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Las Vegas Strip’s New Resort Casino Rising in Unique Location

Las Vegas has another major new casino/hotel project underway.



Las Vegas has another major new casino/hotel project underway.

The pandemic somehow led to a major construction boom in Las Vegas. Even though the city shutdown for a brief period where its casinos had to completely close, that did not stop construction in Sin City,

Resorts World Las Vegas opened during the pandemic bringing a major new resort casino the somewhat neglected north end of the Strip. That project has led to a revitalization of that section of the famous 4.2-mile stretch of road. The most notable project might be Fontainebleau Las Vegas, a project that has been on a nearly 20-year odyssey, which appears on track for a late-2023 opening.

That casino will give the north Strip critical mass making it a more attractive area that might be able to compete for tourists with the central and south strip areas dominated by Caesars Entertainment (CZR) - Get Caesars Entertainment Inc. Report and MGM Resorts International (MGM) - Get MGM Resorts International Report.  

The Strip, however, has become some of the most valuable real estate in the world. Any scrap of land available has been selling for outrageous prices, and land that was once thought of as not worth developing has become valuable.

Now, a new major casino project has been announced and it will bring a resort casino to an area on the Strip that surprisingly has never had one.

Image source: Palms Casino

Las Vegas Gets a New Strip Casino

Unlike many major cities, Las Vegas' airport is actually quite close to the Strip. But, while it's just a short ride from the terminal to the heart of Strip, there's not actually a hotel right at the airport.

That's going to change when Dream Las Vegas, a new resort casino planned for the south end of the Las Vegas Strip right near the airport gets built. The project won't be coming from Caesars, MGM, or any other major casino operator. Instead, it's being built by Shopoff Realty Investments, an Irvine, Calif.-based real estate firm, and Contour, a privately-owned commercial real estate investment and development group.

The 19-story hotel will be modest by Las Vegas standards offering 526 rooms and suites along with a casino, a pool, nightlife venue, retail, and 12,000 square feet of meeting and event space, CasinoBeats,com reported.

Dream Las Vegas is expected to open in the third quarter of 2024.  

Why Build an Airport Casino?

An airport hotel and casino is convenient for people looking to come to Las Vegas for a quick meeting. That's really a minor factor given that the heart of the Strip is not a long ride (maybe 20 minutes depending upon traffic) from the airport.

The project met with some security concerns due to its proximity to the airport. 

“After working closely with Clark County Board of County Commissioners, McCarran Airport and the Clark County Department of Comprehensive Planning we are pleased to have been able to secure entitlements for Dream Las Vegas that are mutually beneficial to Clark County as well as our partnership,” said Shopoff Realty CEO William Shopoff, “We believe that this project will be a stellar example for future development on the south end of the Strip.”

The developers tried to make it clear that they're looking to bring something different to the Strip.

“As a Las Vegas native, born and raised, I know first-hand the benefits Dream will bring to the Strip,” Contour CEO David Daneshforooz told CasinoBeats. “Dream Hotel Group will bring the same magic to Las Vegas as they have to their other locations – a curated entertainment destination in a well-designed intimate environment for both locals and visitors to enjoy. This will be a departure from the mega-themed resort concept, ushering in a new era of hotel/casino design for Las Vegas.”

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Sixth recession red flag raised, despite strong jobs report

On the same day, the BLS revealed that we’ve recovered all the jobs lost to COVID-19 and I am raising my sixth recession red flag.
The post Sixth recession…



What a crazy day for my economic model! On the same day, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revealed that we’ve recovered all the jobs lost to COVID-19 and I am raising my sixth recession red flag.

When I wrote the America is back recovery model on April 7, 2020, and then retired it on Dec. 9, 2020, I knew one data line would lag the most: jobs! I have talked about how job openings would move toward 10 million and that we should get all the jobs we lost to COVID-19 back by September 2022. Well, I was off by two months: Today, the BLS reported that 528,000 jobs were created with positive revisions of 28,000, which gave us just enough to pass the February 2020 levels.

From BLS: 
Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 528,000 in July, and the unemployment rate edged down to 3.5 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Job growth was widespread, led by gains in leisure and hospitality, professional and business services, and health care. Both total nonfarm employment and the unemployment rate have returned to their February 2020 pre-pandemic levels.

Feb 2020: 152,504,000
July 2022: 152,536,000

The big job numbers we have seen recently are tied to the decline in the job openings data, which lags also, but we do see a decrease in this data line as it appears for now that the job openings data has peaked in this cycle. It recently went from 11.3 million to 10.7 million, and the recent peak was near 11.9 million.

We have seen increases in jobless claims and slighter increases in continuing claims. However, nothing too drastic yet. Again, at this stage of the economic cycle you should focus on the rate of change data.

A tighter labor market is a good thing; this means people with less educational backgrounds can get employed since we have many jobs that don’t require a college education. The unemployment rate did tick up for those with less than a high school diploma in this report.

Here is a breakdown of the unemployment rate and educational attainment for those 25 years and older:

—Less than a high school diploma: 5.9%.
—High school graduate and no college: 3.6%
—Some college or associate degree: 2.8%
—Bachelor’s degree and higher: 2.0%

Below is a breakdown of the jobs created. Every sector created jobs; even the government created jobs. All this was just working our way back from the losses to COVID-19, which I knew would take a bit longer than some people would have thought with the economic data we had in 2021.

Now that we have regained all the jobs lost to COVID-19, what is next?

Hopefully, people know that we weren’t in a recession in the first six months of the year. When you’re in a recession, you don’t create jobs, have positive industrial production data, or positive consumer data in GDP. We had some funky trade and inventory data that tilted the GDP negatively, but the traditional data lines that go negative in a recession are just not there yet.

Even so, because some of the more current data is trending negatively,  I am raising my sixth recession red flag today. Allow me to present my case.

Recession red flag watch

Where are we in the economic cycle? I’ve already raised five of my six recession red flags, but until they are all up, I don’t use the word recession.

Let’s review those red flags in order, as my model is based on an economic progression model:

1. The unemployment rate falls down to a level where we start to talk about Federal Reserve rate hikes because the economy doesn’t need as much stimulus for employment gains.  For this recovery, the unemployment rate getting to 4% is the level where I raised my first recession red flag. This just means that the recovery is more mature than the earlier stages of the unemployment rate falling. Today it’s currently at 3.5%.

2. The Federal Reserve starts to raise rates. The Federal Reserve started Its rate hike process this year, to start fighting inflation and has been more aggressive recently. This shows that the expansion is longer and that the Federal Reserve is in a mood to tighten policy rather than make it more accommodative.

3. The inverted yield curve. This is more of a market-driven bond yield red flag. I had been on an inverted yield curve watch since Thanksgiving of 2021. This is when the two-year yield and 10-year yield slap high fives and say hi to each other. It’s another progression red flag, reflecting that we are in a more mature stage of the economy. Traditionally you see an inverted yield curve before every recession.

4. Find the overheating economic sector where demand can’t be sustained. Once that demand comes back to normal, people will be laid off. We see this in the durable goods data. A few companies are laying people off or putting into place a hiring freeze.

5.  New home sales, housing starts, and permits fall into a recession. Once mortgage rates rise, the new home sales sector does get hit harder than the existing home sales market. The homebuilder confidence index is falling noticeably, and while we never had the housing build-up in credit and sales that we saw in 2005, the builders will slow housing production down with higher rates. I raised my fifth recession red flag in June.

Today, I am raising the last recession red flag, which considers the Leading Economic Index (LEI). This week I presented my six recession red flag model to the Committee For Economic Development of The Conference Board (CED) — the committee that created the leading economic index. “Since its inception in 1942, CED has addressed national priorities to promote sustained economic growth and development to benefit all Americans. CED’s work in those first few years led to great policy accomplishments. One is the Marshall Plan, the economic development program that helped rebuild Europe and maintain peace, the Bretton Woods Agreement that established the new global financial system, and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.” 

6. Leading economic index declines four to six months before a recession. Historically, the LEI fades into every recession, outside a one-time huge economic shock like COVID-19. To raise this flag I needed four to six months of decline, which we saw recently. However, knowing the components of this data line, I know this data line has legs to keep going lower.

As you can see, the LEI doesn’t have a good history of reversing course when the downtrend is in place. We have had times in the mid-1990s when we saw a slowdown but didn’t get a recession.

With that in mind, how might this reverse? Well, the two easy answers are this:

1. Rates fall to get the housing sector back in line.
2. Growth rate of inflation falls, the Fed stops hiking rates and reverses course, as they did in 2018.

Most Americans are working, and job openings are still high enough that people can find work if they need to. However, if you’re asking me how we could see a reversal after all six flags are up, this is it.

So how do I square raising the last recession red flag when we had such a strong job report today? Well, the model isn’t designed to work during a recession. It’s intended to show the progression of an expansion into a recession.  As you can see below, this data line fell in 2006, and we were still creating jobs in 2006 and 2007.

During the housing bubble, we had a clear over-investment, and that was in the housing market, so the recession red flag model was evident before the recession. Only three of my recession red flags were up before the COVID-19 crisis; in fact, we were still in expansionary mode if COVID-19 hadn’t occurred.

I can’t describe it any other way: things have been crazy since April 2020. All of us that track economic data have had to adjust to the highest velocity of data movement in our lifetime and have had to make COVID-19 adjustments all the time.

At some point in the future, things will get back to normal. I’ve presented you with my data lines to show we weren’t in a recession the first six months of the year, but the economic data is getting softer and softer. I will be looking for weaker data lines getting to the point where we actually see real recessionary data, which means jobs are being lost monthly, production data falls and companies make adjustments to their business model with greater force.

I’ll take each data point one day at a time and try to make sense of it. Remember, economics done right should be very boring, and always, be the detective, not the troll.

The post Sixth recession red flag raised, despite strong jobs report appeared first on HousingWire.

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Spread & Containment

Inflation: why it’s happening and why interest rates are going up to combat it

Central banks are trying to strike a balance between curbing inflation and enabling economic growth.



Inflation rates are currently rising, reflecting the increasing cost of goods and services. PERO Studio / Shutterstock

Soaring prices have forced central banks in many developed countries to raise their interest rates in recent weeks. These organisations are in charge of attempts to rein in rising costs that are threatening to wreak havoc on household budgets in coming months.

Western economies are currently experiencing two major shocks that are pushing up the costs of goods and services. First, the war in Ukraine has resulted in surging energy and food prices. Second, there has been record-high industrial goods inflation due to sluggish supply in response to COVID-19.

The graph below shows the main components of inflation in the Euro area. All items are rising but energy has seen the highest annual inflation rate (42% in June 2022), followed by food. High food and energy prices are trickling down to real incomes, leading to a drop in households’ expectations of their financial situation. Businesses are also suffering due to supply shortages and high energy prices.

Euro area annual inflation and its main components. Eurostat

At the same time, growth has been picking up due to the post-lockdown reopening of the economy, high amounts of accumulated household savings and fiscal support to offset high energy prices. It’s a broadly similar picture in the UK and it’s safe to say that inflation today is being imported from outside both economies.

As a result, the Bank of England has implemented its biggest hike in nearly 30 years in August, bringing UK rates to 1.75%. Before that, the US Federal Reserve increased its base rate for a third time this year, implementing its second 0.75% rise on July 27. The ECB made its biggest rate change in more than a decade on July 21 when it raised rates by half a percentage point, defying market expectations of a quarter-point rise.

A quarter of a percentage point change may not sound like much but these moves are designed to tweak the economy while maintaining a balance between preventing inflation (when prices increase and people’s money cannot buy as much) and maintaining economic growth. Central banks do this by trying to bring inflation into line with their “price stability” targets, which for the ECB and the Bank of England means 2% inflation, for example.

Central bank tools

The recent rate increases are also part of central banks’ plans to “normalise” monetary policy following strategies used to stem the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Together with the subsequent euro area sovereign debt crisis, the financial crisis devastated many households, businesses and banks.

In response, the ECB launched its unconventional monetary policy in 2013. It wanted to try to return inflation to levels consistent with its price stability target of 2% and incentivise banks to lend to businesses as a way to boost the economy after the downturn. This involved the use of tools including:

  • forward guidance, when the central bank openly discusses market expectations of future levels of interest rates
  • negative interest-rate policy, setting target nominal interest rates below 0%
  • targeted long-term refinancing operations, providing cheap financing to lenders
  • asset purchase programmes, when the central bank buys assets such as government bonds, corporate bonds, and asset-backed securities.

And it wasn’t just the ECB. Other central banks including the Bank of England and US Federal Reserve reacted by boosting liquidity to the banking sector and aggressively lowering interest rates.

The Bank of Japan has adopted similar measures since the early 2000s, following its own house and stock price crashes. Central banks also used quantitative easing to jumpstart their economies following the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Getting back to normal

These days, the most recent central bank decisions reflect changing strategies in response to a new economic picture, particularly in relation to some central bank expectations that inflation will remain high for some time. They hope that current efforts to normalise monetary policy following the use of the post financial crisis tools discussed above and the absence of new disruptions will help global supply bottlenecks ease and energy costs stabilise. This should push inflation back towards their targets.

But balance is key. When it comes to the direct impact of these moves, increases in interest rates will create higher mortgage repayments, especially for new borrowers as well as those on tracker mortgages or variable rates. This will mean people have less money to spend elsewhere. Increasing inflation – and therefore uncertainty about the future – can also lead to reduced consumer and business confidence, dragging down household and business spending even further.

External shot of European Central Bank sign & building in Frankfurt, Germany
Central banks like the ECB are currently implementing policies to address inflation. nitpicker / Shutterstock

One bright spot for the economy at the moment is the strength of the labour market. There are employment opportunities in many sectors and employer demand for labour is robust.

But high employment also means people have more money to spend and this risks creating excess demand, which would add to inflation. To guard against this outcome, governments could target increased public spending on sectors in dire need, while also addressing cost of living pressures alongside central banks.

And for business, as they continue to face high costs and supply chain disruptions, diversifying away from more than one supply location could help bring down costs and feed through to prices for consumers.

Current expectations are that inflation will remain undesirably high for some time. Central bank decision-making will play a major role in striking the balance needed to bring down the cost of living without stalling the economy.

Supriya Kapoor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Spread & Containment

Can a hot but smaller labor market keep making gains in participation?

It is simultaneously true that labor supply is not back to its pre-pandemic projected path and that labor demand is strong relative to supply. The result…



By Lauren Bauer, Aidan Creeron, Wendy Edelberg, Sara Estep

It is simultaneously true that labor supply is not back to its pre-pandemic projected path and that labor demand is strong relative to supply. The result is a smaller but hot labor market.

In anticipation of the release of this month’s Employment Situation Report, we take stock of the size and composition of the labor force to identify both populations and policies that could contribute to gains in labor force participation. Such gains would increase labor market income and would help the economy grow without creating more inflationary pressure.

As of June 2022, the size of the labor force has shrunk relative to its pre-pandemic path: the labor force is roughly three- to three-and-a-half million workers smaller than its pre-pandemic projection.[1] A large portion of the decrease in the size of the labor force relative to pre-pandemic projections—approximately a third—has nothing to do with labor force participation. First, the population is smaller because of pandemic-related deaths. While those deaths have been concentrated among those 65 and older (three-quarters of a million), more than a quarter of a million pandemic-related deaths are estimated for those between the ages of 18 and 64. Second, there are ongoing pandemic- and policy-related factors that are depressing immigration.

The biggest decline in the labor force has been among those ages 55 and over, with those 65 and older accounting for about a third of the total decline, owing to a combination of death among this group and lower labor force participation. The declines in participation likely reflect early retirements, concerns about health, and to some extent excess disability and lower life expectancy caused by disability due to COVID-19.

The aggregate labor force participation rate (the share of the population over the age of 16 who is working or actively seeking work) remains depressed at 62.2 percent. This piece documents changes in labor force participation between June 2022 and two earlier periods: 2016 (when LFPR began to pick up after a sustained decline) and 2000 (when LFPR peaked). By controlling for the contribution of changing demographics to LFPR, we isolate the contribution of participation to the differences in LFPR from June 2022 to 2016 and 2000. This analysis explores the opportunities that a smaller but hotter labor market afford, identifies populations who could drive labor force growth, and points to public policy interventions that could increase labor force participation.

Trends in labor force participation due to demographics

Figure 1 shows monthly and annualized labor force participation rates from the late 1970s to today. As of June 2022, LFPR is 0.9 percentage points below its 2019 average rate.[2] It is also 0.6 percentage points below its 2016 rate—the year the rate began its three-year rebound after 15 years of decline. And, compared to its 2000 peak, LFPR is down 4.9 percentage points; LFPR’s peak in 2000 reflected rising labor force entry among women, whose participation rate grew by more than 20 percentage points between the early 1960s and the turn of the century.

The overall decline in LFPR from the early 2000s has largely reflected the aging of the population and the movement away from work for young adults in school, which more than offset the increase in LFPR from increases in educational attainment (both high school and postsecondary) and from older workers staying in the labor market longer. Labor force participation has also been influenced by the business cycle, declining in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the COVID-19 recession and then recovering as conditions improved. Aaronson et al. find that structural factors (such as aging, the trajectory of participation among certain demographic groups, and disability insurance takeup) could explain almost all of the decline in LFPR between 2007 and 2014.

Figure 2 shows the effects of changing demographics on labor force participation. The figure shows two dashed lines that represent what the labor force participation rate would have been had the age, education, and sex distribution stayed the same but other factors continued to affect LFPR. Holding age, education, and sex constant at 2000 levels (the green line), the LFPR low point would have been 64.5 percent in 2020, rather than 61.8 percent; in other words, population aging and other demographic factors contributed 2.7 percentage points to the difference in LFPR between 2000 and 2020 and changing participation rates within groups 2.5 percentage points.[3] Additionally, even in the relatively short period since 2016, changes in demographics have pulled down LFPR. As shown by the gap between the blue dashed line and the black line, changing demographics lowered, on net, LFPR in June 2022 by 1.1 percentage points.

Labor Force Participation Rate vs Counterfactual Scenarios That Keep Age, Education, and Sex Unchanged

Changes in participation unrelated to demography

Although demographics explained most of the decline in LFPR from 2000 to 2009, other factors pushing down LFPR became increasingly apparent and important after the Great Recession through 2016. Indeed, at the time, policymakers, economists, and other observers had significant concerns that LFPR was continuing to decline even as other parts of the economy recovered. Then, from 2016 through just before the pandemic, LFPR rose even as demographics, on net, pushed it down. That experience offers evidence that factors can indeed push up labor force participation within demographic groups.

Figure 3a shows how changing labor force participation rates among different demographic groups contributed to the net change in LFPR from 2016 to June 2022 (shown in the blue dashed line in Figure 2). Figure 3b decomposes the change since 2000 (shown in the green dashed line in Figure 2). These decompositions show how LFPR has changed within demographic groups, that is, the portion of the labor force participation rate that changes with the propensity for different demographic groups to work. We find that groups with lower LFPRs than in prior periods have room for further recovery in LFPR, under the right conditions.

The contribution to LFPR of different groups’ propensity to work: 2016-June 2022

While on net LFPR as of June 2022 is still below its 2016 rate, some groups are participating at higher rates while others at lower rates. From 2016 to June 2022, women made the greatest positive contribution to the overall labor force participation rate, netting an increase of 0.4 percentage points, compared to men at 0.1 percentage point. Prime-age (25- to 54-year-old) women increased aggregate LFPR by 0.1 percentage points while prime-age men reduced it by 0.1 percentage points. Among prime-age men, the biggest decline came from men without a bachelor’s degree. The decline for women between 45 and 54 with less than a bachelor’s degree was also sizable.

In 2019, half of all prime-age women who were in the labor force had children under the age of 18. Women handled the brunt of child care responsibilities during COVID-19 and were the most likely to leave the labor force. Based on this analysis, women under 44 are more than back to their pre-COVID participation. Women between the ages of 25 and 44 added about a fifth of a percentage point to LFPR since 2016; more than two-thirds of that gain can be attributed to women with at least a bachelor’s degree.

Young people—those between the ages of 16 and 24—had the largest positive contribution to LFPR from 2016 to June 2022; men and women between the ages of 16 to 24 with less than a college degree added more than 0.6 percentage points to LFPR during that period.

For people 55 and over, a declining propensity to work reduced LFPR by 0.1 percentage points. Men with bachelor’s degrees over the age of 55 and women over the age of 65 collectively reduced LFPR by 0.3 percentage points from 2016 to June 2022; in some cases, these may have been early retirements spurred by COVID-19. Interestingly, less educated men ages 45 and older increased aggregate LFPR by 0.1 percentage point; more than half of this increase came from the 65+ age group.

Chart showing effects of changing group participation rates on overall labor force participation rate

The contribution to LFPR of different groups’ propensity to work: 2000-June 2022

Figure 3b decomposes the labor force participation rate between 2000 to June 2022 (holding demographics constant), helping to put the changes since 2016 in a longer-term context. Nearly three quarters of the decline since 2000 is attributable to the 16-24 group, whose pivot toward exclusive schooling consequentially explains their movement away from work; it remains to be seen whether the magnitude of the 2016 to June 2022 rebound will persist, partly reversing the long-term trend.

Men and women ages 25 to 54 with less than a bachelor’s reduced overall labor force participation by 0.81 percentage points and 0.83 percentage points, respectively, since 2000. To be sure, some structural factors not accounted for here help to explain those declines. For example, the flow of net international migration to the United States has decreased substantially since 2016. Because immigrants tend to have higher LFPRs, that decrease puts downward pressure on the aggregate LFPR. Nonetheless, the high-water mark in 2000 suggests room for more significant increases in LFPRs among prime-age people than if we just compare current conditions to those in 2016.

For all groups over the age of 55, LFPRs have been higher since 2000 even though some of these groups saw decreases since 2016. For a time, improving health at older ages and changes in work conditions drove LFPRs up among older workers, but the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically altered those trends, both in terms of the health of older workers and the risk that working posed to them. However, even after the pandemic has receded as a factor determining LFPR, the past few years may have shown that LFPRs among older people will not persistently rise as predicted. For example, a greater share of the increases in LFPRs among older people in the decade after the Great Recession may have been a temporary response to the loss of wealth and earnings early in that period; the increase in wealth from equity and real estate prices in 2020 and 2021 along with the health effects of the pandemic may have abruptly ended that response.

Comparing LFPRs among different groups between June 2022 and both 2016 and 2000 shows where history suggests there is the potential for increases. Among prime-age people—particularly among men and among people without a bachelor’s degree—comparisons to earlier years suggests room for substantial increases. In contrast, the recent decreases in LFPR among older workers still leaves participation rates higher than in 2000. Improvements among that group depend on whether the pandemic persistently altered the trends that had been pushing up LFPRs. In addition, the increases among younger workers may not be durable if those ages 16 to 24 return to going to school exclusively.

How Can the Labor Market Grow Through Increased Participation?

Based on this analysis, is there room for the labor market to grow? Yes.

The factors that have depressed labor force participation among older people and that have increased labor demand in general have led to opportunities for younger workers; but, this has not led to uniformly higher participation for all groups under age 65. Most significantly, participation is still depressed for prime-age men—particularly those without a bachelor’s degree. The decline for women between 45 and 54 with less than a bachelor’s degree has also been sizable. If LFPR came back to its pre-pandemic trend for those groups, the labor force would be larger by hundreds of thousands of workers.

Hot labor market conditions in 2016-19 pulled less educated prime-age men off the sidelines and into the labor market. These men are likely more responsive to current labor market demand-side factors than older workers. And indeed, men with less than a bachelor’s over the age of 45 were participating at a higher rate in June 2022 than in 2016. However, the experience of 2016-2019 showed that these men responded to an improvement in labor market conditions with a considerable lag. Even though participation remains depressed among less educated men under 45, policymakers should continue to focus on encouraging participation among this group.

Moreover, policymakers should not take for granted the increases in participation seen so far among other groups. On the whole, prime-age women have increased their LFPR relative to 2016 lows. However, those gains may have come at great personal cost among women with young children and other care responsibilities during the pandemic. Moreover, LFPRs among prime-age women with less than a bachelor’s are still well below the levels in 2000. This group should garner the attention of policymakers hoping to increase the size of the labor market, and The Hamilton Project has put out policy proposals that improve productivity and room for advancement in jobs that require less formal education.

In order to pull people off the sidelines, policies that spur productivity and wage growth, remove barriers to entry, invest in workforce development, and increase the returns to work for those with lower wages through the Earned Income Tax Credit will be crucial. As the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic becomes endemic, proposals that allow people with disabilities to more fully engage in the labor market are essential to help improve participation. Policy proposals to support women in the workforce, whether by increasing the returns to work or by supporting caregiving and child care responsibilities, will allow women to not only enter but stay in the labor force.

[1] Calculating the changes in the sizes of the population and labor force relative to pre-pandemic projections is less straightforward than it might appear. In January 2022, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics updated its population estimates for household survey data to introduce the blended 2020 decennial census to the population composition and size. This revision was incorporated into the data starting in 2022, which implies revisions to early years. That makes 2022 estimates of labor force participation and the labor force look somewhat better than the years leading into the pandemic for technical reasons. If one adds the increase in the size of the labor force between December 2021 and January 2022 to 2022 Q2 and compares it with the labor force projection from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in January 2020: the size of the difference between the CBO projection plus the January increase and June 2022 is about three-and-a-half million. One would arrive at the three million number if instead one extrapolates pre-pandemic trends to determine the labor force projection alongside the annual revisions to the size of the population; in other words, the size of the difference between the actual labor force and the pre-pandemic trend is roughly three million.

[2] As detailed in footnote 1, the one-time population revision incorporated into the monthly CPS exaggerates the progress made in closing the LFPR gap between 2019 and 2022.

[3] Throughout this analysis, we hold age, sex, and education constant to document the contribution of changing labor force participation within these groups. Were we to hold only age and sex fixed, the counterfactual LFPR (shown in the dashed lines in figure 2) in June 2022 would have been 63.7 percent (2016 age and sex demographics held constant) and 66.9 percent (2000 age and sex demographics held constant).

The Brookings Institution is financed through the support of a diverse array of foundations, corporations, governments, individuals, as well as an endowment. A list of donors can be found in our annual reports, published online. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in this report are solely those of its author(s) and are not influenced by any donation.

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