Freedom Financial Holdings Announces Earnings for First Quarter of 2022
Freedom Financial Holdings Announces Earnings for First Quarter of 2022
PR Newswire
FAIRFAX, Va., April 28, 2022
FAIRFAX, Va., April 28, 2022 /PRNewswire/ — Freedom Financial Holdings (OTCQX: FDVA), (the “Company” or “Freedom”), the holding compan…
Freedom Financial Holdings Announces Earnings for First Quarter of 2022
PR Newswire
FAIRFAX, Va., April 28, 2022
FAIRFAX, Va., April 28, 2022 /PRNewswire/ -- Freedom Financial Holdings (OTCQX: FDVA), (the "Company" or "Freedom"), the holding company for The Freedom Bank of Virginia (the "Bank") today announced net income of $2,784,297, or $0.38 per diluted share, for the three months ended March 31, 2022. This compares to net income of $2,743,088 or $0.37 per diluted share, for the linked quarter and net income of $2,468,211 or $0.34 per diluted share for the three months ending March 31, 2021.
Joseph J. Thomas, President, and CEO, commented, "We entered 2022 with lots of uncertainties including COVID outbreaks, supply chain problems, low housing inventory, significant inflation, higher interest rates, and geopolitical instability. I am proud of our team for sustaining the Company's profitability with net income up 12.8% in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the prior year and higher ROAA and ROAE of 1.29% and 13.53%, respectively. Annualized growth in loans held-for-investment (excluding PPP loans) at 7.48% along with a 13-basis point increase in net interest margin to 3.68% bolstered interest income, up 9.86% over the prior year. The company's core profitability has been resilient through a major cyclical downdraft in residential mortgage volumes, in part due to the emerging contribution of our Small Business Lending platform. We have also been very disciplined on the expense front as reflected in the improved Efficiency Ratio of 61.70% for the quarter compared to 67.91% for the same period in 2021. We remain grateful that the clients and communities we serve see value in our culture of innovation. We continue to develop creative ideas to help clients grow and provide the financial services that they need."
First Quarter 2022 Highlights include:
- Net income for the first quarter was $2,784,297 or $0.38 per diluted share compared to net income of $2,743,088 or $0.37 per diluted share in the linked quarter and net income of $2,468,211 or $0.34 per diluted share for the three months ending March 31, 2021.
- Return on Average Assets ("ROAA") was 1.29% for the quarter ended March 31, 2022, compared to 1.22% for the linked quarter and 1.26% for the three months ended March 31, 2021.
- Return on Average Equity ("ROAE") was 13.53% for the three months ended March 31, 2022, compared to 13.11% for the linked quarter and 13.44% for the three months ended March 31, 2021.
- Total assets were $863.12 million on March 31, 2022, a decrease of $13.55 million or 1.55% from total assets on December 31, 2021.
- Loans held-for-investment (excluding PPP loans) increased by $10.64 million or 1.87% during the quarter.
- PPP loan balances decreased by $19.31 million during the first quarter on loan forgiveness and mortgage loans held for sale decreased by $2.04 million during the same period, on a decline in mortgage activity.
- Cash balances at the Federal Reserve decreased by $3.01 million during the first quarter.
- Available for sale investment securities decreased by $2.42 million during the first quarter.
- Total deposits increased by $12.99 million or by 1.85% in the first quarter. Non-interest-bearing demand deposits decreased by $13.99 million from the linked quarter to $208.17 million and represented 29.13% of total deposits on March 31, 2022.
- The net interest margin decreased in the first quarter to 3.68%, lower by 6 basis points compared to the linked quarter and higher by 13 basis points compared to the same period in 2021. Excluding PPP loans, the net interest margin would have been 3.55%. The decrease in the net interest margin across linked quarters was primarily due to lower yields on loans and a 3-basis point increase in funding costs.
- The cost of funds was 0.36% for the first quarter, higher by 3 basis points compared to the linked quarter and lower by 15 basis points compared to the same period in 2021, as deposit costs declined, partially offset by an increase in borrowing costs related to the issuance of subordinated debt in the fourth quarter of 2021.
- Non-interest income increased by 3.17% compared to the linked quarter and decreased by 40.61% compared to the same period in 2021. The increase in non-interest income compared to the linked quarter was primarily due to revenue from the sale of SBA loans and other fee income. The decrease in non-interest income compared to the calendar quarter was primarily due to lower mortgage revenue stemming from a slowdown in mortgage activity, partially offset by revenue from SBA loan sales.
- Non-interest expense in the first quarter decreased by 5.04% compared to the linked quarter and decreased by 11.94% compared to the same period in 2021. The decrease in non-interest expense in calendar quarters was primarily due to lower performance related costs: specifically, commissions paid to mortgage loan officers and mortgage settlement costs.
- The Efficiency Ratio was 61.70% for the quarter ended March 31, 2022, compared to 62.62% for the linked quarter and 67.91% for the same period in 2021.
- Non-accrual loans were relatively unchanged in the first quarter from the prior period, and the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets was 1.02% on March 31, 2022, compared to 0.28% on March 31, 2021.
- As a result of an increase in loans held-for-investment during the quarter and an assessment of the risks in the held-for-investment loan portfolio, the Company recognized a $164,000 provision for loan losses during the first quarter and the ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses to loans held-for-investment was 1.12% (or 1.15% excluding PPP loans, which carry a full faith and guarantee of the US Government) compared to 1.08% in the linked quarter (or 1.14% excluding PPP loans);
- The Bank continues to be well capitalized and capital ratios continue to be strong with a Leverage ratio of 12.09%, Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.23%, Tier 1 Risk Based Capital ratio of 14.23% and a Total Capital ratio of 15.15%.
Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") Activity
In the second quarter of 2020, the Company processed and funded 510 PPP loans (referred to as 2020 PPP loans), with balances of $106.37 million. The interest rate on these 2020 PPP loans was 1% and the term varied from two to five years. The SBA also paid processing fees which were deferred over the term of the loans. The loans were fully guaranteed and could be forgiven in whole or in part by the SBA.
In December of 2020, Congress approved a renewal of the PPP loan program with different rules and requirements for small businesses to receive loans, referred to as round two PPP loans. These 2021 PPP loans were also fully guaranteed and may be forgiven in whole or in part by the SBA. The interest rate on the loans was 1% and the term was five years. As with 2020 PPP loans, the SBA paid processing fees which are being deferred over the term of the loans. The Company originated $53.89 million of round two PPP loans during 2021.
Beginning in January of 2021, the Company began to process loan forgiveness applications from borrowers of 2020 PPP loans and round two PPP loans. As of March 31, 2022, the SBA had forgiven 713 of these PPP loans with balances of $117.17 million, and the Company had recognized income from acceleration of processing fees of $2.97 million.
Net Interest Income
The Company recorded net interest income of $7.61 million for the first quarter of 2022, a decrease of 5.12% compared to the linked quarter, and 14.16% higher than the same period in 2021. The net interest margin in the first quarter of 2022 was 3.68%, lower by 6 basis points compared to the linked quarter and higher by 13 basis points compared to the same period in 2021. Income from PPP loan forgiveness during the first quarter was $459,847 (from $14.42 million of PPP loans forgiven by the SBA), compared to PPP loan forgiveness income of $755,510 (from $19.75 million of PPP loans forgiven by the SBA) during the fourth quarter of 2021. Excluding the PPP loans, the net interest margin in the first quarter would have been 3.53%.
The following factors contributed to the changes in net interest margin during the first quarter of 2022 compared to the linked quarter:
- Yields on average earning assets decreased by 4 basis points to 4.01% compared to 4.05% in the linked quarter, driven by lower yields on loans and investments during the quarter.
- Loan yields decreased by 36 basis points to 4.75% from 5.11% in the linked quarter, while yields on investment securities decreased by 9 basis points to 2.45% from 2.54% in the linked quarter. Higher payoff activity and a slower pace of PPP loan forgiveness contributed to the decline in loan yields.
- Cost of funds increased by 3 basis points to 0.36%, from 0.33% in the linked quarter, as higher borrowing costs offset declines in deposit costs. The higher borrowing costs were related to the subordinated debt that was issued in November of 2021 as well as fewer low-cost advances from the PPP Liquidity Facility. Advances from the PPP Liquidity Facility are retired as the associated PPP loans are forgiven or paid off.
- Excluding PPP loans would have reduced the net interest margin by 15 basis points.
Non-interest Income
Non-interest income was $1.82 million for the first quarter, higher by 3.17% compared to the linked quarter and lower by 40.61% compared to the same period in 2021. The higher non-interest income across linked quarters was primarily due to an increase in SBA gain-on-sale revenue and other fee income, while the decline in non-interest income compared to the calendar quarter was largely due to lower mortgage gain-on-sale and fee revenue, stemming from a decline in mortgage activity.
Total Revenue
Total revenue, defined as the sum of net interest income, before provision for loan losses, and non-interest income, was lower by 3.63% compared to the linked quarter, primarily due to lower net interest income driven by a decline in the net interest margin, and lower by 3.07% compared to the same period in 2021, primarily due to lower non-interest income in the calendar quarter.
Non-interest Expenses
Non-interest expenses in the first quarter of 2022 were lower by 5.04% compared to the linked quarter and decreased by 11.94% compared to the same period in 2021. The decrease in non-interest expenses in the first quarter compared to the prior quarter was largely due to lower compensation costs, a decrease in legal fees and lower mortgage settlements costs.
The Efficiency Ratio was 61.70% for the quarter ended March 31, 2022, compared to 62.62% for the prior quarter and 67.91% for the same period in 2021.
Asset Quality
Non-accrual loans were $8,770,552 or 1.48% of loans held-for-investment as of March 31, 2022, compared to $8,801,983 or 1.46% of loans held-for-investment at the end of the linked quarter. There were no troubled debt restructurings ("TDRs") as of March 31, 2022. On March 31, 2022, there were no loans that were 90 days or more past due and accruing. There was no Other Real Estate Owned ("OREO") on the balance sheet as of March 31, 2022. Total non-performing assets (defined as the sum of loans on non-accrual, loans greater than 90 days past due and accruing, loans that are TDRs but not on non-accrual, and OREO assets) were $8,770,552 or 1.02% of total assets on March 31, 2022, compared to $8,801,983 or 1.00% of assets, at the end of the linked quarter.
Following an assessment of the collectability of the loans held-for-investment at the end of the fourth quarter, it was determined that a $164,000 provision for loan losses was necessary to account for loan growth and changes to environmental factors. The Company booked a provision of $355,000 in the fourth quarter of 2021. The Company's ALLL ratio was 1.12% of loans held-for-investment (or 1.15% of loans held-for investment excluding PPP loans) as of March 31, 2022, compared to an ALLL ratio of 1.08% on December 31, 2021 (or 1.14% of loans held-for-investment excluding PPP loans).
Total Assets
Total assets on March 31, 2022, were $863.12 million compared to $876.67 million on December 31, 2021. Changes in major asset categories during linked quarters were as follows:
- Cash balances at the Federal Reserve decreased by $3.01 million
- Available for sale investment balances decreased by $2.42 million
- PPP loan balances decreased by $19.31 million on loan forgiveness by the SBA
- Other loans held-for investment grew by $10.64 million
- Mortgage loans held-for-sale declined by $2.04 million
Total Liabilities
Total liabilities on March 31, 2022, were $783.33 million compared to total liabilities of $792.51 million on December 31, 2021. Total deposits were $714.69 million compared to total deposits of $701.69 million on December 31, 2021. Non-interest-bearing demand deposits decreased by $13.99 million during the quarter and comprised 29.13% of total deposits at the end of the quarter, compared to 31.66% of total deposits on December 31, 2021. Other interest-bearing demand deposits increased by $26.37 million, savings deposits increased by $1.63 million and time deposits declined by $1.01 million during the quarter. Federal Home Loan Bank advances decreased by $3.14 million during the quarter, while PPP Liquidity Facility term advances decreased by $18.95 million, in line with PPP loan forgiveness.
Stockholders' Equity and Capital
Stockholders' equity on March 31, 2022, was $79.79 million compared to $84.16 million on December 31, 2021. Additional paid-in capital was $58.66 million on March 31, 2022, compared to $59.88 million on December 31, 2021. Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income ("AOCI"), which generally comprises unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities and derivative positions, decreased by $5.92 million on net unrealized losses during the first quarter of 2022. Retained earnings were $26.33 million on March 31, 2022, compared to $23.55 million at the end of the prior quarter. Total shares issued and outstanding were 7,286,915 on March 31, 2022, compared to 7,262,757 shares on December 31, 2021. The tangible book value of the Company's common stock on March 31, 2022, was $10.95 per share compared to $11.59 per share on December 31, 2021, and $10.35 per share on March 31, 2021.
As of March 31, 2022, the Bank's capital ratios were well above regulatory minimum capital ratios for well-capitalized bank holding companies. The Bank's capital ratios on March 31, 2022, and December 31, 2021, were as follows:
March 31, 2022 | December 31, 2021 | |
Total Capital Ratio | 15.15% | 15.42% |
Tier 1 Capital Ratio | 14.23% | 14.49% |
Common Equity | ||
Tier 1 Capital Ratio | 14.23% | 14.49% |
Leverage Ratio | 12.09% | 11.85% |
About Freedom Financial Holdings, Inc.
Freedom Financial Holdings, Inc. is the holding company of The Freedom Bank of Virginia, a community bank with locations in Fairfax, Reston, Chantilly, Vienna, and Manassas, Virginia. The Freedom Bank of Virginia also has a mortgage division headquartered in Chantilly. For information about deposit, loan and other services, visit the website at www.freedom.bank.
Forward Looking Statements
This release contains forward-looking statements, including our expectations with respect to future events that are subject to various risks and uncertainties. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from management's projections, forecasts, estimates, and expectations include: fluctuation in market rates of interest and loan and deposit pricing; general economic and financial market conditions, in the United States generally and particularly in the markets in which the Company operates and which its loans are concentrated, including the effects of declines in real estate values, an increase in unemployment levels and slowdowns in economic growth, including as a result of COVID-19 and the impact of the geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine; maintenance and development of well-established and valued client relationships and referral source relationships; the adequacy or inadequacy of our allowance for loan and lease losses; acquisition or loss of key production personnel; and the potential adverse effects of unusual and infrequently occurring events, such as weather-related disasters, wars, terrorist acts or public health events (such as COVID-19), and of governmental and societal responses thereto; these potential adverse effects may include, without limitation, adverse effects on the ability of the Company's borrowers to satisfy their obligations to the Company, on the value of collateral securing loans, on the demand for the Company's loans or its other products and services, on incidents of cyberattack and fraud, on the Company's liquidity or capital positions, on risks posed by reliance on third-party service providers, on other aspects of the Company's business operations and on financial markets and economic growth. The Company cautions readers that the list of factors above is not exclusive. The forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this release, and the Company may not undertake steps to update the forward-looking statements to reflect the impact of any circumstances or events that arise after the date the forward-looking statements are made. In addition, our past results of operations are not necessarily indicative of future performance. Some of the financial tables in this document reflect classifications to accounts to improve consistency in financial reporting.
Contact:
Joseph J. Thomas
President & Chief Executive Officer
703-667-4161: Phone
jthomas@freedom.bank: Email
FREEDOM FINANCIAL HOLDINGS | ||||||
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS | ||||||
(Unaudited) | (Audited) | |||||
ASSETS | ||||||
Cash and Due from Banks | $ | 2,348,210 | $ | 2,536,450 | ||
Interest Bearing Deposits with Banks | 28,687,951 | 31,696,891 | ||||
Securities Available-for-Sale | 169,108,572 | 171,532,394 | ||||
Securities Held-to-Maturity | 17,982,536 | 18,012,874 | ||||
Restricted Stock Investments | 3,797,700 | 3,321,250 | ||||
Loans Held for Sale | 11,256,546 | 13,297,125 | ||||
PPP Loans Held for Investment | 13,046,988 | 32,355,451 | ||||
Other Loans Held for Investment | 580,650,677 | 570,013,870 | ||||
Allowance for Loan Losses | (6,650,120) | (6,486,120) | ||||
Net Loans | 587,047,545 | 595,883,201 | ||||
Bank Premises and Equipment, net | 1,099,230 | 1,139,204 | ||||
Accrued Interest Receivable | 2,412,068 | 2,466,712 | ||||
Deferred Tax Asset | 1,642,041 | 1,631,115 | ||||
Bank-Owned Life Insurance | 24,740,507 | 24,579,879 | ||||
Right of Use Asset, net | 2,464,873 | 2,704,888 | ||||
Other Assets | 10,533,227 | 7,870,617 | ||||
Total Assets | $ | 863,121,006 | $ | 876,672,600 | ||
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY | ||||||
Deposits | ||||||
Demand Deposits | ||||||
Non-interest Bearing | $ | 208,170,761 | 222,167,095 | |||
Interest Bearing | 326,732,976 | 300,361,979 | ||||
Savings Deposits | 7,471,426 | 5,841,800 | ||||
Time Deposits | 172,310,577 | 173,322,527 | ||||
Total Deposits | 714,685,740 | 701,693,401 | ||||
Federal Home Loan Bank Advances | 25,892,857 | 29,035,714 | ||||
PPP Liquidity Facility Advances | 13,106,863 | 32,055,915 | ||||
Subordinated Debt (Net of Issuance Costs) | 19,636,350 | 19,616,869 | ||||
Accrued Interest Payable | 388,953 | 294,237 | ||||
Lease Liability | 2,581,181 | 2,823,885 | ||||
Other Liabilities | 7,035,034 | 6,993,855 | ||||
Total Liabilities | $ | 783,326,978 | $ | 792,513,876 | ||
Stockholders' Equity | ||||||
Preferred stock, $0.01 par value, 5,000,000 shares authorized: | ||||||
0 Shares Issued and Outstanding, March 31, 2022 and December 31, 2021, | ||||||
Common Stock, $0.01 Par Value, 25,000,000 Shares: | ||||||
23,000,000 Shares Voting and 2,000,000 Shares Non-voting. | ||||||
Voting Common Stock: | ||||||
6,626,819 and 6,589,757 Shares Issued and Outstanding | 65,404 | 65,898 | ||||
Non-Voting Common Stock: | ||||||
673,000 Shares Issued and Outstanding March 31, 2022 | 6,730 | 6,730 | ||||
Additional Paid-in Capital | 58,659,955 | 59,884,615 | ||||
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income, Net | (5,272,569) | 651,272 | ||||
Retained Earnings | 26,334,508 | 23,550,209 | ||||
Total Stockholders' Equity | 79,794,028 | 84,158,724 | ||||
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity | $ | 863,121,006 | $ | 876,672,600 |
FREEDOM FINANCIAL HOLDINGS | |||||
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS | |||||
(Unaudited) | (Unaudited) | ||||
For the three | For the three | ||||
months ended | months ended | ||||
March 31, 2022 | March 31, 2021 | ||||
Interest Income | |||||
Interest and Fees on Loans | $ 7,141,999 | $ 6,912,386 | |||
Interest on Investment Securities | 1,145,377 | 636,742 | |||
Interest on Deposits with Other Banks | 15,596 | 8,831 | |||
Total Interest Income | 8,302,972 | 7,557,959 | |||
Interest Expense | |||||
Interest on Deposits | 418,788 | 675,824 | |||
Interest on Borrowings | 270,778 | 212,923 | |||
Total Interest Expense | 689,566 | 888,747 | |||
Net Interest Income | 7,613,406 | 6,669,212 | |||
Provision for Loan Losses | (164,000) | (64,000) | |||
Net Interest Income After | |||||
Provision for Loan Losses | 7,449,406 | 6,605,212 | |||
Non-Interest Income | |||||
Mortgage Loan Gain-on-Sale and Fee Revenue | 1,037,978 | 2,822,186 | |||
SBA Gain-on-Sale Revenue | 266,023 | - | |||
Service Charges and Other Income | 301,396 | 48,702 | |||
Gain on Sale of Securities | - | 12,885 | |||
Servicing Income | 52,149 | 51,643 | |||
Swap Fee Income | - | - | |||
Increase in Cash Surrender Value of Bank- | |||||
owned Life Insurance | 160,628 | 125,886 | |||
Total Non-interest Income | 1,818,174 | 3,061,302 | |||
Non-Interest Expenses | |||||
Officer and Employee Compensation | |||||
and Benefits | 4,003,321 | 4,662,235 | |||
Occupancy Expense | 332,366 | 290,389 | |||
Equipment and Depreciation Expense | 172,107 | 155,916 | |||
Insurance Expense | 70,626 | 57,056 | |||
Professional Fees | 248,329 | 291,434 | |||
Data and Item Processing | 265,625 | 267,783 | |||
Advertising | 105,369 | 73,078 | |||
Franchise Taxes and State Assessment Fees | 200,099 | 185,429 | |||
Mortgage Fees and Settlements | 105,849 | 463,419 | |||
Other Operating Expense | 315,416 | 161,361 | |||
Total Non-interest Expenses | 5,819,107 | 6,608,100 | |||
Income Before Income Taxes | 3,448,473 | 3,058,414 | |||
Income Tax Expense | 664,176 | 590,203 | |||
Net Income | $ 2,784,297 | $ 2,468,211 | |||
Earnings per Common Share - Basic | $ 0.38 | $ 0.34 | |||
Earnings per Common Share - Diluted | $ 0.38 | $ 0.34 | |||
Weighted-Average Common Shares | |||||
Outstanding - Basic | 7,324,527 | 7,295,190 | |||
Weighted-Average Common Shares | |||||
Outstanding - Diluted | 7,362,290 | 7,334,463 |
FREEDOM FINANCIAL HOLDINGS | ||||||||||||||
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS | ||||||||||||||
(Unaudited) | (Unaudited) | (Unaudited) | (Unaudited) | (Unaudited) | ||||||||||
For the three | For the three | For the three | For the three | For the three | ||||||||||
months ended | months ended | months ended | months ended | months ended | ||||||||||
March 31, 2022 | December 31, 2021 | September 30, 2021 | June 30, 2021 | March 31, 2021 | ||||||||||
Interest Income | ||||||||||||||
Interest and Fees on Loans | $ | 7,141,999 | $ | 7,556,406 | $ | 6,914,453 | $ | 6,951,964 | $ | 6,912,386 | ||||
Interest on Investment Securities | 1,145,377 | 1,092,427 | 750,570 | 655,996 | 636,742 | |||||||||
Interest on Deposits with Other Banks | 15,596 | 35,908 | 26,994 | 15,170 | 8,831 | |||||||||
Total Interest Income | 8,302,972 | 8,684,741 | 7,692,017 | 7,623,130 | 7,557,959 | |||||||||
Interest Expense | ||||||||||||||
Interest on Deposits | 418,788 | 470,791 | 546,168 | 582,997 | 675,824 | |||||||||
Interest on Borrowings | 270,778 | 189,834 | 150,599 | 212,703 | 212,923 | |||||||||
Total Interest Expense | 689,566 | 660,625 | 696,767 | 795,700 | 888,747 | |||||||||
Net Interest Income | 7,613,406 | 8,024,116 | 6,995,249 | 6,827,430 | 6,669,212 | |||||||||
Provision for Loan Losses | (164,000) | (355,000) | (229,000) | (191,000) | (64,000) | |||||||||
Net Interest Income after | ||||||||||||||
Provision for Loan Losses | 7,449,406 | 7,669,116 | 6,766,249 | 6,636,430 | 6,605,212 | |||||||||
Non-Interest Income | ||||||||||||||
Mortgage Loan Gain-on-Sale and Fee Revenue | 1,037,978 | 1,456,195 | 1,995,535 | 2,012,153 | 2,822,186 | |||||||||
SBA Gain-on-Sale Revenue | 266,023 | - | 371,172 | 66,652 | - | |||||||||
Service Charges and Other Income | 301,396 | 95,335 | 67,374 | 43,501 | 48,702 | |||||||||
Gains on Sale of Securities | - | 6,315 | (13,493) | 1,726 | 12,885 | |||||||||
Servicing Income | 52,149 | 53,479 | 44,443 | 42,847 | 51,643 | |||||||||
Swap Fee Income | - | - | - | - | - | |||||||||
Increase in Cash Surrender Value of Bank- | ||||||||||||||
owned Life Insurance | 160,628 | 151,054 | 141,608 | 126,117 | 125,886 | |||||||||
Total Non-interest Income | 1,818,174 | 1,762,378 | 2,606,639 | 2,292,996 | 3,061,302 | |||||||||
Revenue | $ | 9,431,580 | $ | 9,786,494 | $ | 9,601,889 | $ | 9,120,426 | $ | 9,730,514 | ||||
Non-Interest Expenses | ||||||||||||||
Officer and Employee Compensation | ||||||||||||||
and Benefits | 4,003,321 | 4,055,344 | 3,862,969 | 3,760,697 | 4,662,235 | |||||||||
Occupancy Expense | 332,366 | 317,038 | 318,109 | 306,521 | 290,389 | |||||||||
Equipment and Depreciation Expense | 172,107 | 170,335 | 176,379 | 159,420 | 155,916 | |||||||||
Insurance Expense | 70,626 | 74,357 | 70,814 | 65,356 | 57,056 | |||||||||
Professional Fees | 248,329 | 470,786 | 243,678 | 359,159 | 291,434 | |||||||||
Data and Item Processing | 265,625 | 299,120 | 303,444 | 311,000 | 267,783 | |||||||||
Advertising | 105,369 | 80,569 | 92,806 | 82,605 | 73,078 | |||||||||
Franchise Taxes and State Assessment Fees | 200,099 | 200,084 | 200,048 | 192,508 | 185,429 | |||||||||
Mortgage Fees and Settlements | 105,849 | 172,967 | 230,582 | 274,231 | 463,419 | |||||||||
Other Operating Expense | 315,416 | 287,459 | 220,739 | 177,593 | 161,361 | |||||||||
Total Non-interest Expenses | 5,819,108 | 6,128,059 | 5,719,568 | 5,689,090 | 6,608,100 | |||||||||
Income before Income Taxes | 3,448,473 | 3,448,473 | 3,653,322 | 3,240,336 | 3,058,414 | |||||||||
Income Tax Expense | 664,176 | 560,347 | 763,041 | 613,955 | 590,203 | |||||||||
Net Income | $ | 2,784,297 | $ | 2,743,088 | $ | 2,890,281 | $ | 2,626,381 | $ | 2,468,211 | ||||
Earnings per Common Share - Basic | $ | 0.38 | $ | 0.37 | $ | 0.39 | $ | 0.36 | $ | 0.34 | ||||
Earnings per Common Share - Diluted | $ | 0.38 | $ | 0.37 | $ | 0.39 | $ | 0.36 | $ | 0.34 | ||||
Weighted-Average Common Shares | ||||||||||||||
Outstanding - Basic | 7,324,527 | 7,336,016 | 7,341,635 | 7,306,710 | 7,295,190 | |||||||||
Weighted-Average Common Shares | ||||||||||||||
Outstanding - Diluted | 7,362,290 | 7,380,138 | 7,395,062 | 7,354,389 | 7,334,463 |
Average Balances, Income and Expenses, Yields and Rates | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(Unaudited) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Three Months Ended | Three Months Ended | Three Months Ended | Three Months Ended | Three Months Ended | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
March 31, 2022 | December 31, 2021 | September 30, 2021 | June 30, 2021 | March 31, 2021 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
Average Balance | Income/ | Yield | Average Balance | Income/ | Yield | Average Balance | Income/ | Yield | Average Balance | Income/ Expense | Yield | Average Balance | Income/ | Yield | |||||||||||||||
Assets | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cash | $ 40,375,846 | $ 15,596 | 0.16% | $ 91,458,843 | $ 35,908 | 0.16% | $ 71,114,495 | $ 26,994 | 0.15% | $ 64,848,200 | $ 15,170 | 0.09% | $ 42,563,835 | $ 8,831 | 0.08% | ||||||||||||||
Investments (Tax Exempt) | 23,331,336 | 187,632 | 23,460,432 | 190,195 | 27,138,446 | 177,809 | 23,292,663 | 223,691 | 24,057,819 | 152,583 | |||||||||||||||||||
Investments (Taxable) | 165,979,811 | 957,745 | 153,582,906 | 942,173 | 113,180,210 | 610,101 | 103,971,494 | 479,280 | 91,675,593 | 516,202 | |||||||||||||||||||
Total Investments | 189,311,147 | 1,145,377 | 2.45% | 177,043,338 | 1,132,368 | 2.54% | 140,318,656 | 787,910 | 2.23% | 127,264,157 | 702,971 | 2.22% | 115,733,412 | 668,785 | 2.34% | ||||||||||||||
Total Loans | 609,412,292 | 7,141,999 | 4.75% | 586,725,477 | 7,556,406 | 5.11% | 602,948,952 | $6,914,454 | 4.55% | 622,826,541 | $6,951,964 | 4.48% | 607,880,043 | $6,912,386 | 4.61% | ||||||||||||||
Earning Assets | 839,099,285 | 8,302,972 | 4.01% | 855,227,658 | 8,724,682 | 4.05% | 814,382,103 | 7,729,358 | 3.77% | 814,938,898 | 7,670,105 | 3.78% | 766,177,290 | 7,590,002 | 4.02% | ||||||||||||||
Assets | $ 876,180,566 | $ 891,226,178 | $ 847,472,317 | $ 846,402,419 | $ 794,829,492 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Liabilities | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Interest Checking | $ 110,305,411 | 48,246 | 0.18% | $ 88,172,651 | 38,893 | 0.18% | $ 36,659,322 | 12,240 | 0.13% | $ 34,272,772 | 10,907 | 0.13% | $ 32,270,173 | 15,629 | 0.20% | ||||||||||||||
Money Market | 206,230,959 | 89,516 | 0.18% | 202,560,648 | 85,450 | 0.17% | 189,055,851 | 80,347 | 0.17% | 164,337,737 | 63,989 | 0.16% | 148,969,677 | 62,497 | 0.17% | ||||||||||||||
Savings | 6,652,079 | 1,725 | 0.11% | 5,336,531 | 1,431 | 0.11% | 4,147,591 | 1,170 | 0.11% | 4,195,416 | 1,078 | 0.10% | 3,301,845 | 814 | 0.10% | ||||||||||||||
Time Deposits | 174,009,190 | 279,301 | 0.65% | 187,240,613 | 345,016 | 0.73% | 197,133,663 | 452,411 | 0.91% | 197,180,571 | 507,023 | 1.03% | 172,994,520 | 596,885 | 1.40% | ||||||||||||||
Interest Bearing Deposits | 497,197,639 | 418,788 | 0.34% | 483,310,443 | 470,790 | 0.38% | 426,996,427 | 546,168 | 0.51% | 399,986,496 | 582,997 | 0.58% | 357,536,215 | 675,825 | 0.77% | ||||||||||||||
Borrowings | $ 71,634,636 | 270,778 | 1.53% | $ 81,399,848 | 189,834 | 0.93% | $ 101,033,443 | 150,599 | 0.59% | $ 138,398,143 | 212,703 | 0.62% | $ 134,120,845 | 212,923 | 0.64% | ||||||||||||||
Interest Bearing Liabilities | 568,832,275 | 689,566 | 0.49% | 564,710,291 | 660,624 | 0.46% | 528,029,870 | 696,767 | 0.52% | 538,384,639 | 795,700 | 0.59% | 491,657,060 | 888,748 | 0.73% | ||||||||||||||
Non Interest Bearing Deposits | $ 213,315,104 | $ 231,181,073 | $ 226,514,808 | $ 217,927,934 | $ 215,148,589 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cost of Funds | 0.36% | 0.33% | 0.37% | 0.42% | 0.51% | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Net Interest Margin1 | $ 7,613,406 | 3.68% | $ 8,064,057 | 3.74% | $ 7,032,590 | 3.43% | $ 6,874,405 | 3.38% | $ 6,701,254 | 3.55% | |||||||||||||||||||
Shareholders Equity | $ 83,440,208 | $ 82,994,140 | $ 80,866,605 | $ 77,178,196 | $ 74,480,607 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
1 Net interest margin is calculated as fully taxable equivalent net interest income divided by average earning assets and represents the Bank's net yield on its earning assets |
Average Balances, Income and Expenses, Yields and Rates | ||||||||||||||
(Unaudited) | ||||||||||||||
Three Months Ended | Three Months Ended | |||||||||||||
March 31, 2022 | Income / | March 31, 2021 | Income / | |||||||||||
Average Balance | Expense | Yield | Average Balance | Expense | Yield | |||||||||
Assets | ||||||||||||||
Cash | $ 40,375,846 | $ 15,596 | 0.16% | $ 42,563,835 | $ 8,831 | 0.08% | ||||||||
Investments (Tax Exempt) | 23,331,336 | 187,632 | 24,057,819 | 152,583 | ||||||||||
Investments (Taxable) | 165,979,811 | 957,745 | 91,675,593 | 516,202 | ||||||||||
Total Investments | 189,311,147 | 1,145,377 | 2.45% | 115,733,412 | 668,785 | 2.34% | ||||||||
Total Loans | 609,412,292 | 7,141,999 | 4.75% | 607,880,043 | 6,912,386 | 4.61% | ||||||||
Earning Assets | 839,099,285 | 8,302,972 | 4.01% | 766,177,290 | 7,590,002 | 4.02% | ||||||||
Assets | $ 876,180,566 | $ 794,829,492 | ||||||||||||
Liabilities | ||||||||||||||
Interest Checking | $ 110,305,411 | 48,246 | 0.18% | $ 32,270,173 | 15,629 | 0.20% | ||||||||
Money Market | 206,230,959 | 89,516 | 0.18% | 148,969,677 | 62,497 | 0.17% | ||||||||
Savings | 6,652,079 | 1,725 | 0.11% | 3,301,845 | 814 | 0.10% | ||||||||
Time Deposits | 174,009,190 | 279,301 | 0.65% | 172,994,520 | 596,885 | 1.40% | ||||||||
Interest Bearing Deposits | 497,197,639 | 418,788 | 0.38% | 357,536,215 | 675,825 | 0.77% | ||||||||
Borrowings | 71,634,636 | 270,778 | 1.53% | 134,120,845 | 212,923 | 0.64% | ||||||||
Interest Bearing Liabilities | 568,832,275 | 689,566 | 0.49% | 491,657,060 | 888,748 | 0.73% | ||||||||
Non Interest Bearing Deposits | $ 213,315,104 | $ 215,148,589 | ||||||||||||
Cost of Funds | 0.36% | 0.51% | ||||||||||||
Net Interest Margin1 | $ 7,613,406 | 3.68% | $ 6,701,254 | 3.55% | ||||||||||
Shareholders Equity | $ 83,440,208 | $ 74,480,607 | ||||||||||||
ROAA | 1.29% | 1.26% | ||||||||||||
ROAE | 13.53% | 13.44% | ||||||||||||
1 Net interest margin is calculated as fully taxable equivalent net interest income divided by average earning assets and represents the Bank's net yield on its earning assets |
Selected Financial Data by Quarter Ended: | |||||
(Unaudited) | |||||
Balance Sheet Ratios | March 31, 2022 | December 31, 2021 | September 30, 2021 | June 30, 2021 | March 31, 2021 |
Loans held-for-investment to Deposits | 83.07% | 85.85% | 84.45% | 96.14% | 95.51% |
Income Statement Ratios (Quarterly) | |||||
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) | 1.29% | 1.22% | 1.35% | 1.24% | 1.26% |
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) | 13.53% | 13.11% | 14.18% | 13.65% | 13.44% |
Efficiency Ratio | 61.70% | 62.62% | 59.57% | 62.38% | 67.91% |
Net Interest Margin1 | 3.68% | 3.74% | 3.43% | 3.38% | 3.55% |
Yield on Average Earning Assets | 4.01% | 4.05% | 3.77% | 3.78% | 4.02% |
Yield on Securities | 2.45% | 2.54% | 2.23% | 2.22% | 2.34% |
Yield on Loans | 4.75% | 5.11% | 4.55% | 4.48% | 4.61% |
Cost of Funds | 0.36% | 0.33% | 0.37% | 0.42% | 0.51% |
Noninterest income to Total Revenue | 19.28% | 18.01% | 27.15% | 25.14% | 31.46% |
Per Share Data | |||||
Tangible Book Value | $10.95 | $11.59 | $11.14 | $10.81 | $10.35 |
Share Price Data | |||||
Closing Price | $14.06 | $13.37 | $12.55 | $11.98 | $10.90 |
Book Value Multiple | 128% | 115% | 113% | 111% | 105% |
Common Stock Data | |||||
Outstanding Shares at End of Period | 7,286,915 | 7,262,757 | 7,312,565 | 7,305,581 | 7,307,915 |
Weighted Average shares outstanding, basic | 7,324,527 | 7,336,016 | 7,341,635 | 7,306,710 | 7,295,190 |
Weighted Average shares outstanding, diluted | 7,362,290 | 7,438,268 | 7,395,062 | 7,354,389 | 7,334,463 |
Capital Ratios (Bank Only) | |||||
Tier 1 Leverage ratio | 12.09% | 11.85% | 10.47% | 10.56% | 10.95% |
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio | 14.23% | 14.49% | 12.73% | 12.90% | 12.88% |
Tier 1 Risk Based Capital ratio | 14.23% | 14.49% | 12.73% | 12.90% | 12.88% |
Total Risk Based Capital ratio | 15.15% | 15.42% | 13.68% | 13.86% | 13.84% |
Credit Quality | |||||
Net Charge-offs to Average Loans | 0.00% | -0.02% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
Total Non-performing Loans to loans held-for-investment | 1.48% | 1.46% | 0.15% | 0.15% | 0.41% |
Total Non-performing Assets to Total Assets | 1.02% | 1.00% | 0.10% | 0.11% | 0.28% |
Nonaccrual Loans to loans held-for-investment | 1.48% | 1.46% | 0.15% | 0.15% | 0.41% |
Provision for Loan and Lease Losses | $164,000 | $355,000 | $229,000 | $191,000 | $64,000 |
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses to net loans held-for-investment | 1.12% | 1.08% | 1.05% | 0.96% | 0.92% |
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses to net loans held-for-investment (ex PPP loans) | 1.15% | 1.14% | 1.17% | 1.15% | 1.16% |
1 Net interest margin is calculated as fully taxable equivalent net interest income divided by average earning assets and represents the Bank's net yield on its earning assets |
View original content to download multimedia:https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/freedom-financial-holdings-announces-earnings-for-first-quarter-of-2022-301534821.html
SOURCE Freedom Financial Holdings
Government
The Great Replacement Loophole: Illegal Immigrants Score 5-Year Work Benefit While “Waiting” For Deporation, Asylum
The Great Replacement Loophole: Illegal Immigrants Score 5-Year Work Benefit While "Waiting" For Deporation, Asylum
Over the past several…
Over the past several months we've pointed out that there has been zero job creation for native-born workers since the summer of 2018...
... and that since Joe Biden was sworn into office, most of the post-pandemic job gains the administration continuously brags about have gone foreign-born (read immigrants, mostly illegal ones) workers.
And while the left might find this data almost as verboten as FBI crime statistics - as it directly supports the so-called "great replacement theory" we're not supposed to discuss - it also coincides with record numbers of illegal crossings into the United States under Biden.
In short, the Biden administration opened the floodgates, 10 million illegal immigrants poured into the country, and most of the post-pandemic "jobs recovery" went to foreign-born workers, of which illegal immigrants represent the largest chunk.
'But Tyler, illegal immigrants can't possibly work in the United States whilst awaiting their asylum hearings,' one might hear from the peanut gallery. On the contrary: ever since Biden reversed a key aspect of Trump's labor policies, all illegal immigrants - even those awaiting deportation proceedings - have been given carte blanche to work while awaiting said proceedings for up to five years...
... something which even Elon Musk was shocked to learn.
Wow, learn something new every day https://t.co/8MDtEEZGam
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) March 10, 2024
Which leads us to another question: recall that the primary concern for the Biden admin for much of 2022 and 2023 was soaring prices, i.e., relentless inflation in general, and rising wages in particular, which in turn prompted even Goldman to admit two years ago that the diabolical wage-price spiral had been unleashed in the US (diabolical, because nothing absent a major economic shock, read recession or depression, can short-circuit it once it is in place).
Well, there is one other thing that can break the wage-price spiral loop: a flood of ultra-cheap illegal immigrant workers. But don't take our word for it: here is Fed Chair Jerome Powell himself during his February 60 Minutes interview:
PELLEY: Why was immigration important?
POWELL: Because, you know, immigrants come in, and they tend to work at a rate that is at or above that for non-immigrants. Immigrants who come to the country tend to be in the workforce at a slightly higher level than native Americans do. But that's largely because of the age difference. They tend to skew younger.
PELLEY: Why is immigration so important to the economy?
POWELL: Well, first of all, immigration policy is not the Fed's job. The immigration policy of the United States is really important and really much under discussion right now, and that's none of our business. We don't set immigration policy. We don't comment on it.
I will say, over time, though, the U.S. economy has benefited from immigration. And, frankly, just in the last, year a big part of the story of the labor market coming back into better balance is immigration returning to levels that were more typical of the pre-pandemic era.
PELLEY: The country needed the workers.
POWELL: It did. And so, that's what's been happening.
Translation: Immigrants work hard, and Americans are lazy. But much more importantly, since illegal immigrants will work for any pay, and since Biden's Department of Homeland Security, via its Citizenship and Immigration Services Agency, has made it so illegal immigrants can work in the US perfectly legally for up to 5 years (if not more), one can argue that the flood of illegals through the southern border has been the primary reason why inflation - or rather mostly wage inflation, that all too critical component of the wage-price spiral - has moderated in in the past year, when the US labor market suddenly found itself flooded with millions of perfectly eligible workers, who just also happen to be illegal immigrants and thus have zero wage bargaining options.
None of this is to suggest that the relentless flood of immigrants into the US is not also driven by voting and census concerns - something Elon Musk has been pounding the table on in recent weeks, and has gone so far to call it "the biggest corruption of American democracy in the 21st century", but in retrospect, one can also argue that the only modest success the Biden admin has had in the past year - namely bringing inflation down from a torrid 9% annual rate to "only" 3% - has also been due to the millions of illegals he's imported into the country.
We would be remiss if we didn't also note that this so often carries catastrophic short-term consequences for the social fabric of the country (the Laken Riley fiasco being only the latest example), not to mention the far more dire long-term consequences for the future of the US - chief among them the trillions of dollars in debt the US will need to incur to pay for all those new illegal immigrants Democrat voters and low-paid workers. This is on top of the labor revolution that will kick in once AI leads to mass layoffs among high-paying, white-collar jobs, after which all those newly laid off native-born workers hoping to trade down to lower paying (if available) jobs will discover that hardened criminals from Honduras or Guatemala have already taken them, all thanks to Joe Biden.
International
‘I couldn’t stand the pain’: the Turkish holiday resort that’s become an emergency dental centre for Britons who can’t get treated at home
The crisis in NHS dentistry is driving increasing numbers abroad for treatment. Here are some of their stories.
It’s a hot summer day in the Turkish city of Antalya, a Mediterranean resort with golden beaches, deep blue sea and vibrant nightlife. The pool area of the all-inclusive resort is crammed with British people on sun loungers – but they aren’t here for a holiday. This hotel is linked to a dental clinic that organises treatment packages, and most of these guests are here to see a dentist.
From Norwich, two women talk about gums and injections. A man from Wales holds a tissue close to his mouth and spits blood – he has just had two molars extracted.
The dental clinic organises everything for these dental “tourists” throughout their treatment, which typically lasts from three to 15 days. The stories I hear of what has caused them to travel to Turkey are strikingly similar: all have struggled to secure dental treatment at home on the NHS.
“The hotel is nice and some days I go to the beach,” says Susan*, a hairdresser in her mid-30s from Norwich. “But really, we aren’t tourists like in a proper holiday. We come here because we have no choice. I couldn’t stand the pain.”
This is Susan’s second visit to Antalya. She explains that her ordeal started two years earlier:
I went to an NHS dentist who told me I had gum disease … She did some cleaning to my teeth and gums but it got worse. When I ate, my teeth were moving … the gums were bleeding and it was very painful. I called to say I was in pain but the clinic was not accepting NHS patients any more.
The only option the dentist offered Susan was to register as a private patient:
I asked how much. They said £50 for x-rays and then if the gum disease got worse, £300 or so for extraction. Four of them were moving – imagine: £1,200 for losing your teeth! Without teeth I’d lose my clients, but I didn’t have the money. I’m a single mum. I called my mum and cried.
Susan’s mother told her about a friend of hers who had been to Turkey for treatment, then together they found a suitable clinic:
The prices are so much cheaper! Tooth extraction, x-rays, consultations – it all comes included. The flight and hotel for seven days cost the same as losing four teeth in Norwich … I had my lower teeth removed here six months ago, now I’ve got implants … £2,800 for everything – hotel, transfer, treatments. I only paid the flights separately.
In the UK, roughly half the adult population suffers from periodontitis – inflammation of the gums caused by plaque bacteria that can lead to irreversible loss of gums, teeth, and bone. Regular reviews by a dentist or hygienist are required to manage this condition. But nine out of ten dental practices cannot offer NHS appointments to new adult patients, while eight in ten are not accepting new child patients.
Some UK dentists argue that Britons who travel abroad for treatment do so mainly for cosmetic procedures. They warn that dental tourism is dangerous, and that if their treatment goes wrong, dentists in the UK will be unable to help because they don’t want to be responsible for further damage. Susan shrugs this off:
Dentists in England say: ‘If you go to Turkey, we won’t touch you [afterwards].’ But I don’t worry because there are no appointments at home anyway. They couldn’t help in the first place, and this is why we are in Turkey.
‘How can we pay all this money?’
As a social anthropologist, I travelled to Turkey a number of times in 2023 to investigate the crisis of NHS dentistry, and the journeys abroad that UK patients are increasingly making as a result. I have relatives in Istanbul and have been researching migration and trading patterns in Turkey’s largest city since 2016.
In August 2023, I visited the resort in Antalya, nearly 400 miles south of Istanbul. As well as Susan, I met a group from a village in Wales who said there was no provision of NHS dentistry back home. They had organised a two-week trip to Turkey: the 12-strong group included a middle-aged couple with two sons in their early 20s, and two couples who were pensioners. By going together, Anya tells me, they could support each other through their different treatments:
I’ve had many cavities since I was little … Before, you could see a dentist regularly – you didn’t even think about it. If you had pain or wanted a regular visit, you phoned and you went … That was in the 1990s, when I went to the dentist maybe every year.
Anya says that once she had children, her family and work commitments meant she had no time to go to the dentist. Then, years later, she started having serious toothache:
Every time I chewed something, it hurt. I ate soups and soft food, and I also lost weight … Even drinking was painful – tea: pain, cold water: pain. I was taking paracetamol all the time! I went to the dentist to fix all this, but there were no appointments.
Anya was told she would have to wait months, or find a dentist elsewhere:
A private clinic gave me a list of things I needed done. Oh my God, almost £6,000. My husband went too – same story. How can we pay all this money? So we decided to come to Turkey. Some people we know had been here, and others in the village wanted to come too. We’ve brought our sons too – they also need to be checked and fixed. Our whole family could be fixed for less than £6,000.
By the time they travelled, Anya’s dental problems had turned into a dental emergency. She says she could not live with the pain anymore, and was relying on paracetamol.
In 2023, about 6 million adults in the UK experienced protracted pain (lasting more than two weeks) caused by toothache. Unintentional paracetamol overdose due to dental pain is a significant cause of admissions to acute medical units. If left untreated, tooth infections can spread to other parts of the body and cause life-threatening complications – and on rare occasions, death.
In February 2024, police were called to manage hundreds of people queuing outside a newly opened dental clinic in Bristol, all hoping to be registered or seen by an NHS dentist. One in ten Britons have admitted to performing “DIY dentistry”, of which 20% did so because they could not find a timely appointment. This includes people pulling out their teeth with pliers and using superglue to repair their teeth.
In the 1990s, dentistry was almost entirely provided through NHS services, with only around 500 solely private dentists registered. Today, NHS dentist numbers in England are at their lowest level in a decade, with 23,577 dentists registered to perform NHS work in 2022-23, down 695 on the previous year. Furthermore, the precise division of NHS and private work that each dentist provides is not measured.
The COVID pandemic created longer waiting lists for NHS treatment in an already stretched public service. In Bridlington, Yorkshire, people are now reportedly having to wait eight-to-nine years to get an NHS dental appointment with the only remaining NHS dentist in the town.
In his book Patients of the State (2012), Argentine sociologist Javier Auyero describes the “indignities of waiting”. It is the poor who are mostly forced to wait, he writes. Queues for state benefits and public services constitute a tangible form of power over the marginalised. There is an ethnic dimension to this story, too. Data suggests that in the UK, patients less likely to be effective in booking an NHS dental appointment are non-white ethnic groups and Gypsy or Irish travellers, and that it is particularly challenging for refugees and asylum-seekers to access dental care.
This article is part of Conversation Insights
The Insights team generates long-form journalism derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.
In 2022, I experienced my own dental emergency. An infected tooth was causing me debilitating pain, and needed root canal treatment. I was advised this would cost £71 on the NHS, plus £307 for a follow-up crown – but that I would have to wait months for an appointment. The pain became excruciating – I could not sleep, let alone wait for months. In the same clinic, privately, I was quoted £1,300 for the treatment (more than half my monthly income at the time), or £295 for a tooth extraction.
I did not want to lose my tooth because of lack of money. So I bought a flight to Istanbul immediately for the price of the extraction in the UK, and my tooth was treated with root canal therapy by a private dentist there for £80. Including the costs of travelling, the total was a third of what I was quoted to be treated privately in the UK. Two years on, my treated tooth hasn’t given me any more problems.
A better quality of life
Not everyone is in Antalya for emergency procedures. The pensioners from Wales had contacted numerous clinics they found on the internet, comparing prices, treatments and hotel packages at least a year in advance, in a carefully planned trip to get dental implants – artificial replacements for tooth roots that help support dentures, crowns and bridges.
In Turkey, all the dentists I speak to (most of whom cater mainly for foreigners, including UK nationals) consider implants not a cosmetic or luxurious treatment, but a development in dentistry that gives patients who are able to have the procedure a much better quality of life. This procedure is not available on the NHS for most of the UK population, and the patients I meet in Turkey could not afford implants in private clinics back home.
Paul is in Antalya to replace his dentures, which have become uncomfortable and irritating to his gums, with implants. He says he couldn’t find an appointment to see an NHS dentist. His wife Sonia went through a similar procedure the year before and is very satisfied with the results, telling me: “Why have dentures that you need to put in a glass overnight, in the old style? If you can have implants, I say, you’re better off having them.”
Most of the dental tourists I meet in Antalya are white British: this city, known as the Turkish Riviera, has developed an entire economy catering to English-speaking tourists. In 2023, more than 1.3 million people visited the city from the UK, up almost 15% on the previous year.
Read more: NHS dentistry is in crisis – are overseas dentists the answer?
In contrast, the Britons I meet in Istanbul are predominantly from a non-white ethnic background. Omar, a pensioner of Pakistani origin in his early 70s, has come here after waiting “half a year” for an NHS appointment to fix the dental bridge that is causing him pain. Omar’s son had been previously for a hair transplant, and was offered a free dental checkup by the same clinic, so he suggested it to his father. Having worked as a driver for a manufacturing company for two decades in Birmingham, Omar says he feels disappointed to have contributed to the British economy for so long, only to be “let down” by the NHS:
At home, I must wait and wait and wait to get a bridge – and then I had many problems with it. I couldn’t eat because the bridge was uncomfortable and I was in pain, but there were no appointments on the NHS. I asked a private dentist and they recommended implants, but they are far too expensive [in the UK]. I started losing weight, which is not a bad thing at the beginning, but then I was worrying because I couldn’t chew and eat well and was losing more weight … Here in Istanbul, I got dental implants – US$500 each, problem solved! In England, each implant is maybe £2,000 or £3,000.
In the waiting area of another clinic in Istanbul, I meet Mariam, a British woman of Iraqi background in her late 40s, who is making her second visit to the dentist here. Initially, she needed root canal therapy after experiencing severe pain for weeks. Having been quoted £1,200 in a private clinic in outer London, Mariam decided to fly to Istanbul instead, where she was quoted £150 by a dentist she knew through her large family. Even considering the cost of the flight, Mariam says the decision was obvious:
Dentists in England are so expensive and NHS appointments so difficult to find. It’s awful there, isn’t it? Dentists there blamed me for my rotten teeth. They say it’s my fault: I don’t clean or I ate sugar, or this or that. I grew up in a village in Iraq and didn’t go to the dentist – we were very poor. Then we left because of war, so we didn’t go to a dentist … When I arrived in London more than 20 years ago, I didn’t speak English, so I still didn’t go to the dentist … I think when you move from one place to another, you don’t go to the dentist unless you are in real, real pain.
In Istanbul, Mariam has opted not only for the urgent root canal treatment but also a longer and more complex treatment suggested by her consultant, who she says is a renowned doctor from Syria. This will include several extractions and implants of back and front teeth, and when I ask what she thinks of achieving a “Hollywood smile”, Mariam says:
Who doesn’t want a nice smile? I didn’t come here to be a model. I came because I was in pain, but I know this doctor is the best for implants, and my front teeth were rotten anyway.
Dentists in the UK warn about the risks of “overtreatment” abroad, but Mariam appears confident that this is her opportunity to solve all her oral health problems. Two of her sisters have already been through a similar treatment, so they all trust this doctor.
The UK’s ‘dental deserts’
To get a fuller understanding of the NHS dental crisis, I’ve also conducted 20 interviews in the UK with people who have travelled or were considering travelling abroad for dental treatment.
Joan, a 50-year-old woman from Exeter, tells me she considered going to Turkey and could have afforded it, but that her back and knee problems meant she could not brave the trip. She has lost all her lower front teeth due to gum disease and, when I meet her, has been waiting 13 months for an NHS dental appointment. Joan tells me she is living in “shame”, unable to smile.
In the UK, areas with extremely limited provision of NHS dental services – known as as “dental deserts” – include densely populated urban areas such as Portsmouth and Greater Manchester, as well as many rural and coastal areas.
In Felixstowe, the last dentist taking NHS patients went private in 2023, despite the efforts of the activist group Toothless in Suffolk to secure better access to NHS dentists in the area. It’s a similar story in Ripon, Yorkshire, and in Dumfries & Galloway, Scotland, where nearly 25,000 patients have been de-registered from NHS dentists since 2021.
Data shows that 2 million adults must travel at least 40 miles within the UK to access dental care. Branding travel for dental care as “tourism” carries the risk of disguising the elements of duress under which patients move to restore their oral health – nationally and internationally. It also hides the immobility of those who cannot undertake such journeys.
The 90-year-old woman in Dumfries & Galloway who now faces travelling for hours by bus to see an NHS dentist can hardly be considered “tourism” – nor the Ukrainian war refugees who travelled back from West Sussex and Norwich to Ukraine, rather than face the long wait to see an NHS dentist.
Many people I have spoken to cannot afford the cost of transport to attend dental appointments two hours away – or they have care responsibilities that make it impossible. Instead, they are forced to wait in pain, in the hope of one day securing an appointment closer to home.
‘Your crisis is our business’
The indignities of waiting in the UK are having a big impact on the lives of some local and foreign dentists in Turkey. Some neighbourhoods are rapidly changing as dental and other health clinics, usually in luxurious multi-storey glass buildings, mushroom. In the office of one large Istanbul medical complex with sections for hair transplants and dentistry (plus one linked to a hospital for more extensive cosmetic surgery), its Turkish owner and main investor tells me:
Your crisis is our business, but this is a bazaar. There are good clinics and bad clinics, and unfortunately sometimes foreign patients do not know which one to choose. But for us, the business is very good.
This clinic only caters to foreign patients. The owner, an architect by profession who also developed medical clinics in Brazil, describes how COVID had a major impact on his business:
When in Europe you had COVID lockdowns, Turkey allowed foreigners to come. Many people came for ‘medical tourism’ – we had many patients for cosmetic surgery and hair transplants. And that was when the dental business started, because our patients couldn’t see a dentist in Germany or England. Then more and more patients started to come for dental treatments, especially from the UK and Ireland. For them, it’s very, very cheap here.
The reasons include the value of the Turkish lira relative to the British pound, the low cost of labour, the increasing competition among Turkish clinics, and the sheer motivation of dentists here. While most dentists catering to foreign patients are from Turkey, others have arrived seeking refuge from war and violence in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and beyond. They work diligently to rebuild their lives, careers and lost wealth.
Regardless of their origin, all dentists in Turkey must be registered and certified. Hamed, a Syrian dentist and co-owner of a new clinic in Istanbul catering to European and North American patients, tells me:
I know that you say ‘Syrian’ and people think ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, and maybe think ‘how can this dentist be good?’ – but Syria, before the war, had very good doctors and dentists. Many of us came to Turkey and now I have a Turkish passport. I had to pass the exams to practise dentistry here – I study hard. The exams are in Turkish and they are difficult, so you cannot say that Syrian doctors are stupid.
Hamed talks excitedly about the latest technology that is coming to his profession: “There are always new materials and techniques, and we cannot stop learning.” He is about to travel to Paris to an international conference:
I can say my techniques are very advanced … I bet I put more implants and do more bone grafting and surgeries every week than any dentist you know in England. A good dentist is about practice and hand skills and experience. I work hard, very hard, because more and more patients are arriving to my clinic, because in England they don’t find dentists.
While there is no official data about the number of people travelling from the UK to Turkey for dental treatment, investors and dentists I speak to consider that numbers are rocketing. From all over the world, Turkey received 1.2 million visitors for “medical tourism” in 2022, an increase of 308% on the previous year. Of these, about 250,000 patients went for dentistry. One of the most renowned dental clinics in Istanbul had only 15 British patients in 2019, but that number increased to 2,200 in 2023 and is expected to reach 5,500 in 2024.
Like all forms of medical care, dental treatments carry risks. Most clinics in Turkey offer a ten-year guarantee for treatments and a printed clinical history of procedures carried out, so patients can show this to their local dentists and continue their regular annual care in the UK. Dental treatments, checkups and maintaining a good oral health is a life-time process, not a one-off event.
Many UK patients, however, are caught between a rock and a hard place – criticised for going abroad, yet unable to get affordable dental care in the UK before and after their return. The British Dental Association has called for more action to inform these patients about the risks of getting treated overseas – and has warned UK dentists about the legal implications of treating these patients on their return. But this does not address the difficulties faced by British patients who are being forced to go abroad in search of affordable, often urgent dental care.
A global emergency
The World Health Organization states that the explosion of oral disease around the world is a result of the “negligent attitude” that governments, policymakers and insurance companies have towards including oral healthcare under the umbrella of universal healthcare. It as if the health of our teeth and mouth is optional; somehow less important than treatment to the rest of our body. Yet complications from untreated tooth decay can lead to hospitalisation.
The main causes of oral health diseases are untreated tooth decay, severe gum disease, toothlessness, and cancers of the lip and oral cavity. Cases grew during the pandemic, when little or no attention was paid to oral health. Meanwhile, the global cosmetic dentistry market is predicted to continue growing at an annual rate of 13% for the rest of this decade, confirming the strong relationship between socioeconomic status and access to oral healthcare.
In the UK since 2018, there have been more than 218,000 admissions to hospital for rotting teeth, of which more than 100,000 were children. Some 40% of children in the UK have not seen a dentist in the past 12 months. The role of dentists in prevention of tooth decay and its complications, and in the early detection of mouth cancer, is vital. While there is a 90% survival rate for mouth cancer if spotted early, the lack of access to dental appointments is causing cases to go undetected.
The reasons for the crisis in NHS dentistry are complex, but include: the real-term cuts in funding to NHS dentistry; the challenges of recruitment and retention of dentists in rural and coastal areas; pay inequalities facing dental nurses, most of them women, who are being badly hit by the cost of living crisis; and, in England, the 2006 Dental Contract that does not remunerate dentists in a way that encourages them to continue seeing NHS patients.
The UK is suffering a mass exodus of the public dentistry workforce, with workers leaving the profession entirely or shifting to the private sector, where payments and life-work balance are better, bureaucracy is reduced, and prospects for career development look much better. A survey of general dental practitioners found that around half have reduced their NHS work since the pandemic – with 43% saying they were likely to go fully private, and 42% considering a career change or taking early retirement.
Reversing the UK’s dental crisis requires more commitment to substantial reform and funding than the “recovery plan” announced by Victoria Atkins, the secretary of state for health and social care, on February 7.
The stories I have gathered show that people travelling abroad for dental treatment don’t see themselves as “tourists” or vanity-driven consumers of the “Hollywood smile”. Rather, they have been forced by the crisis in NHS dentistry to seek out a service 1,500 miles away in Turkey that should be a basic, affordable right for all, on their own doorstep.
*Names in this article have been changed to protect the anonymity of the interviewees.
For you: more from our Insights series:
GP crisis: how did things go so wrong, and what needs to change?
Insomnia: how chronic sleep problems can lead to a spiralling decline in mental health
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Diana Ibanez Tirado receives funding from the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex.
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Beloved mall retailer files Chapter 7 bankruptcy, will liquidate
The struggling chain has given up the fight and will close hundreds of stores around the world.
It has been a brutal period for several popular retailers. The fallout from the covid pandemic and a challenging economic environment have pushed numerous chains into bankruptcy with Tuesday Morning, Christmas Tree Shops, and Bed Bath & Beyond all moving from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation.
In all three of those cases, the companies faced clear financial pressures that led to inventory problems and vendors demanding faster, or even upfront payment. That creates a sort of inevitability.
Related: Beloved retailer finds life after bankruptcy, new famous owner
When a retailer faces financial pressure it sets off a cycle where vendors become wary of selling them items. That leads to barren shelves and no ability for the chain to sell its way out of its financial problems.
Once that happens bankruptcy generally becomes the only option. Sometimes that means a Chapter 11 filing which gives the company a chance to negotiate with its creditors. In some cases, deals can be worked out where vendors extend longer terms or even forgive some debts, and banks offer an extension of loan terms.
In other cases, new funding can be secured which assuages vendor concerns or the company might be taken over by its vendors. Sometimes, as was the case with David's Bridal, a new owner steps in, adds new money, and makes deals with creditors in order to give the company a new lease on life.
It's rare that a retailer moves directly into Chapter 7 bankruptcy and decides to liquidate without trying to find a new source of funding.
The Body Shop has bad news for customers
The Body Shop has been in a very public fight for survival. Fears began when the company closed half of its locations in the United Kingdom. That was followed by a bankruptcy-style filing in Canada and an abrupt closure of its U.S. stores on March 4.
"The Canadian subsidiary of the global beauty and cosmetics brand announced it has started restructuring proceedings by filing a Notice of Intention (NOI) to Make a Proposal pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada). In the same release, the company said that, as of March 1, 2024, The Body Shop US Limited has ceased operations," Chain Store Age reported.
A message on the company's U.S. website shared a simple message that does not appear to be the entire story.
"We're currently undergoing planned maintenance, but don't worry we're due to be back online soon."
That same message is still on the company's website, but a new filing makes it clear that the site is not down for maintenance, it's down for good.
The Body Shop files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
While the future appeared bleak for The Body Shop, fans of the brand held out hope that a savior would step in. That's not going to be the case.
The Body Shop filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States.
"The US arm of the ethical cosmetics group has ceased trading at its 50 outlets. On Saturday (March 9), it filed for Chapter 7 insolvency, under which assets are sold off to clear debts, putting about 400 jobs at risk including those in a distribution center that still holds millions of dollars worth of stock," The Guardian reported.
After its closure in the United States, the survival of the brand remains very much in doubt. About half of the chain's stores in the United Kingdom remain open along with its Australian stores.
The future of those stores remains very much in doubt and the chain has shared that it needs new funding in order for them to continue operating.
The Body Shop did not respond to a request for comment from TheStreet.
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