Connect with us

Government

May Monthly

After generally trending higher in the first quarter, the dollar slumped in April.  An important leg of support was cut, as interest rates fell.  The 10-year yield slid by more than 20 bp at one point despite the unambiguous evidence that the economy…

Published

on

After generally trending higher in the first quarter, the dollar slumped in April.  An important leg of support was cut, as interest rates fell.  The 10-year yield slid by more than 20 bp at one point despite the unambiguous evidence that the economy was strengthening, and input prices were rising, not just stemming from comparisons with last year's depressed levels.  The implied yield of the December 2022 Eurodollar futures contract is lower than at the end of February. Yet, we expect the dollar to perform better in May and yields to rise.  

Growth was not rewarded broadly last month by the foreign exchange market. Three of the currencies we look at below, sterling, the Canadian and Australian dollars, which were among four top-performing major currencies in Q1, under-performed in April.  The Norwegian krone was the exception, and it was in the top three major currencies in April, rising almost 3%. The Norges Bank has indicated that it is prepared to hike rates toward the end of the year.  For its part, the Bank of Canada reduced its bond-buying in late April and brought forward by six months to H2 22 when its economic slack would be absorbed, which is understood as the timeframe of a rate hike.  The Bank of Canada's balance sheet has been shrinking since mid-March when the emergency lending facilities formally began winding down.  The Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of Australia may recalibrate their monetary policy in Q3.   

Neither the Federal Reserve nor the ECB meets in May, but the June meetings will be important.  We suspect it will be increasingly difficult for the Fed to justify $120 bln a month of bond buying indefinitely as the economy accelerates and a reasonable case can be made that the bar to tapering ("significant further progress" toward the Fed's targets) has been met.  The consensus at the Fed will begin fraying and some regional Fed presidents favor talking about tapering soon.  That said, given the uncertainties around the pandemic, fear of economic scarring, and the more patient stance reflected in targeting the average rate of inflation, the Fed may wait a bit longer.  Tapering could be hinted at the Jackson Hole confab in August or at the September meeting.    

The increase in ECB bond purchases starting in March will be reassessed at the June meeting.  It is difficult to consider the counter-factual, where yields would be if the ECB had not accelerated its bond-buying under the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program.  What we do know is that European benchmark 10-year yields rose in April, and the premium offered by Italy over Germany rose by almost 15 bp. Still, barring a new negative shock, the ECB will likely slow the pace of its purchases.  Officials may be reluctant to call the exercise of its built-in flexibility "tapering". It will likely assure investors that strong monetary stimulus will continue and that PEPP runs through Q1 23.  

The EU's Next Generation (recovery fund) that will be financed by a common bond has not been ratified by all the members yet, overshooting a self-imposed deadline of the end of April.  Poland represents the chief hurdle now as a junior member of the governing coalition has balked.  Still, the most likely scenario is that the new facility begins distributing funds in Q3, coincidentally around the time that some US fiscal measures begin expiring and the US debt ceiling looms.  

European politics are moving into the spotlight.  The situation seems very fluid. In France, the shift is to the right, and although the national election is not until next year,  polls showing Le Pen ahead of Macron have made the news. Germany seems to be moving in the other direction, as recent surveys show the Greens may secure a plurality of votes. The CDU/CSU selection process was bruising. Some speculate that the Bavaria-based CSU could split from the larger CDU, but it may confirm that while the "realos" are in ascendancy among the Greens, the "fundos" have the reins in the CSU.  

UK local elections on May 6 are center stage. In some ways, it will serve as a referendum on the government's handling of the pandemic and Brexit.  The most important race is not for the Mayor of London. Khan will be easily re-elected.  The focus is on Scotland.  A majority of Scottish voters wanted to remain in the EU and the First Minister Sturgeon was credited with the handling of Covid.  Despite a split in the Scottish National Party, it appears that a majority of Scots now want independence.  If that is the result of the election, then a clash with Prime Minister Johnson is inevitable.  Wales is a traditional stronghold for Labour, and polls suggest it may hold on to 29 of the 60 seats.  However, the polls have not included 16 and17-year olds who will be allowed to vote for the first time.  

Japan has lagged Europe in rolling out the vaccine and four prefectures are formally in states of emergency, including Tokyo and Osaka. This will likely dampen the recovery from what is expected to have been a nearly 4% annualized contraction in Q1.  Prime Minister Suga has seen his support erode, and ideas of an early election have been dashed.  Suga insists on pressing ahead with the Olympics, which is also terribly unpopular.  There will be a leadership contest in the Liberal Democratic Party in September ahead of the general election that must be held by late October.  A supplemental budget may be delivered ahead of the election.

China's economy expanded at a modest rate of 0.6% in Q1, which was less than half of what economists had anticipated.  The early indications for April suggest the momentum has not picked up at the start of Q2.  Officials have moved to discourage banks from expanding lending, except to small businesses.  It is difficult to tell whether Beijing's anti-monopoly stance is truly about the concentration of market power or a crackdown on the private sector.  While China's voracious appetite for industrial metals may have been tempered, it apparently has stepped up its buying of soy, wheat, and corn.  China's buying amid tight supplies and challenging weather conditions in some key growing areas in the US and Brazil have seen prices rise to the highest levels in eight years. 

Emerging market currencies mostly gained against the dollar in April.   Eastern and Central European currencies, in the euro's orbit, as a whole did best. The Turkish lira was an exception.  Its small decline brought the year-to-date loss to around 10.3, after around a 20% drop last year.   Rising grain prices did the Argentine peso few favors.  With its nearly 1.7% decline in April, it was the weakest among the emerging markets. It is off 10% so far this year.   The public health tragedy that continues to unfold in India, sapped the rupees strengthen, and darkened the economic outlook. It recovered in the last week of April as international assistance was offered.  The 1.3% losses in April followed a nearly flat performance in Q1 when it was the best performing emerging market currency.    

The Bannockburn World Currency Index, a GDP-weighted basket of the top 12 economies (with the eurozone counting as one) rose by a little more than 1.1% in April, the first monthly gain of the year and nearly offsetting the March decline in full.  This reflected the US dollar's heavier tone after broadly trading higher in Q1 after its slide accelerated in the last two months of 2020.  The Indian rupee was the only currency in our index to have fallen against the dollar.  The Brazilian real's nearly 3.5% gain was the best performer.  The larger than expected 75 bp rate hike in mid-March (lifting the Selic rate to 2.75%) and progress on the budget helped the real pare the 7.7% decline in Q1.  With inflation pushing above 6%, the central bank is expected to lift the Selic rate another 75 bp when it meets on May 5.  

Dollar:  The dollar trended lower in April. The Dollar Index rose in nine sessions of the 22 sessions in the month.  The retreat was likely corrective after rallying in Q1. Yields softened too. About 18 hours after the Federal Reserve Chair said that it was too early to "talk about talking about tapering" the $120 bln of bonds it is buying a month, the US reported that in nominal terms, the economy expanded by 10.5% in Q1. The economy is surging and nonfarm payrolls likely rose by around a million in April after an almost 920k increase in March. Efforts to legislate the Biden Administration's Job and Family initiatives with their accompanying progressive tax increases will likely take several months.  In the Senate, conservative Democrats may prove to be more effective than Republicans in moderating the proposed expenditures and revenues.  After the April slide, the technical indicators warn that the greenback is oversold.  The strength of the bounce may be shaped by the trajectory of US yields.  

Euro:  After falling for each month of the first quarter, the euro traded higher in April. The pullback in US yields and some position adjustment helped the euro find better traction. In the larger picture, the euro's pullback in Q1 may be seen as a correction to last year's rally.  That correction may not have been completed and the April bounce stalled around where it had to for the view to hold.  Momentum indicators are stretched and recognizing the importance of initial conditions, we see potential toward the 200-day moving average of around $1.1950. The vaccine rollout is improving, and this promises to lift growth going forward.  Barring a new shock, at the June 10 ECB meeting, the staff will upgrade its growth forecasts, and this may be sufficient cover to ratchet down the bond purchases from the accelerated pace in Q2. Still, the ECB will argue that conditions continue to require extraordinary levels of monetary support.  The national ratification of the EU's Recovery Fund may be more protracted than desirable, but it will likely be able to begin making distributions in Q3. 

 

(end of March 2021 indicative prices, previous in parentheses)

 

Spot: $1.2020  ($1.1730)

Median Bloomberg One-month Forecast $1.2010 ($1.1830) 

One-month forward  $1.2025 ($1.1735)    One-month implied vol  5.3%  (5.8%)    

 

 

Yen:  The dollar's 1.3% decline against the yen needs to placed in the context of its nearly 4% drop in March, the biggest monthly advance since the 9.2% gain in November 2016. Rising US interest rates seemed to be the most important driver, though Japanese investors' appetite for foreign assets seemed to have been dampened by the weaker yen. The dollar pared its losses against the yen as the US 10-year yield rose.  In February, speculators in the futures market began trimming the net long yen position in the futures market.  The move accelerated in March and swung to the largest net short position in more than a year, where it remained through late April.  The formal emergency in Tokyo and other areas in the first part of the year, a fire at a semiconductor chip factory, and a powerful earthquake point to a possible contraction of 4%-5% in Q1 before a rebound in Q2.  The third formal emergency in Tokyo and three other prefectures runs through May 11.  While the JPY109.60-JPY110.00 may offer stiff resistance, rising US rates could lift the dollar back to the late March high around JPY111.00.

 

Spot: JPY109.30 (JPY110.71)      

Median Bloomberg One-month Forecast JPY108.60 (JPY109.30)     

One-month forward JPY109.00 (JPY110.65)    One-month implied vol  5.5% (6.4%)  

 

 

Sterling:   The vaccine rollout is keeping the UK on track to allow a full economic re-opening on June 21.  The recovery seems to be taking hold, though the extensive government support may conceal the scarring. The social restrictions in the first part of the year warn that the UK economy likely contracted in Q1 (GDP due May 12) by as much as 2% quarter-over-year.  However, the high-frequency data suggest the upside momentum is building.  The Bank of England will likely recognize this and the fiscal stimulus, which will boost its confidence in a vigorous economic rebound.  Although it will standpat, in May, we suspect it could taper the bond purchases in Q3.  Local elections are on May 6, and it will be partly be seen referendum on the government's handling of the public health crisis.  At the same time, a strong showing by the nationalists in Scotland will hasten the confrontation with Britain over a formal referendum. . Sterling rallied about 10.75% from early last November (~$1.2855) through late February (~$1.4235).  It consolidated mostly in $1.3670-$1.4000 trading in March and April, and its attempt to push through the top was again rebuffed.  This warns of the likelihood of a test on the lower end.    

  

Spot: $1.3820 ($1.3780)   

Median Bloomberg One-month Forecast $1.3860 ($1.3825) 

One-month forward $1.3825 ($1.3785)   One-month implied vol 6.9% (7.0%)

  

 

Canadian Dollar: Between the fiscal support of Ottawa and Washington, the Bank of Canada became the first G7 bank to announce a slowing of its bond purchases (to C$3 bln a week from C$4 bln), with an eye toward ending them,  and brought forward by six-month to mid-2022 when it projects that the economic slack will be absorbed.  This, in turn, encourages the market to price in a rate hike late next year.  Canada's two-year yield is near 30 bp, only behind Norway among the high-income countries.  Meanwhile, the government's fiscal support remains strong, with over C$100 bln for new initiatives, including childcare, which will likely also serve as a re-election platform for the minority government.  The trajectory of the policy mix is support for the Canadian dollar, which strengthened for the third consecutive month in April.  Much good news has been discounted, including three rate hikes by the end of 2023, but the policy mix often leads to currency overshoots, and the OECD's model of Purchasing Power Parity has the Canadian dollar undervalued by 2.5%.    

 

Spot: CAD1.2290  (CAD 1.2565) 

Median Bloomberg One-month Forecast  CAD1.2400 (CAD1.2575)

One-month forward CAD1.2300 (CAD1.2560)    One-month implied vol  6.2%  (6.6%) 

 

 

Australian Dollar:  The Australian dollar rallied strongly on the reflation meme that began in earnest in early last November and peaked in late February a little above $0.8000.  It has spent the last two months confined mostly to a $0.7600-$0.7800 trading range. The range was frayed on an intraday basis but did not close outside of it a single time in April. The risk in at least the first part of May seems to be on the downside, which may extend toward $0.7500.  The central bank could taper its quantitative easing and yield curve control in Q3  A rate hike looks largely discounted for Q3 22.  A full third of Australia's exports are shipped to China, yet the strategic interests diverge.  Canberra recently canceled two projects in Victoria under the auspices of China's Belt Road Initiative.  This will further antagonize the strained relationship.  


Spot:  $0.7715 ($0.7600)       

Median Bloomberg One-Month Forecast $0.7705 ($0.7635)     

One-month forward  $0.7720 ($0.7605)     One-month implied vol 8.6  (9.7%)   

 

 

Mexican Peso:  After falling at the start of the year, the peso trended higher since early March, but the recovery ended abruptly in late April. Two of the three legs on which the peso stood weakened. The large trade surplus swung into deficit in March, and its interest rate appeal slackens as other emerging market countries begin a tightening cycle (e.g., Brazil, Russia), the high-income countries seem around peak easing in aggregate. Rising price pressures and an economy proving resilient (Q1 GDP 0.4% quarter-over-quarter and was forecast to have stagnated) will prevent Banxico from resuming its easing cycle, and that also changes the outlook for Mexican bonds for fund managers. In contrast, Brazil's central bank meets on May 5 and it is likely to deliver its second consecutive 75 bp rate hike, which would lift the Selic rate to 3.50%.  A move above the MXN20.50 could signal a test on MXN21.00.

 

Spot: MXN20.2460 (MXN20.4415)  

Median Bloomberg One-Month Forecast  MXN20.3820 (MXN20.4350)  

One-month forward  MXN20.3150 (MXN20.5115     One-month implied vol 12.5% (14.8%)

  

 

Chinese Yuan:  The yuan will take a four-week advance in tow, but it will likely be broken at the start of the new month if we are right about that the dollar will take on a better tone. The yuan's 1.2% gain in April represents a middling performance in the region and among emerging market currencies more broadly, though it matched the gain of the JP Morgan Emerging Market Currency Index.  Chinese officials are withdrawing fiscal support by discouraging increases in lending (banks) and borrowing (local governments), but it does not appear to be considering a rate hike. Chinese regulators have toughened their stance toward the large new economy companies, which are not coincidentally in the private sector.  This may have a cooling-off effect.  Three months into the Biden administration and there does not appear to be any improvement in the bilateral relationship.  At the same time, China's aerial harassment of Taiwan is unabated, keeping the geopolitical tension elevated.   

 

Spot: CNY6.4750 (CNY6.5530)

Median Bloomberg One-month Forecast  CNY6.4885 (CNY6.5140) 

One-month forward CNY6.4900 (CNY6.5760)    One-month implied vol  4.7% (5.0%)



Disclaimer



Read More

Continue Reading

International

Fuel poverty in England is probably 2.5 times higher than government statistics show

The top 40% most energy efficient homes aren’t counted as being in fuel poverty, no matter what their bills or income are.

Published

on

By

Julian Hochgesang|Unsplash

The cap set on how much UK energy suppliers can charge for domestic gas and electricity is set to fall by 15% from April 1 2024. Despite this, prices remain shockingly high. The average household energy bill in 2023 was £2,592 a year, dwarfing the pre-pandemic average of £1,308 in 2019.

The term “fuel poverty” refers to a household’s ability to afford the energy required to maintain adequate warmth and the use of other essential appliances. Quite how it is measured varies from country to country. In England, the government uses what is known as the low income low energy efficiency (Lilee) indicator.

Since energy costs started rising sharply in 2021, UK households’ spending powers have plummeted. It would be reasonable to assume that these increasingly hostile economic conditions have caused fuel poverty rates to rise.

However, according to the Lilee fuel poverty metric, in England there have only been modest changes in fuel poverty incidence year on year. In fact, government statistics show a slight decrease in the nationwide rate, from 13.2% in 2020 to 13.0% in 2023.

Our recent study suggests that these figures are incorrect. We estimate the rate of fuel poverty in England to be around 2.5 times higher than what the government’s statistics show, because the criteria underpinning the Lilee estimation process leaves out a large number of financially vulnerable households which, in reality, are unable to afford and maintain adequate warmth.

Blocks of flats in London.
Household fuel poverty in England is calculated on the basis of the energy efficiency of the home. Igor Sporynin|Unsplash

Energy security

In 2022, we undertook an in-depth analysis of Lilee fuel poverty in Greater London. First, we combined fuel poverty, housing and employment data to provide an estimate of vulnerable homes which are omitted from Lilee statistics.

We also surveyed 2,886 residents of Greater London about their experiences of fuel poverty during the winter of 2022. We wanted to gauge energy security, which refers to a type of self-reported fuel poverty. Both parts of the study aimed to demonstrate the potential flaws of the Lilee definition.

Introduced in 2019, the Lilee metric considers a household to be “fuel poor” if it meets two criteria. First, after accounting for energy expenses, its income must fall below the poverty line (which is 60% of median income).

Second, the property must have an energy performance certificate (EPC) rating of D–G (the lowest four ratings). The government’s apparent logic for the Lilee metric is to quicken the net-zero transition of the housing sector.

In Sustainable Warmth, the policy paper that defined the Lilee approach, the government says that EPC A–C-rated homes “will not significantly benefit from energy-efficiency measures”. Hence, the focus on fuel poverty in D–G-rated properties.

Generally speaking, EPC A–C-rated homes (those with the highest three ratings) are considered energy efficient, while D–G-rated homes are deemed inefficient. The problem with how Lilee fuel poverty is measured is that the process assumes that EPC A–C-rated homes are too “energy efficient” to be considered fuel poor: the main focus of the fuel poverty assessment is a characteristic of the property, not the occupant’s financial situation.

In other words, by this metric, anyone living in an energy-efficient home cannot be considered to be in fuel poverty, no matter their financial situation. There is an obvious flaw here.

Around 40% of homes in England have an EPC rating of A–C. According to the Lilee definition, none of these homes can or ever will be classed as fuel poor. Even though energy prices are going through the roof, a single-parent household with dependent children whose only income is universal credit (or some other form of benefits) will still not be considered to be living in fuel poverty if their home is rated A-C.

The lack of protection afforded to these households against an extremely volatile energy market is highly concerning.

In our study, we estimate that 4.4% of London’s homes are rated A-C and also financially vulnerable. That is around 171,091 households, which are currently omitted by the Lilee metric but remain highly likely to be unable to afford adequate energy.

In most other European nations, what is known as the 10% indicator is used to gauge fuel poverty. This metric, which was also used in England from the 1990s until the mid 2010s, considers a home to be fuel poor if more than 10% of income is spent on energy. Here, the main focus of the fuel poverty assessment is the occupant’s financial situation, not the property.

Were such alternative fuel poverty metrics to be employed, a significant portion of those 171,091 households in London would almost certainly qualify as fuel poor.

This is confirmed by the findings of our survey. Our data shows that 28.2% of the 2,886 people who responded were “energy insecure”. This includes being unable to afford energy, making involuntary spending trade-offs between food and energy, and falling behind on energy payments.

Worryingly, we found that the rate of energy insecurity in the survey sample is around 2.5 times higher than the official rate of fuel poverty in London (11.5%), as assessed according to the Lilee metric.

It is likely that this figure can be extrapolated for the rest of England. If anything, energy insecurity may be even higher in other regions, given that Londoners tend to have higher-than-average household income.

The UK government is wrongly omitting hundreds of thousands of English households from fuel poverty statistics. Without a more accurate measure, vulnerable households will continue to be overlooked and not get the assistance they desperately need to stay warm.

The Conversation

Torran Semple receives funding from Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) grant EP/S023305/1.

John Harvey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Read More

Continue Reading

International

Looking Back At COVID’s Authoritarian Regimes

After having moved from Canada to the United States, partly to be wealthier and partly to be freer (those two are connected, by the way), I was shocked,…

Published

on

After having moved from Canada to the United States, partly to be wealthier and partly to be freer (those two are connected, by the way), I was shocked, in March 2020, when President Trump and most US governors imposed heavy restrictions on people’s freedom. The purpose, said Trump and his COVID-19 advisers, was to “flatten the curve”: shut down people’s mobility for two weeks so that hospitals could catch up with the expected demand from COVID patients. In her book Silent Invasion, Dr. Deborah Birx, the coordinator of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, admitted that she was scrambling during those two weeks to come up with a reason to extend the lockdowns for much longer. As she put it, “I didn’t have the numbers in front of me yet to make the case for extending it longer, but I had two weeks to get them.” In short, she chose the goal and then tried to find the data to justify the goal. This, by the way, was from someone who, along with her task force colleague Dr. Anthony Fauci, kept talking about the importance of the scientific method. By the end of April 2020, the term “flatten the curve” had all but disappeared from public discussion.

Now that we are four years past that awful time, it makes sense to look back and see whether those heavy restrictions on the lives of people of all ages made sense. I’ll save you the suspense. They didn’t. The damage to the economy was huge. Remember that “the economy” is not a term used to describe a big machine; it’s a shorthand for the trillions of interactions among hundreds of millions of people. The lockdowns and the subsequent federal spending ballooned the budget deficit and consequent federal debt. The effect on children’s learning, not just in school but outside of school, was huge. These effects will be with us for a long time. It’s not as if there wasn’t another way to go. The people who came up with the idea of lockdowns did so on the basis of abstract models that had not been tested. They ignored a model of human behavior, which I’ll call Hayekian, that is tested every day.

These are the opening two paragraphs of my latest Defining Ideas article, “Looking Back at COVID’s Authoritarian Regimes,” Defining Ideas, March 14, 2024.

Another excerpt:

That wasn’t the only uncertainty. My daughter Karen lived in San Francisco and made her living teaching Pilates. San Francisco mayor London Breed shut down all the gyms, and so there went my daughter’s business. (The good news was that she quickly got online and shifted many of her clients to virtual Pilates. But that’s another story.) We tried to see her every six weeks or so, whether that meant our driving up to San Fran or her driving down to Monterey. But were we allowed to drive to see her? In that first month and a half, we simply didn’t know.

Read the whole thing, which is longer than usual.

(0 COMMENTS)

Read More

Continue Reading

International

Problems After COVID-19 Vaccination More Prevalent Among Naturally Immune: Study

Problems After COVID-19 Vaccination More Prevalent Among Naturally Immune: Study

Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times (emphasis…

Published

on

Problems After COVID-19 Vaccination More Prevalent Among Naturally Immune: Study

Authored by Zachary Stieber via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),

People who recovered from COVID-19 and received a COVID-19 shot were more likely to suffer adverse reactions, researchers in Europe are reporting.

A medical worker administers a dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine to a patient at a vaccination center in Ancenis-Saint-Gereon, France, on Nov. 17, 2021. (Stephane Mahe//Reuters)

Participants in the study were more likely to experience an adverse reaction after vaccination regardless of the type of shot, with one exception, the researchers found.

Across all vaccine brands, people with prior COVID-19 were 2.6 times as likely after dose one to suffer an adverse reaction, according to the new study. Such people are commonly known as having a type of protection known as natural immunity after recovery.

People with previous COVID-19 were also 1.25 times as likely after dose 2 to experience an adverse reaction.

The findings held true across all vaccine types following dose one.

Of the female participants who received the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, for instance, 82 percent who had COVID-19 previously experienced an adverse reaction after their first dose, compared to 59 percent of females who did not have prior COVID-19.

The only exception to the trend was among males who received a second AstraZeneca dose. The percentage of males who suffered an adverse reaction was higher, 33 percent to 24 percent, among those without a COVID-19 history.

Participants who had a prior SARS-CoV-2 infection (confirmed with a positive test) experienced at least one adverse reaction more often after the 1st dose compared to participants who did not have prior COVID-19. This pattern was observed in both men and women and across vaccine brands,” Florence van Hunsel, an epidemiologist with the Netherlands Pharmacovigilance Centre Lareb, and her co-authors wrote.

There were only slightly higher odds of the naturally immune suffering an adverse reaction following receipt of a Pfizer or Moderna booster, the researchers also found.

The researchers performed what’s known as a cohort event monitoring study, following 29,387 participants as they received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. The participants live in a European country such as Belgium, France, or Slovakia.

Overall, three-quarters of the participants reported at least one adverse reaction, although some were minor such as injection site pain.

Adverse reactions described as serious were reported by 0.24 percent of people who received a first or second dose and 0.26 percent for people who received a booster. Different examples of serious reactions were not listed in the study.

Participants were only specifically asked to record a range of minor adverse reactions (ADRs). They could provide details of other reactions in free text form.

“The unsolicited events were manually assessed and coded, and the seriousness was classified based on international criteria,” researchers said.

The free text answers were not provided by researchers in the paper.

The authors note, ‘In this manuscript, the focus was not on serious ADRs and adverse events of special interest.’” Yet, in their highlights section they state, “The percentage of serious ADRs in the study is low for 1st and 2nd vaccination and booster.”

Dr. Joel Wallskog, co-chair of the group React19, which advocates for people who were injured by vaccines, told The Epoch Times: “It is intellectually dishonest to set out to study minor adverse events after COVID-19 vaccination then make conclusions about the frequency of serious adverse events. They also fail to provide the free text data.” He added that the paper showed “yet another study that is in my opinion, deficient by design.”

Ms. Hunsel did not respond to a request for comment.

She and other researchers listed limitations in the paper, including how they did not provide data broken down by country.

The paper was published by the journal Vaccine on March 6.

The study was funded by the European Medicines Agency and the Dutch government.

No authors declared conflicts of interest.

Some previous papers have also found that people with prior COVID-19 infection had more adverse events following COVID-19 vaccination, including a 2021 paper from French researchers. A U.S. study identified prior COVID-19 as a predictor of the severity of side effects.

Some other studies have determined COVID-19 vaccines confer little or no benefit to people with a history of infection, including those who had received a primary series.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention still recommends people who recovered from COVID-19 receive a COVID-19 vaccine, although a number of other health authorities have stopped recommending the shot for people who have prior COVID-19.

Another New Study

In another new paper, South Korean researchers outlined how they found people were more likely to report certain adverse reactions after COVID-19 vaccination than after receipt of another vaccine.

The reporting of myocarditis, a form of heart inflammation, or pericarditis, a related condition, was nearly 20 times as high among children as the reporting odds following receipt of all other vaccines, the researchers found.

The reporting odds were also much higher for multisystem inflammatory syndrome or Kawasaki disease among adolescent COVID-19 recipients.

Researchers analyzed reports made to VigiBase, which is run by the World Health Organization.

Based on our results, close monitoring for these rare but serious inflammatory reactions after COVID-19 vaccination among adolescents until definitive causal relationship can be established,” the researchers wrote.

The study was published by the Journal of Korean Medical Science in its March edition.

Limitations include VigiBase receiving reports of problems, with some reports going unconfirmed.

Funding came from the South Korean government. One author reported receiving grants from pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/15/2024 - 05:00

Read More

Continue Reading

Trending