ChoiceOne Financial Reports First Quarter 2022 Results
ChoiceOne Financial Reports First Quarter 2022 Results
PR Newswire
SPARTA, Mich., April 29, 2022
SPARTA, Mich., April 29, 2022 /PRNewswire/ — ChoiceOne Financial Services, Inc. (“ChoiceOne”, NASDAQ: COFS) reported net income of $5,528,000 or $0.74…
ChoiceOne Financial Reports First Quarter 2022 Results
PR Newswire
SPARTA, Mich., April 29, 2022
SPARTA, Mich., April 29, 2022 /PRNewswire/ -- ChoiceOne Financial Services, Inc. ("ChoiceOne", NASDAQ: COFS) reported net income of $5,528,000 or $0.74 per diluted share in the first quarter of 2022 compared to $6,238,000 or $0.80 per diluted share in the same period in 2021.
"We continue to see strong organic growth in both core deposits, which grew $93.3 million in the first quarter of 2022 or 18.2% on an annualized basis, and core loans, which grew $35.2 million in the first quarter of 2022 or 14.3% on an annualized basis" said Kelly Potes, Chief Executive Officer. "Growing our core loan portfolio is key to our strategy as we look to deploy our low-cost funding into higher earning assets. Our investments in building strong customer relationships are paying off and I am hopeful to continue this trend while still providing the service level our customers expect".
Total assets as of March 31, 2022 grew $10.1 million as compared to December 31, 2021 and $306.7 million compared to March 31, 2021, driven by core deposit growth. Growth in the first quarter was offset by a paydown of FHLB borrowings. Deposits grew $93.3 million in the first quarter of 2022 and $305.6 million since March 31, 2021. Despite the large increase in deposit balances, ChoiceOne has been able to maintain low deposit costs with interest expense from deposits up $34,000 in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the fourth quarter of 2021 and down $97,000 compared to the first quarter of 2021. Core loans, which exclude Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") loans, held for sale loans, and loans to other financial institutions, grew organically by $35.2 million during the first quarter of 2022. Additions to our commercial lending staff in 2021 and investments in the automation of our commercial loan process, have helped drive our pipeline of commercial loans and corresponding growth. Loans to other financial institutions decreased $42.6 million during the three months ended March 31, 2022. Loans to other financial institutions is comprised of a warehouse line of credit to facilitate mortgage loan originations and fluctuates with the national mortgage market. This balance is expected to remain minimal for the remainder of the year. During the three months ended March 31, 2022, $24.7 million of PPP loans were forgiven resulting in $869,000 of fee income. $8.5 million in PPP loans and $351,000 in deferred PPP fee income remains outstanding as of March 31,2022. Management expects the remaining PPP loans to be forgiven in the second quarter of 2022. Interest income increased $656,000 in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the fourth quarter of 2021. Securities interest income increased $360,000 due to a higher average balance while the increase in loan interest income was primarily due to accretion income from acquired loans of $818,000 and a larger core loan average balance.
ChoiceOne had no provision for loan losses expense for the three months ended March 31, 2022, as management has seen declining deferrals and very few past due loans as the economy recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. At March 31, 2022, the allowance for loan losses represented 0.74% of total loans. The remaining credit mark on acquired loans from the recent mergers with County Bank Corp. and Community Shores Bank Corporation totaled $4.5 million as of March 31, 2022. If the credit mark associated with the loans acquired in the mergers were added to the allowance for loan losses, the allowance for loan losses would have represented 1.18% of total loans excluding loans held for sale at March 31, 2022.
In the last two years ChoiceOne has grown its securities portfolio substantially. Total available for sale securities on December 31, 2020, amounted to $577.7 million and grew steadily to an available for sale balance on December 31, 2021, of $1.1 billion. Many of the securities making up this balance include local municipals and other securities ChoiceOne has no intent to sell prior to maturity. As such, on January 1, 2022, ChoiceOne elected to move $428.4 million of the portfolio into a held to maturity status. Management believes the $657.9 million in available for sale securities at March 31, 2022 to be sufficient for any future liquidity needs.
During the first quarter of 2022, the Federal Reserve sharply increased interest rates in response to published inflation rates. This change in interest rates increased ChoiceOne's unrealized pre-tax loss on the available for sale securities portfolio from $3.3 million at December 31, 2021 to $42.8 million at March 31, 2022. Additionally, meeting minutes from the Federal Open Market Committee indicated that interest rates are expected to continue to rise in order to combat inflation in the coming quarters. As such, ChoiceOne has elected to utilize interest rate derivatives in order to better manage its interest rate risk position. On April 21, 2022, ChoiceOne purchased five forward-starting interest rate caps with a total notional amount of $200 million and entered into a $200 million forward-starting pay-fixed interest rate swap. These strategies create accounting symmetry between available-for-sale securities and other comprehensive income (equity), thus protecting tangible capital from further increases in interest rates. ChoiceOne also entered into a $200 million receive-fixed interest rate swap, which, in the current environment, offsets the cost of the rising rate protection. These three strategies, in the aggregate, are expected to be modestly accretive to net income in 2022 and better position ChoiceOne Bank should rates continue to rise. Importantly, the transactions were structured to qualify for hedge accounting, which means that changes in the fair value of the instruments flow through other comprehensive income (equity).
Shareholders' equity totaled $191.1 million as of March 31, 2022, down from $221.7 million at year-end 2021 primarily due to an increase in the after-tax net unrealized holding loss on securities available for sale resulting from higher market interest rates. ChoiceOne Bank's capital position remains "well-capitalized" with a total risk-based capital ratio of 13.3% as of March 31, 2022, compared to 12.9% at December 31, 2021.
ChoiceOne repurchased 25,899 shares for $683,000, or a weighted average all-in cost per share of $26.35, during the first quarter of 2022. This was part of the common stock repurchase program announced in April 2021 which authorized repurchases of up to 390,114 shares, representing 5% of the total outstanding shares of common stock as of the date the program was adopted. Since adoption of the program, ChoiceOne has repurchased 335,173 shares for $8.5 million, or a weighted average all-in cost per share of $25.26. The total shares repurchased as part of the program as of March 31, 2022, represented roughly 4.5% of outstanding shares of ChoiceOne common stock as of March 31, 2022.
Total noninterest income declined $299,000 in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the prior quarter and $1.8 million compared to the quarter ended March 31, 2021. Total noninterest income in the first quarter of 2021 was bolstered by heightened levels of refinancing activity within ChoiceOne's mortgage portfolio, with gains on sales of loans $1.3 million larger than in the first quarter of 2022. Customer service charges declined $130,000 in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the fourth quarter of 2021 and increased $269,000 compared to the same period in the prior year. Prior year service charges were depressed by stay at home orders during the COVID 19 pandemic. The market value of equity securities declined during the current quarter compared to both the fourth quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of 2021 consistent with general market conditions. Equity investments include local small bank stocks and CRA bond mutual funds.
Total noninterest expense declined $68,000 in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the fourth quarter of 2021 and increased $1.2 million compared to the first quarter of 2021. The increase since the first quarter of 2021 is related to an increase in salaries and wages due to new commercial loan production staff and wealth management staff. Other expenses have also increased in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the same quarter in the prior year due to an increase to our FDIC insurance related and other expenses. ChoiceOne continues to monitor expenses and looks to improve our efficiency through automation and use of digital tools.
Kelly Potes, Chief Executive Officer commented. "As the interest rates continues to evolve, we remain focused on our strategy in growing strong customer relationships, which we expect will provide sustainable earnings in any rate environment."
About ChoiceOne
ChoiceOne Financial Services, Inc. is a financial holding company headquartered in Sparta, Michigan and the parent corporation of ChoiceOne Bank. Member FDIC. ChoiceOne Bank operates 35 offices in parts of Kent, Lapeer, Macomb, Muskegon, Newaygo, Ottawa, and St. Clair counties. ChoiceOne Bank offers insurance and investment products through its subsidiary, ChoiceOne Insurance Agencies, Inc. For more information, please visit Investor Relations at ChoiceOne's website at choiceone.com.
Forward-Looking Statements
This release may contain forward-looking statements. Words such as "anticipates," "believes," "estimates," "expects," "forecasts," "intends," "is likely," "plans," "predicts," "projects," "may," "could," "look forward," "continue", "future" and variations of such words and similar expressions are intended to identify such forward looking statements. These statements reflect current beliefs as to the expected outcomes of future events and are not guarantees of future performance. These statements involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions ("risk factors") that are difficult to predict with regard to timing, extent, likelihood and degree of occurrence. Therefore, actual results and outcomes may materially differ from what may be expressed, implied or forecasted in such forward-looking statements. Furthermore, ChoiceOne undertakes no obligation to update, amend, or clarify forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Risk factors include, but are not limited to, the risk factors described in Item 1A in ChoiceOne Financial Services, Inc.'s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2021.
Condensed Balance Sheets | ||||||||||||
(In thousands) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | 3/31/2021 | |||||||||
Cash and Cash Equivalents | $ | 89,976 | $ | 31,887 | $ | 135,328 | ||||||
Securities Available for Sale | 657,887 | 1,116,265 | 734,435 | |||||||||
Securities Held to Maturity | 429,918 | - | - | |||||||||
Loans Held For Sale | 13,450 | 9,351 | 18,736 | |||||||||
Loans to Other Financial Institutions | - | 42,632 | 7,312 | |||||||||
Loans, Net of Allowance For Loan Losses | 1,019,805 | 1,009,160 | 1,027,343 | |||||||||
Premises and Equipment | 29,678 | 29,880 | 29,870 | |||||||||
Cash Surrender Value of Life Insurance Policies | 43,520 | 43,356 | 32,938 | |||||||||
Goodwill | 59,946 | 59,946 | 59,946 | |||||||||
Core Deposit Intangible | 3,660 | 3,962 | 4,961 | |||||||||
Other Assets | 28,938 | 20,243 | 19,234 | |||||||||
Total Assets | $ | 2,376,778 | $ | 2,366,682 | $ | 2,070,103 | ||||||
Noninterest-bearing Deposits | $ | 565,657 | $ | 560,931 | $ | 515,552 | ||||||
Interest-bearing Deposits | 1,579,944 | 1,491,363 | 1,324,412 | |||||||||
Borrowings | - | 50,000 | 3,484 | |||||||||
Subordinated Debt | 35,078 | 35,017 | 3,115 | |||||||||
Other Liabilities | 4,981 | 7,702 | 4,901 | |||||||||
Total Liabilities | 2,185,660 | 2,145,013 | 1,851,464 | |||||||||
Common stock and paid-in capital, no par value; shares authorized: | 171,492 | 171,913 | 178,993 | |||||||||
Retained earnings | 55,988 | 52,332 | 42,012 | |||||||||
Accumulated other comprehensive income, net | (36,362) | (2,576) | (2,366) | |||||||||
Shareholders' Equity | 191,118 | 221,669 | 218,639 | |||||||||
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity | $ | 2,376,778 | $ | 2,366,682 | $ | 2,070,103 |
Condensed Statements of Income | ||||||||||||
Three Months Ended | ||||||||||||
(In Thousands, Except Per Share Data) | 3/31/2022 | 12/31/2021 | 3/31/2021 | |||||||||
Interest Income | ||||||||||||
Loans, including fees | $ | 12,298 | $ | 12,002 | $ | 12,682 | ||||||
Securities and other | 5,176 | 4,816 | 2,973 | |||||||||
Total Interest Income | 17,474 | 16,818 | 15,655 | |||||||||
Interest Expense | ||||||||||||
Deposits | 783 | 749 | 880 | |||||||||
Borrowings | 370 | 324 | 87 | |||||||||
Total Interest Expense | 1,153 | 1,073 | 967 | |||||||||
Net Interest Income | 16,321 | 15,745 | 14,688 | |||||||||
Provision for Loan Losses | - | - | 250 | |||||||||
Net Interest Income After Provision for Loan Losses | 16,321 | 15,745 | 14,438 | |||||||||
Noninterest Income | ||||||||||||
Customer service charges | 2,189 | 2,319 | 1,920 | |||||||||
Insurance and investment commissions | 205 | 141 | 273 | |||||||||
Gains on sales of loans | 857 | 1,032 | 2,128 | |||||||||
Gains (losses) on sales of securities | - | (43) | 1 | |||||||||
Trust income | 178 | 178 | 172 | |||||||||
Earnings on life insurance policies | 280 | 239 | 186 | |||||||||
Change in market value of equity securities | (356) | 18 | 608 | |||||||||
Other income | 492 | 260 | 312 | |||||||||
Total Noninterest Income | 3,845 | 4,144 | 5,600 | |||||||||
Noninterest Expense | ||||||||||||
Salaries and benefits | 7,606 | 7,581 | 7,168 | |||||||||
Occupancy and equipment | 1,625 | 1,577 | 1,555 | |||||||||
Data processing | 1,744 | 1,616 | 1,429 | |||||||||
Professional fees | 510 | 583 | 729 | |||||||||
Core deposit intangible amortization | 282 | 302 | 307 | |||||||||
Other expenses | 1,923 | 2,099 | 1,340 | |||||||||
Total Noninterest Expense | 13,690 | 13,758 | 12,528 | |||||||||
Income Before Income Tax | 6,476 | 6,131 | 7,510 | |||||||||
Income Tax Expense | 948 | 1,119 | 1,272 | |||||||||
Net Income | $ | 5,528 | $ | 5,012 | $ | 6,238 | ||||||
Basic Earnings Per Share | $ | 0.74 | $ | 0.67 | $ | 0.80 | ||||||
Diluted Earnings Per Share | $ | 0.74 | $ | 0.66 | $ | 0.80 |
Other Selected Financial Highlights (Unaudited) | ||||||||||||||||||||
Quarterly | ||||||||||||||||||||
Earnings | 2022 1st | 2021 4th | 2021 3rd | 2021 2nd | 2021 1st | |||||||||||||||
(in thousands except per share data) | ||||||||||||||||||||
Net interest income | $ | 16,321 | $ | 15,745 | $ | 15,700 | $ | 14,508 | $ | 14,688 | ||||||||||
Provision for loan losses | - | - | - | 166 | 250 | |||||||||||||||
Noninterest income | 3,845 | 4,144 | 4,718 | 4,732 | 5,600 | |||||||||||||||
Noninterest expense | 13,690 | 13,758 | 13,506 | 13,129 | 12,528 | |||||||||||||||
Net income before federal income tax expense | 6,476 | 6,131 | 6,912 | 5,945 | 7,510 | |||||||||||||||
Income tax expense | 948 | 1,119 | 1,163 | 902 | 1,272 | |||||||||||||||
Net income | 5,528 | 5,012 | 5,749 | 5,043 | 6,238 | |||||||||||||||
Basic earnings per share | 0.74 | 0.67 | 0.75 | 0.65 | 0.80 | |||||||||||||||
Diluted earnings per share | 0.74 | 0.66 | 0.75 | 0.65 | 0.80 | |||||||||||||||
End of period balances | 2022 1st | 2021 4th | 2021 3rd | 2021 2nd | 2021 1st | |||||||||||||||
(in thousands) | ||||||||||||||||||||
Gross loans | $ | 1,040,856 | $ | 1,068,832 | $ | 1,034,590 | $ | 1,017,472 | $ | 1,061,131 | ||||||||||
Loans held for sale (1) | 13,450 | 9,351 | 7,505 | 12,884 | 18,736 | |||||||||||||||
Loans to other financial institutions (2) | - | 42,632 | 38,728 | - | 7,312 | |||||||||||||||
PPP loans (3) | 8,476 | 33,129 | 61,192 | 109,898 | 137,458 | |||||||||||||||
Core loans (gross loans excluding 1, 2, and 3 above) | 1,018,930 | 983,720 | 927,165 | 894,690 | 897,625 | |||||||||||||||
Allowance for loan losses | 7,601 | 7,688 | 7,755 | 7,950 | 7,740 | |||||||||||||||
Securities available for sale | 657,887 | 1,116,264 | 1,044,538 | 871,964 | 734,435 | |||||||||||||||
Securities held to maturity | 429,918 | - | - | - | - | |||||||||||||||
Other interest-earning assets | 62,945 | 9,751 | 30,383 | 64,407 | 106,279 | |||||||||||||||
Total earning assets (before allowance) | 2,191,606 | 2,194,847 | 2,109,511 | 1,953,843 | 1,901,845 | |||||||||||||||
Total assets | 2,376,778 | 2,366,682 | 2,277,180 | 2,120,931 | 2,070,103 | |||||||||||||||
Noninterest-bearing deposits | 565,657 | 560,931 | 543,165 | 527,964 | 515,552 | |||||||||||||||
Interest-bearing deposits | 1,579,944 | 1,491,363 | 1,468,985 | 1,352,771 | 1,324,412 | |||||||||||||||
Total deposits | 2,145,601 | 2,052,294 | 2,012,150 | 1,880,735 | 1,839,964 | |||||||||||||||
Total subordinated debt | 35,078 | 35,017 | 34,956 | 3,140 | 3,115 | |||||||||||||||
Total borrowed funds | - | 50,000 | - | 2,642 | 3,484 | |||||||||||||||
Total interest-bearing liabilities | 1,615,022 | 1,576,380 | 1,503,941 | 1,358,553 | 1,331,011 | |||||||||||||||
Shareholders' equity | 191,118 | 221,669 | 225,055 | 228,521 | 218,639 | |||||||||||||||
Average Balances | 2022 1st | 2021 4th | 2021 3rd | 2021 2nd | 2021 1st | |||||||||||||||
(in thousands) | ||||||||||||||||||||
Loans | $ | 1,037,646 | $ | 1,019,966 | $ | 1,021,326 | $ | 1,041,118 | $ | 1,080,181 | ||||||||||
Securities | 1,130,681 | 1,079,616 | 922,653 | 824,753 | 639,803 | |||||||||||||||
Other interest-earning assets | 36,460 | 29,999 | 106,831 | 57,782 | 84,822 | |||||||||||||||
Total earning assets (before allowance) | 2,204,787 | 2,129,581 | 2,050,810 | 1,923,653 | 1,804,806 | |||||||||||||||
Total assets | 2,375,864 | 2,298,579 | 2,234,228 | 2,091,900 | 1,989,760 | |||||||||||||||
Noninterest-bearing deposits | 553,267 | 556,214 | 545,251 | 533,877 | 479,649 | |||||||||||||||
Interest-bearing deposits | 1,548,685 | 1,472,022 | 1,441,831 | 1,327,836 | 1,266,356 | |||||||||||||||
Total deposits | 2,101,952 | 2,028,236 | 1,987,082 | 1,861,713 | 1,746,005 | |||||||||||||||
Total subordinated debt | 35,342 | 35,674 | 9,154 | 3,123 | 3,099 | |||||||||||||||
Total borrowed funds | 10,239 | 8,010 | 2,667 | 2,758 | 8,462 | |||||||||||||||
Total interest-bearing liabilities | 1,594,266 | 1,515,706 | 1,453,652 | 1,333,717 | 1,277,917 | |||||||||||||||
Shareholders' equity | 206,280 | 221,076 | 229,369 | 224,993 | 224,257 | |||||||||||||||
Performance Ratios | 2022 1st | 2021 4th | 2021 3rd | 2021 2nd | 2021 1st | |||||||||||||||
Return on average assets | 0.93 | % | 0.87 | % | 1.03 | % | 0.96 | % | 1.25 | % | ||||||||||
Return on average equity | 10.72 | % | 9.07 | % | 10.03 | % | 8.97 | % | 11.13 | % | ||||||||||
Return on average tangible common equity | 14.85 | % | 12.16 | % | 13.28 | % | 11.89 | % | 16.31 | % | ||||||||||
Net interest margin (fully tax-equivalent) | 3.04 | % | 3.04 | % | 3.06 | % | 3.02 | % | 3.23 | % | ||||||||||
Efficiency ratio | 64.37 | % | 66.15 | % | 63.16 | % | 64.70 | % | 61.20 | % | ||||||||||
Full-time equivalent employees | 376 | 374 | 358 | 362 | 355 |
View original content to download multimedia:https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/choiceone-financial-reports-first-quarter-2022-results-301535704.html
SOURCE ChoiceOne Financial Services, Inc.
Spread & Containment
The Coming Of The Police State In America
The Coming Of The Police State In America
Authored by Jeffrey Tucker via The Epoch Times,
The National Guard and the State Police are now…
Authored by Jeffrey Tucker via The Epoch Times,
The National Guard and the State Police are now patrolling the New York City subway system in an attempt to do something about the explosion of crime. As part of this, there are bag checks and new surveillance of all passengers. No legislation, no debate, just an edict from the mayor.
Many citizens who rely on this system for transportation might welcome this. It’s a city of strict gun control, and no one knows for sure if they have the right to defend themselves. Merchants have been harassed and even arrested for trying to stop looting and pillaging in their own shops.
The message has been sent: Only the police can do this job. Whether they do it or not is another matter.
Things on the subway system have gotten crazy. If you know it well, you can manage to travel safely, but visitors to the city who take the wrong train at the wrong time are taking grave risks.
In actual fact, it’s guaranteed that this will only end in confiscating knives and other things that people carry in order to protect themselves while leaving the actual criminals even more free to prey on citizens.
The law-abiding will suffer and the criminals will grow more numerous. It will not end well.
When you step back from the details, what we have is the dawning of a genuine police state in the United States. It only starts in New York City. Where is the Guard going to be deployed next? Anywhere is possible.
If the crime is bad enough, citizens will welcome it. It must have been this way in most times and places that when the police state arrives, the people cheer.
We will all have our own stories of how this came to be. Some might begin with the passage of the Patriot Act and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2001. Some will focus on gun control and the taking away of citizens’ rights to defend themselves.
My own version of events is closer in time. It began four years ago this month with lockdowns. That’s what shattered the capacity of civil society to function in the United States. Everything that has happened since follows like one domino tumbling after another.
It goes like this:
1) lockdown,
2) loss of moral compass and spreading of loneliness and nihilism,
3) rioting resulting from citizen frustration, 4) police absent because of ideological hectoring,
5) a rise in uncontrolled immigration/refugees,
6) an epidemic of ill health from substance abuse and otherwise,
7) businesses flee the city
8) cities fall into decay, and that results in
9) more surveillance and police state.
The 10th stage is the sacking of liberty and civilization itself.
It doesn’t fall out this way at every point in history, but this seems like a solid outline of what happened in this case. Four years is a very short period of time to see all of this unfold. But it is a fact that New York City was more-or-less civilized only four years ago. No one could have predicted that it would come to this so quickly.
But once the lockdowns happened, all bets were off. Here we had a policy that most directly trampled on all freedoms that we had taken for granted. Schools, businesses, and churches were slammed shut, with various levels of enforcement. The entire workforce was divided between essential and nonessential, and there was widespread confusion about who precisely was in charge of designating and enforcing this.
It felt like martial law at the time, as if all normal civilian law had been displaced by something else. That something had to do with public health, but there was clearly more going on, because suddenly our social media posts were censored and we were being asked to do things that made no sense, such as mask up for a virus that evaded mask protection and walk in only one direction in grocery aisles.
Vast amounts of the white-collar workforce stayed home—and their kids, too—until it became too much to bear. The city became a ghost town. Most U.S. cities were the same.
As the months of disaster rolled on, the captives were let out of their houses for the summer in order to protest racism but no other reason. As a way of excusing this, the same public health authorities said that racism was a virus as bad as COVID-19, so therefore it was permitted.
The protests had turned to riots in many cities, and the police were being defunded and discouraged to do anything about the problem. Citizens watched in horror as downtowns burned and drug-crazed freaks took over whole sections of cities. It was like every standard of decency had been zapped out of an entire swath of the population.
Meanwhile, large checks were arriving in people’s bank accounts, defying every normal economic expectation. How could people not be working and get their bank accounts more flush with cash than ever? There was a new law that didn’t even require that people pay rent. How weird was that? Even student loans didn’t need to be paid.
By the fall, recess from lockdown was over and everyone was told to go home again. But this time they had a job to do: They were supposed to vote. Not at the polling places, because going there would only spread germs, or so the media said. When the voting results finally came in, it was the absentee ballots that swung the election in favor of the opposition party that actually wanted more lockdowns and eventually pushed vaccine mandates on the whole population.
The new party in control took note of the large population movements out of cities and states that they controlled. This would have a large effect on voting patterns in the future. But they had a plan. They would open the borders to millions of people in the guise of caring for refugees. These new warm bodies would become voters in time and certainly count on the census when it came time to reapportion political power.
Meanwhile, the native population had begun to swim in ill health from substance abuse, widespread depression, and demoralization, plus vaccine injury. This increased dependency on the very institutions that had caused the problem in the first place: the medical/scientific establishment.
The rise of crime drove the small businesses out of the city. They had barely survived the lockdowns, but they certainly could not survive the crime epidemic. This undermined the tax base of the city and allowed the criminals to take further control.
The same cities became sanctuaries for the waves of migrants sacking the country, and partisan mayors actually used tax dollars to house these invaders in high-end hotels in the name of having compassion for the stranger. Citizens were pushed out to make way for rampaging migrant hordes, as incredible as this seems.
But with that, of course, crime rose ever further, inciting citizen anger and providing a pretext to bring in the police state in the form of the National Guard, now tasked with cracking down on crime in the transportation system.
What’s the next step? It’s probably already here: mass surveillance and censorship, plus ever-expanding police power. This will be accompanied by further population movements, as those with the means to do so flee the city and even the country and leave it for everyone else to suffer.
As I tell the story, all of this seems inevitable. It is not. It could have been stopped at any point. A wise and prudent political leadership could have admitted the error from the beginning and called on the country to rediscover freedom, decency, and the difference between right and wrong. But ego and pride stopped that from happening, and we are left with the consequences.
The government grows ever bigger and civil society ever less capable of managing itself in large urban centers. Disaster is unfolding in real time, mitigated only by a rising stock market and a financial system that has yet to fall apart completely.
Are we at the middle stages of total collapse, or at the point where the population and people in leadership positions wise up and decide to put an end to the downward slide? It’s hard to know. But this much we do know: There is a growing pocket of resistance out there that is fed up and refuses to sit by and watch this great country be sacked and taken over by everything it was set up to prevent.
Government
Low Iron Levels In Blood Could Trigger Long COVID: Study
Low Iron Levels In Blood Could Trigger Long COVID: Study
Authored by Amie Dahnke via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
People with inadequate…
Authored by Amie Dahnke via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
People with inadequate iron levels in their blood due to a COVID-19 infection could be at greater risk of long COVID.
A new study indicates that problems with iron levels in the bloodstream likely trigger chronic inflammation and other conditions associated with the post-COVID phenomenon. The findings, published on March 1 in Nature Immunology, could offer new ways to treat or prevent the condition.
Long COVID Patients Have Low Iron Levels
Researchers at the University of Cambridge pinpointed low iron as a potential link to long-COVID symptoms thanks to a study they initiated shortly after the start of the pandemic. They recruited people who tested positive for the virus to provide blood samples for analysis over a year, which allowed the researchers to look for post-infection changes in the blood. The researchers looked at 214 samples and found that 45 percent of patients reported symptoms of long COVID that lasted between three and 10 months.
In analyzing the blood samples, the research team noticed that people experiencing long COVID had low iron levels, contributing to anemia and low red blood cell production, just two weeks after they were diagnosed with COVID-19. This was true for patients regardless of age, sex, or the initial severity of their infection.
According to one of the study co-authors, the removal of iron from the bloodstream is a natural process and defense mechanism of the body.
But it can jeopardize a person’s recovery.
“When the body has an infection, it responds by removing iron from the bloodstream. This protects us from potentially lethal bacteria that capture the iron in the bloodstream and grow rapidly. It’s an evolutionary response that redistributes iron in the body, and the blood plasma becomes an iron desert,” University of Oxford professor Hal Drakesmith said in a press release. “However, if this goes on for a long time, there is less iron for red blood cells, so oxygen is transported less efficiently affecting metabolism and energy production, and for white blood cells, which need iron to work properly. The protective mechanism ends up becoming a problem.”
The research team believes that consistently low iron levels could explain why individuals with long COVID continue to experience fatigue and difficulty exercising. As such, the researchers suggested iron supplementation to help regulate and prevent the often debilitating symptoms associated with long COVID.
“It isn’t necessarily the case that individuals don’t have enough iron in their body, it’s just that it’s trapped in the wrong place,” Aimee Hanson, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cambridge who worked on the study, said in the press release. “What we need is a way to remobilize the iron and pull it back into the bloodstream, where it becomes more useful to the red blood cells.”
The research team pointed out that iron supplementation isn’t always straightforward. Achieving the right level of iron varies from person to person. Too much iron can cause stomach issues, ranging from constipation, nausea, and abdominal pain to gastritis and gastric lesions.
1 in 5 Still Affected by Long COVID
COVID-19 has affected nearly 40 percent of Americans, with one in five of those still suffering from symptoms of long COVID, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Long COVID is marked by health issues that continue at least four weeks after an individual was initially diagnosed with COVID-19. Symptoms can last for days, weeks, months, or years and may include fatigue, cough or chest pain, headache, brain fog, depression or anxiety, digestive issues, and joint or muscle pain.
Uncategorized
February Employment Situation
By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000…
By Paul Gomme and Peter Rupert
The establishment data from the BLS showed a 275,000 increase in payroll employment for February, outpacing the 230,000 average over the previous 12 months. The payroll data for January and December were revised down by a total of 167,000. The private sector added 223,000 new jobs, the largest gain since May of last year.
Temporary help services employment continues a steep decline after a sharp post-pandemic rise.
Average hours of work increased from 34.2 to 34.3. The increase, along with the 223,000 private employment increase led to a hefty increase in total hours of 5.6% at an annualized rate, also the largest increase since May of last year.
The establishment report, once again, beat “expectations;” the WSJ survey of economists was 198,000. Other than the downward revisions, mentioned above, another bit of negative news was a smallish increase in wage growth, from $34.52 to $34.57.
The household survey shows that the labor force increased 150,000, a drop in employment of 184,000 and an increase in the number of unemployed persons of 334,000. The labor force participation rate held steady at 62.5, the employment to population ratio decreased from 60.2 to 60.1 and the unemployment rate increased from 3.66 to 3.86. Remember that the unemployment rate is the number of unemployed relative to the labor force (the number employed plus the number unemployed). Consequently, the unemployment rate can go up if the number of unemployed rises holding fixed the labor force, or if the labor force shrinks holding the number unemployed unchanged. An increase in the unemployment rate is not necessarily a bad thing: it may reflect a strong labor market drawing “marginally attached” individuals from outside the labor force. Indeed, there was a 96,000 decline in those workers.
Earlier in the week, the BLS announced JOLTS (Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey) data for January. There isn’t much to report here as the job openings changed little at 8.9 million, the number of hires and total separations were little changed at 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively.
As has been the case for the last couple of years, the number of job openings remains higher than the number of unemployed persons.
Also earlier in the week the BLS announced that productivity increased 3.2% in the 4th quarter with output rising 3.5% and hours of work rising 0.3%.
The bottom line is that the labor market continues its surprisingly (to some) strong performance, once again proving stronger than many had expected. This strength makes it difficult to justify any interest rate cuts soon, particularly given the recent inflation spike.
unemployment pandemic unemployment-
Uncategorized2 weeks ago
All Of The Elements Are In Place For An Economic Crisis Of Staggering Proportions
-
Uncategorized1 month ago
Cathie Wood sells a major tech stock (again)
-
Uncategorized3 weeks ago
California Counties Could Be Forced To Pay $300 Million To Cover COVID-Era Program
-
Uncategorized2 weeks ago
Apparel Retailer Express Moving Toward Bankruptcy
-
Uncategorized3 weeks ago
Industrial Production Decreased 0.1% in January
-
International1 day ago
Walmart launches clever answer to Target’s new membership program
-
Uncategorized3 weeks ago
RFK Jr: The Wuhan Cover-Up & The Rise Of The Biowarfare-Industrial Complex
-
Uncategorized3 weeks ago
GOP Efforts To Shore Up Election Security In Swing States Face Challenges