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China Credit Creation Craters, Sparking Speculation Of A Growth, Stock Bounce

China Credit Creation Craters, Sparking Speculation Of A Growth, Stock Bounce

While we wait for China’s economic data dump due Monday, when…

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China Credit Creation Craters, Sparking Speculation Of A Growth, Stock Bounce

While we wait for China's economic data dump due Monday, when industrial production and retail sales are expected to crater to deep negative territory as a result of the ongoing covid lockdowns, this morning we got a harsh reminder just how hard the world's 2nd biggest economy has been hit when Beijing reported that April total social financing and RMB loans came in much below market expectations, even as M2 growth accelerated and was above market expectations on the back of the RRR cut and more expansionary fiscal policy stance.

Here are the details:

  • New CNY loans: RMB 645.4 bn in April, badly missing consensus of RMB 1520bn. Outstanding CNY loan growth: 10.9% yoy in April vs March 11.4% yoy; Overall CNY loans growth decelerated materially and grew 6.6% mom annualized sa from 18.1% in March.
  • Total social financing RMB 910bn in April, badly missing consensus growth of RMB 2200bn; Total social financing (TSF) was well below expectations after a strong acceleration in March. The sequential growth of TSF stock decelerated to 3.9% mom annualized in April, the slowest sequential growth in the past decade.
  • TSF stock growth was 10.2% yoy in April, slower than the 10.6% in March. The implied month-on-month growth of TSF stock decelerated to 3.9% from 14.4% in March.
  • M2: 10.5% yoy in April vs. above consensus of 9.9% yoy. March: 9.7% yoy; M2 year-on-year growth accelerated on the other hand to 10.5% yoy in April, vs 9.7% in March, and expanded by 13.8% in month-over-month annualized terms, vs 24.4% in March.

Among major TSF components, shadow banking credit continued to contract in April at a much faster pace compared with March. Trust, entrusted loans and undiscounted bankers’ acceptance bills fell RMB275bn in April, vs the RMB113bn contraction in March. Based on loans to different sectors, weakness in loan growth was broad-based, with the only exception being bill financing. Corporate mid-to-long term loan growth was 6% vs 22.5% mom annualized in March. Corporate bill financing rose strongly by 102.4% mom annualized from 97.3% in March. On loans to households, total household loans declined by 1.7% month-over-month annualized, vs an expansion of 6.6% in March. PBOC changed their categorization of household loans and now focuses on usage of loans (housing related vs consumption related, for example), rather than by maturity. April data are thus not strictly comparable with March data. However, on a net basis, new mortgages were -61bn RMB in April, in comparison with household new medium to long term loans (which are mostly mortgages) of 492bn RMB in April 2021, or +374bn RMB in March 2022 (NSA basis). Government and corporate bond issuance also slowed in April.

According to Goldman, "the composition of RMB loans suggests corporate loan growth decelerated and household loans stock declined in April", which is painfully obvious of course. The question is why, and according to the PBOC, credit demand tumbled due to the Covid resurgence which was cited as one main reason behind the weak RMB loans and TSF data. Medium to long term loan growth was still much slower than short term loans (such as bill financing) growth, and loans to the real economy was also much lower than overall RMB new loans (which include lending between financial institutions). "These all implied very weak credit demand despite monetary policy easing", according to Goldman.

What does China's collapsing credit data means? Well, as Bloomberg's Simon White writes, liquidity and lending data in China looks to be forming a trough, which points to a bottom in growth and stocks. However, there are two important caveats:

  1. growth is likely to be lower than its previous trend as internal imbalances rise again; and
  2. any growth is vulnerable to a wage-price spiral if CPI takes off.

Echoing what we wrote above, White writes that on the surface, April lending data for China released today looked dismal, showing a Covid-driven slump for aggregate financing and new CNY loans, "but monthly numbers are noisy and impacted by seasonal effects. Looking at the 1-year aggregate sum’s change over the last year gives a more stable picture, and on this basis new CNY loans look to be bottoming."

Meanwhile, today’s announcement that China will build more Covid hospitals and increased testing suggests they are making the first steps towards “endemicity”, or living with Covid according to White. Moreover, the PBoC has recently introduced new relending programs and further loosened restrictions to aid beleaguered property developers. Lending going forward should thus begin to pick up steam, which points to growth soon turning up.

Still, the total figures mask the sharp decline in lending to the household sector, in a sign imbalances are worsening again. As the Bloomberg strategist explains, a key feature of China’s economy has been to repress the household sector to the benefit of the export-orientated corporate sector. The household sector is a net importer so inhibiting its demand widens the trade surplus. Further household repression has resulted in even larger trade surpluses through the pandemic, which China must foist upon the rest of the world.

Of course, the flipside of trade surpluses is capital outflow, and capital outflow from China has been depressing domestic credit (it will also soon prove a major tailwind to bitcoin once Chinese households with $35 trillion in deposits realize more devaluation is coming and scramble to park their capital offshore using the only possible mechanism available). Rising trade surpluses and falling FX reserves (some of which is due to the rising dollar and rising US yields) betray increasing capital leakage. In an economy with a managed exchange rate and capital controls, capital outflow leads to a destruction of domestic credit.

This is why the yuan has been allowed to weaken, as it lessens the fall in domestic credit from capital outflow. However, as White warns, it also adds to imbalances, and globally it requires a greater trade deficit in the US. These are bad for China’s and the US’s growth in the medium term.

Bottom line: growth in China should soon bottom, but rise at a slower pace than before. Nevertheless, all bets are off if food prices drive an acceleration in China’s CPI - the way they did in 2011 - risking a wage-price spiral, a significantly weaker yuan, and a rise in global trade protectionism.

Tyler Durden Fri, 05/13/2022 - 15:05

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NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally From October’s Low

Yesterday we posted NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally from the Sep/Oct Low. This
year we have hit the low in October, so here are NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally stat’s from October
lows….

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Yesterday we posted NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally from the Sep/Oct Low. This year we have hit the low in October, so here are NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally stat’s from October lows. Since 1971, there has been a NASDAQ Yearend Rally 98.1% of the time, and its average advance has been 13.1%. We define the Yearend Rally here as the gain from NASDAQ’s October closing low through its high in November or December. 

NASDAQ’s best Yearend rally was an amazing 54.5% in 1998. And even when we review NASDAQ’s performance from the same October low through the last day of the year, NASDAQ has been nearly as strong, advancing 46 of 52 years or 88.5% of the time with an average gain of 9.5%. Only one (2007) of the six losses was a pre-election year.

Buy in October, and Get Your Portfolio Sober

Octoberphobia strikes again but fear not. Our Tactical Seasonal MACD Buy signal has triggered. Market seasonality has turned bullish, and October has historically been a good time to buy. Our bullish outlook for Q4 remains intact. The market’s pullback/correction has most likely run its course, the seasonal low is in, and the market is likely to begin a new trend higher. Weakness can be considered an opportunity to accumulate new long positions for the “Best Months.”

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Uncategorized

NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally From October’s Low

Yesterday we posted NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally from the Sep/Oct Low. This
year we have hit the low in October, so here are NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally stat’s from October
lows….

Published

on

Yesterday we posted NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally from the Sep/Oct Low. This year we have hit the low in October, so here are NASDAQ’s Q4 Rally stat’s from October lows. Since 1971, there has been a NASDAQ Yearend Rally 98.1% of the time, and its average advance has been 13.1%. We define the Yearend Rally here as the gain from NASDAQ’s October closing low through its high in November or December. 

NASDAQ’s best Yearend rally was an amazing 54.5% in 1998. And even when we review NASDAQ’s performance from the same October low through the last day of the year, NASDAQ has been nearly as strong, advancing 46 of 52 years or 88.5% of the time with an average gain of 9.5%. Only one (2007) of the six losses was a pre-election year.

Buy in October, and Get Your Portfolio Sober

Octoberphobia strikes again but fear not. Our Tactical Seasonal MACD Buy signal has triggered. Market seasonality has turned bullish, and October has historically been a good time to buy. Our bullish outlook for Q4 remains intact. The market’s pullback/correction has most likely run its course, the seasonal low is in, and the market is likely to begin a new trend higher. Weakness can be considered an opportunity to accumulate new long positions for the “Best Months.”

Don’t delay, click here and subscribe today!

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International

Why heating your home this winter may be even harder than last year

Time is running out to ensure that people in fuel poverty can afford to keep warm this winter.

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Daisy Daisy/Shutterstock

Domestic energy prices more than doubled during 2022 compared with the year before. This meant that the number of UK households in fuel poverty who could not afford to heat their homes to a safe level rose from 4.5 million to 7.3 million.

The UK government attempted to alleviate the impact of rocketing bills with a package of support measures. This included capping the unit cost of electricity and gas, a £400 rebate to all households using mains gas for heating and £200 for those using alternative fuels, and a further £650 “cost of living payment” to claimants of means-tested benefits.

Many of these schemes ended in spring 2023. And with wholesale gas costs and the government’s energy price cap having come down somewhat, you could be forgiven for thinking that the worst of the energy crisis has passed.

But that’s not the case for many billpayers – in fact, this winter is likely to be worse than the last for many households.

The energy price cap, introduced in 2019 by market regulator Ofgem, limits how much people pay for each unit of gas and electricity. The latest price cap, set on October 1 2023, means that a typical household will pay £1,834 a year for energy – less than £2,000 for the first time in 18 months.

This might sound like good news, but it’s still a substantial increase on the pre-crisis cap. In August 2021, the most a typical household could expect to pay in a year for energy was £1,277.

Although the unit prices of electricity and gas have fallen, there has been a steep increase in standing charges. These are a levy on all energy bills which cover the costs associated with supplying energy to homes.

Standing charges have gone up from around £186 a year pre-crisis to just over £300 now – effectively adding £110 to bills.

An engineer atop of wooden electricity transmission pole.
Standing charges pay for the upkeep of the UK’s energy supply network. KingTa/Shutterstock

Standing charges are regressive because they are the same for everyone, regardless of how much energy you consume. Poorer households often use much less energy than wealthier ones, so standing charges make up a larger proportion of their energy costs.

In fact, some low-income households use such small amounts of energy that they are paying little more than their standing charges.

Energy bill rebates ended

The £400 energy bill rebate paid to all households last winter has now ended. Meanwhile, cost of living payments to claimants of means-tested benefits have increased from £650 to £900 a year. This will be helpful to those who qualify, but one third of households eligible for means-tested welfare payments do not claim them due to stigma, lack of awareness or bad experiences with the assessment process, and so will receive no assistance.

Many households who do receive these cost of living payments will spend it on other expenses, such as food, rather than heating their home. This reflects the fact that energy is often seen by struggling households as something that can be rationed.

If you’re in a household that does not qualify for the cost of living payment then the savings of around £150 that resulted from the lowering of the cap will soon be more than cancelled out by the lack of a rebate.

Cold homes can kill

Despite the financial support offered last winter, average levels of energy debt for people contacting Citizens Advice in England and Wales have risen sharply over the last year, from around £1,400 per household on average in March 2022 to £1,711 in July 2023. One-third of UK energy customers are now in arrears.

So although energy bills have fallen slightly, many households are less resilient to financial shocks than they were in early 2022. Volatile energy prices are predicted to last until the end of the decade.

Research last winter found that households in fuel poverty were underheating their homes, causing damp and mould that can create serious health problems and exacerbating anguish and stress. The health risks of a cold home increase with repeated exposure.

A PVC window frame with black mould growing on it.
Poorly heated homes are at risk of damp. Burdun Iliya/Shutterstock

As temperatures begin to fall again, a range of measures are urgently needed to prevent a crisis worse than that of last winter.

What can be done to help?

Since energy prices are expected to remain high for years, long-term solutions are vital. There must be increased investment in efforts to insulate the UK’s leaky housing stock. But with winter just weeks away, what can the government do right now?

To start, it could offer greater energy bill rebates. Given the scale of the fuel poverty problem, eligibility for these rebates must be wide enough for anyone on a below average income to receive help.

Alternatively, the government could make the rebates universal again, and potentially recoup the costs by increasing taxes on the most wealthy or energy company profits. At the very least, unclaimed energy bill support from last winter should be used to support those likely to struggle in the coming winter, rather than being returned to the treasury.

Cut funding for government-backed advice services could also be restored. And there are reforms to the retail energy market that could be implemented fairly quickly, such as bringing standing charges in line with levels of usage.

More fundamentally, there are a number of proposals that would be fairer than the current system and could be implemented together for maximum impact. These include a “green power pool”, which would ensure that the cheap power generated by renewables such as wind and solar benefits those most in need first and foremost, social tariffs (discounted energy bills for low-income households), or a national energy guarantee that would secure access to enough free energy to meet everyone’s basic needs.

The government’s forthcoming autumn statement must not sidestep these issues if people in fuel poverty are to stay safe and warm this winter.

Aimee Ambrose receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Economic and Social Research Council and the Energy Innovation Centre.

Lucie Middlemiss receives funding from Horizon 2020, the Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions and the British Academy. She has previously received funding from the UK Energy Research Centre (UKRI) and the Nuffield Foundation.

Neil Simcock receives funding from the Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions. He has previously received funding for fuel poverty research from the Royal Geographical Society (with IBG) and the EU under the Horizon 2020 programme.

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