las Vegas, NV First half of June 3.4% $14,600
Kansas City, MO Second half of May 2.5% $7,300
Columbus, OH Second half of June 3.3% $10,400
Indianapolis, IN First half of July 3.0% $8,100
Cleveland, OH First half of July  3.4% $7,400
San Jose, CA First half of June 5.5% $88,400

 

The post Homes listed for sale in early June sell for $7,700 more appeared first on Zillow Research.

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