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Rural Households Hit Hardest by Inflation in 2021-22

To conclude our series, we present disparities in inflation rates by U.S. census region and rural status between June 2019 and the present. Notably, rural…

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To conclude our series, we present disparities in inflation rates by U.S. census region and rural status between June 2019 and the present. Notably, rural households were hit by inflation the hardest during the 2021-22 inflationary episode. This is intuitive, as rural households rely on transportation, and especially on motor fuel, to a much greater extent than urban households do. More generally, the recent rise in inflation has affected households in the South more than the national average, and households in the Northeast by less than the national average, though this difference has decreased in the last few months. Once again, these changes in inflation patterns can be explained by transportation inflation driving a large extent of price rises during 2021 and much of 2022, with housing and food inflation lately coming to the fore.

Unlike for the other heterogeneities explored in this series on inflation disparities, the BLS provides estimates of the CPI by U.S. census region (Northeast, South, Midwest and West). Therefore, we use them to compute inflation differences between the census regions and the national average. We use the methodology from our previous posts—combining budget shares from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX) with CPI inflation measures at the metro area and census region level —to compute the rural-urban inflation differential. However, an additional complication of the latter analysis is that while the CEX surveys both urban and rural households, the CPI collects only urban prices for each census region. Therefore, following Hobijn and Lagakos (2005), when measuring the inflationary experience of rural households, we are using rural budget shares but not rural prices. We therefore caveat our results on rural households but consider them worth reporting given the large and intuitive inflation disparity that we uncover.

Inflation Disparities across Census Regions

The chart below displays disparities in inflation by U.S. census regions. The left panel shows budget shares for three major consumption categories that have experienced high inflation since 2021—food, housing, and transportation—for households located in these regions. Even though we use the entire consumption basket in our computations, and we disaggregate these categories considerably, we display only the three largest aggregate components, which comprise about two-thirds of the consumption basket, to illustrate our case. We see that households in the Midwest and (especially) the South have a larger transportation share of their consumption basket, but that households in the West and (especially) the Northeast have larger budget shares of housing.

The right panel shows differences between CPI inflation as experienced by each region and the national average. If each region experienced the same inflation rate, all four lines would be at zero. Before the pandemic, inflation in the West census region ran at 1.15 percentage point (pp) higher than the national average likely because of the high housing budget share and rising housing prices in the West—while the inflation rates in the other three regions were below the national average by as much as 0.8 pp. During the pandemic recession, inflation differences in the West and Northeast spiked, while inflation differences in the South and Midwest became more negative, but as the economy recovered from the pandemic recession, inflation in all regions including the West returned to the national average.

However, inflation differentials expanded again during the 2021 inflationary episode. At first, when transportation inflation was driving the overall inflation increase, inflation in the Midwest and in the South ran above the national average by about 0.5 pp in July, while households in the Northeast experienced 1 pp lower inflation than the national average, and inflation in the West was modestly below the national average. As of December 2022, as transportation inflation pressures are subsiding and housing inflation is picking up, inflation in the South is 0.6 pp above the national average, followed by inflation in the West, which is 0.2 percent below the national average. Inflation in the Northeast is still about one-third of a percentage point less than the national average but rising rapidly, and exceeded inflation in the Midwest this month, which is now 0.45 pp below the national average. While the Midwest and the South bore a greater brunt of transportation inflation in 2021, the Northeast enjoyed relatively milder inflation than the nation as a whole.

The South and the Midwest Bore the Brunt of Transportation Inflation in 2021 while Northeast Inflation Is Rising Rapidly Now

Two-panel Liberty Street Economics chart showing disparities in inflation by U.S. census regions. The left panel shows the share of expenditure on food, housing, and transportation for households located in these regions, while the right panel shows differences between CPI inflation as experienced by each region and the national average.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys and Consumer Price Index.

Inflation Disparities of Rural Households

The next chart explores inflation disparities by the rural status of the household. Rural households are defined as those residing in rural nonmetropolitan areas that are not covered by the CPI. The left panel presents the expenditure shares for the same three goods categories of rural and urban households. Not surprisingly, rural households spend a larger share of their budget on transportation, while urban households spend a larger share of their budget on housing.

The right panel presents inflation disparities of rural households relative to the urban average inflation. This chart is different from all the previous inflation disparity charts in this series because it combines CEX consumption shares of rural households with CPI data on urban prices as in the existing literature (data on rural prices is not collected). As rural prices could be systematically different, the conclusions we reach based on this chart are tentative. We also omit the line for the inflation disparity for urban consumers, as it is by construction very close to the horizontal line at zero.

Before 2021 and during the pandemic recession, rural households experienced persistently lower inflation (once again, at urban prices) by about 0.5 pp than urban households did. This can be explained to a large extent by low transportation inflation and the much higher transportation budget share of rural households. However, as transportation inflation soared in 2021, rural inflation climbed to over 2 pp higher than the urban average by February 2022. Rural inflation remained more than 1 pp higher than the urban average until May 2022, when falling transportation inflation and rising housing inflation decreased inflation inequality. In December 2022, rural inflation is once again below the national average by about 0.7 pp.

The Rise and Fall of Rural Inflation

Two-panel Liberty Street Economics chart showing inflation disparities by households’ rural status. The left panel shows rural and urban households’ share of expenditure on food, housing, and transportation, while the right panel presents inflation disparities of rural households relative to the urban average inflation.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys and Consumer Price Index.

Conclusion

To conclude, under the assumption that urban price growth is similar to rural price growth within relatively narrow categories of goods, rural households experienced considerably higher inflation than urban households did, especially relative to what was the case before the 2021 inflationary episode. Among U.S. census regions, the South experienced higher inflation than the national average, while the Northeast experienced lower inflation, though these patterns are beginning to reverse. All of these patterns can generally be explained by the variations in housing and transportation shares across regions and between urban and rural households and the variation of these prices. We will continue to monitor inflation inequality as the Federal Reserve System continues to work to reduce overall inflation to the FOMC’s longer-run goal.

Chart data

Rajashri Chakrabarti is the head of Equitable Growth Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.  

Dan Garcia is a research analyst in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Maxim Pinkovskiy is an economic research advisor in Equitable Growth Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

How to cite this post:
Rajashri Chakrabarti, Dan Garcia, and Maxim Pinkovskiy, “Rural Households Hit Hardest by Inflation in 2021-22,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, January 18, 2023, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2023/01/rural-households-hit-hardest-by-inflation-in-2021-22/.


Disclaimer
The views expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s).

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February Employment Situation

By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000…

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By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert

The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000 average over the previous 12 months. The payroll data for January and December were revised down by a total of 167,000. The private sector added 223,000 new jobs, the largest gain since May of last year.

Temporary help services employment continues a steep decline after a sharp post-pandemic rise.

Average hours of work increased from 34.2 to 34.3. The increase, along with the 223,000 private employment increase led to a hefty increase in total hours of 5.6% at an annualized rate, also the largest increase since May of last year.

The establishment report, once again, beat “expectations;” the WSJ survey of economists was 198,000. Other than the downward revisions, mentioned above, another bit of negative news was a smallish increase in wage growth, from $34.52 to $34.57.

The household survey shows that the labor force increased 150,000, a drop in employment of 184,000 and an increase in the number of unemployed persons of 334,000. The labor force participation rate held steady at 62.5, the employment to population ratio decreased from 60.2 to 60.1 and the unemployment rate increased from 3.66 to 3.86. Remember that the unemployment rate is the number of unemployed relative to the labor force (the number employed plus the number unemployed). Consequently, the unemployment rate can go up if the number of unemployed rises holding fixed the labor force, or if the labor force shrinks holding the number unemployed unchanged. An increase in the unemployment rate is not necessarily a bad thing: it may reflect a strong labor market drawing “marginally attached” individuals from outside the labor force. Indeed, there was a 96,000 decline in those workers.

Earlier in the week, the BLS announced JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) data for January. There isn’t much to report here as the job openings changed little at 8.9 million, the number of hires and total separations were little changed at 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively.

As has been the case for the last couple of years, the number of job openings remains higher than the number of unemployed persons.

Also earlier in the week the BLS announced that productivity increased 3.2% in the 4th quarter with output rising 3.5% and hours of work rising 0.3%.

The bottom line is that the labor market continues its surprisingly (to some) strong performance, once again proving stronger than many had expected. This strength makes it difficult to justify any interest rate cuts soon, particularly given the recent inflation spike.

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Mortgage rates fall as labor market normalizes

Jobless claims show an expanding economy. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

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Everyone was waiting to see if this week’s jobs report would send mortgage rates higher, which is what happened last month. Instead, the 10-year yield had a muted response after the headline number beat estimates, but we have negative job revisions from previous months. The Federal Reserve’s fear of wage growth spiraling out of control hasn’t materialized for over two years now and the unemployment rate ticked up to 3.9%. For now, we can say the labor market isn’t tight anymore, but it’s also not breaking.

The key labor data line in this expansion is the weekly jobless claims report. Jobless claims show an expanding economy that has not lost jobs yet. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

From the Fed: In the week ended March 2, initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits were flat, at 217,000. The four-week moving average declined slightly by 750, to 212,250


Below is an explanation of how we got here with the labor market, which all started during COVID-19.

1. I wrote the COVID-19 recovery model on April 7, 2020, and retired it on Dec. 9, 2020. By that time, the upfront recovery phase was done, and I needed to model out when we would get the jobs lost back.

2. Early in the labor market recovery, when we saw weaker job reports, I doubled and tripled down on my assertion that job openings would get to 10 million in this recovery. Job openings rose as high as to 12 million and are currently over 9 million. Even with the massive miss on a job report in May 2021, I didn’t waver.

Currently, the jobs openings, quit percentage and hires data are below pre-COVID-19 levels, which means the labor market isn’t as tight as it once was, and this is why the employment cost index has been slowing data to move along the quits percentage.  

2-US_Job_Quits_Rate-1-2

3. I wrote that we should get back all the jobs lost to COVID-19 by September of 2022. At the time this would be a speedy labor market recovery, and it happened on schedule, too

Total employment data

4. This is the key one for right now: If COVID-19 hadn’t happened, we would have between 157 million and 159 million jobs today, which would have been in line with the job growth rate in February 2020. Today, we are at 157,808,000. This is important because job growth should be cooling down now. We are more in line with where the labor market should be when averaging 140K-165K monthly. So for now, the fact that we aren’t trending between 140K-165K means we still have a bit more recovery kick left before we get down to those levels. 




From BLS: Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 275,000 in February, and the unemployment rate increased to 3.9 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Job gains occurred in health care, in government, in food services and drinking places, in social assistance, and in transportation and warehousing.

Here are the jobs that were created and lost in the previous month:

IMG_5092

In this jobs report, the unemployment rate for education levels looks like this:

  • Less than a high school diploma: 6.1%
  • High school graduate and no college: 4.2%
  • Some college or associate degree: 3.1%
  • Bachelor’s degree or higher: 2.2%
IMG_5093_320f22

Today’s report has continued the trend of the labor data beating my expectations, only because I am looking for the jobs data to slow down to a level of 140K-165K, which hasn’t happened yet. I wouldn’t categorize the labor market as being tight anymore because of the quits ratio and the hires data in the job openings report. This also shows itself in the employment cost index as well. These are key data lines for the Fed and the reason we are going to see three rate cuts this year.

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January…

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January jobs report was the "most ridiculous in recent history" but, boy, were we wrong because this morning the Biden department of goalseeked propaganda (aka BLS) published the February jobs report, and holy crap was that something else. Even Goebbels would blush. 

What happened? Let's take a closer look.

On the surface, it was (almost) another blockbuster jobs report, certainly one which nobody expected, or rather just one bank out of 76 expected. Starting at the top, the BLS reported that in February the US unexpectedly added 275K jobs, with just one research analyst (from Dai-Ichi Research) expecting a higher number.

Some context: after last month's record 4-sigma beat, today's print was "only" 3 sigma higher than estimates. Needless to say, two multiple sigma beats in a row used to only happen in the USSR... and now in the US, apparently.

Before we go any further, a quick note on what last month we said was "the most ridiculous jobs report in recent history": it appears the BLS read our comments and decided to stop beclowing itself. It did that by slashing last month's ridiculous print by over a third, and revising what was originally reported as a massive 353K beat to just 229K,  a 124K revision, which was the biggest one-month negative revision in two years!

Of course, that does not mean that this month's jobs print won't be revised lower: it will be, and not just that month but every other month until the November election because that's the only tool left in the Biden admin's box: pretend the economic and jobs are strong, then revise them sharply lower the next month, something we pointed out first last summer and which has not failed to disappoint once.

To be fair, not every aspect of the jobs report was stellar (after all, the BLS had to give it some vague credibility). Take the unemployment rate, after flatlining between 3.4% and 3.8% for two years - and thus denying expectations from Sahm's Rule that a recession may have already started - in February the unemployment rate unexpectedly jumped to 3.9%, the highest since February 2022 (with Black unemployment spiking by 0.3% to 5.6%, an indicator which the Biden admin will quickly slam as widespread economic racism or something).

And then there were average hourly earnings, which after surging 0.6% MoM in January (since revised to 0.5%) and spooking markets that wage growth is so hot, the Fed will have no choice but to delay cuts, in February the number tumbled to just 0.1%, the lowest in two years...

... for one simple reason: last month's average wage surge had nothing to do with actual wages, and everything to do with the BLS estimate of hours worked (which is the denominator in the average wage calculation) which last month tumbled to just 34.1 (we were led to believe) the lowest since the covid pandemic...

... but has since been revised higher while the February print rose even more, to 34.3, hence why the latest average wage data was once again a product not of wages going up, but of how long Americans worked in any weekly period, in this case higher from 34.1 to 34.3, an increase which has a major impact on the average calculation.

While the above data points were examples of some latent weakness in the latest report, perhaps meant to give it a sheen of veracity, it was everything else in the report that was a problem starting with the BLS's latest choice of seasonal adjustments (after last month's wholesale revision), which have gone from merely laughable to full clownshow, as the following comparison between the monthly change in BLS and ADP payrolls shows. The trend is clear: the Biden admin numbers are now clearly rising even as the impartial ADP (which directly logs employment numbers at the company level and is far more accurate), shows an accelerating slowdown.

But it's more than just the Biden admin hanging its "success" on seasonal adjustments: when one digs deeper inside the jobs report, all sorts of ugly things emerge... such as the growing unprecedented divergence between the Establishment (payrolls) survey and much more accurate Household (actual employment) survey. To wit, while in January the BLS claims 275K payrolls were added, the Household survey found that the number of actually employed workers dropped for the third straight month (and 4 in the past 5), this time by 184K (from 161.152K to 160.968K).

This means that while the Payrolls series hits new all time highs every month since December 2020 (when according to the BLS the US had its last month of payrolls losses), the level of Employment has not budged in the past year. Worse, as shown in the chart below, such a gaping divergence has opened between the two series in the past 4 years, that the number of Employed workers would need to soar by 9 million (!) to catch up to what Payrolls claims is the employment situation.

There's more: shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative assessment, reveals just how ugly the composition of "new jobs" has been. Consider this: the BLS reports that in February 2024, the US had 132.9 million full-time jobs and 27.9 million part-time jobs. Well, that's great... until you look back one year and find that in February 2023 the US had 133.2 million full-time jobs, or more than it does one year later! And yes, all the job growth since then has been in part-time jobs, which have increased by 921K since February 2023 (from 27.020 million to 27.941 million).

Here is a summary of the labor composition in the past year: all the new jobs have been part-time jobs!

But wait there's even more, because now that the primary season is over and we enter the heart of election season and political talking points will be thrown around left and right, especially in the context of the immigration crisis created intentionally by the Biden administration which is hoping to import millions of new Democratic voters (maybe the US can hold the presidential election in Honduras or Guatemala, after all it is their citizens that will be illegally casting the key votes in November), what we find is that in February, the number of native-born workers tumbled again, sliding by a massive 560K to just 129.807 million. Add to this the December data, and we get a near-record 2.4 million plunge in native-born workers in just the past 3 months (only the covid crash was worse)!

The offset? A record 1.2 million foreign-born (read immigrants, both legal and illegal but mostly illegal) workers added in February!

Said otherwise, not only has all job creation in the past 6 years has been exclusively for foreign-born workers...

Source: St Louis Fed FRED Native Born and Foreign Born

... but there has been zero job-creation for native born workers since June 2018!

This is a huge issue - especially at a time of an illegal alien flood at the southwest border...

... and is about to become a huge political scandal, because once the inevitable recession finally hits, there will be millions of furious unemployed Americans demanding a more accurate explanation for what happened - i.e., the illegal immigration floodgates that were opened by the Biden admin.

Which is also why Biden's handlers will do everything in their power to insure there is no official recession before November... and why after the election is over, all economic hell will finally break loose. Until then, however, expect the jobs numbers to get even more ridiculous.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/08/2024 - 13:30

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