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AUXLY REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2022 FINANCIAL RESULTS AND PROVIDES OUTLOOK FOR 2023

AUXLY REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2022 FINANCIAL RESULTS AND PROVIDES OUTLOOK FOR 2023
PR Newswire
TORONTO, March 31, 2023

TORONTO, March 31, 2023 /PRNewswire/ – Auxly Cannabis Group Inc. (TSX: XLY) (OTCQB: CBWTF) (“Auxly” or the “Company”…

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AUXLY REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2022 FINANCIAL RESULTS AND PROVIDES OUTLOOK FOR 2023

PR Newswire

TORONTO, March 31, 2023 /PRNewswire/ - Auxly Cannabis Group Inc. (TSX: XLY) (OTCQB: CBWTF) ("Auxly" or the "Company") today released its financial results for the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2022. These filings and additional information regarding Auxly are available for review on SEDAR at www.sedar.com. All amounts are Canadian dollars except common shares ("Shares") and per Share amounts.

2022 Highlights

  • Total net revenues of $94.4 million in 2022, an increase of $10.6 million or 13% compared to 2021;
  • Made significant improvements to Adjusted EBITDA in the fourth quarter to negative $0.8 million, due to improved margins and lower SG&A, with momentum continuing into 2023;
  • Fourth quarter total net revenues of $24.7 million, approximately $4.6 million lower than the same period in 2021, however $4.9 million or 20% greater than Q3 2022;
  • Retained the #1 LP position in Canada for Cannabis 2.0 product sales for the third consecutive year, while improving sales of dried flower and pre-roll products, exiting the year with positive momentum as the #5 LP1 by share of market;
  • Successfully integrated Auxly Leamington and continuously improved product quality during 2022; and leveraged Leamington's large-scale cultivation to introduce new successful strains to the market while continuing to drive down costs to become one of the lowest cost facilities in the country;
  • Rationalized assets and product SKUs to improve financial performance and used non-core asset sale proceeds to further strengthen the balance sheet;
  • Recorded non-cash impairment of approximately $25.7M related to the closure of Auxly Annapolis and Auxly Annapolis OG cultivation facilities during Q1 of 2022 and $45 million in the third quarter of 2022 related to impairment of goodwill and other assets.

Financial Highlights

For the years ended December 31:











(000's)


2022


2021


2020


Change 2022


Change 2021

Total net revenues


94,472


83,829


46,719


10,643


37,110

Net income/(loss)*


(130,293)


(33,739)


(85,426)


(96,554)


51,687

Net income/(loss) from continuing
operations*


(130,293)


(45,895)


(83,889)


(84,398)


37,994

Adjusted EBITDA**


(16,878)


(21,672)


(28,523)


4,794


6,851

Weighted average shares outstanding


889,871,187


783,379,798


631,528,750


106,491,389


151,851,048












As at December 31:











(000's)


2022


2021


2020


Change 2022


Change 2021

Cash and equivalents

$

14,636

$

14,754

$

20,657

$

(118)

$

(5,903)

Total assets

$

331,820

$

450,422

$

378,963

$

(118,602)

$

71,459

Debt***

$

174,475

$

168,809

$

114,825

$

5,666

$

53,984

*Attributable to shareholders of the Company.                                                         

**Adjusted EBITDA is a Non-IFRS financial measure. Refer to the Non-GAAP Measures.   

***Debt is a supplementary financial measure. Refer to the Non-GAAP Measures.

                   

 

Results of Operations

For the years ended December 31:


(000's)

2022

2021

CONTINUING OPERATIONS



Revenues



Revenue from sales of cannabis products

$        138,885

$         120,824

Excise taxes

(44,413)

(36,995)

Total net revenues

94,472

83,829




Costs of sales



Costs of finished cannabis inventory sold

70,262

62,754

Biological asset impairment

704

-

Inventory (gain)/impairment

10,732

3,264

Gross profit/(loss) excluding fair value items

12,774

17,811




Unrealized fair value gain/(loss) on biological transformation

28,518

2,384

Realized fair value gain/(loss) on inventory

(24,780)

(905)

Gross profit

16,512

19,290




Expenses



Selling, general, and administrative expenses

46,649

44,288

Equity-based compensation

4,023

1,433

Depreciation and amortization

14,816

12,507

Interest expense

21,578

17,668

Total expenses

87,066

75,896




Other income/(loss)



Fair value gain/(loss) for financial instruments accounted under FVTPL

-

6

Interest and other income

337

1,591

Impairment of assets

(67,180)

(11,426)

Gain/(loss) on settlement of assets and liabilities and other expenses

(2,231)

20,289

Gain on disposal of assets held for sale

2,150

-

Gain/(loss) on disposal of subsidiary

-

1,355

Share of gain/(loss) on investment in joint venture

-

(4,661)

Foreign exchange gain/(loss)

923

(788)

Total other income/(loss)

(66,001)

6,366




Net loss before income tax

(136,555)

(50,240)

Income tax recovery

6,262

4,330

Net loss from continuing operations

$      (130,293)

$         (45,910)

Net income/(loss) from discontinued operations

-

12,156

Net income/(loss)

$      (130,293)

$         (33,754)




Net income/(loss) attributable to shareholders of the Company

$      (130,293)

$         (33,739)

Net loss attributable to non-controlling interest

-

(15)




Adjusted EBITDA

$        (16,878)

$         (21,672)




From continuing operations

$            (0.15)

$             (0.06)

From discontinued operations

-

0.02

Net income/(loss) per common share (basic and diluted)

$            (0.15)

$             (0.04)




Weighted average shares outstanding (basic and diluted)

889,871,187

783,379,798

 

Hugo Alves, CEO of Auxly, commented: "The Canadian cannabis industry faced numerous challenges in 2022 and Auxly was not immune to their impacts. To better position the Company within current industry realities, we adapted our strategy in the third quarter by streamlining our focus to the three largest Canadian product categories of dried flower, pre-rolls, and vapes, leveraging our large-scale Leamington facility to deepen our competitive advantage and refining our cost structure. Our efforts have yielded positive results, including our first significant wholesales of bulk dried flower from Auxly Leamington, improved net revenues and blended margins, and reductions in SG&A during the fourth quarter. We also internalized our sales team to improve relationships with retailers, strengthen distribution, and obtain new dried flower and pre-roll listings to increase category breadth and set the stage for further growth in 2023. We are encouraged by our recent achievements and remain dedicated to delivering further improvements in financial performance. I want to thank our talented team members for their continued commitment to Auxly's success."

Net Revenues

For the year ended December 31, 2022, net revenues were $94.5 million as compared to $83.8 million during the same period in 2021. Revenues for 2022 were comprised of approximately 42% in sales of dried flower and pre-roll Cannabis Products, with the remainder from oils and Cannabis 2.0 Product sales. Net revenues included wholesale bulk flower sales of approximately $3.2 million in the fourth quarter, contributing towards the Company's overall shift to increased sales of Cannabis 1.0 Products, which represented approximately 48% of net revenues during the quarter. For the third year, Auxly continued its leadership in national sales of Cannabis 2.0 Products, while increasing its share of market for Cannabis 1.0 Products over the year from 2.5% to 3.7%1.

Consistent with prior periods, as the Company does not participate in the Quebec market, approximately 85% of cannabis sales in 2022 originated from sales to British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario.

Gross Profit

Auxly realized a gross profit of $16.5 million in 2022, a decrease of $2.8 million as compared to 2021, which includes the impacts of non-cash impairments and fair value adjustments. The Gross Profit Margin for 2022 was 17% versus 23% in 2021. Excluding non-cash amounts, the Cost of Finished Cannabis Inventory Sold Margin improved to 26% versus 25% in 2021, while increasing from 23% in the first quarter of 2022 to 30% in the fourth quarter as a result of a higher proportion of Cannabis 1.0 Products sold by the Company utilizing low-cost cannabis cultivated at Auxly Leamington, and the streamlining of Cannabis 2.0 SKUs and operating costs.

Following the acquisition of Auxly Leamington in November 2021, the Company recognizes gross profit or loss from Auxly Leamington as part of the costs of finished cannabis inventory sold only as product is sold to the Company's customers after being further processed by Auxly Ottawa or Auxly Charlottetown. Realized and unrealized fair value gains and losses reflect accounting treatments associated with Auxly Leamington cultivation and sales. Prior to the acquisition of Auxly Leamington, the net operating results of Auxly Leamington were recorded in other income and expenses on an equity basis in proportion to the Company's ownership in the joint venture.

Biological and inventory impairments during the year were $11.4 million as compared to $3.3 million in 2021, primarily as a result of charges related to the closure of the Auxly Annapolis facilities of $5.0 million in the first quarter of 2022, certain third-party product write-offs, and as a result of SKU rationalization and run-off, and product not meeting quality specifications.

Total Expenses

Selling, general and administrative expenses ("SG&A") are comprised of wages and benefits, office and administrative, professional fees, business development, and selling expenses. SG&A expenses were $46.7 million during 2022, a $2.4M or 5% increase over 2021, which includes the full year impact of the addition of Auxly Leamington expenditures.

Wages and benefits were $18.7 million for the year, as compared to $17.8 million for the same period of 2021. The net increase is primarily due to the addition of Auxly Leamington, partially offset by reductions associated with the closure and sale of the Auxly Annapolis and Auxly Annapolis OG facilities and measures taken after the third quarter to reduce overhead in the rest of the organization.

Office and administrative expenses were $11.6 million for the year, decreasing by $2.0 million compared to the same period in 2021. The decreased expenditures primarily relate to higher product cost absorption, reduced waste and the timing and cost associated with product innovation, partially offset by the inclusion of Auxly Leamington.

Auxly's professional fees were $2.9 million for 2022, the same as the prior year. Professional fees incurred primarily related to accounting fees, regulatory matters, reporting issuer fees, and legal fees associated with certain corporate activities.

Business development expenses were $0.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2022, consistent with the same period in 2021. These expenses have been nominal during the year due to the COVID-19 pandemic and primarily relate to acquisition, business development and travel related expenses.

Selling expenses were $13.1 million for 2022, an increase of $3.5 million over 2021, as a result of cannabis sales activities comprised of brokerage fees, Health Canada fees related to higher revenues, and increased marketing initiatives for Cannabis Products.

Equity-based compensation for the year ended December 31, 2022, was $4.0 million, an increase of $2.6 million over 2021, primarily reflecting the impact of restricted share units ("RSU") granted in June 2022, in respect of services provided by employees in 2021. The RSU charge is primarily determined by the number of units granted, vesting periods and forfeiture assumptions, and the Share price at the time of grant. Equity-based compensation includes expenses related to options which are primarily determined as a function of the number of grants, the weighted average aging of the grants and the share price at the time of grant.

Depreciation and amortization expenses were $14.8 million for the year representing an increase of $2.3 million over 2021, primarily related to additional capital expenditures and the inclusion of Auxly Leamington in 2022.

Interest expenses were $21.6 million in 2022 as compared to $17.7 million during the prior year. The increase in expense is primarily a result of the inclusion of Auxly Leamington and the impact of rising interest rates where such obligations are subject to variable charges. Interest expense includes accretion on the convertible debentures and interest paid in kind on the $123 million Imperial Brands Debenture. Interest payable in cash was approximately $6.7 million for the year.

Total Other Incomes and Losses

Total other incomes and losses for the year were a net loss of $66.0 million primarily due to the third quarter impairment of goodwill and other assets of $45 million, comprised of $24.8 million towards goodwill, $13.2 million towards intangible assets, $2.2 million towards other receivables, and $4.8 million of impairment losses towards long-term assets, including property, plant and equipment. In addition, during the first quarter of 2022, an impairment of long-term assets of $12.9 million and intangible assets and goodwill of $10.8 million related to the closure of the Auxly Annapolis and Auxly Annapolis OG facilities, respectively, where the carrying value exceeds the fair value less cost to sell.

In 2022, foreign exchange gains were $0.9 million as compared to a loss of $0.8 million in 2021. Auxly is exposed to foreign exchange fluctuations from the U.S. dollar to CAD dollar exchange rate primarily related to inventory, capital purchases and Inverell net assets.

Net Income and Loss

Net losses attributable to shareholders of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2022 were $130.3 million, net of income tax recoveries of $6.3 million, representing a net loss of $0.15 per share on a basic and diluted basis. The change in net loss in 2022 as compared to 2021 was primarily driven by changes in total other incomes and losses in 2022 as compared to net gains recorded in 2021.

Adjusted EBITDA

Adjusted EBITDA during the year ended December 31, 2022 was negative $16.9 million, an improvement of $4.8 million over the same period of 2021, primarily as a result of improvements realized during the fourth quarter of 2022.

Discontinued Operations

On May 27, 2021, the Company announced that it had reached an agreement to sell KGK to Myconic Capital Corp. (now Wellbeing Digital Sciences Inc.) ("Wellbeing"), and on June 2, 2021, completed the sale of KGK to Wellbeing. As a result of the sale, results from operations and cash flows from KGK have been presented as discontinued operations, as applicable, on a retrospective basis.

Outlook 

In 2022, we committed to building on our success as a Canadian market leader. We planned on driving organic growth through continued innovation, increasing brand traction, and strengthening distribution, while prioritizing operational efficiencies and profitability. Our high-level objectives for 2022 were:

  • Improve revenue and Gross Profit Margin to achieve positive Adjusted EBITDA
    • Our key priority in 2022 was to achieve Adjusted EBITDA profitability by continuing to grow top line revenue while enhancing Gross Profit Margins through leveraging the increasing flower output from our Auxly Leamington facility, focused and differentiated brand and product offerings, increased depth and breadth of distribution, and cost optimization through investments in automation to increase production capabilities and efficiency and continuous improvement initiatives.
  • Win with consumers and increase brand traction
    • We continue to be deeply committed to understanding our targeted consumers and to developing products and brands that help them live happier lives. Driven by deep consumer insights, we will continue to evolve our brand portfolio to earn and maintain the trust and loyalty of our customers and consumers and be the choice of consumers in-store. We will service the evolving preferences of our consumers by bringing new and innovative branded products to market and ensuring that our consumers can access those products broadly and reliably.

Looking back on the year, the Canadian cannabis industry continued to face challenges posed by increasing competition and fragmentation, oversupply of cannabis, high taxation, restrictive regulations, a robust illicit market and severe price compression which were further exacerbated by inflation, global conflict, negative macroeconomic impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic, global supply chain disruptions, and constrained capital markets.

In light of these challenges, we adapted our approach, and at the end of the third quarter, streamlined our product assortment to run off certain low-margin or low-demand SKUs and increased our focus on the dried flower, pre-roll and vape product categories. Concurrently, we reduced costs throughout the organization, and internalized our sales team providing us with a sales team that focuses exclusively on our brands and products when communicating with our retail partners. While we did not meet all of our objectives for 2022, we are pleased with the progress made during the year and, in particular, with the impact that our actions taken at the end of the third quarter have had on our business. We have seen improvements in our margins, our fourth quarter sales (even with fewer SKUs), especially in the key dried flower and pre-roll categories; and material improvements in our Adjusted EBITDA resulting from significant reductions in our supporting cost structure.

As a backdrop to the year ahead, we have been working hard on updating and expanding our dried flower and pre-roll product portfolio utilizing Auxly Leamington's competitive advantage of high-quality, large-scale and low-cost cultivation. Starting in 2023, we have increased our listed flower SKUs by 60% and pre-roll SKUs by 50% as compared to September 30, 2022. We are entering 2023 with improved earnings performance, increased focus on key product formats, lowered costs and increased efficiency which we expect will yield positive results. With these actions in mind, our goals for the coming year are broadly defined below:

  • Increase net revenues by 15%, with a focus on key product categories, enhanced by strategic expansion of our product portfolio, while supporting strong retail distribution through our internal sales team.
  • Continue to leverage Auxly Leamington's large-scale, low-cost cultivation facility and the Company's manufacturing automation to increase blended Cost of Finished Cannabis Inventory Sold Margin to an average of 35-40%.
  • Vigorously manage SG&A as a percentage of net revenues to keep it below 40%, further building upon savings realized in Q4 2022.
  • Prudently manage the Company's balance sheet and streamline assets where possible.

We believe we have an achievable plan built upon proven demand for our products, outstanding employees, top-tier assets and an underlying desire to continue to put our consumers first by delivering safe, effective, high-quality products that address their evolving needs and preferences and help them live happier lives.

Non-GAAP Measures

Please see the Company's MD&A for the three and twelves months ended December 31, 2022, under "Non-GAAP Measures" for a further description of the following financial and supplementary financial measures.

Financial Measures

EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA

These are non-GAAP measures used in the cannabis industry and by the Company to assess operating performance removing the impacts and volatility of non-cash adjustments. The definition may differ by issuer. The Adjusted EBITDA reconciliation is as follows:

(000's)

Q4/22

Q3/22

Q2/22

Q1/22

Q4/21

Q3/21

Q2/21

Q1/21

Net loss from continuing operations

$  (16,056)

$ (60,102)

$  (14,289)

$  (39,846)

$  (18,376)

$  (13,527)

$    (3,685)

$  (10,322)

Interest expense

5,655

5,507

5,336

5,080

4,348

3,932

4,787

4,601

Interest income

(63)

(105)

(84)

(85)

(308)

(436)

(431)

(416)

Income tax recovery

(1,112)

(2,110)

(85)

(2,955)

-

-

(4,291)

(39)

Depreciation and amortization
included in cost of sales

1,296

681

2,180

1,211

689

386

326

141

Depreciation and amortization
     included in expenses

2,791

3,525

3,900

4,600

5,678

2,223

2,174

2,432

EBITDA

(7,489)

(52,604)

(3,042)

(31,995)

(7,969)

(7,422)

(1,120)

(3,603)










Impairment of biological assets

-

-

-

704

-

-

-

-

Impairment of inventory

2,062

2,014

1,778

4,878

2,194

716

124

230

Unrealized fair value loss / (gain) on
     biological transformation

(2,814)

(7,496)

(11,735)

(6,473)

(1,462)

(352)

(315)

(255)

Realized fair value loss / (gain) on
     inventory

7,382

8,175

6,898

2,325

904

1

1

(1)

Restructuring related costs

-

193

-

-

-

-

-

-

Equity-based compensation

429

475

2,916

203

212

55

960

206

Fair value loss / (gain) for financial
instruments accounted under FVTPL

-

-

-

-

408

(223)

(75)

(116)

Impairment of assets

676

42,831

-

23,673

-

60

11,366

-

(Gain) / loss on settlement of
assets, liabilities and disposals

(1,330)

1,574

(163)

-

815

(1,396)

(16,995)

(4,068)

Share of loss on investment in joint
     venture

-

-

-

-

(1,387)

3,095

2,494

459

Foreign exchange loss / (gain)

301

(938)

(647)

361

242

(633)

571

608

Adjusted EBITDA

$       (783)

$    (5,776)

$    (3,995)

$    (6,324)

$    (6,043)

$    (6,099)

$    (2,989)

$    (6,540)

 

Supplementary Financial Measures

Cost of Finished Cannabis Inventory Sold Margin

"Cost of Finished Cannabis Inventory Sold Margin" is a supplementary financial measure and is defined as Cost of Finished Cannabis Inventory Sold divided by net revenues.

Gross Profit Margin

"Gross Profit Margin" is defined as gross profit divided by net revenues. Gross Profit Margin is a supplementary financial measure.

Debt

"Debt" is defined as current and long-term debt and is a supplementary financial measure. It is a useful measure in managing our capital structure and financing requirements.

Conference Call

Auxly's management team will host a conference call today, Monday, April 3, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. EST to discuss its financial results. Participants can access the conference call by telephone by dialing: 1-888-664-6383 or by audio webcast at: https://app.webinar.net/KV4LpqozBOn.

For those unable to participate in the conference call at the scheduled time, it will be available for replay on the Company's website within 24 hours after the conclusion of the call.

ON BEHALF OF THE BOARD
"Hugo Alves" CEO

About Auxly Cannabis Group Inc. (TSX: XLY)

Auxly is a leading Canadian consumer packaged goods company in the cannabis products market, headquartered in Toronto, Canada. Our focus is on developing, manufacturing and distributing branded cannabis products that delight our consumers.

Our vision is to be a leader in branded cannabis products that deliver on our consumer promise of quality, safety and efficacy.

Learn more at www.auxly.com and stay up to date at Twitter: @AuxlyGroup; Instagram: @auxlygroup; Facebook: @auxlygroup; LinkedIn: company/auxlygroup/.

Notice Regarding Forward Looking Information:

This news release contains certain "forward-looking information" within the meaning of applicable Canadian securities law. Forward-looking information is frequently characterized by words such as "plan", "continue", "expect", "project", "intend", "believe", "anticipate", "estimate", "may", "will", "potential", "proposed" and other similar words, or information that certain events or conditions "may" or "will" occur. This information is only a prediction. Various assumptions were used in drawing the conclusions or making the projections contained in the forward-looking information throughout this news release. Forward-looking information includes, but is not limited to: the proposed operation of Auxly and its subsidiaries; the intention to grow the business, operations and existing and potential activities of Auxly; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Company's current and future operations; the Company's execution of its innovative product development, commercialization strategy and expansion plans; the Company's intention to introduce innovative new cannabis products to the market and the timing thereof; the anticipated benefits of the Company's partnerships, research and development initiatives and other commercial arrangements; the anticipated benefits of the Company's acquisition of Auxly Leamington; the expectation and timing of future revenues and of positive Adjusted EBITDA; expectations regarding the Company's expansion of sales, operations and investment into foreign jurisdictions; future legislative and regulatory developments involving cannabis and cannabis products; the timing and outcomes of regulatory or intellectual property decisions; the relevance of Auxly's subsidiaries' current and proposed products with provincial purchasers and consumers; consumer preferences; political change; competition and other risks affecting the Company in particular and the cannabis industry generally.

A number of factors could cause actual results to differ materially from a conclusion, forecast or projection contained in the forward-looking information in this release including, but not limited to, whether: the Company will be able to execute on its business strategy; Auxly's subsidiaries are able to obtain and maintain the necessary governmental and regulatory authorizations to conduct business; the Company is able to successfully manage the integration of its various business units with its own; there are not materially more closures or lockdowns related to the COVID–19 pandemic; the Company's subsidiaries obtain and maintain all necessary governmental and regulatory permits and approvals for the operation of their facilities and the development of cannabis products, and whether such permits and approvals can be obtained in a timely manner; the Company will be able to continue to successfully integrate Auxly Leamington's operations with its own, and whether the expected benefits of the acquisition materialize in the manner expected, or at all; the Company will be able to successfully launch new product formats and enter into new markets; there is acceptance and demand for current and future Company products by consumers and provincial purchasers; the Company will be able to increase revenues and achieve positive Adjusted EBITDA; and general economic, financial market, legislative, regulatory, competitive and political conditions in which the Company and its subsidiaries and partners operate will remain the same. Additional risk factors are disclosed in the annual information form of the Company for the financial year ended December 31, 2022 dated March 30, 2023.

New factors emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for management to predict all of those factors or to assess in advance the impact of each such factor on the Company's business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking information. The forward-looking information in this release is based on information currently available and what management believes are reasonable assumptions. Forward-looking information speaks only to such assumptions as of the date of this release. In addition, this release may contain forward-looking information attributed to third party industry sources, the accuracy of which has not been verified by the Company. The forward-looking information is being provided for the purposes of assisting the reader in understanding the Company's financial performance, financial position and cash flows as at and for periods ended on certain dates and to present information about management's current expectations and plans relating to the future, and the reader is cautioned that such forward-looking information may not be appropriate for any other purpose. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking information contained in this release.

The forward-looking information contained in this release is expressly qualified by the foregoing cautionary statements and is made as of the date of this release. Except as may be required by applicable securities laws, the Company does not undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking information to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this release or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events, whether as a result of new information, future events or results, or otherwise.

Neither Toronto Stock Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

______________________________

1 Headset Canadian Insights data, provided as of March 8, 2023

 

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SOURCE Auxly Cannabis Group Inc.

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Mortgage rates fall as labor market normalizes

Jobless claims show an expanding economy. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

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on

Everyone was waiting to see if this week’s jobs report would send mortgage rates higher, which is what happened last month. Instead, the 10-year yield had a muted response after the headline number beat estimates, but we have negative job revisions from previous months. The Federal Reserve’s fear of wage growth spiraling out of control hasn’t materialized for over two years now and the unemployment rate ticked up to 3.9%. For now, we can say the labor market isn’t tight anymore, but it’s also not breaking.

The key labor data line in this expansion is the weekly jobless claims report. Jobless claims show an expanding economy that has not lost jobs yet. We will only be in a recession once jobless claims exceed 323,000 on a four-week moving average.

From the Fed: In the week ended March 2, initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits were flat, at 217,000. The four-week moving average declined slightly by 750, to 212,250


Below is an explanation of how we got here with the labor market, which all started during COVID-19.

1. I wrote the COVID-19 recovery model on April 7, 2020, and retired it on Dec. 9, 2020. By that time, the upfront recovery phase was done, and I needed to model out when we would get the jobs lost back.

2. Early in the labor market recovery, when we saw weaker job reports, I doubled and tripled down on my assertion that job openings would get to 10 million in this recovery. Job openings rose as high as to 12 million and are currently over 9 million. Even with the massive miss on a job report in May 2021, I didn’t waver.

Currently, the jobs openings, quit percentage and hires data are below pre-COVID-19 levels, which means the labor market isn’t as tight as it once was, and this is why the employment cost index has been slowing data to move along the quits percentage.  

2-US_Job_Quits_Rate-1-2

3. I wrote that we should get back all the jobs lost to COVID-19 by September of 2022. At the time this would be a speedy labor market recovery, and it happened on schedule, too

Total employment data

4. This is the key one for right now: If COVID-19 hadn’t happened, we would have between 157 million and 159 million jobs today, which would have been in line with the job growth rate in February 2020. Today, we are at 157,808,000. This is important because job growth should be cooling down now. We are more in line with where the labor market should be when averaging 140K-165K monthly. So for now, the fact that we aren’t trending between 140K-165K means we still have a bit more recovery kick left before we get down to those levels. 




From BLS: Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 275,000 in February, and the unemployment rate increased to 3.9 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Job gains occurred in health care, in government, in food services and drinking places, in social assistance, and in transportation and warehousing.

Here are the jobs that were created and lost in the previous month:

IMG_5092

In this jobs report, the unemployment rate for education levels looks like this:

  • Less than a high school diploma: 6.1%
  • High school graduate and no college: 4.2%
  • Some college or associate degree: 3.1%
  • Bachelor’s degree or higher: 2.2%
IMG_5093_320f22

Today’s report has continued the trend of the labor data beating my expectations, only because I am looking for the jobs data to slow down to a level of 140K-165K, which hasn’t happened yet. I wouldn’t categorize the labor market as being tight anymore because of the quits ratio and the hires data in the job openings report. This also shows itself in the employment cost index as well. These are key data lines for the Fed and the reason we are going to see three rate cuts this year.

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January…

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Inside The Most Ridiculous Jobs Report In History: Record 1.2 Million Immigrant Jobs Added In One Month

Last month we though that the January jobs report was the "most ridiculous in recent history" but, boy, were we wrong because this morning the Biden department of goalseeked propaganda (aka BLS) published the February jobs report, and holy crap was that something else. Even Goebbels would blush. 

What happened? Let's take a closer look.

On the surface, it was (almost) another blockbuster jobs report, certainly one which nobody expected, or rather just one bank out of 76 expected. Starting at the top, the BLS reported that in February the US unexpectedly added 275K jobs, with just one research analyst (from Dai-Ichi Research) expecting a higher number.

Some context: after last month's record 4-sigma beat, today's print was "only" 3 sigma higher than estimates. Needless to say, two multiple sigma beats in a row used to only happen in the USSR... and now in the US, apparently.

Before we go any further, a quick note on what last month we said was "the most ridiculous jobs report in recent history": it appears the BLS read our comments and decided to stop beclowing itself. It did that by slashing last month's ridiculous print by over a third, and revising what was originally reported as a massive 353K beat to just 229K,  a 124K revision, which was the biggest one-month negative revision in two years!

Of course, that does not mean that this month's jobs print won't be revised lower: it will be, and not just that month but every other month until the November election because that's the only tool left in the Biden admin's box: pretend the economic and jobs are strong, then revise them sharply lower the next month, something we pointed out first last summer and which has not failed to disappoint once.

To be fair, not every aspect of the jobs report was stellar (after all, the BLS had to give it some vague credibility). Take the unemployment rate, after flatlining between 3.4% and 3.8% for two years - and thus denying expectations from Sahm's Rule that a recession may have already started - in February the unemployment rate unexpectedly jumped to 3.9%, the highest since February 2022 (with Black unemployment spiking by 0.3% to 5.6%, an indicator which the Biden admin will quickly slam as widespread economic racism or something).

And then there were average hourly earnings, which after surging 0.6% MoM in January (since revised to 0.5%) and spooking markets that wage growth is so hot, the Fed will have no choice but to delay cuts, in February the number tumbled to just 0.1%, the lowest in two years...

... for one simple reason: last month's average wage surge had nothing to do with actual wages, and everything to do with the BLS estimate of hours worked (which is the denominator in the average wage calculation) which last month tumbled to just 34.1 (we were led to believe) the lowest since the covid pandemic...

... but has since been revised higher while the February print rose even more, to 34.3, hence why the latest average wage data was once again a product not of wages going up, but of how long Americans worked in any weekly period, in this case higher from 34.1 to 34.3, an increase which has a major impact on the average calculation.

While the above data points were examples of some latent weakness in the latest report, perhaps meant to give it a sheen of veracity, it was everything else in the report that was a problem starting with the BLS's latest choice of seasonal adjustments (after last month's wholesale revision), which have gone from merely laughable to full clownshow, as the following comparison between the monthly change in BLS and ADP payrolls shows. The trend is clear: the Biden admin numbers are now clearly rising even as the impartial ADP (which directly logs employment numbers at the company level and is far more accurate), shows an accelerating slowdown.

But it's more than just the Biden admin hanging its "success" on seasonal adjustments: when one digs deeper inside the jobs report, all sorts of ugly things emerge... such as the growing unprecedented divergence between the Establishment (payrolls) survey and much more accurate Household (actual employment) survey. To wit, while in January the BLS claims 275K payrolls were added, the Household survey found that the number of actually employed workers dropped for the third straight month (and 4 in the past 5), this time by 184K (from 161.152K to 160.968K).

This means that while the Payrolls series hits new all time highs every month since December 2020 (when according to the BLS the US had its last month of payrolls losses), the level of Employment has not budged in the past year. Worse, as shown in the chart below, such a gaping divergence has opened between the two series in the past 4 years, that the number of Employed workers would need to soar by 9 million (!) to catch up to what Payrolls claims is the employment situation.

There's more: shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative assessment, reveals just how ugly the composition of "new jobs" has been. Consider this: the BLS reports that in February 2024, the US had 132.9 million full-time jobs and 27.9 million part-time jobs. Well, that's great... until you look back one year and find that in February 2023 the US had 133.2 million full-time jobs, or more than it does one year later! And yes, all the job growth since then has been in part-time jobs, which have increased by 921K since February 2023 (from 27.020 million to 27.941 million).

Here is a summary of the labor composition in the past year: all the new jobs have been part-time jobs!

But wait there's even more, because now that the primary season is over and we enter the heart of election season and political talking points will be thrown around left and right, especially in the context of the immigration crisis created intentionally by the Biden administration which is hoping to import millions of new Democratic voters (maybe the US can hold the presidential election in Honduras or Guatemala, after all it is their citizens that will be illegally casting the key votes in November), what we find is that in February, the number of native-born workers tumbled again, sliding by a massive 560K to just 129.807 million. Add to this the December data, and we get a near-record 2.4 million plunge in native-born workers in just the past 3 months (only the covid crash was worse)!

The offset? A record 1.2 million foreign-born (read immigrants, both legal and illegal but mostly illegal) workers added in February!

Said otherwise, not only has all job creation in the past 6 years has been exclusively for foreign-born workers...

Source: St Louis Fed FRED Native Born and Foreign Born

... but there has been zero job-creation for native born workers since June 2018!

This is a huge issue - especially at a time of an illegal alien flood at the southwest border...

... and is about to become a huge political scandal, because once the inevitable recession finally hits, there will be millions of furious unemployed Americans demanding a more accurate explanation for what happened - i.e., the illegal immigration floodgates that were opened by the Biden admin.

Which is also why Biden's handlers will do everything in their power to insure there is no official recession before November... and why after the election is over, all economic hell will finally break loose. Until then, however, expect the jobs numbers to get even more ridiculous.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/08/2024 - 13:30

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Economic Earthquake Ahead? The Cracks Are Spreading Fast

Economic Earthquake Ahead? The Cracks Are Spreading Fast

Authored by Brandon Smith via Alt-Market.us,

One of my favorite false narratives…

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Economic Earthquake Ahead? The Cracks Are Spreading Fast

Authored by Brandon Smith via Alt-Market.us,

One of my favorite false narratives floating around corporate media platforms has been the argument that the American people “just don’t seem to understand how good the economy really is right now.” If only they would look at the stats, they would realize that we are in the middle of a financial renaissance, right? It must be that people have been brainwashed by negative press from conservative sources…

I have to laugh at this notion because it’s a very common one throughout history – it’s an assertion made by almost every single political regime right before a major collapse. These people always say the same things, and when you study economics as long as I have you can’t help but throw up your hands and marvel at their dedication to the propaganda.

One example that comes to mind immediately is the delusional optimism of the “roaring” 1920s and the lead up to the Great Depression. At the time around 60% of the U.S. population was living in poverty conditions (according to the metrics of the decade) earning less than $2000 a year. However, in the years after WWI ravaged Europe, America’s economic power was considered unrivaled.

The 1920s was an era of mass production and rampant consumerism but it was all fueled by easy access to debt, a condition which had not really existed before in America. It was this illusion of prosperity created by the unchecked application of credit that eventually led to the massive stock market bubble and the crash of 1929. This implosion, along with the Federal Reserve’s policy of raising interest rates into economic weakness, created a black hole in the U.S. financial system for over a decade.

There are two primary tools that various failing regimes will often use to distort the true conditions of the economy: Debt and inflation. In the case of America today, we are experiencing BOTH problems simultaneously and this has made certain economic indicators appear healthy when they are, in fact, highly unstable. The average American knows this is the case because they see the effects everyday. They see the damage to their wallets, to their buying power, in the jobs market and in their quality of life. This is why public faith in the economy has been stuck in the dregs since 2021.

The establishment can flash out-of-context stats in people’s faces, but they can’t force the populace to see a recovery that simply does not exist. Let’s go through a short list of the most faulty indicators and the real reasons why the fiscal picture is not a rosy as the media would like us to believe…

The “miracle” labor market recovery

In the case of the U.S. labor market, we have a clear example of distortion through inflation. The $8 trillion+ dropped on the economy in the first 18 months of the pandemic response sent the system over the edge into stagflation land. Helicopter money has a habit of doing two things very well: Blowing up a bubble in stock markets and blowing up a bubble in retail. Hence, the massive rush by Americans to go out and buy, followed by the sudden labor shortage and the race to hire (mostly for low wage part-time jobs).

The problem with this “miracle” is that inflation leads to price explosions, which we have already experienced. The average American is spending around 30% more for goods, services and housing compared to what they were spending in 2020. This is what happens when you have too much money chasing too few goods and limited production.

The jobs market looks great on paper, but the majority of jobs generated in the past few years are jobs that returned after the covid lockdowns ended. The rest are jobs created through monetary stimulus and the artificial retail rush. Part time low wage service sector jobs are not going to keep the country rolling for very long in a stagflation environment. The question is, what happens now that the stimulus punch bowl has been removed?

Just as we witnessed in the 1920s, Americans have turned to debt to make up for higher prices and stagnant wages by maxing out their credit cards. With the central bank keeping interest rates high, the credit safety net will soon falter. This condition also goes for businesses; the same businesses that will jump headlong into mass layoffs when they realize the party is over. It happened during the Great Depression and it will happen again today.

Cracks in the foundation

We saw cracks in the narrative of the financial structure in 2023 with the banking crisis, and without the Federal Reserve backstop policy many more small and medium banks would have dropped dead. The weakness of U.S. banks is offset by the relative strength of the U.S. dollar, which lures in foreign investors hoping to protect their wealth using dollar denominated assets.

But something is amiss. Gold and bitcoin have rocketed higher along with economically sensitive assets and the dollar. This is the opposite of what’s supposed to happen. Gold and BTC are supposed to be hedges against a weak dollar and a weak economy, right? If global faith in the dollar and in the U.S. economy is so high, why are investors diving into protective assets like gold?

Again, as noted above, inflation distorts everything.

Tens of trillions of extra dollars printed by the Fed are floating around and it’s no surprise that much of that cash is flooding into the economy which simply pushes higher right along with prices on the shelf. But, gold and bitcoin are telling us a more honest story about what’s really happening.

Right now, the U.S. government is adding around $600 billion per month to the national debt as the Fed holds rates higher to fight inflation. This debt is going to crush America’s financial standing for global investors who will eventually ask HOW the U.S. is going to handle that growing millstone? As I predicted years ago, the Fed has created a perfect Catch-22 scenario in which the U.S. must either return to rampant inflation, or, face a debt crisis. In either case, U.S. dollar-denominated assets will lose their appeal and their prices will plummet.

“Healthy” GDP is a complete farce

GDP is the most common out-of-context stat used by governments to convince the citizenry that all is well. It is yet another stat that is entirely manipulated by inflation. It is also manipulated by the way in which modern governments define “economic activity.”

GDP is primarily driven by spending. Meaning, the higher inflation goes, the higher prices go, and the higher GDP climbs (to a point). Eventually prices go too high, credit cards tap out and spending ceases. But, for a short time inflation makes GDP (as well as retail sales) look good.

Another factor that creates a bubble is the fact that government spending is actually included in the calculation of GDP. That’s right, every dollar of your tax money that the government wastes helps the establishment by propping up GDP numbers. This is why government spending increases will never stop – It’s too valuable for them to spend as a way to make the economy appear healthier than it is.

The REAL economy is eclipsing the fake economy

The bottom line is that Americans used to be able to ignore the warning signs because their bank accounts were not being directly affected. This is over. Now, every person in the country is dealing with a massive decline in buying power and higher prices across the board on everything – from food and fuel to housing and financial assets alike. Even the wealthy are seeing a compression to their profit and many are struggling to keep their businesses in the black.

The unfortunate truth is that the elections of 2024 will probably be the turning point at which the whole edifice comes tumbling down. Even if the public votes for change, the system is already broken and cannot be repaired without a complete overhaul.

We have consistently avoided taking our medicine and our disease has gotten worse and worse.

People have lost faith in the economy because they have not faced this kind of uncertainty since the 1930s. Even the stagflation crisis of the 1970s will likely pale in comparison to what is about to happen. On the bright side, at least a large number of Americans are aware of the threat, as opposed to the 1920s when the vast majority of people were utterly conned by the government, the banks and the media into thinking all was well. Knowing is the first step to preparing.

The second step is securing your own financial future – that’s where physical precious metals can play a role. Diversifying your savings with inflation-resistant, uninflatable assets whose intrinsic value doesn’t rely on a counterparty’s promise to pay adds resilience to your savings. That’s the main reason physical gold and silver have been the safe haven store-of-value assets of choice for centuries (among both the elite and the everyday citizen).

*  *  *

As the world moves away from dollars and toward Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), is your 401(k) or IRA really safe? A smart and conservative move is to diversify into a physical gold IRA. That way your savings will be in something solid and enduring. Get your FREE info kit on Gold IRAs from Birch Gold Group. No strings attached, just peace of mind. Click here to secure your future today.

Tyler Durden Fri, 03/08/2024 - 17:00

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