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A central bank digital euro could save the eurozone – here’s how

By changing the rules around bank lending, you can make a huge cut to national debt.

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Blockchain bailout? 4K_Heaven

The European Central Bank and its counterparts in the UK, US, China and India are exploring a new form of state-backed money built on similar online ledger technology to cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and ethereum. So-called central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) envision a future where we’ll all have our own digital wallets and transfer money between them at the touch of a button, with no need for high-street banks to be involved because it all happens on a blockchain.

But CBDCs also present an opportunity that has gone unnoticed – to vastly reduce the exorbitant levels of public debt weighing down many countries. Let us explain.

The idea behind CBDCs is that individuals and firms would be issued with digital wallets by their central bank with which to make payments, pay taxes and buy shares or other securities. Whereas with today’s bank accounts, there is always the outside possibility that customers are unable to withdraw money because of a bank run, that can’t happen with CBDCs because all deposits would be 100% backed by reserves.

Today’s retail banks are required to keep little or no deposits in reserve, though they do have to hold a proportion of their capital (meaning easily sold assets) as protection in case their lending books run into trouble. For example, eurozone banks’ minimum requirement is 15.1%, meaning if they have capital of €1 billion (£852 million), their lending book cannot exceed €6.6 billion (that’s 6.6 times deposits).

In an era of CBDCs, we assume that people will still have bank accounts – to have their money invested by a fund manager, for instance, or to make a return by having it loaned out to someone else on the first person’s behalf. Our idea is that the 100% reserve protection in central bank wallets should extend to these retail bank accounts.

That would mean that if a person put 1,000 digital euros into a retail bank account, the bank could not multiply that deposit by opening more accounts than they could pay upon request. The bank would have to make money from its other services instead.

At present, the ECB holds about 25% of EU members’ government debt. Imagine that after transitioning to a digital euro, it decided to increase this holding to 30% by buying new sovereign bonds issued by member states.

To pay for this, it would create new digital euros – just like what happens today when quantitative easing (QE) is used to prop up the economy. Crucially, for each unit of central bank money created in this way, the money circulating in the wider economy increases by a lot more: in the eurozone, it roughly triples. This is essentially because QE drives up the value of bonds and other assets, and as a result, retail banks are more willing to lend to people and firms. This increase in the money supply is why QE can cause inflation.

If there was a 100% reserve requirement on retail banks, however, you wouldn’t get this multiplication effect. The money created by the ECB would be that amount and nothing more. Consequently, QE would be much less inflationary than today.

The debt benefit

So where does national debt fit in? The high national debt levels in many countries are predominantly the result of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the eurozone crisis of the 2010s and the COVID pandemic. In the eurozone, countries with very high debt as a proportion of GDP include Belgium (100%), France (99%), Spain (96%), Portugal (119%), Italy (133%) and Greece (174%).

One way to deal with high debt is to create a lot of inflation to make the value of the debt smaller, but that also makes citizens poorer and is liable to eventually cause unrest. But by taking advantage of the shift to CBDCs to change the rules around retail bank reserves, governments can go a different route.

The opportunity is during the transition phase, by reversing the process in which creating money to buy bonds adds three times as much money to the real economy. By selling bonds in exchange for today’s euros, every one euro removed by the central bank leads to three disappearing from the economy.

Indeed, this is how digital euros would be introduced into the economy. The ECB would gradually sell sovereign bonds to take the old euros out of circulation, while creating new digital euros to buy bonds back again. Because the 100% reserve requirement only applies to the new euros, selling bonds worth €5 million euros takes €15 million out of the economy but buying bonds for the same amount only adds €5 million to the economy.

However, you wouldn’t just buy the same amount of bonds as you sold. Because the multiplier doesn’t apply to the bonds being bought, you can triple the amount of purchases and the total amount of money in the economy stays the same – in other words, there’s no extra inflation.

For example, the ECB could increase its holdings of sovereign debt of EU member states from 25% to 75%. Unlike the sovereign bonds in private hands, member states don’t have to pay interest to the ECB on such bonds. So EU taxpayers would now only need to pay interest on 25% of their bonds rather than the 75% on which they are paying interest now.

Interest rates and other questions

An added reason for doing this is interest rates. While interest rates payable on bonds have been meagre for years, they could hugely increase on future issuances due to inflationary pressures and central banks beginning to raise short-term interest rates in response. The chart below shows how the yields (meaning rates of interest) on the closely watched 10-year sovereign bonds for Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal have already increased between three and fivefold in the past few months.

Mediterranean 10-year bond yields

Following several years of immense shocks from the pandemic, the energy crisis and war emergency, there’s a risk that the markets start to think that Europe’s most indebted countries can’t cover their debts. This could lead to widespread bond selling and push interest rates up to unmanageable levels. In other words, our approach might even save the eurozone.

The ECB could indeed achieve all this without introducing a digital euro, simply by imposing a tougher reserve requirement within the current system. But by moving to a CBDC, there is a strong argument that because it’s safer than bank deposits, retail banks should have to guarantee that safety by following a 100% reserve rule.

Note that we can only take this medicine once, however. As a result, EU states will still have to be disciplined about their budgets.

Instead of completely ending fractional reserve banking in this way, there’s also a halfway house where you make reserve requirements more stringent (say a 50% rule) and enjoy a reduced version of the benefits from our proposed system. Alternatively, after the CBDC transition ends, the reserve requirement could be progressively relaxed to stimulate the economy, subject to GDP growth, inflation and so on.

What if other central banks do not take the same approach? Certainly, some coordination would help to minimise disruption, but reserve requirements do differ between countries today without significant problems. Also, many countries would probably be tempted to take the same approach. For example, the Bank of England holds over one-third of British government debt, and UK public debt as a proportion of GDP currently stands at 95%.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Government

The End Game Approaches

The pendulum of market sentiment swings dramatically.  It has swung from nearly everyone and their sister complaining that the Federal Reserve was lagging…

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The pendulum of market sentiment swings dramatically.  It has swung from nearly everyone and their sister complaining that the Federal Reserve was lagging behind the surge in prices to fear of a recession.  On June 15, at the conclusion of the last FOMC meeting, the swaps market priced in a 4.60% terminal Fed funds rate.  That seemed like a stretch, given the headwinds the economy faces that include fiscal policy and an energy and food price shock on top of monetary policy tightening. It is now seen closer to 3.5%.  It is lower now than it was on when the FOMC meeting concluded on May 4 with a 50 bp hike.  

In addition to the tightening of monetary policy and the roughly halving of the federal budget deficit, the inventory cycle, we argued was mature and would not be the tailwind it was in Q4. While we recognized that the labor market was strong, with around 2.3 mln jobs created in the first five month, we noted the four-week moving average of weekly jobless claims have been rising for more than two months.  In the week to June 17, the four-week moving average stood at 223k.  It is a 30% increase from the lows seen in April.  It is approaching the four-week average at the end of 2019 (238k), which itself was a two-year high.  In addition, we saw late-cycle behavior with households borrowing from the past (drawing down savings and monetizing their house appreciation) and from the future (record credit card use in March and April).  

The Fed funds futures strip now sees the Fed's rate cycle ending in late Q1 23 or early Q2 23.  A cut is being priced into the last few months of next year.  This has knock-on effects on the dollar.  We suspect it is an important part of the process that forms a dollar peak.  There is still more wood to chop, as they say, and a constructive news stream from Europe and Japan is still lacking.  The sharp decline in Russian gas exports to Europe is purposely precipitating a crisis that Germany's Green Economic Minister, who reluctantly agreed to boost the use of coal (though not yet extend the life of Germany's remaining nuclear plants that are to go offline at the end of the year), warns could spark a Lehman-like event in the gas sector.  

At the low point last week, the US 10-year yield had declined by around 50 bp from the peak the day before the Fed delivered its 75 bp hike.  This eases a key pressure on the yen, and, at the same time, gives the BOJ some breathing space for the 0.25% cap on its 10-year bond.  A former Ministry of Finance official cited the possibility of unilateral interventionWhile we recognize this as another step up the intervention escalation ladder, it may not be credible.  First, it was a former official.  It would be considerably more important if it were a current official.  Second, by raising the possibility, it allowed some short-covering of the yen, which reduces the lopsided positioning and reduces the impact of intervention.  Third, on the margin, it undermines the surprise-value.  

Ultimately, the decline in the yen reflects fundamental considerations.  The widening of the divergence of monetary policy is not just that other G10 countries are tightening, but also that Japan is easing policy.  A couple of weeks ago, to defend its yield-curve-control, the BOJ bought around $80 bln in government bonds.  The odds of a successful intervention, besides the headline impact, is thought to be enhanced if it signals a change in policy and/or if it is coordinated (multilateral).  

There are a few high frequency data points that will grab attention in the coming days, but they are unlikely to shape the contours of the investment and business climate.  The key drivers are the pace that financial conditions are tightening, the extent that China's zero-Covid policy is disrupting its economy and global supply chains, and the uncertainty around where inflation will peak. 

Most of the high frequency data, like China's PMI and Japan's industrial production report and the quarterly Tankan survey results, and May US data are about fine-tuning the understanding of Q2 economic activity and the momentum at going into Q3.  They pose headline risk, perhaps, but may be of little consequence.  It is all about the inflation and inflation expectations: except in Japan. Tokyo's May CPI, released a few weeks before the national figures, is most unlikely to persuade the Bank of Japan that the rise in inflation will not be temporary.  

With fear of recession giving inflation a run for its money in terms of market angst, the dollar may be vulnerable to disappointing real sector data, though the disappointing preliminary PMI likely stole some thunder.  The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow says the US economy has stagnated in Q2, but this is not representative of expectations.  It does not mean it is wrong, but it is notable that the median in Bloomberg's survey is that the US economy is expanding by 3% at an annualized rate.  This seems as optimistic as the Atlanta Fed model is pessimistic.  May consumption and income figures will help fine-tune GDP forecasts, but the deflator may lose some appeal.  Even though the Fed targets the headline PCE deflator, Powell cited the CPI as the switch from 50 to 75 bp hike.  

In that light, the preliminary estimate of the eurozone's June CPI that comes at the end of next week might be the most important economic data point.  It comes ahead of the July 21 ECB meeting for which the first rate hike in 11 years has been all but promised.  Although ECB President Lagarde had seemed to make clear a 25 bp initial move was appropriate, the market thinks the hawks may continue to press and have about a 1-in-3 chance of a 50 bp move.  The risk of inflation is still on the upside and Lagarde has mentioned the higher wage settlements in Q2.  That said, the investors are becoming more concerned about a recession and expectations for the year-end policy rate have fallen by 30 bp (to about 0.90%) since mid-June.  

A couple of days before the CPI release the ECB hosts a conference on central banking in Sintra (June 27-June 29).  The topic of this year's event is "Challenges for monetary policy in a rapidly changing world," which seems apropos for almost any year.  The conventional narrative places much of the responsibility of the high inflation on central banks.  It is not so much the dramatic reaction to the Pandemic as being too slow to pullback.  In the US, some argue that the fiscal stimulus aggravated price pressures. On the face of it, the difference in fiscal policy between the US and the eurozone, for example, may not explain the difference between the US May CPI of 8.6% year-over-year and EMU's 8.1% increase, or Canada's 7.7% rise, or the UK's 9.1% pace.

There is a case to be made that we are still too close to the pandemic to put the experience in a broader context. This may also be true because the effects are still rippling through the economies.  In the big picture, central banks, leaving aside the BOJ, appear to have responded quicker this time than after the Great Financial Crisis in pulling back on the throttle, even if they could have acted sooner.  Some of the price pressures may be a result of some of the changes wrought by the virus.  For example, a recent research paper found that over half of the nearly 24% rise in US house prices since the end of 2019 can be explained by the shift to working remotely, for example. 

The rise in gasoline prices in the US reflect not only the rise in oil prices, but also the loss of refining capacity. The pandemic disruptions saw around 500k barrels a day of refining capacity shutdown.  Another roughly 500k of day of refining capacity shifted to biofuels.  ESG considerations, and pressure on shale producers to boost returns to shareholders after years of disappointment have also discouraged investment into the sector.  The surge in commodity prices from energy and metals to semiconductors to lumber are difficult to link to monetary or fiscal policies.  

Such an explanation would also suggest that contrary to some suggestions, the US is not exporting inflation.  Instead, most countries are wrestling with similar supply-driven challenges and disruptions.  That said, consider that US core CPI has risen 6% in the year through May, while the ECB's core rate is up 3.8%, and rising. The US core rate has fallen for two months after peaking at 6.5%.  The UK's core CPI was up 5.9% in May, its first slowing (from 6.2%) since last September.  Japan's CPI stood at 2.5% in May, but the measure excluding fresh food and energy has risen a benign 0.8% over the past 12 months.  

Consider Sweden.  The Riksbank meets on June 30.  May CPI accelerated to 7.3% year-over-year.  The underlying rate, which uses a fixed interested rate, and is the rate the central bank has targeted for five years is at 7.2%.  The underlying rate excluding energy is still up 5.4% year-over-year, more than doubling since January.  The policy rate sits at 0.25%, having been hiked from zero in April.  The economy is strong.  The May composite PMI was a robust 64.4.  The economy appears to be growing around a 3% year-over-year clip.  Unemployment, however, remains elevated at 8.5%, up from 6.4% at the end of last year.  The swaps market has a 50 bp hike fully discounted and about a 1-in-3 chance of a 75 bp hike.  The next Riksbank meeting is not until September 20, and the market is getting close to pricing in a 100 bp hike.  Year-to-date, the krona has depreciated 11% against the dollar and about 3% against the euro.  

In addition to macroeconomic developments, geopolitics gets the limelight in the coming days.  The G7 summit is June 26-28.  Coordinating sanctions on Russia will likely dominate the agenda and as the low-hanging fruit has been picked, it will be increasingly challenging to extend them to new areas.  

At least two important issues will go unspoken and they arise from domestic US political considerations.  Although President Biden has recommended a three-month gas tax holiday, he needs Congress to do it.  That is unlikely.  Inflation, and in particular gasoline prices are a critical drag on the administration and the Democrats more broadly, who look set to lose both houses.  And the Senate and Congressional Republicans are not inclined to soften the blow.  Talk of renewing an export ban on gasoline and/oil appears to be picking up. The American president has more discretion here. This type of protectionism needs to be resisted because could it be a slippery slope. 

The other issue is the global corporate tax reform.  Although many countries, most recently Poland, have been won over, it looks increasingly likely that the US Senate will not approve it.  Biden and Yellen championed it, but the votes are not there now, and it seems even less likely they will be there in the next two years.  The particulars are new, but the pattern is not.  The US has not ratified the Law of the Seas nor is it a member of the International Court of Justice. Some push back and say that the US acts as if it were.  That argument will be less persuasive on the corporate tax reform.  

NATO meets on June 29-30.  For the first time, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea will be attending.  Clearly, the signal is that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not distracting from China. Most recently, China pressed its case that the Taiwan Strait is not international waters.  Some in Europe, including France, do not want to dilute NATO's mission by extending its core interest to the Asia Pacific area and distracting from European challenges. NATO is to publish a new long-term strategy paper.  Consider that the last one was in 2010 and did not mention Beijing and said it would seek a strategic partnership with Russia.  Putin's actions broke the logjam in Sweden and Finland, and both now want to join NATO, but Turkey is holding it up.  


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Bonds

HW+ Member Spotlight: Ben Bernstein

This week’s HW+ member spotlight features Ben Bernstein as he shares why it’s an interesting time to be tracking the housing market and all of the…

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This week’s HW+ member spotlight features Ben Bernstein, director at Axonic Capital, an investment firm with a deep focus on the structured credit sector of the financial markets. Prior to that, Bernstein held leadership roles in Odeon Capital Group and JPMorgan Chase.

Below, Bernstein answers questions about the housing industry:

HousingWire: What is your current favorite HW+ article and why?

Ben Bernstein: Logan and Sarah’s Monday podcast is my go to. Logan cuts through all the noise and delivers clear concise opinions rooted in the data. So not only do I get updates on what is going on in the housing market but I learn which data points are relevant and how to analyze them. And Sarah always asks insightful questions. On top of that, it is super entertaining!

HousingWire: What has been your biggest learning opportunity?

Ben Bernstein: My biggest learning opportunity (and weirdest job I ever had) was every job I ever had. I started my career at Bear Stearns on February 23 2008. To say that was an interesting time and place to start a career would be an understatement. Two weeks later I was working for JPMorgan and eventually made it to a desk whose focus was working out of the assets that brought Bear down in the first place.

Think funky bonds linked to housing like subprime RMBS and CDOs. Getting to dig deep into what these bonds were and how the underlying mortgages impacted them was priceless. I started at Axonic, a credit fund focused on investments linked to residential and commercial real estate, in November of 2019.

Another interesting time to join an investment firm! Three months later, I was working remotely and figuring out how to be productive from home. Fourteen years into my career and my biggest learning opportunity is right now.

I’m learning new stuff every single day whether it be about the bond market, housing, trading, macro economics, etc. All I need to do is turn around and ask a question out loud and I’ll learn something new.

HousingWire: What is the best piece of advice you’ve ever received?

Ben Bernstein: The best piece of advice I’ve ever received was what is important is what you do when no one is looking. Your reputation, work ethic, success, productivity and integrity are all linked to what you do because you know you need to do it as opposed to what you think other people want you to do.

HousingWire: What’s 2-3 trends that you’re closely following?

Ben Bernstein: I don’t think anyone will be surprised by the trends I’m following these days: Inflation, credit spreads, housing prices and how they are all intertwined. Fortunately I have smart people around me (including HousingWire) to give me their opinions on where we are headed. It’s my job to put it all together. The past two years have been some of the most interesting times in markets and from where I sit I don’t think that will change any time soon.

HousingWire: What keeps you up at night and why?

Ben Bernstein: What keeps me up at night is the state of the housing market. 35+% home price appreciation since COVID-19 began. Two months supply of housing. Mortgage rates going up faster than they ever have. There’s a lot going on!

One thing as bond traders that we do is we look down before we look up. In other words we look at risk before we look at upside. An overheated housing market is something we pay close attention to because we don’t want prices to go down precipitously but we don’t want inflation to run away either. So it’s really an interesting time to be tracking the housing market and all of the ancillary markets that are impacted by it.  

To become an HW+ member, click here.

For more information on HW+ benefits, click here.

To view past issues of our HW+ exclusive HousingWire Magazine, go here.

The post HW+ Member Spotlight: Ben Bernstein appeared first on HousingWire.

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Economics

Risk Appetites Improve Ahead of the Weekend

Overview: Equities are higher and bonds lower as the week’s activity winds down. Asia Pacific markets rallied, paced by more than 2% gains in Hong Kong…

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Overview: Equities are higher and bonds lower as the week's activity winds down. Asia Pacific markets rallied, paced by more than 2% gains in Hong Kong and South Korea. Japan's Nikkei rallied more than 1%, as did China's CSI 300. Most of the large markets but South Korea and Taiwan advanced this week, though only China and Hong Kong are up for the month. Europe's Stoxx 600 is up 1.3% through the European morning, its biggest advance of the week and what looks like the first weekly gain in four weeks. US futures are trading around 0.6%-0.8% higher. The NASDAQ is 4% higher and the S&P 500 is 3.3% stronger on the week coming into today. The US 10-year yield is virtually unchanged today and around 3.08%, is off about 14 bp this week. European bonds are mostly 2-4 bp firmer, and peripheral premiums over Germany have edged up. The US dollar is sporting a softer profile against the major currencies but the Japanese yen. Emerging market currencies are also mostly higher. The notable exception is the Philippine peso, off about 0.6% on the day and 2.2% for the week. Gold fell to a five-day low yesterday near $1822 and is trading quietly today and is firmer near $1830. August WTI is consolidating and remains inside Wednesday’s range (~$101.50-$109.70). It settled at almost $108 last week and assuming it does not rise above there today, it will be the first back-to-back weekly loss since March. US natgas is stabilizing after yesterday’s 9% drop. On the week, it is off about 10% after plummeting 21.5% last week. Europe is not as fortunate. Its benchmark is up for the 10th consecutive session. It soared almost 48% last week and rose another 7.7% this week. Iron ore’s 2% loss today brings the weekly hit to 5.1% after last week’s 14% drop. Copper is trying to stabilize after falling 7.5% in the past two sessions. It is at its lowest level since Q1 21. September wheat is up about 1.5% today to pare this week’s decline to around 8%.

 

Asia Pacific

Japan's May CPI was spot on expectations, unchanged from April. That keeps the headline at 2.5% and the core rate, which excludes fresh food, at 2.1%, slightly above the 2% target. However, the bulk of that 2.1% rise is attributable to energy prices. Without fresh food and energy, Japan's inflation remains at a lowly 0.8%.

The BOJ says that Japanese inflation is not sustainable, which is another way to say transitory. In turn, that means no change in policy. The fallout though is increasing disruptive. The yield curve control defense roiled the cash-futures basis and the uncertainty about hedging may have contributed to the soft demand at this week's auction. In addition, interest rates swap rates have risen as if the market is seeking compensation for the added uncertainty. Meanwhile, for the fourth session there were no takers of the BOJ's offer to buy bonds at a fixed rate.

The approaching month-end pressures saw the PBOC step up its liquidity provisions and injected the most in three months today. Still, the seven-day repo rate rose 16 bp to 1.17%. In Hong Kong, three-month HIBIOR rose to 1.68%, the highest since April 2020. Australian rates moved in the opposite direct. Australia's three-year yield fell 14 bp today after falling 10 bp in each of the past two sessions. It has fallen every day this week for a cumulative 43 bp drop to 3.20%. It had risen by slightly more than 50 bp the previous week. There was a dramatic shift in expectations for the year-end policy rate. The bill futures imply a year-end rate of 3.17%, which is about 68 bp lower than a week ago. It had risen by a little more than 150 bp in the previous two weeks.

The dollar traded in a two-yen range yesterday, but today is consolidating in a one-yen range above yesterday's low near JPY134.25. The pullback in US yields has been the key development and the dollar is lower for the third consecutive day. If sustained, this would be the longest losing streak for the greenback in three months. The Australian dollar is straddling the $0.6900 level, where options for A$1 bln expire today. It is mired near this week's low, set yesterday near $0.6870. Australia's two-year yield swung back to a discount to the US this week after trading at a premium for most of last week and the start of this week. The greenback was confined to a tight range against the Chinese yuan below CNY6.70 today but holding above CNY6.6920. The greenback traded with a heavier bias this week and snapped a two-week advance with a loss of around 0.3% this week. The PBOC set the dollar's reference rate at CNY6.7000, a little below the median forecast (Bloomberg survey) of CNY6.7008. It was the fourth time this week that the fix was for as weaker dollar/stronger yuan.

Europe

The week that marked the sixth anniversary of the UK referendum to leave the EU could have hardly gone worse. Consider:  The May budget report showed a 20% increase in interest rate servicing costs. Inflation edged higher. The flash June composite PMI remained pinned at its lowest level since February 2021. The GfK consumer confidence fell to -41, a new record low. Retail sales slumped by 0.5% in May and excluding gasoline were off 0.7%. Separately, as the polls had warned, the Tories lost both byelection contests held yesterday. And perhaps not totally unrelated, the Cabinet Secretary revealed that at the Prime Minister's request a position his wife in the royal charity was discussed. This continues a pattern that had included trying to appoint her as Johnson's chief of staff when he was the foreign minister and plays on the image of crass favoritism.

The risk of a new crisis in Europe is under-appreciated. In retaliation for Europe's actions, which in earlier periods, would have been regarded as acts of war, Russia has dramatically reduced its gas shipments to Europe. Many Americans and European who scoff at Russia's "special military operation" may be too young to recall that America's more than 10-year war in Vietnam was a police action and never officially a war. Now, the critics are incensed that Moscow has weaponized gas, while overlook the extreme weaponizing of finance. Aren't US and European sanctions a bit like weaponizing the dollar and euro?  In any event, Putin has ended the European illusion that it would determine the pace of the decoupling from Russia's energy. Germany's Economic Minister and Vice-Chancellor heralds from the Green Party. The gas "embargo" has forced him to swallow principles and allow an increased use of coal. Habeck increased the gas emergency warning system and drew parallels with the Lehman crisis for the energy sector. 

It is with this backdrop that the Swiss National Bank felt obligated to hike its deposit rate by 50 bp last Thursday (June 17). The euro had been trading comfortable in a CHF1.02 to CHF1.05 trading range since mid-April. Judging from the increase in Swiss sight deposits, the SNB may have intervened in late April and early May. However, in recent weeks there was no "need" to intervene and sight deposits fell for four consecutive weeks through June 17. The euro traded at three-and-a-half week lows against the franc yesterday, trading to CHF1.0070 for the first time since March 8. In fact, the Swiss franc is the strongest of the major currencies this week, rising about 1.15% against the dollar and about 0.75% against the euro.

The German IFO survey of investor confidence weakened again but did not seem to impact the euro. The assessment of the business climate slipped (92.3 from 93.0). This reflected the mild downgrade of existing conditions (99.3 from 99.6) and the sharper drop in expectations (85.8 vs. 86.9). This is the most pessimistic outlook since March, which itself was the poorest since May 2020. The euro remains within the range seen Wednesday (~$1.0470-$1.0605). It closed near $1.05 last week. There are options for almost 1.2 bln euros that expire there today but have likely been neutralized. Assuming the euro holds above there, it will be the first weekly gain since the end of May. Par for the course today, sterling is also trading quietly in a narrow half-cent range above $1.2240. If it closes above there, it too will be the first weekly gain in four weeks. Sterling's range this week has been roughly $1.2160 to $1.2325. The US two-year premium over the UK has risen for the Monday and is now around 110 bp, up from about 88 bp in the first part of the week.

America

Bloomberg's survey of 58 economists produced a median forecast of 3.0% for Q2 US GDP. Only five of them see growth lower than 2%. The median has it remaining above 2% in H2 before slowing to what the Fed sees as long-term non-inflationary growth of 1.8% throughout next year. The market does not share this optimism. The shape of the Fed funds and Eurodollar futures curve suggests investors sees the Fed breaking something sooner. Given where inflation is, it is hard to take seriously talk about the Fed front-loading tightening, what it is doing is catching up. But monetary policy impacts with notorious lag, and as several Fed officials have acknowledged, financial conditions began tightening six months before the first hike was delivered. The Fed funds futures strip has terminal rate around 3.5% by late Q1 23. The first cut priced in for Q4 23.

The US reports May new home sales. There are supply issues that are important here, but it will likely be the fifth consecutive monthly decline. Through April, they were off 30% so far this year. New home sales stood at 591k (saar) in April. At the worst of the pandemic, they were at 582k in April 2020. The University of Michigan survey was specifically mentioned by Fed Chair Powell at his press conference following the FOMC's decision to hike by 75 bp. The final report is rarely significantly different than the preliminary report, but it cannot help by draw attention.

Mexico's central bank unanimously delivered the widely expected 75 bp hike in its overnight rate to take it to 7.75%. It was the ninth hike in the cycle that began last June for a cumulative 375 bp. The move followed slightly firmer than expected inflation in the first half of this month (7.88%) and stronger than expected April retail sales. The key is that it matched the Fed's move. It indicated that it will likely move just as "forcefully" at its next meeting in August. The swaps market has almost another 200 bp more of tightening this year. Banxico also revised its inflation forecast. Previously, it saw inflation peaking in Q2 22 at 7.6% and now it says the peak will be 8.1% in Q3. It has inflation finishing the year at 7.5%, up from 6.4%. Separately, reports suggest the US is escalating complaints that President AMLO's energy policies, favoring the state companies, violates the free-trade agreement.

The US dollar rose a little more than 3.5% against the Canadian dollar in the past two weeks as the S&P 500 tumbled nearly 11%. With today's roughly 0.25% pullback, the greenback doubled its loss to 0.50% this week, and the S&P 500 is up about 3.3% this week coming into today. The macro backdrop for the Canadian dollar looks constructive:  strong jobs market, better than expected April retail sales reported this week and firmer May price pressures. The market 70 bp hike priced in for the July 13 Bank of Canada meeting. The year-end rate is off four basis points this week to 3.41%. In comparison, the US year-end rate is off about 13 bp this week to about 3.44%. The US dollar is off for the sixth consecutive session against the Mexican peso. The peso is the strongest currency in the world this week, leaving aside the machinations of the Russian rouble, with a 1.8% gain, including today's 0.2% advance through the European morning. The greenback frayed support around MXN20.00 yesterday for the first time in nearly two weeks. It is spending more time below there today with a move to MXN19.96. A convincing break of the MXN19.94 area could signal a move toward MXN19.80. There is a $1 bln option expiring at MXN20.00 today, and the related hedging may have weighed on the dollar. 


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